' MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J.---Through this appeal, with the leave of the Court, the legality of an order recorded by Service Tribunal of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, dated February 19, 1995, has been called in question, whereby the appeal filed by the appellant herein against the Order of the High Court issued under No, 6521-48/HC/91, dated June 6, 1991, was dismissed.
2. The dispute between the parties relates to the seniority of judicial officers who at the present moment are of the rank of District and Sessions Judges. According to the appellant he was initially appointed as Law Drafting Officer on March 8, 1972. He was therefore, appointed and transferred as Sub-Judge vides order, dated August 19, 1973. The appellant was relieved by the Law Department on December 11, 1973. Kh. Iftikhar Hussain Butt and Raja Nazir Ahmed Khan respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were appointed as Sub-Judges, while Mirza Zaid Ullah respondent No,5 was appointed as Registrar High Court on ad hoc basis for six months on September 9, 1973. These respondents were confirmed vide order, dated June 8, 1976, on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission. The appellant herein made two representations, the first one on November 5, 1978 and the other on March 15, 1979, for fixation of inter se seniority of the contesting Sub-Judges.
3. On October 12, 1979, the Deputy Registrar of the High Court addressed a communication to Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Kayani which reads as follows:-- "While inviting your attention towards your representation dated November 5, 1978, and March, 15, 1979, pertaining to the subject noted above, I am directed to say that these representations were placed before the Judges who in their meeting held on October 10, 1979, have been pleased to decide as under:-- ' Decided that since under the provisions of K.S.R. Seniority is to be determined from the date of his first appointment to such service or class or category about which the question has arisen and Mr. Kayani having joined as Sub-Judge on December 11, 1973, his plea for fixation of seniority as Sub- Judge from the date of joining Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government as Law Drafting Officer, on March 8, 1972, is devoid of force, and therefore, rejected' ."
4. Dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Kayani, appellant, filed an appeal before the Government on July 8, 1979. This appeal was rejected on June 3, 1981, by a short order of the Government. Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Kayani, the appellant herein, then filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal on June 24, 1981 praying therein that the order of the High Court, dated April 10, 1979, whereby the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 were declared senior to him may be set aside so as to declare Mr.Ashraf Kayani as senior to the three other Sub-Judges and that NPS-18 may be granted to the appellant with effect from October 30, 1978, at least.
5. The appeal was decided by the Service Tribunal on October 16, 1985, and the relief granted by Service Tribunal may be summarized as follows:--
(A) Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Kayani appellant was declared to be the senior most among the four contesting Sub-Judges, on the ground that seniority begins from the date of first appointment and not from the date of joining;
(B) Order granting Grade-18 to Mirza Zaid Ullah and Raja Niaz Ahmed Khan during the pendency of the appeal before the Service Tribunal, ' was set aside and instead it was granted to Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Kayani with effect from November 17, 1984;
(C) It was held that the period spent as ad hoc appointee counts towards seniority if it is so ordered and this benefit was, therefore, validly given to the three Sub-Judges;
(D) It was held that Mirza Zaid Ullah had been wrongly given benefit of the period during which he was working as Registrar of the High Court so far as his seniority as a Sub-Judge was concerned; and
(E) The order passed on February 17, 1979, by which selection grade i,e, NPS-18 has been sanctioned in favour of Mr. Iftikhar Hussain Butt was kept intact on the ground that the same has not been challenged by Mr. Kayani in his appeal before the Service Tribunal.
6. Against this order all the four contesting Judicial Officers, with the leave of the Court, filed appeals in this Court, raising pleas of their different grievances. One of us (Mr. Justice Basharat Ahmad Shaikh) after discussing the whole law on the subject vide order, dated May 16, 1989, observed in the concluding part of the judgment in the following manner:- ' The upshot of the foregoing is that:--
(A) Civil Appeal No,22 of 1986 "Raja Muhammad Ashraf Kayani v. The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government and 4 others" is dismissed.
(B) Civil Appeal No,23 of 1986 "Mirza Zaid Ullah and another v. Raja Muhammad Ashraf Kayani and 3 others" is accepted and the following orders of the Service Tribunal forming part of the judgment under appeal are set aside, namely, orders:--
(i) declaring respondent No, 1 Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Kayani senior to the appellants Mirza Zaid Ullah and Raja Niaz Ahmed Khan; and
(ii) granting NPS-18 to the said respondent with effect from November 17, 1984, and consequential adjustment.
