BASHARAT AHMAD SHAIKH, J.---The above-noted two appeals relate to the same property. There is a fundamental legal question which is common in these appeals, and a factual point is also interconnected. Therefore, these two appeals are being decided by this single judgment.
2. Facts common to both the appeals are that Allah Ditta was owner of the land in dispute situated in village Trar, Tehsil Rawalakot, but it was in occupation of occupancy-tenants who were non- Muslims. Allah Ditta initially put up a case that the occupancy-tenants surrendered their tenancy in 1946 AD and handed over possession to him. The other view, which has so far prevailed, is that the occupancy tenants actually left Azad Jammu and Kashmir due to war of liberation and thus they became evacuees and resultantly the land in dispute became evacuee property. Treating it as evacuee property the land in dispute was allotted separately to Muhammad Afsar Khan, respondent in both the appeals, and to Gulab Din who has passed away meanwhile and is now represented by his heirs Mst.Razia Begum- and Mst. Shareen Akhtar who are respondents in C.A.
No,148 of 1999. The original owner, Allah Ditta, is also no more and his legal representatives are Muhammad Akram and others. They are respondents in both the appeals. In due course of time Mst. Razia Begum and Mst. Shareen Akhtar obtained proprietary rights and sold part of the land to Muhammad Ashraf Khan, a respondent in C.A. No,148 of 1999. Muhammad Afsar Khan has also obtained proprietary rights.
3. Facts of Civil Appeal No,147 of 1999 are that appellant Muhammad Ibrahim filed an application before the Custodian of Evacuee Property on 6th March, 1996 in which he prayed that allotment of evacuee land measuring 57 Kanals 16 Marlas out of the land in dispute may be cancelled from the name of Muhammad Afsar, respondent No,3, and it may be allotted to him (Muhammad Ibrahim) as a refugee. The application was moved under section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act, section 18-B read with section 43(6) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957. Appellant Muhammad Ibrahim is a refugee from occupied Poonch and resides in Rawalakot. He stated that Muhammad Afsar Khan is a local and, according to the official record, a report by Tehsildar Custodian, he was owner of 77 Kanals of private land. It was stated that land belonging to Muhammad Afsar Khan was in the Army use for which rent was being paid to him. He further stated that Muhammad Afsar also owned some more land. It was stated in the application that allotment in favour of Muhammad Afsar Khan was illegal because only refugees, dependents of Shaheeds, local destitute and disabled persons were entitled to get allotment of evacuee land. It was stated that Muhammad Afsar Khan did not fall in any of these categories. It was also averred that Muhammad Afsar Khan was a senior teacher in the Education Department and retired from service on 1st December, 1980 from which it was clear that he had reasonable income. During arguments before the Custodian it was argued that allotment in favour of Muhammad Afsar Khan was violate of Council Order No,25/60. It was argued that the Custodian enjoyed wide powers which may be exercised for cancelling the allotment and the Provisional Rights Transfer Order issued in favour of the said respondent. Cases reported as Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government and another v. Hakim Bashir Ahmad and others (1992 SCR 81) and Azmatullah and another v. Ali Bahadur and another (1996 CLC 254) were cited before the Custodian. It was further prayed that the respondent may be ordered to pay rent for the period from l%5 to 1996 for use of the evacuee land.
