KH. MUHAMMAD NASIM, J.---The titled appeal by leave of the Court has been directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 06.09.2019, whereby , the writ petition filed by the petitioner , herein, has been dismissed in limine.
2. The facts of the case briefly stated are that the appellant, herein, filed a writ petition in the High Court, alleging therein, that the land comprising survey numbers 13, 18, 30, 33, and 36, measuring 28 Kanal, 12 marla, situated at village Sohatar along with survey Nos. 1022, 1022/1, 2013, measuring 04 marla, situated at Muzaf farabad was allotted to father of the appellant, herein, through allotment permit dated 29.05.1955. After demise of the father of the appellant, his sons, i.e. the brothers of the appellant moved an application before the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner (ARC) and got allotted the land in question secretly vide allotmen t permits dated 09.04.1969 and 03.11.1969, as legal heirs of the father of the appellant, Muhammad Shafi (late). Thereafter they also got issued the proprietary rights transfer order (PRTO) in their favour on 28.11.1992. It was further alleged that the appellant, herein, being a housewife has neither got any knowledge of the proceedings regarding allotment in favour of her brothers nor she knew about any official affairs. It was stated that after getting the knowledge of the allotment made in favour of her brothers, the appellant filed a review petition before the Custodian of Evacuee Property , on 10.03.201 1. The learned Custodian dismissed the review petition filed by the appellant vide judgment dated 08.06.2015. Feeling dissatisfied, the appellant, herein, filed a writ petition in the High Court against the aforementioned judgment of the learned Custodian. The learned High Court after hearing the preliminary arguments dismissed the writ petition in limine vide impugned judgment dated 06.09.2019, which is the subject matter of the captioned appeal by leave of the Court.
3. Mrs. Bilqees Rasheed Minhas, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant argued the case at some length and stated that the land in question was allotted to her father Muhammad Shafi (late) vide allotment permit dated 29.05.1955, being a refugee. After his death, the brothers of the appellant got allotted the land in question vide allotment permits dated 09.04.1969 and 03.11.1969. Thereafter , they got issued proprietary rights transfer orders
(PRTO) in their favour on 28.11.1992. The. learned counsel further argued that being daughter of Muhammad Shafi (late), the appellant, herein, was included in his family at the time the allotment was made in his favour and after his death she was also entitled to get the share from the allottee's property being a legal heir but the Courts below fell in error of law while not considering this fact and dismissed the review petition and the writ petition on the point of limitation. The learned Advocate further argued that the question of limitation is a mixed question of facts and law which cannot be resolved without recor ding the evidence but this important aspect of the case has not been considered by the Courts below , hence, impugned judgments are liable to be set aside. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to and relied upon the cases reported as [2017 YLR 1895 ], [2016 SCR 358], [2013 SCR 262], [2007 SCR 540] and [2005 SCR 80] , in support of her version and prayed for acceptance of the appeal.
4. While controverting the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Shahid Ali Awan and Syed Meher Ali Shah Bukhari, Advocates, the learned counsel for the respondents have defended the impugned judgments and stated that the same are perfect and legal. The learned Custodian has decided the review petition on the ground of limitation as well as on merits. The learned counsel further argued that under Rule 17(3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Rules, 1950, the limita tion for filing review petition before the Custodian is 30 days, whereas, in the instant case the review petition was filed on 10.03.201 1, after a period of 42 years against the allotment permits and after 20 years against the proprietary rights transfer orders (PRTO), therefore, the same was hopelessly time barred. They further submitted that neither any sufficient explanation was furnished in the review petition nor any separate application was filed for condonation of such a huge delay , hence, the impugned judgments of the Courts below are in accordance with law. The learned counsel referred to and relied upon the cases cited as [2020 SCR 296], [2019 SCR 339/394], [2017 SCR 1485], [2016 SCR 90] and [2015 SCR 1229], in support of their version and prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
5. We have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the partie s and have perused the record with utmost care. A perusal of the record reveals that the appellant, herein, on 10th March, 2011, filed a review petition before the learned Custodian of Evacuee Property against the proprietary rights transfer order (PRTO) issued on 28.11.1992 and the allotment permits dated 09.04.1969 and 03.11.1969. The appellant, herein, alleged that, the land in question was allotted in favour of Muhammad Shafi (late), the father of the appellant on 29.05.1955. After the demise of Muhammad Shafi (late), the brothers of the appellant, herein, namely Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Mushtaq obtained allotment permits and thereafter got issued the proprietary rights transfer orders (PRTO) in their favour . The appellant, herein, being daughter of Muhammad Shafi (late) was also entitled to get share of the allotted land. The appellant, herein, challenged the allotment permits and the proprietary rights transfer orders (PRTO) after a period of almost 42 years and 20 years, respectively , therefore the Custodian of Evacuee Property by way of review petition. The learned Custodian dismissed the review petition on the ground of limitation as well as on merits of the case vide judgment dated 08.06.2015. Being dissatisfied, the appellant, herein, filed a writ petition before the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court which was dismissed in limine vide impugned judgment dated 09.06.2019.