(C) Civil Appeal No, 24 of 1986, "Kh. Iftikhar Hussain Butt v. Mr.Muhammad Ashraf Kayani and 4 others" is accepted so that the following orders of the Service Tribunal shall stand vacated:--
(i) that respondent No, 1 Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Kayani was senior to the appellant Kh. Iftikhar Hussain Butt; and
(ii) Grant of NPS-.18 to the said respondent with effect from November 17, 1984.
(D) Status goo ante as it existed before judgment under appeal shall be restored.
7. It was observed by this Court that while determining the seniority of the judicial officers the relevant provision to be made applicable would be section 30(2) of the Laws Code Act. At page 50 of the judgment it was observed as under:-- "I may pause here and add that section 30(2) of the Laws Code appears to be a legislation of somewhat unusual nature. Normally the seniority of a person in Government service is fixed on the basis of length of service while qualification, past experience and some other factors are taken into consideration at the time of recruitment. Other factors mentioned in this provision of law, for instance, honesty and efficiency are considered at the time of promotion. But the provision in hand has made all these factors to be the basis of seniority. However, the will of the law maker has to prevail and the Courts, being the creation of law, cannot arrogate to themselves the functions which ar entrusted to the law-maker or to question the wisdom of law. As it is the law as enacted by the law maker which in the present context is section 30(2) of the Laws Code which had to be administered for the determination of the seniority of judicial officers."
8. In view of the aforesaid dictum of this Court, the High Court determined the seniority of the parties with the approval of the Government and declared respondents Nos.3 to 5 senior to the appellant. The appeal filed by the appellant in the Service Tribunal was dismissed. Hence this appeal.
9.Arguing the case on behalf of appellant, Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, the learned counsel, submitted that the High Court did not determine the seniority of the contesting parties in accordance with the provision of section 30(2) of the Courts and Laws Code of 1949 (hereinafter to be referred as Laws Code) and the only consideration that weighed with the High Court was the date of appointment of a particular judicial officer and the other factors such as past experience, duration of service under the Government, qualification, efficiency and honesty were ignored, rendering the impugned judgment into a nullity. It was argued that order passed by the High Court was telegraphic in nature as the same is not supported by reasons. The learned counsel vehemently submitted that in the meeting of judges wherein the matter of seniority was determined Justice Kh.Muhammad Saeed also participated who was ineligible to participate, on account of being counsel for one of respondents, (Mr. Iftikhar Hussain Butt) in the previous round of litigation and thus this Act, had seriously prejudiced the case of appellant, whereas Justice Ch. Sher Zaman who was senior most Judge of the High Court at the relevant time was not associated in the meeting. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, had Justice Ch. Sher Zaman participated in the meeting, the outcome would have been different. The learned counsel pressed into service the submission that the orders granting selection grade to respondents Nos.3 to 5 prior in time than the appellant have no legal sanction and validity for the simple reason that those were granted without the approval of the Selection Board. The learned counsel maintained that the High Court did not apply its mind in a judicial manner, while determining the seniority of judicial officers and based its verdict on extraneous considerations, which were totally alien to the provisions of Laws Code.