4. The application was dismissed by the learned Custodian. It was held that Muhammad Ibrahim was neither in occupation of the disputed land nor was he its allotted, therefore, he could not be termed as an aggrieved person and thus could not file the petition. The Custodian also dealt with the question relating to Muhammad Afsar Khan's entitlement as local destitute and held that objection was previously raised and was rejected by the Custodian who had held that he was a destitute. The details of the order were however not mentioned. It was then observed that in another file, bearing No,16, the learned Custodian had reaffirmed that Muhammad Afsar Khan was a destitute. The learned Custodian therefore, held that this matter now could not be reconsidered once again. The learned Custodian also mentioned that Muhammad Akram and others had also taken the case to the High Court in which they had challenged the claim of Muhammad Afsar Khan that he was a local destitute but this objection had been rejected. It was observed that the matter could not re-examine due to the decision of the High Court in Muhammad Akram's case. It was observed by the learned Custodia that Muhammad Afsar had been forcibly dispossessed from his land so that it could be utilized for Army purposes. At the same time the learned Custodian observed that no person could be allotted land on the basis that his own land was in use of the Army and rehabilitation authorities should not continue with this practice and allotment must be made in accordance with the Rehabilitation Act. It was further observed that there was no other manner in which evacuee land could be allotted to anyone. However the learned Custodian thought that it was not proper to cancel the allotment of Muhammad Afsar Khan because in that case he would suffer irreparable loss. It was observed that upsetting status quo after such a long time would not advance the ends for which rehabilitation laws were made. In the ultimate analysis the learned Custodian recorded a statement of Muhammad Afsar Khan that he would deposit the money which he had received as rent/compensation from the Army authorities and in return allowed him to retain possession of the allotted land. Muhammad Afsar Khan also stated in the statement that he preferred the allotted land. It will be useful to reproduce the operative portion:-- - "Since evacuee land could not be legally allotted to the respondent and allotment was made in peculiar circumstances. Thus respondent is unable to utilize both the lands which fact had been admitted by the respondent in his statement. Therefore, all the amount which the respondent has received as compensation from the military shall be deposited by him in the Custodian fund within two months. Manager Custodian shall receive the rent/compensation under reference and shall deposit it in the Custodian fund and in future also the compensation to be received would be regularly deposited with the Manager Custodian. In case the respondent fails to do so Manager will have the right to move for cancellation of evacuee land measuring 57 Kanals, 16 Marlas which stands allotted to the respondent.
In these circumstances the review petition is dismissed. If any stay order has been issued it shall stand cancelled."
5. Muhammad Ibrahim filed a writ petition to challenge the order passed by the Custodian which has been dismissed. We will advert to the contents of the High Court judgment a little later. He was granted leave to appeal by this Court.
6. The learned counsel for respondent Muhammad Afsar Khan, Mr.M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, has raised a preliminary objection that Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner, Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner and Rehabilitation Commissioner were necessary parties but were not arrayed as respondents in the writ petition. It was contended that these rehabilitation authorities had allotted the land to the respondent and orders passed by them could not be cancelled by the High Court unless they were arrayed as respondents in the writ petition. Mr.M.Tabassum Aftab Alvi cited Mirza Lal Hussain v. Custodian of Evacuee Property and others 1992 SCR 214 and Abdul Hamid Khan v.
Muhammad Zameer Khan and others 1990 M LD 1617 in support of his contention.
7. We do not find any force in this objection. Section 18-B of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957 confers wide powers on the Custodian which are free from technicalities. Prior to the insertion of section 18-B of -the Administration of Evacuee Property Act the scheme of rehabilitation laws was that normally the allotment of evacuee property was made by the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner and an appeal was maintainable before the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner. A further remedy was also available before the Rehabilitation Commissioner. Finally Custodian of Evacuee Property could hear revisions against allotment and cancellation of allotment etc. In the scheme of things as it existed at that time, an order of allotment would become final if it was not challenged before the higher forum within the prescribed time. However when it was decided to grant proprietary rights to the allottees and provision for it was made by inserting section 18-A in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957, section 18-B was also enacted to give powers to the Custodian of Evacuee Property to cancel any allotment of evacuee property for the reason, inter alia, that it had been made in violation of law and without jurisdiction.
This power was exercisable without any limit of time. It was also not necessary that an application be moved for getting an allotment cancelled and thus the Custodian was given suo motu powers.
Relevant portion of section 18-B is as follows:-- "18-B.---(1) Notwithstanding anything contained contrary in any other law, for the time being in force, and without prejudice to the generality of the powers which already vest in him, the Custodian may cancel any allotment of evacuee property in the following cases:--
(a) Where an allotted has failed to comply with the terms and conditions of allotment within the meaning of section 18 of the Act;
(b) where an allotted has, to the satisfaction of the Custodian, voluntarily surrendered or abandoned the allotment;
(c) where the allotment has been made in violation of law or is without jurisdiction;
(d) where the evacuee property stands allotted to more than one person and it is necessary to determine the entitlement to allotment;
(e) where an allotment is in excess of the prescribed scale and it is necessary to bring the allotment within scale in order to confer proprietary rights in accordance with law, upon such allotted. The Custodian shall exercise the powers of Multiple Judge under the Multiple Allotment Act, 1961, in cases processed or being processed for the grant of proprietary rights."
