IHSAN-UL-HAQ CHAUDHRY, J.-- The relevant facts for the decision of this First Appeal are that the respondent purchased a portion of Property No. SW-107-R-5/B situated in Qutab Road, Hadhast Village Sheesh Mahal. Lahore, from Mian Rafique vide sale-deed registered on 10.1:1995 for a total considerations of Rs. 3,00.000/-. The appellant tiled suit on 14.5.1995 for possession in exercise of superior right of preemption. The suit came up for hearing before the Trial Court on 15.5.1995 when it proceeded to direct the plaintiff to deposit I/3rd of the sale price i.e. Rs. 1,00,000/- within 30 days from the date of the order. The appellant subsequently moved application under section 151, C.P.C.
On 11.6.1995. It was prayed that instead of depositing the cash the plaintiff may he permitted to invest the amount in a profit hearing scheme. The application was granted vide order dated 11.6.1995. He was allowed to purchase Defence. Saving Certificates in the name of the Court. The appellant, accordingly, purchased the Defence Saving Certificates on 12.6.1995 and deposited the same in the Trial Court on 14.6.1995. The respondent tiled the written statement. The Trial Court accordingly framed issues. The plaintiff had examined three witnesses when on 12.9.1998 the respondent moved an application under Section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), wherein it was prayed that the plaintiff faired to deposit the 1/3rd of the sale price in cash as required by Section 24 of the Act, therefore, suit was liable to he dismissed. The application was dismissed by the Trial Court vide order dated 15.9.1998, which was assailed through C.R. No. 156/98. The same was accepted by this Court vide judgment dated 2.10.1998 and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court to decide the application afresh .In the light of the observations made in the judgment. The Trial Court, this time, accepted the application vide order dated 25.11..1998. The result was that the suit was dismissed. Now this first appeal. Which was admitted to hearing and notice was issued to the respondent, who has appeared and contested the appeal.
2. The matter came up for final hearing before the learned Division Bench, which requested the Hon'hle Chief Justice for constitution of a Full Bench as, inter alia following legal questions of public importance were involved:- What is the legal value of the order of the Trial Court dated 15.5.1995 whereby the plaintiff was directed to deposit 1/3rd of the sale price within 30 days firom.The date of the order whereas the statute provides for a maximum period of 30 days from the date of institution of the suit:
(ii) Whether the purchase and deposit of Defence Saving Certificate under the order of Court and in the name of the Court, in the given circumstances, was compliance of the provisions of section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991: and
(iii) Whether a litigant should suffer for void orders of Court passed in violation of the proviSions of section 24 of the Punjab Pre- emption Act, 1991."
The Hon'ble Chief Justice constituted this Bench for decision of the appeal.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the date of order was to be excluded while working out the time of 30 days for deposit of 1/3rd of the sale price. In this behalf, he referred to Section 8 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 and relied on Muhammad Yousqf and 3 others Vs. Zafarullah and another (P.L.J. 1992 S.C. 41). It was argued that the appellant was ready with the cash and purchased the Defence Saving Certificates in the name of the Court as per order of the Court, therefore, it was a valid deposit. It was added that according to section 3 read with Section 32 of the Act, the suit was to he decided in accordance with Quran and Sunnah. Therefore, Section 24 of the Act was to be interpreted beneficially and equitably. In this behalf learned counsel referred to The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lahore Vs. Messrs Crescent Textile Mills Ltd. (PLD 1992 S.C. 41). It was argued that this Court while accepting the revision petition had directed the Trial Court to decide the application under section 24 of the Act moved by the defendant afresh keeping in view following points:-
(a) Whether the Court could substitute the order of deposit in cash with investment in Defence Saving Certificates when the law requires deposit in cash?
(h) Whether the initial as well as subsequent order requiring deposit in cash or investment in Defence Saving Certificates within 30 days from,the date of the order instead of 30 days from the date of institution of suit were without jurisdiction?
(c) Whether the Court had committei an error and can act of the Court prejudice anyone?
(d) If the maxim that act of the Court shall prejudice no man would apply, keening in view the rule laid down in PLD 1990 SC 859, then can the Court enlarge the time for deposit beyond the statutory period?
It was complained that the Trial Court while deciding the application did lot attend to these points.
