1. ANWARUL HAQ, C. J.-This appeal, by the leave of the Court, is directed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court dated the 11th of June 1976, by which the second appeal filed by the present appellant against the appellate order of the learned District Judge, Sialkot, dated the 20th of February 1976, directing the appellant's ejectment from a premises situate on Abbot Road, Sialkot, was dismissed.
2. The respondent-landlord bad filed two separate applications for the ejectment of the appellant ; the first on the ground of default is tire payment of rent, and the second on the ground of reconstruction. Both the applications were consolidated for hearing by the learned Rent Controller and dismissed by his order dated the 6th of February 1975. As the issue concerning default in the payment of rent was decided in favour of the present appellant on the basis of a special oath offered by the landlord and taken by the appellant, the dispose in the present appeal relates only to the second application based on the ground of reconstruction. After considering the evidence adduced by the parties, the learned Rent Controller found that the respondent dad not reasonably and in good faith require the property for reconstruction.
3. This finding of the Rent Controller was reversed in first appeal by the learned District Judge, Sialkot, by his order dated the 20th of February 1976. He observed that there was reliable evidence to show that the landlord wanted to construct a house for his residence in place of the present building, end that for this Purpose he had already obtained the sanction of the Municipal Committee for the plan of the proposed reconstruction. He went on to state that it was an admitted fact that the landlord had no other residential house 9n Sialkot. He repelled the contention raised on behalf of the present appellant that the grounds of reconstruction and personal need were mutually destructive of each other. On this view of the matter he allowed the respondent's application for the ejectment of the appellant. These findings of the learned District Judge have been upheld, in second appeal, by the High Court.
4. Leave to appeal was granted to examine the contention that a landlord could not evict a tenant of a non-residential premises for the purpose of reconstructing the premises for residential accommodation. It was submitted at that stage that the promises, in dispute, had been taken on rent by the appellant for the installation of machinery etc., which had, in fact, been installed and several small industrial units were functioning in the premises.
5. The main ground of ejectment urged by the respondent fell within the purview o: clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Ordinance, which reads as follows :- "A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied that (i)
(ii) . ............------------------------------------------------------------.
(iii) ---------------------------------------------------------------------.
(iv) ...........................................................................................
(v) .............................................................................................
(vi) the building or rented lance is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for the reconstruction or erection of a building on the site, and the landlord has obtained the necessary sanction for the said reconstruction or erection from the Town Improvement Trust, Municipal Committee oar Town Committee for the Area where such building or rented land is situated ; the Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord to possession of the building or tented land."
6. It will be seen that the clause, in question, contemplates that the landlord should satisfy the Rent Controller on two points : -
(a) That the building or the rented land is reasonably and in good faith required by him for the reconstruction or erection of a building on the site ; and
(b) That he has obtained the necessary sanction from the local authority concerned.
7. It is submitted by Mr. Nazeer Ahmad Cheema, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, that this is a finding of fact which cannot be reopened in the present appeal. On the other hand, it is submitted by Mr. Noor Ahmed Noori, the learned counsel for the appellant, that &he finding stance vitiated on account of a serious error of law, namely, the omission of the learned District Judge and the learned Judge in the High Court to fully appreciate the legal implications of the two mutually exclusive pleas takers by the respondent as grounds of ejectment. Mr. Noori contends that, in the first instance, the landlord bad not specifically stated in the application for ejectment that the purpose of his reconstruction eras to convert the prom-see into a residential house and then to occupy the same for his personal requirement ; and that, in the second place, the landlord failed to prove the necessary ingredients specified in subsection (3) of section 13 of the Ordinance in connection with a demand for ejectment on the ground of personal need. The learned counsel contends that in such a case the landlord had to show not only that he needed the premises for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children but also that he was not occupying another residential building suitable for big needs in the same urban area, r or had he vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Ordinance. He further submits that more or less similar requirements are spelled out by subsection (3) in the case of a non-residential building required by the landlord for his personal occupation. Mr. Noori contends that although during the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the landlord's attorney mentioned the personal need of the landlord, yet the evidence did not satisfy the other requirements prescribed by law. It appears to the learned counsel that in these circumstances the Courts below should have held, firstly, that the pleas taken up by the landlord were mutually destructive 1 and that in any case he had failed to prove that his demand for reconstruction of the promises was reasonable and bona fide. Finally. Mr. Noori contends that the provisions contained to subsections (2; and (3) of section 13 of the Ordinance are subject to subsections (5), (5-A) and (5-A) of the same section, which place certain restrictions and prescribe certain penalties for a landlord who fails to reconstruct the building as claimed by him, and also enable the Rent Controller to put the tenant back into possession in the new building after it has been reconstructed; but if the reconstruction changes the purpose and shape of the building, then the provisions of subsection (5-B) are rendered nugatory. The learned counsel concludes that the Courts below should, therefore, have held that the reconstruction of the building for its conversion into a residential premises could not form a valid ground for the ejectment of the appellant.