8. Appellant Muhammad Ibrahim moved the application before the Custodian under the provision of law reproduced above. Since power was exercisable suo motu no technicalities were involved. It was not necessary to implead the rehabilitation authorities who had made or confirmed the order of allotment in favour of the respondent. Muhammad Ibrahim through his application laid information before the learned Custodian and it was for the Custodian to examine the legality of the allotment order in favour of respondent Muhammad Afsar Khan. The only requirement was that notice had to be issued to the allotted before passing any final order. The learned Custodian entertained the case, summoned respondent Muhammad Afsar Khan and decided it in the manner which has been described above. When the appellant filed a writ petition he challenged the order of the Custodian and no other order. He duly impleaded the Custodian as a respondent and there was no requirement beyond it because the order passed by the Custodian was in original jurisdiction and not in revisional jurisdiction, therefore, the rehabilitation authorities were not necessary parties in the writ petition.
9. Now we come to the merits of the case. From the portion of the judgment reproduced above it is clear that the learned Custodian himself was of the view that the allotment in favour of respondent Muhammad Afsar Khan was not legal but he did not cancel the allotment on the ground that it was not proper to disturb status quo after such a long time. This is clearly unlawful. Section 18-B reproduced above reopened allotments which were made as far back as forty years and it was clearly the intention of law that illegal allotments may be cancelled even though those had become final. Therefore, the learned Custodian had no authority to say that status quo may not be disturbed only because long time had elapsed. We fail to understand as to how in presence of section 18-B a purely illegal allotment could vest any right in the respondent so that the illegality may be perpetuated. The learned Custodian also failed to appreciate that the so-called status quo was entirely favorable to the respondent because he was enjoying the fruits of the evacuee land and also was getting compensation from the Army Authorities for his own land which means that he was getting double benefit. Admittedly the respondent was not covered by Government Order No,25/60 issued under section 7 of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act, as in force in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, which lays down that locals who are dependents of "Shaheeds", disabled persons and destitute could be granted allotment of evacuee land in addition to the refugees from Occupied Kashmir. The learned Custodian also observed that Muhammad Akram's case was still pending in the High Court and that it was not appropriate to decide the question whether Muhammad Afsar Khan was a local destitute or not. We fail to appreciate as to how the case pending in the High Court was relevant. The question before the Custodian was whether the allotment in favour of Muhammad Afsar Khan had been made in violation of law or was without jurisdiction. Any other decision was not relevant because the finality attached to orders passed in appeal or revision by the Rehabilitation Authorities or the Custodian prior to enactment of section 18-B were taken away by the aforesaid section. It was an overriding provision and was meant to give special powers irrespective of limitation, res judicata etc. The learned Custodian then passed the order, reproduced above, that compensation paid by the Army Authorities will be deposited in the Custodian fund and the allotment shall continue. The learned Custodian failed to appreciate that the order which he passed was also not covered by any provision of law and, apart from being novel in nature, was void abs initio.
10. Thus the order passed by the learned Custodian should have been set aside by the High Court.
The High Court brushed aside the matter by saying that there was no distinction between a refugee and a local and if a local was disturbed by the State or due to natural calamity he can be settled on evacuee property. The learned Judge in the High Court has not quoted the provision of law on which the view taken by him is based. We are not aware of any other legal instruments except Council Order No,25/60 which enables a Rehabilitation Authority to allot evacuee land to a local. We are only cognizant of Government Order No,25/60 which deals with locals so far as allotment of evacuee land is concerned but it does not make any provision that evacuee property may be allotted to persons who may be disturbed by the State or by natural calamity.
11. The High Court has mentioned that the case filed against allotted Muhammad Afsar by Muhammad Akram, appellant herein, had already been dismissed by the Supreme Court. The High Court file contains certified copy of an order by which two writ petitions titled Muhammad Akram v.
Custodian of Evacuee Property and others being Writ Petition No,12 of 1994 and Writ Petition No,12 of 1995 were dismissed in limine on 14th November 1995. In that order there is no verdict about the legality of allotment in favour of respondent Muhammad Afsar Khan. Facts relating to that case need to be noticed. Allah Ditta, the original owner, moved review petitions before Custodian of Evacuee Property praying that the allotments in favour of Muhammad Afsar and Gulab Din and the subsequent Proprietary Rights Transfer Orders may be cancelled but this application was rejected.
