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1994 SCMR 845

Haji GUL NABI vs Mst. SAHIB JAMALA and 8 others

Citation1994 SCMR 845
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.C.R. No, 431 of 1991 Civil Appeal No, 732 of 1992
Date1994-02-23
Judge(s)Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, Wali Muhammad Khan
ResultAppeal allowed

' ABDUL QADEER CHAUDHRY, J.---This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 17-6-1992.

2. The facts in brief are that Fazal Rehman, the predecessor of the respondents, instituted a pre- emption suit on 27-1-1991 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Mardan, wherein Rs, 70,000 was mentioned as sale price of the suit land. The Court vide order dated 27-1-1991 directed the plaintiff- respondent to deposit Rs, 24,000 in cash i,e. 1/3rd of Rs, 70,000 and for the remaining amount a bank guarantee be furnished within thirty days. The plaintiff was also allowed to deposit the entire sale consideration if he so desired. The plaintiff deposited the entire amount of Rs, 70,000 in the Court within he specified period. The appellant contested the suit and filed the written statement on 22-4-1991 for the dismissal of the suit or in the alternative issuing of direction to the respondent to deposit a sum of Rs, 7,00,000, the real sale consideration of the land in dispute. The respondent opposed the claim of the appellant, but the trial Court reviewed its earlier order dated 3-6-1991, and directed the respondent to deposit a sum of Rs, 7,00,000 within thirty days. The observations of the learned Civil Judge are as under:- "Impugned Mutation No, 5321 is the subject-matter of the present suit. There is no dispute that Patwari has entered a sum of Rs, 7,00,000 (7 lakh) as the sale consideration. Attested/certified copy of the impugned mutation is on file and this also cannot be disputed that the same carries specific order to the effect that figure 7,00,000 (7 lakh) should be read taken for figure 70,000 (seventy thousand) in the impugned mutation. The said situation clearly convey, that ambiguity about figure (7,00,000 or 70,000) has been removed. In the given situation it cannot be controverted that this shall be figure 7,00,000 (7 lakh) and not 70,000) seventy thousand) which shall be considered for an order under section 24 of the Pre-emption Act.

' In support of figure 7,00,000 (7 lakh) the applicant has also produced original receipt of the District Council. (filed on 27-5-1991). In these circumstances, narrated above plaintiff/respondent is directed to deposit pre-emption money to the tune of Rs, 7,00,000 (7 lakh) in the meaning of section 24 of N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987. Plaintiff is requited to deposit pre-emption money within 30 days positively, failing which the suit shall be liable to dismissal. The application is accepted in the above terms."

' This order was challenged by the respondent, by way of appeal. The appeal was heard on 24-11- 1991 by an Additional District Judge, who maintained the order of the learned Civil Judge and dismissed the appeal. The respondent then preferred a revision petition before the High Court, which was accepted by the impugned judgment.

3. The learned counsel for the respondent has taken a preliminary objection that the appeal before the District Judge was not competent and only revision could be filed. The appeal was filed by the respondent himself, therefore, he is estopped to take objection about the competency of the appeal. Even, if his appeal is treated as revision before the District Judge, the second revision by him before the High Cowl was not maintainable under the law, (section 115(4), C.P.C.). However, be that as it may, the High Court reversed the orders of the two Courts below and passed an order in favour of the respondent.

4. The appellant is aggrieved against the order passed by the learned High Court.

5. The dispute does not relate to the facts, but it goes to the jurisdiction. The High Court has taken the view that "the order passed by the Civil Judge on 3-6-1991 was against the spirit of section 24 of North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1987. The first order was passed within thirty days and the proviso to subsection (1) of section 24 of the Act is specific that the Court shall require the plaintiff to deposit in such Court 1/3rd of the sale price of the property in cash and that such period shall not extend beyond thirty days of the filing of the suit." Reliance has been placed on Awal Noor v. District Judge, Karak (1992 SCMR 736). In order to resolve the dispute we may refer to section 24 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, as under:- "24. Plaintiff to deposit sale price of the property.--(1) In every suit for preemption the Court shall require the plaintiff to deposit in such Court one-third of the sale price of the property in cash and for the remaining two-third furnish bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the Court within such period as the Court may fix: ' Provided that such period shall not extend beyond thirty days of the filing of the suit: ' Provided further that if no sale price is mentioned in the sale-deed or in the mutation, the Court shall require the deposit of one-third of the probable value of the property, and a bank guarantee for the remaining two-third of such probable value: ' Provided also that the plaintiff may, in lieu of bank guarantee, deposit the required amount in cash.

(2) Where the plaintiff fails to deposit one-third of the sale price or the probable value of the property and the required bank guarantee under section (1) within the period fixed by the Court, his suit shall be dismissed.

(3) Where the plaintiff withdraws the sum deposited by him or the bank guarantee furnished by him under subsection (1), his suit shall be dismissed.

(4) Every sum deposited under subsection (1) shall be available for the discharge of costs.

(5) The probable value fixed under subsection (1) shall not affect the final determination of the price payable by the pre-emptor."

According to subsection (1) of section 24, the Court shall require the plaintiff to deposit in such Court one-third of the sale price of the property in cash and for the remaining two-third furnish bank guarantee. According to first proviso, such a period shall not extend beyond thirty days of the filing of the suit. According to proviso (ii), if no sale price is mentioned in the sale-deed or in the mutation, the Court shall require the deposit of one-third of the probable value of the property. It is, therefore, clear that if the sale price is not in dispute and it can be discernible from the mutation or the sale-deed, then the Court shall direct the deposit of the amount on the basis of such sale price, and where the sale price is not mentioned in the above-mentioned documents, then a probable value of the property would be taken into consideration for passing an order within the meaning of section 24(1). In the present case when the first order dated 27-1-1991 for deposit of the amount was passed the defendant was not present. The Court, after going through the plaint, passed that order.