6. The limitation for filing review petition before the Custodian of Evacuee Property has been provided under Rule 17(3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Rules, 1950, as 30 days. The appellant, herein, in para 9 of the review petition has stated that the impugned allotment permits and proprietary rights transfer order (PRTO) came into her knowledge a week ago but no specific date has been mentioned that as to how she acquired the knowledge of the same. The appellant, herein, neither filed any affidavit in support of this para nor filed a separate application for condonation of delay . It is a settled principle of law that a party seeking the condonation of delay has to satisfactorily explain the delay of each and every day but in the instant case, the appellant, herein has failed to furnish any such explanation, thus, the review petition filed by the appellant, herein, before the Custodian was hopelessly time barred. The learned Custodian has rightly dismissed the same on the ground of limitation besides on merits and the learned High Court has rightly maintained the judgment passed by the learned Custodian. In a such like case reported as Mehmood Ahmed v. Custodian and 10 others [2016 SCR 901], wherein, this Court in para 6 of the judgment has observed as under:- "6. The limitation for filing review petition under Rule 17(3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Rules, 1950, is 30 days. In the review petition, the petitioner , appellant herein, has not uttered a single word that he was not in knowledge of the Proprietary Rights Transfer Order and allotment and as to when he acquired the knowledge of the order impugned in the review petition. The appellant also has not made any request for condonation of delay , rather nothing has been stated in respect of the limitation in the review petition that how and when, the petitioner acquired the knowledge of allotment and Proprietary Rights Transfer Order issued in favour of respondent No.3. The review petition was hopelessly time barred, it merited dismissal on the sole ground."
The same proposition came under cons ideration before this Court in the case reported as Makhan Jan and 5 others v. Custodian of Evacuee Property , Azad Jammu and Kashmir and 2 others (2001 CLC 1149) whereby , it was observed as under:- "9. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel of the appellants that the Administration of Evacuee Property Rules, 1950, which prescribe limitation of 30 days for filing a review petition to the Custodian are not adopted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir is fallacious and is hereby repelled. So far as the authorities referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants are concerned, only authority reported as Muhammad Ibrahim v. Custodian of Evacuee Property Azad Jammu and Kashmir Muzaf farabad and 2 others [2000 YLR 2367 ] has some indirect bearing on the question of limitation in case of a review to the Custodian. It may be observed that the point was not directly involved in the aforesaid judgme nt as to whether there is any limitation prescribed for filing of review petition or not. The observations in the said judgment to the effect that Custodian could suo motu cancel the allotment after he found the same illegal despite the fact that substantial period had elapsed after the order of allotment, cannot be interpreted to mean that there was no period of limitation prescribed for filing a review petition to Custodian under section 43(6) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. On the contrary , this Court in an unreported judgment titled Khawaja Ghulam Qadir v. Custodian of Evacuee Property Azad Jammu and Kashmir (Civil Appeal No.10 of 1992 decided on 02.11.1992), referred to above, has held that limitation for filing review petition to the Custodian was 30 days from the date of its order and thus it was held that order of the High Court cancelling the allotment of Khawaja Ghulam Qadir and another was barred by limitation and consequently this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court.