Order passed by the Custodian was challenged before the High Court by filing writ petitions being Writ Petition No,12 of 1994 and Writ Petition No,12 of 1995. Both the writ petitions were dismissed in limine. In one writ petition Muhammad Afsar was a respondent while in the other writ legal representatives of Gulab Din, Muhammad Akram and others, were amongst the respondents. The High Court took the view that in light of section 22 of the Rehabilitation Ordinance, 1952 and sections 8 and 10 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957, all rights, including occupancy rights, which vested in the non-Muslims had become vested in the Custodian. The High Court, therefore, took the view that allotment and proprietary rights were valid acts. This Court set aside the order of the High Court by holding that occupancy rights of evacuees vested in the Custodian but law did not provide that where evacuees were occupancy-tenants the ownership rights of Muslim landowners would be extinguished. We noted that documents attached with the writ petition showed that heirs of Allah Ditta were still entered in ownership column, in light of-this fact it was observed as follows:- "The question therefore arises as to whether the heirs of Allah Ditta have ceased to be owners of the land. If the answer is in negative then how property rights have been granted to the respondents. This controversy has not been resolved by the High Court."
' We, therefore, remanded the case to the High Court after setting aside the High Court order dated 14th November, 1995. The judgment of this Court was rendered on 7th July, 1996.
12. In the judgment under appeal the High Court has referred to the judgment of the High Court dated 14th November, 1995 but, as mentioned above, it was set aside on 7th July, 1996 by this Court and the case was remanded. On remand the High Court has decided the case afresh vide judgment of a Division Bench rendered on 31st May, 1999. The High Court has held that heirs of Allah Ditta continue to be the owners of the land but Muhammad Afsar Khan will be treated as occupancy-tenant. This judgment was subject-matter of appeal in Civil Appeal No,148 of 1999 titled Muhammad Akram and others v. Custodian of Evacuee Property which is being disposed of by this judgment. The judgment of the High Court is attached as Annexure "B" in the said file. Its perusal shows that, apart from points mentioned above, the High Court did not deal with the merits of the case as to whether the allotments in favour/ of Muhammad Afsar Khan and Gulab Din were valid or not. Thus we reached the conclusion that the question of legality of allotment in favour of Muhammad Afsar was not determined in the earlier round of litigation. Thus this reason recorded by the High Court is also not sustainable.
13. Even otherwise we do not think that the application moved by Muhammad Ibrahim before the Custodian of Evacuee Property for cancellation of allotment was in any way barred because another application was pending or had been disposed of. As already seen the Custodian of Evacuee Property has wide suo motu powers which are exercisable at any time to set aside an illegal order of allotment. The Custodian also enjoys wide powers under section 43(6) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957 under which he can review earlie r decisions to grant proprietary rights if he reaches the conclusion that it was based on an illegal allotment order. If any authority is needed we may refer to Azmatullah and another v. Ali Bahadur and another 1996 CLC
254. Therefore, it is clear that the learned Custodian failed to give effect to the clear legal provisions by not cancelling Muhammad Afsar Khan's allotment after having himself reaching the conclusion that it was illegal. Similarly the High Court also fell in error in upholding the order passed by the learned Custodian.
14. Therefore, we accept the appeal filed by Muhammad Ibrahim C.A. No,147 of 1999 and set aside the judgment of the High Court. For the same reasons writ petition filed by the appellant herein is accepted and the order passed by the learned Custodian of Evacuee Property on 1st August, 1997 is declared to have been passed without lawful authority and of no legal effect. A direction is issued to the learned Custodian to pass an order of cancellation of allotment made in favour of Muhammad Afsar Khan and also to cancel the Proprietary Rights Transfer Order issued in his favour.
15. Appellant Muhammad Ibrahim himself is not entitled to any relief in respect of allotment of disputed land in his favour because powers of allotment are vested in the Rehabilitation Authorities who will consider his application for allotment in light of the relevant laws. However they will treat the case of Muhammad Ibrahim on priority basis in view of his long struggle which is evident from the record.