In para. 4 of the plaint, the plaintiff stated that he came to know that the respondent purchased the property for a consideration of Rs, 1,00,000, therefore, he issued a notice to the respondent calling upon him to accept Rs, 100,000 for the suit land. Rs, 70,000 were considered on the basis of the copy of mutation. But subsequently when the original receipt of the District Council, the report of the Patwari and the attested copy of the mutation were brought to the notice of the learned Civil Judge, he passed an appropriate and legal order on the basis of actual mutation. The decision of this Court in Awal Noor's case is distinguishable. It was not a case of sale being incorporated in sale-deed or in a mutation, therefore, no actual price data being available with the appellant. He gave before the trial Court. Only the estimated value of the property. In these circumstances an observation was made that, "First proviso bars the extension of time beyond thirty days by a positive command in the negative. Therefore, if the period cannot be extended on the asking of the plaintiff it cannot be extended even suo motu. The question of act of God as a reason for extension may have to be examined in another appropriate case." It has been further observed that the amount has to be determined through a process of approximation resulting in the probable value if there is nothing mentioned in the sale-deed or the mutation. This is not the position in the present case. The plaintiff produced an incorrect copy of the mutation. The defendant produced not only the copy of mutation but also supported said mutation with other documents, therefore, the order passed on 3-6-1991 will be an order passed under section 24 of the Act. A person cannot get the benefit of his own wrong doing. Law is to be interpreted rationally and justly. It cannot be urged that an order passed on the basis of an invalid document becomes sacrosanct and cannot be removed after true documents, as contemplated in section 24 of the Act, are brought before the Court. Learned counsel for the respondents has referred to Mst. Nighar Bibi v. Salahuddin Khan (PLD 1990 SC 76) and stated that the order of the learned Civil Judge dated 3-6-1991 is incompetent as it was passed beyond the period of limitation. This precedent is inapt and does not apply to the facts of the present case. He then referred to Janat Gul Khan v. Faqir Muhammad Khan (PLD 1993 SC 204), wherein it is stated that for filing a suit for pre-emption, "it is mandatory for the pre-emptor to deposit one-third of the amount mentioned in the sale-deed in cash and two-third through bank guarantee or the entire amount in cash and that too, within thirty days of the filing of the suit and in the event of non-compliance thereof, the suit shall stand dismissed." In the cited precedent the amount of the sale has been mentioned in the sale-deed, therefore, the respondent cannot seek assistance from this judgment.

6. The learned counsel next submitted that the order of deposit of amount was tentative in nature and ultimately the Court on proper inquiry would determine actual sale price and the respondents would be prepared to make such payment when the decree is passed. No doubt an order passed under section 24 is tentative in nature and the Court, after inquiry, would finally determine the actual amount to be paid by the pre-emptor to the vendee. According to section 25 of the Act, where a Court passes a decree in favour of a pre-emptor on payment of a sale price which is in excess of the amount already deposited by the pre-emptor, the Court shall require the preemptor to deposit the remaining amount within thirty days of the passing of the decree. Under section 27 of the Act, where in the ease of a sale the parties are not agreed to the price at which the pre-emptor shall exercise his right of preemption the Court shall determine whether the price at which the sale purports to have taken place has been fixed in good faith or paid, and if it finds that the price was not so fixed or paid, it *all fix the market value of the property as the price to be paid by the pre- emptor, and if the Court finds that the price was fixed in good faith or paid, it shall fix such price to be paid by the pre-emptor. These provisions cast a duty on the Court to finally determine the price to be paid by the pre-emptor to the vendee. The dispute about sale price can be done after detailed inquiry, but the provision of section 24 demands that one-third of the sale price of the property has to be deposited by the pre-emptor in order to claim his right of pre-emption. The guidelines for passing such an order have been mentioned in the section aforesaid. This view is also supported by section 24 (as amended) by Act X of 1987, North-West Frontier Province Pre- emption Act, wherein it is mentioned that if no sale price is mentioned in the sale-deed or in mutation then the Court shall require the deposit of one-third probable 'value of the property: By means. Of Act X of 1992, North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption (Amendment) Act, 1992, the following amendments have been made in section 24:- "24. Plaintiff to deposit sale price of the property. --- (1) In every suit for pre-emption the Court shall require the plaintiff to deposit in such Court one-third of the sale price of the property in cash within such period as the Court may fix: ' Provided that if no sale price is mentioned in the sale-deed or in the mutation, the Court shall require the deposit of one-third of the probable value of the property.

(2) Where the plaintiff fails to deposit one-third of the sale price or the probable value of the property within the period fixed by the Court, his suit shall be dismissed.

(3) Where the plaintiff withdraws the sum deposited under subsection (1), his suit shall be dismissed."

In the circumstances of the present case, the order passed by the learned Civil Judge, dated 3-6- 1991, is in consonance with the spirit of law. We allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, dated 17-6-1992, and restore that of the learned Civil Judge dated 3-6-1991. The respondents are directed to deposit one-third of Rs, 7,00,000 (seven lac), less the amount already deposited, within thirty days from today, failing which the suit shall stand dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

Cited by 3 cases

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