This vitiated its judgment. It was argued that the learned Trial Court itself admitted at least at four places in the impugned judgment that the Trial Court committed an error yet, proceeded to accept the application. It was argued that the application was belated as it was moved after 39 months, when evidence of the plaintiff had already been partially recorded, therefore, it amounted to acquiescence. It was added that no party can be made to suffer for an act of Court. In this behalf, reliance is placed on the judgments.' In the cases of Mehdi Khan Vs. Faqir Muhammad and 4 others (PLD 1980 Lahore 110), Ghulam Haider. And others Vs. Mst. Raj Bharri and others (PLD 1988 S.C. 20), Muhammad Hanif and others Vs. Muhammad and others (PLD 1990 SC 859), Fateh Khan Vs. Boze Mir (PLD 1991 SC 782), Abdul Rashid Vs. Abdul Salam and others (1991 SCMR 2012), Muhammad Yousaf and 3 others Vs. Zafarullah and another (PLJ 1992 SC 41), Naseer Ahmad Vs. District Judge, Multan and 4 others (PLD 1992 Lahore 92), Jamshaid A.I and 2 others Vs. Ghulam Hassan (1995 CLC 957), Muhammad Nawaz and others Vs. Muhammad Sadiq and another (NLR 1995 Civil 446), The State Vs. Asif Adil and others (1997 SCMR 209), Shakir Ullah Khan and 2 others Vs. Madad Khan Oraskazai and others (1998 SCMR 324), Haji Gul Nabi Vs. Mst. Sahib Jamala (1994 SCMR 845), Habibullah Khan Vs. Amir Zaman (1995 SCMR 135), Rashid Ehsan Vs. Bashir Ahmad (PLD 1989 SC 146) and Dost Muhammad Vs. Muzaffar Khan (1995 MLD 1038).
4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent argued that the appellant committed two day delay in deposit of 1/3rd of the sale price. It was added that the order of the Court can not over-ride a provision of law. It was explained that three terms in section 24 of the Act were important namely 'date of institution'; ' within 30 days'; and 'cash'. The Trial Court rightly accepted the application moved by the defendant under section 24 of the Act in view of the clear provision. It was added that repugnancy cannot be attributed to the legislature. It was added that repugnancy cannot be attributed to the legislature. In this behalf, reference is made. To Haji Rana Muhammad Shabbir Ahmad Khan Vs. Government of Punjab Province, Lahore (PLD 1994 SC 1). It was argued that the Act of 1991 is valid law, therefore, should be followed strictly. In this behalf, reference is made to Muhammad Ismail Qureshi and others Vs. Government of Punjab end others (PLD 1991 FSC 80). It was added that the Court has no suo mote power to extend the time. In this behalf, reference is made to Awal Noor Vs. District Judge, Karak and 8 others (1992 SCMR 746). It was argued that if the order was invalid or not strictly in accordance with law then the plaintiff should have complied with the provision of law. In this behalf, reliance is placed on Haji Janat Gul Khan Vs. Haji Faqir Muhammad Khan and 4 others (PLD 1993 SC 204), Qadir Bakhsh Vs. Muhammad Ashraf and others (1998 SCMR 1289). It was added that the Civil Judge could not enact law. It was argued that General Clauses Act is not relevant for the decision of the appeal arising out of the suit for pre- emption. In this behalf, reliance is placed on Ghulam Mustafa Vs. Muhammad Shafi (1998 CLC 1327).
It was added that Sections 3 and 32 of the Act were not attracted to the present controversy which should he decided in accordance with the provisions :A' the Act. Learned counsel has also placed reliance on Sakhi Muhammad Vs. Munshi Khan (PLD 1992 SC 256), Muhammad Ismail Vs. Jamil-ur- Rehman (1995 MLD 1011), Muhammad Rafique Vs. Hassan Bakhsh (1993 CLC 622), Mehhoob Khan Vs. Sher Buz Khan (1993 CLC 1939), HO Abdul Qadir Vs. Zafar Shaheen (PLD 1997 Lab. 549), Mst. Wafa Jan Vs. Muhammad (1995 CLC 2002) and Ghulam Qadir Khan Vs. Ahmad Nawaz Khan (1994 CLC 1118).
5. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments and gone through the record, relevant provisions of law and precedent cases relied on behalf of the parties. The questions for determination have been .Noted in para 2 above of this judgment. The decision of this appeal mainly depends o the interpretation of sub-section (I) of Section 24 of the Act. The same reads as under:- "24. Plaintiff to deposit sale price of the property.-- (1)
Provided that such period shall not extend beyond thirty days of the filing of the suit: Provided further that if no sale price is mentioned in the sale deed or in the mutation, or the price so mentioned appears to he inflated, the Court shall require deposit of one-third of the probable value of the property." (underlining is ours)
It is clear from the above provision that: Firstly the Trial. Court has to pass an order for deposit of 1/3rd of the pre-emption amount: Secondly, it has power to extend the time but such period shall not he beyond 30 days of the filing of the suit; and Lastly, in case the sale price was not mentioned in the sale-deed then it shall require deposit of 1/3rd of the probable value of the property.