16. Now we take up Civil Appeal No,148 of 1999 titled Muhammad Akram and others v. Custodian of Evacuee Property and others. The present round of litigation was initiated by Muhammad Akram, the original owner's son, on 22nd July, 1990 when he filed an application under section 18-B read with section 43(6) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957 praying for cancellation of allotment and Proprietary Rights Transfer Order standing in the name of Muhammad Afsar Khan. It was stated in the application that initially Allah Ditta and after his death his heirs were owners for the land in dispute and it could not be legally allotted to respondent Muhammad Afsar Khan. It was also stated that in any case the proprietary rights could not be granted to him. It was further stated that Muhammad Afsar Khan was a local who owned more than 52 Kanals of land which was under the use of Army and Muhammad Afsar Khan was getting rent for it. It was stated that land could only be allotted to local if his case is covered by Council Order 25/60 but Muhammad Afsar's case did not fall under the said Order. The report of Enforcement Staff against Muhammad Afsar was attached with the petition. The petition was dismissed by the learned Custodian, but its date is not available from the present record although an undated certified copy forms part of the paper books as Annexure J. The learned Custodian referred to the earlier decisions of the Additional Custodian and the Civil Court to repel the contention that non-Muslim occupancy-tenants had abandoned the land in their possession before the war of liberation. The learned Custodian also referred to some documents filed by Muhammad Akram and also give a separate finding that there was no proof in support of the allegation that the occupancy tenants had abandoned their tenancy by handing over the possession to the landowner. It was further held that the Proprietary Rights Transfer Order issued in favour of Mst. Razia Begum and Mst. Shareen Akhtar, the legal representatives of allotted Gulab Din, conferred only those rights which vested in the non-Muslim occupancy-tenants and that the allotted would retain possession of the land in dispute as occupancy-tenants as was the case of the non-Muslim occupancy-tenants. The learned Custodian also rejected the plea that Muhammad Afsar Khan was not entitled to allotment of evacuee land because he was not covered by Government Order 25/60. It was pointed out that the Custodian of Evacuee Property had held in his order passed on 4th April, 1979 that Muhammad Afsar Khan was a local destitute. After dismissal of his petition, Muhammad Akram filed two writ petitions in the High Court on 3rd November, 1994 bearing No,12 of 1994. Other heirs of Allah Ditta were subsequently added on 31st July, 1997.
17. Muhammad Akram also filed a similar application against the other allotted Gulab Din. It was moved on 22nd July, 1990 before the learned Custodian of Evacuee Property graying that the portion of the land in the ownership of Allah Ditta which had been allotted to Gulab Din may also be cancelled and Proprietary Rights Transfer Order may also be recalled. At that time Gulab Din had died and Mst. Razia Begum and Mst. Shireen Akhtar, his legal representatives, as well as subsequent transferee, Muhammad Ashraf Khan, were impleaded as respondents. This application was rejected on 29th March, 1995. The learned Custodian held that the land in dispute had been declared evacuee which matter could not be reopened. It was argued before the learned Custodian that when land was allotted to Gulab Din he was not in its possession and it was also pleaded that the allotment in his favour did not in fact exist because it had been maneuvered through forgery. These pleas were rejected. The order of the learned Custodian was also challenged by filing a writ petition bearing No,12 of 1995 on 4th June, 1995.
18. Writ Petition No,12 of 1994 and Writ Petition No,12 of 1995 were dismissed in limine by a single order on 14th November, 1995. Muhammad Akram and others brought appeal to this Court which was accepted on 7th July, 1996 and the case was remanded to the High Court. It will be useful to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment:- "After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we have reached the conclusion that the High Court was not right in dismissing the writ petition in limine. A perusal of the three provisions of law relied upon the High Court shows that occupancy rights of evacuees have been vested in the Custodian but it is not provided in these provisions that evacuees were occupancy tenants the ownership rights of the Muslim land owners would be extinguished.
' The documents attached with the writ show that name of Allah Ditta is still entered in ownership column. The question therefore, arises as to whether the heirs of Allah Ditta have ceased to be owners of the land. If the answer is in negative then how proprietary rights have been granted to the respondents. This controversy not been resolved by the High Court it may be noticed that occupancy tenants were declared entitled to get ownership rights of property held by them after fulfilling certain requirements which were prescribed under the Land Reform Act. To resolve the controversy mentioned above provisions of Land Reform Act have also to be examined."
19. Both the writ petitions have been disposed of by a single judgment. There are two aspects of both the cases which have been decided. First it has been decided that land in dispute is evacuee property and this question had already been decided in the previous round of litigation. However, it was clarified that the land was evacuee only to the extent of the interest which was held by the occupancy tenants who had now become evacuees. Consequently, it was held that the allotted will be treated as occupancy tenants while heirs of Allah Ditta shall continue to be owners of the land. The petitions were accepted to that extent. The second aspect of the case related to the validity of the allotment orders in favour of the allotted. The High Court has upheld the allotments of Muhammad Afsar Khan and Gulab Din.