10. Controverting the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, Sardar Rafique Mahmood Khan, the learned counsel for respondents Nos.3 to 5, fully supported the impugned judgment recorded by the Service Tribunal. The learned counsel argued that in accordance with the direction given by this Court vide its order, dated May 16, 1989, the competent Authority i,e, the High Court determined the seniority of the judicial officers keeping in view the necessary requirements mentioned in subsection (2) of section 30 of Laws Code. The learned Judges of the High Court, as it depicts from the order itself on the basis of which the seniority was determined, were fully alive to the requirements of section 30(2) of Laws Code. The seniority list Exh. P.C. Also indicates that the High Court in exercise of its powers under section 30(2) of the Laws Code with the approval of the Government has determined the seniority of the judicial officers. The High Court also being a Court of supervisory jurisdiction and having control over all the Courts subordinate to it, in performance of its function as superintendence and control was fully aware of the efficiency, quality of judgments, reputation and experience of all the judicial officers and these matters were taken into consideration to asses the comparative traits of subordinate judicial officers. The record of all the judicial officers was in the High Court, all these facts are suggestive of the conclusion that the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court were fully alive to various factors for determining the seniority of the judicial officers particularly when they had the judgment of Supreme Court before them. Sardar Rafique Mahmood Khan also submitted with vehemence that by participation of Mr. Justice Kh. Muhammad Saeed in the meeting of the Judges wherein the matter of seniority was decided did not in any way prejudice the case of appellant, nor it has been so agitated in the memorandum of appeal by the appellant. Had the question of seniority been only between the contesting parties, the factum of participation of Justice Kh. Muhammad Saeed in the meeting would have made some difference or at least some apprehensions would have arisen in the mind of the appellant but the fact of the matter was that in the meeting held by the Honourable Judges of the High Court over all seniority of about 24 judicial officers was determined by the High Court and the case of 2 or 3 individuals was not considered by the Judges. The learned counsel maintained that by participation of Justice Kh. Muhammad Saeed in the meeting of the Judges, no bias has been caused to the appellant. In the alternative the learned counsel submitted that the High Court under section 5 of Laws Code consists of the Chief Justice and three or more Judges and since the seniority has been determined by three Judges besides the Chief Justice, the High Court was complete for the purpose. The minimum number of the Judges fixed under relevant law is three. As regard the non-participation of Justice Ch. Slier Zaman the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is based on mere assumption. Even if Justice Ch. Sher Zaman had joined the meeting, the result would have been the same. The learned counsel pressed into service the submission that respondents Nos. 3 to 5 were granted NPS-18 earlier than the appellant and these orders still hold the field as they were not challenged by the appellant before the Service Tribunal or any competent forum. In the end Sardar Rafique Mahmood Khan, the learned counsel, for respondents Nos. 3 to 5 sought permission of the Court to argue a legal point to the effect that appellant while assailing the judgment of the High Court, dated June 6, 1991, whereby the seniority of judicial officers was determined, did not implead the High Court as one of the respondents in the appeal filed before the Service Tribunal, thereby entailing its dismissal on this score alone. To elaborate his point of view the learned counsel submitted that in the instant case the competent Authority which determined the seniority of the contesting judicial officers was the High Court and under the rule known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1976, it was!' mandatory for the appellant to implead the High Court as the real respondent n the appeal before the Service Tribunal. In stead of impleading the High Court as respondent in the appeal, the appellant impleaded Registrar of the High Court as respondent in the said appeal. The Registrar of High Court cannot be a substitute for the High Court. The High Court being a necessary party should have been impleaded as real respondent in the appeal and the failure on the part of the appellant entailed the dismissal of appeal. The learned counsel submitted that if a necessary party is not impleaded in a proceeding the appeal becomes incompetent and this being purely a law point can be allowed to be raised at any time. Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, the learned counsel for the appellant, in rebuttal maintained that the order was issued in the name of Registrar High Court so the Registrar was impleaded as one of the respondents in the appeal filed before the Service Tribunal. Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan also submitted that it would have been strange enough to implead the Judges of the High Court as respondents because there is no practice as such to implead the Judges of the High Court in the category of respondents.
11. We have heard very lengthy arguments on behalf of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record made available with care. The last point which was raised by Sardar Rafique Mahmood Khan, the learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 with the permission of the Court in our opinion goes to the root of the case. It is indeed a law point and it has been the consistent practice of this Court to allow a law point to be raised at any time if the same does not need any detailed investigation. However, the general rule is that the point should be raised in the appeal or the concise statement. It is true that the point has not been raised in the memo of petition for leave to appeal nor in the concise statement but in many reported cases the absence of a necessary party was noted by the Court itself and without the point being raised the writ petition or appeal was ordered to be dismissed on that ground. We will be referring to some cases on this point subsequently.
12. The precise contention of Sardar Rafique Mahmood Khan is that in the instant case the competent Authority which determined the seniority of contesting judicial officers was the High Court. Rule 8 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1976 provides as under:-- "In every memorandum of appeal, the competent Authority shall be shown as the first respondent and thereafter, all other parties to the dispute shall be shown as respondents."