6. Ft is clear from the main sub-section that the plaintiff was to deposit 1/3rd of the sale price in compliance with the order of the Court. It excludes the possibility of the deposit of amount by the plaintiff of his own. The provision is harsh, therefore, it has to he interpreted strictly. The first proviso empowered the Court to grant extension in the time for deposit of I/3rd but at the same time curtailed its powers by prescribing the total period of 30 days from the date of institution of the suit.
7. It, theretbre, followed that the Trial Court could extend time if in the first order the time allowed to the plaintiff for deposit of 1/3rd of the sale price was less than 30 days from the date of the suit and not otherwise because that would militate against the proviso and the same will become a dead letter. Redundancy cannot he attributed to the Legislature. Now the question Was whether violation of the two provisions could in the circumstances of the case, entail penal consequence of the dismissal of the suit by invoking sub-section (2) of Section 24 of Act, which read as under:- "(2) Where the plaintiff fails to make a deposit under sub-section (1) within the period fixed by the Court, or withdraws the sum so deposited by him, his suit shall he dismissed." (emphasis suppl ied)
8. In our considered view the reply is in negative for the following reasons :-
(i) If the time fixed by the Court over runs the period prescribed by the Statute, it will not entail dismissal of the suit under Section 24(2) of the Act. It was never the intention of the Legislature. If the matter is taken to its logical end then such an order would not he sustainable in an appeal or revision and fresh order will have to he passed strictly in accordance with the Statute;
(ii) The plaintiff could only make the deposit of I/3rd 'of the sale price under the orders of the Court and not of his own;
(iii) The penalty of dismissal of the suit follows when the plaintiff failed to make deposit within the period fixed by the Court as was clear from sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act; and
9. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that in case it was assumed that the Trial Court was at liberty to fix any period, more precisely even beyond 30 days in the first order, then it would make the sub-section (2) redundant and subordinate to the sub-section (1). We do not agree with this proposition because the cardinal principle of interpretation is that the effort should be made to read the provisions of a statute in harmony with each other and not in isolation.
10. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that it was an act of the Court and the rule was that nobody shall suffer to an act of the Court.
11. Now we refer the following cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his submissions:-
(i) Muhammad Nawaz (Supra).
It is a case where the question of competency of the Appellate Court to extend time for deposit of pre-emption amount was considered. It is, therefore, not relevant to the present controversy.
(ii) Mehdi Khan (Supra)..
It was a case under Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 and Zar Punjam' and deficiency in Court-fee was late by one day without any application for extension. Delay of one day likely to be caused by bona ,fide mistake condoned. Stricto senso it is also not relevant.
(iii) Ghulam Haider (Supra)
It was held with reference to Bhai Khan Vs. Allah Bakhsh (1986 SCMR 849) that the Supreme Court was competent to grant extension of time. This was also with reference to Order XX, Rule 14 (a)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, not relevant.
(iv) Dost Muhammad (Supra)
(v) Haji Gul Nabi (Supra)
(vi) Asif Adil (Supra).
1995 SCMR 584). In this case detailed reasons could not be recorded in support of the short order as the learned Judge was not confirmed. It was held that the litigant cannot be made to suffer.
(vii) Muhammad Hanif (Supra).
(viii) Naseer Ahmad (Supra).
(ix) Abdul Rashid (Supra)
(x) Jamshed All (Supra).
The Trial .Court failed to pass an order for deposit 1/3rd of the sale price in terms of Section 24(1) of the Act. The second appeal was allowed and the plaintiff was allowed to deposit 1/3rd. In fact the order of the Trial Court was found to he beyond the scope of Section 24 of the Act and it was substituted by a fresh order of this Court. The controversy in the case in hand is very close to this precedent case.
(xi) Rashid Ehsan (Supra)
It was held that the rule of actus curiae neminem gravahit comes into play, so as to obviate hardships and which may otherwise be the result of the errors of the Court itself.
(xii) Fateh Khan (Supra)
(xiii) Hahihullah Khan (Supra).
This was again a case for deposit of the balance of pre-emption amount after the decree of the suit, therefore, not relevant. However, with reference to section 3 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1987 it was held that the Court would seek guidance from the Holy Qur'an, Sunnah and Fiqah in terms of Section 33, matters ancillary or akin to the provisions of the Act which have not been specifically covered under any provision thereof, would he decided according to Sharjah.
The judgment in the case of Awal Now was relied.