8. We shall first take up the question whether the pleas of reasonable and bona fide requirement for the reconstruction of a building, and its requirement for the personal use of the landlord are indeed mutually exclusive and destructive of each other. As already stated, the first plea is embodied in clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Ordinance, whereas the second pica finds mention in subsection (3) of the same section, and is described separately in the case of residential and non-residential buildings. But the mere fact that the pleas are embodied in different subsections of section 13 of the Ordinance would not, by itself, show that they are mutually exclusive, and cannot be taken together in the same case. However, Mr. Noori has placed reliance on Abdullah Baloch v.
9. Adam A.I (PLD 1961 SC 28), Sheikh Muhammad Yusuf v. Mat. Zohran Bibi (PLD 1973 Pesh. 186) and Bashir Hussain and another v. Sh. Muhammad Saeed and 2 others (PLD 1976 Lah. 1095), in support of his submissions.
10. We find that the first case mentioned by the learned counsel proceeded on a somewhat different basis. In that case the landlord had linked up the requirement of reconstruction with his own personal requirements, but the findings of the Rent Controller specifically negatived each of the personal requirements and for this reason the Court held that these findings must necessarily react upon the allegation of reasonable and bona fide requirement for reconstruction. It was added that requirement for reconstruction, for the sake of reconstruction, was not a valid requirement to enable a landlord to obtain ejectment of a tenant under the Act, as it must be a reasonable and bona fide requirement. It seems to us that the decision in this case cannot be interpreted as laying down the principle that the plea of reconstruction, and that of personal requirement are mutually destructive of each other 1 on the contrary the judgment in this case indicates that the two can certainly be linked together, but the requirement of reconstruction would fail if need for personal occupation is not established.. In other words this judgment runs contrary to the submissions made by Mr. Noori.
11. The next case cited by Mr. Noori does, of course, support the sub-missions made by him. But a perusal of the judgment shows that the dictum of this Court in the case of Abdudlah Baloch, referred to above, was not properly understood by the learned Judge, and he erroneously thought that this Court had held the two pleas to be mutually destructive of each other. We have already seen that far from expressing any such opinion, this Court bad observed that if the two pleas are linked together, then the plea of requirement of reconstruction would fail if the plea of bona fide personal requirement, for which reconstruction wan needed, was riot established on the record. It seems to us, therefore, that this particular judgment of the Peshawar High Court cannot be regarded as laying down good law in this behalf.
12. The last case relied upon by Mr. Noori, namely, that of Bashir Hussain, does not appear to be directly helpful in the present context. That was undoubtedly a case where the landlord's application for ejectment had combined both the grounds we are considering here. But as regards the ground of personal requirement, the learned Judge observed that it could not be said to have been established as the landlord needed the property for the occupation of the Habib bank, and that was not a personal requirement of the landlord. He further held that the provisions contained in subsection (5-B) of section 13 of the Ordinance were relevant for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of subsection 2 (vi) thereof which provides that ejectment can be only for bona fide reconstruction. He added that a reconstruction the object of which was to override the provision of subsection (5-B) could not be deemed to be bona tide. We are unable to see how these observations can be taken to mean that the pleas of bona fide reconstruction and bona fide personal requirement, cannot be linked together in one case. The findings arrived at by the learned Judge on both the pleas are directly related to the facts before him, and do not lay down a principle of general application as to the two pleas being inconsistent.