According to the above said rule it was a fundamental requirement that the appellant should have impleaded the Honourable Judges of High Court as respondent in the appeal filed before the Service Tribunal but the appellant to do so. Instead of impleading the Judges of High Court, he impleaded Registrar of the High Court as one of the respondents. Registrar of the High Court cannot be a substitute for the High Court itself. According to our considered view Rule 8 appears to be a mandatory rule and its violation entails the dismissal of appeal. To meet the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant it may be stated that it is not unusual or somewhat strange to implead the Judges of the superior judiciary as respondent in a particular legal proceeding where the impugned order purports to have been passed by them. There is a plethora of citations on the subject wherein the learned Judges of superior judiciary were arrayed as respondents but we only quote few instances to substantiate our view point. In the case reported as Ch. Sardar Ali, Advocate v. Hon'ble Judges of the Lahore High Court (PLD 1956 SC (Pak) 274), the brief facts were that Ch. Sardar Ali, Advocate was engaged by one Miss Bhagmal, Christian, resident of Gahkhar, on behalf of her brother Subedar Rahmat Ullah, who had appointed her as his special attorney to file a civil appeal in the High Court at Lahore against the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Gujranwala. The said Advocate received Rs,100 as fee for filing the appeal and Rs, 32-8-0 as copying and court-fee expenses, but did not file any appeal in the High Court nor refunded the fee to the lady. Proceedings for professional misconduct were initiated against Ch. Sardar Ali, Advocate and the West Pakistan High Court suspended the appellant Ch. Sardar Ali from was challenged by Ch.Sardar Ali in the Supreme Court of Pakistan whereby the Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan were impleaded as respondents. The Supreme Court of Pakistan vide its majority decision accepted the appeal filed by Ch. Sardar Ali and set aside the order passed by the Lahore High Court. In the case reported as Syed Ahmad Hussain v. Chief Justice and Judges of the West Pakistan High Court (PLD 1961 SC 162), the appellant Syed Ahmad Hussain was originally a resident of Maler Kotla State of India. He was a graduate and had passed the examination in law prescribed in the said State. He was enrolled as a Pleader in 1936, and was later admitted as an Advocate of the High Court of Maler Kotla in the year 1940. He migrated to Pakistan after independence and settled in Montgomery. In 1948 he was granted a Pleader's Certificate and practiced as such pleader for over four and half years and then applied to be enrolled as an Advocate of the Lahore High Court. His application was granted and a certificate of enrolment dated November 19, 1953, was issued under the signature of Deputy Registrar purported to have been issued by the High Court. The Administration Committee of the High Court in 1956, arbitrarily cancelled the said certificate. The appellant made various representations, however, ultimately the High Court refused his prayer and maintained that his certificate had been cancelled after considering all the relevant facts. Against this order of the High Court, the appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court with the leave of the Court and impleaded Chief Justice and Judges of West Pakistan High Court as respondents in the appeal. The appeal filed by the appellant was accepted and the impugned order was set aside. In the case reported as Syed Akhlaque Husain v. Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan (PLD 1961 SC 431). The brief facts were that Syed Akhlaque Husain became permanent Judge of the West Pakistan High Court in October, 1955. Before he became permanent Judge of the High Court he had given an undertaking in the following words:-- "I undertake as a condition of appointment that I will not after retirement practice in the High Court to which I am appointed or to which I may be transferred or in any of the Courts subordinate thereto."