(xiv) Muhammad Yousqf (Supra).
"This is a case not of enactment or contract, but of an order passed by a Judge. The order will therefore have to he construed as to effectuate the intention of the Court, regard being had to the context and the purposes for which the order was-passed, not overlooking the need of an equitable interpretation desirable in the interest of the person who has to make the deposit and who should be free from any doubt. Now an order of the Court must have some semblance of uniformity with the interpretation which the law would put and equity support in such a case where a time is prescribed for the doing of an act by a statutory enactment. .(See Ramchandra Govind Unavne' case (Supra). Under Section 8 of the Provincial General Clauses Act. For the purpose of uniformity, the same interpretation should be given where a Court's order fixes the date from which a period has to commence. The view of the learned Single Judge is therefore appropriate and correct. His interpretation is also equitable and removes all difficulties that may arise in the way of persons who may be called upon by Courts to make such deposits and find themselves in a dilemma when trying to interpret such orders."
12. Now we refer to the cases relied by the learned counsel for the respondent .
(i) Awal Noor (Supra).
(ii) Qadir Bukhsh (Supra)
The -case is not attracted as the plaintiff failed to deposit the agreed amount.
(iii) Haji Janat Gull Khan (Supra).
(iv) Haji Abdul Qadir (Supra).
The plaintiff had come to the High Court for extension. It was held that as per first proviso to Section 24 of the Act, extension cannot be allowed beyond 30 days.
(v) Ghulam Mustaf (Supra).
(vi) Mst. Wafa Jan and Mehboob Khan (Supra).
(vii) Muhammad Ismail Qureshi and MO Rana Shabbir Ahmad Khan (Supra).
(viii) Ghulam Qadir Khan (Supra).
The case is not relevant as the extension of time was to be without showing sufficient cause.
(ix) Muhammad Ismail (Supra).
(x) Sakhi Muhammad (Supra).
This is a case of rejection of plaint of second suit of pre-emption on the same cause of action, therefore, not relevant.
13. It was clear from the above precedent cases relied by learned counsel for the parties that the nearest cases to the present controversy were the cases of Dost Muhammad and Haji Gul Nabi (Supra). The third judgment, which we have come across was in FAO No. 61 of 1996, decided on 5.5.1999 by one of us (Syed Jamshad A.I, J) wherein it was held after referring to the judgment in Awal Noor, Haji Janat Gul Khan, Mst. Wafajan and Jamshed All (Supra) as under:- "15. None of the cases cited by the parties precisely cover the controversy raised in the present case. In the case of Haji Janat Gul (supra) the first order for deposit of zar-e-soim' over ran the prescribed period of 30 days but its effect was not examined. The ratio in the case of Jamshed A.I etc. (supra) is that the doctrine of contributory negligence does not affect the maxim that the act of Court shall not prejudice any one. It is a case in which even the Court was not mindful of the requirement of Section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 and if, therefore, the pre-emptores were misled, they cannot be blamed even of contributory negligence. The pre-emptores complied with the order of the Court and made the deposit on 20.1.1993, therefore, they cannot be made to suffer for the mistake of the Court."
We may refer, in this behalf, to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in the cases of Sherin Vs. Fazal Muhammad (1995 SCMR 584), Malik Hadayat Ullah Vs. Murad All Khan (PLD 1972 SC 69) and Pakistan Vs. Agro Marketing Corporation Ltd. (NLR 1981 UC 390). It is worthwhile to refer here following passage of the judgment by Lord Denning M.R. In Goldsmith Vs. Sperrings Ltd. (1977) 2 All ER 566, 574), which provides guideline in such matters:- "In a civilized society, legal process in the machinery for keeping order and doing justice. It can be used properly or it can be abused. It is used properly when it is invoked for the vindication of men's rights or the enforcement of justice claims. It is abused when it is diverted from its true course so as to serve extortion or oppression; or to exert pressure so as to achieve an improper end. When it is so abused, it is a tort, a wrong known to the law. The Judges can and will intervene to stop it. They will stay the legal process, if they can, before any harm is done. If they will give damages against the wrongdoer. Sometimes abuse can be shown by the very steps being taken in the Courts.
Further, the ultimate object of all procedural rules is to ensure that there should be a fair trial according to law; the fair trial is not all one-sided; it means fairness to both the parties."
14. It is interesting to record here that in the first instance the objection was only a to failure to deposit 1/3rd of the pre-emption amount in cash but subsequently the objection as to the failure to deposit the same within 30 days from the date of institution of the suit was also introduced during the arguments. We have held that the plaintiff had complied with the order of the Court, therefore, the application of the plaintiff u/S. 24 of the Act, 1991 was liable to he dismissed.