10. So far as the question of condonation of delay in the instant case is concerned, the delay has not been condoned by the Custodian and he has dismissed the review petition as being time barred. It is evident even from the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellants that discretion exercised by the Custodian one way or the other , is not ordinarily to be disturbed by this Court even otherwise the case of the appellants with regard to the absence of their knowledge cannot be accepted in view of the fact that they being residents of the same village and thus it is improbable that they were ignorant of the allotment of proprietary rights transfer order in favour of the respondents, especially so when there has been multiple litigation about the same before the Custodian which came upto this Court."
7. So far as, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the orders of allotment permits and proprietary rights transfer order (PRTO) are void orders and there is no limitation for challenging the void orders, is concerned, has no substance because the appellant has failed to point out that how the allotment permits and proprietary rights transfer order (PRTO) are void orders and if the appellant is successful in establishing the fact that the same are ab initio void orders, then too, the appellant should have challenged the same within a reasonable time. This Court in the case reported as Mirza Lal Hussain v. Custodian of Evacuee Property and others [1992 SCR 214], has already held that a ID void order has to be challenged within a reasonable time. It was observed in para 1 1 of the judgment as under:-
11. No case having been made out of condonation, we now pass on to the other limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the order of allotment in favour of Abdul Aziz was void on account of the fact that it had been passed during the subsis tence of a previous allotment order made in his favour . The contention of the learned counsel is that a void order has to be struck down without regard to limitation. The case cited by the learned counsel for the appellant have already been mentioned. These judgmen ts do lay down the proposition canvassed by Ch. Muhammad Sharif Tariq that there is no limitation so far as a void order is concerned. However , it is not a universal rule which may be necessarily applied in every case without regard to the consequences. While this rule would apply to cases where a person who is adversely affected by such an order does not come to know of is existence and has had no occasion to challenge that order there is no warra nt of the conclusion that a void order should be left unchallenged. If a person comes to know of a void order which adversely affects him but still he does not challenge it within a reasonable time the Courts may validly refuse to ignore it on the ground of laches, acquiescence or estoppel. In this connection I would do no better than to reprodu ce the following observations of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Sharif Ahmed Hashmi's case which has been rightly relied upon by Mr. Abdul Ghafoor Qureshi: `This passage does not mean that a void order is always to be struck down regardless of the consequences of such a decision but that a void order must be struck down provided there is no statute or principle of law which would make it unjust or inequitable to strike down the void order . This qualification is very important, and that is why, for example, a writ may be refused against a void order this would enable the petitioner to circumvent the provisions of a statute of limitation. [See this Court's judgment in Civil Appeals 150 and 166 of 1970 Jalal-ud-Din and others v. Mst. Noor Sain and others) and(Jalal-ud-Din and others v. Shamas-ud-Din and others ) respectively . Similarly , in Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1964 SC 829) a writ petition had been filed against an order which this Court held was void. Nonetheless the writ petition was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by acquiescence on the part of the petitioner . There is also ample authority for the proposition that a writ against a void order may be dismissed. If the petitioner is estopped by his conduct from challenging it, or if he has been guilty of laches.
8. The allotment permits and proprietary rights transfer order (PRTO) were issued on 09.04.1969, 03.11.16969 and 28.11.1992, respectively . The review petition before the Custodian was filed against the aforementioned orders on 10.03.201 1 after a period of almost 04 and 02 decades, respectively , and no sufficient explanation was furnished for filing the review petition at a belated stage. Thus, the review petition was hopelessly time barred. There is no illegality in the order passed by the Custodian as well as the High Court, hence, calling for no interference.
9. The case law referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant having distinguishable facts are not applicable to the case in hand, need not to be discussed.
For the above stated reasons, finding no force in this appeal, the same is, hereby, dismissed. Nor order as to costs.