20. Muhammad Akram and others have filed the present appeal with leave of the Court to challenge the consolidated judgment of the High Court. They have prayed that they are the owners of the land allotted to Gulab Din and Muhammad Afsar Khan and are entitled to its possession in the capacity as rightful owners. They have prayed that direction may be given that they may be put in possession. They have also prayed that the loss occurred to the appellants due to dispossession as well as the cost of litigation, may be compensated. They have also challenged the allotment orders in favour of Muhammad Afsar Khan and Gulab Din. About Gulab Din it is stated that "a gypsy was not entitled to allotment of land of which the status was yet to be determined". About Muhammad Afsar Khan they have raised the same points which have been mentioned above, i,e,, that he is a local not covered by Council Order No,25/60 as he is owner of landed property and also because he had other source of income as a teacher.
21. We have heard Sardar Muhammad Siddique Khan in support of this appeal. The respondents were represented by Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, Mr.M.Tabassum Aftab Alvi and Mr.Farooq Hussain Kashmiri Advocates.
22. We first advert to the status of the land in dispute. As has been repeatedly mentioned Allah Ditta Khan was owner of the land in dispute and it was in occupation of non-Muslims as occupancy-tenants. On the factual side the appellants have been trying to prove during approximately for five decades that the occupancy tenants did not become evacuees but they had already ahandoned their tenancy by handing back the possession of Allah Ditta. This claim has been rejected a number of times by different Courts and Tribunals. This claim was reiterated before the learned Custodian in the present round but this plea has been rejected once again. This question is purely factual in nature. The finding that the non-Muslims were in occupation as occupancy-tenants till the war of liberation is a finding of fact which, being recorded by a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction, is sacrosanct. There is nothing on the record to disprove this finding. In fact overwhelming evidence is available on the record which leads to the conclusion that the finding of fact recorded by the learned Custodian is unassailable.
23. Legal aspect of the stand concluded by judgment of this Court in Civil Appeal No,111 of 1998 reported as Abdul 1-lamid Khan v. Ghulam Ahmad Khan 1999 YLR 2440 it was decided on 30th June, 1999 a few days after the judgment under appeal. It was a case in which the owners of the land were Muslims while occupancy tenants were evacuees. The following points have been decided in the said judgment:---
(a) Since occupancy tenants had interest in the property falling under this category, it is evacuee property but to the extent of interest of the evacuees;
(b) Muslim owners continue as owners of the land falling in this category and they shall continue to be so as long as the present laws are in operation;
(c) Land falling in this category can be allotted under the Rehabilitation Law; and
(d) Allotted of such land shall be entitled to keep possession of the land and would not be entitled to obtain proprietary rights.
24. The learned counsel for the parties have not been able to show that the view taken in the above-noted case needs to be reviewed. We, therefore, reiterate the views stated therein. The principles laid down therein would be applicable to the present case also.
25. While dealing with Civil Appeal No,147 of 1999 titled Muhammad Ibrahim v. Custodian of Evacuee Property and others we have taken the view that allotment in favour of Muhammad Afsar Khan was illegal and we have directed the learned Custodian of Evacuee Property to cancel the allotment as well as the Proprietary Rights Transfer Order standing in favour of Muhammad Afsar Khan. Therefore, we need not record separate findings about the legality of the allotment and Proprietary Rights Transfer Order in favour of Muhammad Afsar Khan.
26. So far as the all mint of Gulab Din is concerned nothing substantial has been shown to create any doubt in the validity of the aforesaid allotment. Therefore, the allotment in favour of Gulab Din shall stand intact, subject to the succeeding observations.
27. In light of Abdul Hamid's case the allotment in favour of Gulab Din shall only be to the extent of possession and would not form the basis of proprietary rights. Allan Ditta's successors-in-interest, Muhammad Akram and others, would continue to be the owners of the land in dispute as loans as the present laws are operative. Therefore, the Proprietary Rights Transfer Order issued to Mst. Razia Begum and Mst. Shireen Akhtar are cancelled from the date of issue: Consequently, the transfer made in favour of Muhammad Ashraf Khan shall become inoperative. He will however continue to remain in possession on behalf of Mst. Razia Begum and Mst. Shireen Akhtar as long as the present laws are in operation.