15. The next legal argument in respect of compliance of the order passed under Section 24 of the Act, canvassed before the Trial Court was that the amount should have been deposited in cash and not in the form of any security. The background of the objection as noted in the earlier part of this judgment was that the Trial Court on 15.5.1995 directed the petitioner to deposit 1/3rd of the sale price i.e. Rs. 100,000/- within 30 days from the date of the order of the Court. The appellant/plaintiff subsequently moved an application u/S. 151, C.P.C. On 11.6.1995 with the prayer that instead of depositing the cash the plaintiff may be allowed to deposit the amount in profit bearing scheme for the benefit of the party who ultimately succeeded. The application was allowed by the Trial Court vide order dated 12.6.1995. The relevant portion of the order read as under:- ....... The application is supported by an affidavit. In my view the prayer is genuine, justified and in the interest of justice. Let the plaintiff purchase Defence Saving Certificates of the said sum of Rs.
1,00,000/- in the name of the Court and produce them for placing in the file in a sealed cover by the target date, as given in the order dated 15.5.1995. This disposes of the application in hand."
The order was complied with and the Defence Saving Certificates were placed on the file on 14.6.1995. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the suit having been instituted on 14.5.1995, 30 days period expired on 12.6.1995, therefore, deposit of Defence Saving Certificates on 14.6.1995 was neither compliance of law nor the order of the Trial Court and, thus, the suit was liable to be dismissed.
It was next argued that the date 15.5.1995, on which the order was passed would be excluded while computing the period of 30 days. The controversy is not relevant in view of findings recorded by us.
16. It was clear from the record that the plaintiff had money in his hand on 12.6.1995. He went to the Post Office and purchased the Defence Saving Certificates in the name of the Court, meaning thereby that the money was there and its investment was regularized by the Court in its own wisdom. We have asked the learned counsel for the parties that if the amount was deposited in the Court on 12.6.1995 and then invested in the Defence Saving Certificates whether there could be legally on objection from any side. We did not get any satisfactory reply from either side.
17. We should not be understood to say that the Trial Court could pass orders recklessly and without reference to the provisions of law but we are definite that on the basis of any faulty and wrong order the plaintiff cannot be made to suffer. The cases are not lacking where illegal orders under Section .13(6) of the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance were passed and the tenant failed to comply with the same but in view of the void order the defence of the tenant was not struck off. The learned counsel for the appellant has rightly referred to the cases as noted above, particularly the cases of Asif Adil, Muhammad Hanif Jamshad A.I and Fateh Khan (Supra). Therefore, we hold that the plaintiff had complied with the order of the Trial Court dated 15.5.1995 and the order 11.6.1995 by purchasing Defence Saving Certificates in the name of the Court and placing the same on the record. We have interpreted Section 24 keeping in view the provision of Section 3 read with Section 32 of the Act, 1991 and principles of interpretation.
18. Conversely speaking the learned Trial Court was ill-advised to pass order dated 11.6.1995 on the application of the plaintiff by permitting him to purchase the Defence Saving Certificate in its name. The plaintiff could not, however, be made to suffer for an act of Court. It is true that ignorance of law is no excuse but this rule is not attracted when Court intervened. The order of the Court relieved the citizen of the burden of an act in accordance with law. In this eventuality if he complied with the order of the Court then he is relieved of the legal and penal consequences of any violation.
19. This brings us to the question of contributory negligence of the plaintiff. It was argued on behalf of the respondent that it was the plaintiff who himself moved an application, therefore, he cannot escape the liability. It was not possible for us to agree with this preposition because if the Court did not keep the correct law in view then what could be excepted from a litigant. The principle of contributory negligence was not attracted in this case.
20. The conduct of the Trial Court from the day the suit was instituted is not appreciable: It passed the order tbr deposit of 1/3 of the sale price in violation of the provisions of Section 24 of Act, 1991 then it illegally and in utter disregard of the provisions of Section 24 of Act, 1991 permitted the plaintiff to furnish Defence Saving Certificates in its own name instead depositing the amount in cash. This is not at all. He was directed by our learned brother to keep in view the points formulated in the judgment of Civil Revision No. 156/98 while deciding the application but he failed to abide by the same. The result was again a wrong decision.
21. The upshot of this discussion is that this appeal is accepted with no order as to costs. The result is that the impugned judgment and decree dated 25.11.1998 is set aside. The application u/S. 24(2) of the Act moved by the defendant is dismissed and the suit would be deemed to be pending before the Trial Court, who is directed to decide the same expeditiously in accordance with law.