' Appellant Syed Akhlaque Husain remained Judge of the Lahore High Court until 1959, when upon a reference and a report made under Article 169 of the late Constitution, the President removed him from that office. A Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan sitting at Karachi directed that appellant would not be permitted to appear in the High Court as an Advocate or in any Court subordinate to the High Court. The appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan and impleaded Judges of High Court of West Pakistan as respondents, however, the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court. In the case S.M. Haq v. Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore (PLD 1953 Federal Court 247). Mr. S.M. Haq, an Advocate enrolled as such in the Federal Court as well as in the High Court of Judicature at Lahore filed an appeal against an order passed by the Lahore High Court suspending him from practice as an Advocate of that Court for a period of 3 months in exercise of the powers vesting in that Court under clause (8) of its Letters Patent. The said Advocate acting as senior counsel for the appellants in an appeal before the Federal Court against a judgment of the High Court including the written grounds of appeal to the Federal Court, raised two grounds viz. (i) that the Hon'ble Judges were not legally justified in accepting the suggestion of the Crown for the re-examination of Dr. Moonis in appeal. This step was taken to fill up a gap in the prosecution case as well as to justify another judgment of the High Court which was reversed by the Federal Court. (ii) That the remarks of the Honourable Judges betray a lack of the knowledge of elementary principles bearing on the administration of criminal justice. The above grounds in the opinion of learned Judges of the Lahore Court constituted contempt of that Court and the Advocate was suspended from practice as said earlier. Against aforesaid order of the Lahore High Court Mr. S.M. Haq filed an appeal in the Federal Court and impleaded the Hon'ble Judges of the High Court as respondents in the appeal. In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal was allowed and order under appeal was set aside. In case Shahnaz Begum v. Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan (PLD 1971 SC 677), the precise facts were that a criminal case was enquired into and under investigation by the police.
The incident had created a sort of sensation and the local newspapers not only gave this incident considerable publicity but also highlighted its sensational aspect, propounded their own speculations and even suggested that the investigation ran the risk of interference by the accused, said to be connected with highly placed personages. A senior Judge of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan reading the newspaper reports thought it fit to take action suo motu in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction to call upon the Inspector-General of Police to produce before him all investigation papers relating to the case so that he may examine if the conduct of the investigation has been fair or impartial or the ends of justice require that further investigation of this case be entrusted to any other officer or a Court of law. The order of the High Court was impugned in appeal before the Supreme Court, wherein the Judges of High Court of Sindh and Balochistan were impleaded as respondents. It was held by Supreme Court of Pakistan that the impugned action of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan in the case was unwarranted and beyond its jurisdiction. Similarly in the case Hakam Qureshi, President, District Bar Association, Lahore and 2 others v. The Judges of the Lahore High Court (PLD 1976 SC 713), the three appellants therein and Sh. Shaukat Ali, Advocate were found guilty of contempt of the High Court of Lahore, in that case they along with certain other Advocates organized procession and placards with inscriptions tending to undermine the authority and dignity of the High Court were displayed and slogans of like tendency were shouted. The three appellants contested the proceedings but were found guilty and sentenced to four months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs,1,000 each or two months simple imprisonment in lieu of the fine. Sh. Shaukat Ali, initially contesting the proceedings, entered a plea of unqualified apology. The High Court accepted his apology and sentenced him to imprisonment till the rising of Court and fine of Rs,1,000 or two months simple imprisonment in lieu thereof. The appellants filed an appeal against the order of Lahore High Court in the Supreme Court and 'the learned Judges of the Lahore Court were arrayed in the category of respondents. The order recorded by the High Court was maintained by the Supreme Court.
13. The requirement that the competent Authority be impleaded as a party is analogous to a similar requirement in writ petition. The basic requirement of law in exercise of writ jurisdiction of High Court is that if an order of a public functionary has to be challenged in the High Court through a writ petition that functionary must be impleaded as a party. Similarly if a direction or prohibition is sought against a public functionary that functionary is a necessary party without which neither a writ petition is maintainable nor an effective order can be passed. Requirement of law in dealing with service matters is that if an order adversely affecting the interest of a particular party has been passed by a competent Authority, that authority must be impleaded as real respondent in an appeal before the Service Tribunal. Service Tribunals Act and the rules framed thereunder are special statutes and a specific provision being provided in the rules i,e, rule 8, any party being found guilty of violation of the rules is not entitled to any relief and the appeal filed by that party without impleading the competent Authority as respondent, the same becomes incompetent.
14. In the case reported as Muhammad Resham Khan v. Chairman, Inspection Team and 3 others 1990 CLC 1355, the precise facts were that Muhammad Resham Khan was allotted certain evacuee land situate at Rawalakot. The allotment from his name was cancelled by the Inspection Team set up by the Government. The writ petition filed by Muhammad Resham Khan, challenging the order of cancellation of allotment failed in the High Court. Muhammad Resham Khan appellant filed an appeal in the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir with the leave of the Court. Among other things one important aspect of the case was that it was noticed by the Supreme Court that Inspection Team was not impleaded as a party. The relevant observations made by the Court appearing at page 43 of the report are reproduced for the sake of convenience:- "Apart from that I have noticed that the Inspection Team was not impleaded as party. The parties in the writ petition were (i) the Chairman of the Inspection Team, (ii) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government, (iii) Mst. Fatima Bi, (who claims to be in possession of the disputed land) and (iv) The Secretary of the Inspection Team, while the order has been passed by the Inspection Team. It is elementary requirement that in a writ petition the Government or the person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the State whose order is challenged should be made a party."
' It may be pointed out here that the point with regard to non-impleading of Inspection Team in the above case was not raised in the High Court or before the Supreme Court but during the hearing of the case the omission was noted by the Supreme Court itself and the above verdict was recorded.
In the case of Mirza Lal Hussain v. Custodian of Evacuee Property 1992 M LD 1280, almost a similar type of proposition came under the consideration of the Court. In that case one of the public functionaries was not impleaded in the writ petition but this point was not raised before the High Court. The point was not included in the petition for leave to appeal filed in the Supreme Court nor was it taken in the concise statement. In spite of that the objection was upheld. The following portion of the judgment would show the reasons:- "13. Another point of fundamental importance was raised by Mr. Abdul Ghafoor Qureshi that Rehabilitation Commissioner, Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner and Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner had not been made a party in the writ petition although the orders passed by them were sought to be quashed. On this point the view of this Court has been expressed in the cases reported as Muhammad Resham Khan v. Chairman, Inspection Team and 3 others 1990 CLC 1355 and Abdul Hamid v. Muhammad Zameer 1990 M LD 1617 these judgments support Mr. Qureshi's contention.
14. This point was not raised before the High Court and has not been raised in concise statement filed in this Court, but once it has been brought to our notice the question is whether we should pass an order behind tee back of a Government functionary without hearing him. I am quite clear in my mind the answer to this question has to be in negative. If a necessary party is absent there can be no adjudication. The situation in the aforementioned case was also the same and in fact this point was noticed by the Court itself. Therefore, the writ petition filed by Mirza Lal Hussain can be dismissed on that score alone."
There is a long chain of authorities on the point discussed above. In the unreported cases Rahat Saeed Bukhari and another v. Sadia Shah and another (decided on 17-5-1995), Syed Muhammad Akram Shah and others v. Chairman, Allotment Committee and others and Professor Sarfraz Khan Choudhary v. Chairman, Allotment Committee and others (decided on 24-7-1995).
15. According to our considered view Rule 8 of Service Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1976 is a mandatory requirement of law that the competent Authority is a necessary party which must be impleaded in the category of respondents. If we read the above-quoted Rule with Rule 28 the inevitable conclusion that follows is that without arraying the competent Authority as respondent, neither the appeal was competent nor any effective order could have been passed. Rule 28 of Rules of 1976 may be reproduced:- "A copy of every order of final adjudication on an appeal shall be furnished by the Tribunal, free of cost, to the competent Authority and the said authority shall forthwith give effect to it."
The above Rule is clearly connected with Rule 8. A combined reading of both these Rules makes it clear that in absence of impleading the competent Authority as a patty to the proceedings, neither an effective order could have been passed nor order of final adjudication could have been implemented. Since the Hon'ble Judges of the High Court who determined the seniority of the parties were not impleaded in the category of respondents in their absence no effective order could have been passed by the Service Tribunal. Had the learned Judges been arrayed as respondents, they would have been in a better position to join the proceedings initiated by the appellant and submitted their written statement in reply to the allegations made in the memorandum of appeal by the appellant. More important is that in the absence of the competent Authority from the line of respondents no effective order can be passed by the Service Tribunal or by this Court on appeal. The defect in our opinion is fatal and appeal, filed by the appellant becomes incompetent and hence liable to be dismissed on this score alone. Having disposed of the appeal on the aforesaid ground we did not deem it appropriate to dilate upon the other points raised by the learned counsel for the parties.
16. In the aforesaid circumstances the appeal filed by appellant, being incompetent is dismissed with no order as to costs.