13. On behalf of the respondent landlord, Mr. Nazeer Ahmed Cheema drew our attention to the judgment of this Court in Messry Amir Din Allah Dita v. Seth Adamji AbdulIGh and others (1969 SC M.R 131), and that of the Lahore High Court in Khuda Bakhah v. Muhammad Yousaf (PLD 1976 Lah.
14. 275). In the first mentioned case it was observed that :- "The finding reached by all the Courts below that the respondent genuinely wants to reconstruct the building for his own use, and for which the plan has also been sanctioned by the Municipal Corporation, is one of fact, well based on evidence and does not warrant interference by as. The argument that to respondent's requirement of the new building was neither reasonable nor bona fide was not relevant to the disposal of the ejectment petition filed under section 13 (2) (vi) of the Ordinance aforesaid. The penal provisions contained in subsection (5) of section 13 of the Ordinance afford safeguard against a landlord acting in bad faith."
15. These observations were followed by the Lahore High Court in the case of Khuda Bax, mentioned above, and it was rightly observed that they tended to show that reconstruction of a building for the use of the landlord himself was a permissible ground for ejectment under section 13 (2) (vi) of the Ordinance.
16. It will be seen that the contention that the pleas of reconstruction of a building and its consequent requirement for the personal need of the landlord are mutually destructive of each other, is not supported by authority: On the contrary, if the landlord spells out a sound reason for the reconstruction of the building, it should re-enforce his case on this account B rattler than destroy the same. We would, therefore, approve the view taken by the learned Judge of the Lahore High Court in the case of Khuda Baksh, namely, that the law as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance ill not susceptible to such an interpretation. However, it goes without saying that if the reason put forward by the landlord for the reconstruction of the building is not established then, as already observed by this Court in the case of Abdullah Baloch, this failure would react on the plea of reconstruction, and might well lead to the conclusion that the requirement of reconstruction was not reasonable and in good faith.
17. Now, in the instant case, there is a positive statement in the judgment of the lower appellate Court that "it was an admitted fact that the landlord bad no other residential house in Sialkot", and that "there was reliable evidence to show that the landlord wanted to construct a house for his p residence In place of the present building'". Nothing was said at the Bar to C show that these findings or statements were not sustainable on the record. It follows, therefore, that the demand of the landlord that he reasonably and in good faith wanted to reconstruct the building into a house for his personal use stood fully established on the record, and formed a legitimate ground for the ejectment of the tenant.
18. The question, however, is whether the law prevents a non-residential building from being reconstructed into a residential one. Mr. Noori's contention is that if this is permitted then the provisions contained in sub--section (5-3) of section 13 of the Ordinance would be rendered nugatory, as in that case the tenant of a non-residential building could not, obviously, ask to be put into possession of the new building owing to the change in its ,, character. The learned counsel, therefore, thinks that the provisions contained in clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 13 should be construed as being subject to subsection (5-B) thereof.
19. We regret we cannot subscribe to this line of reasoning, as we find that clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Ordinance does not, by -itself, impose any restriction or limitation as to the nature and purpose o the new building which is to be reconstructed in place of the old building. If this clause is to be read as being subject to the provisions of sub--section (5-B) of the same section in the sense that the nature and character of the building cannot be changed by reconstruction, then the result would be to prevent future development of property even though its environment and the requirements of the community at large, may have changed. Such an interpretation would be altogether unreasonable and ID against the public interest, and should be avoided unless the words of the statute are so clear and unambiguous as to make it inevitable.
20. This does not appear to be the case here.
21. We consider, therefore, that the ground of reconstruction mentioned in clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 13 does not limit the same t reconstruction of a building of the same type and character and for the same purpose, namely, residential or non-residential as the case may be. However, the provisions of subsection (5-B) would come into play if the reconstructed building is of the same type and character and suitable for the same use as was the old building. In other, words, the provisions contained in clause (vi) of subsection (2) of this section are subject to subsection (5-B) thereof, only to this limited extent, and to the extent of preventing a conversion, by reconstruction, of one type of building into another.
22. On this view of the matter it becomes clear that the Courts below were justified in ordering the ejectment of the appellant on the ground that the landlord reasonably and in good faith required the premises in dispute for reconstruction for his personal need. The appeal, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed.
23. We would, however, in the circumstances of the case, leave the parties to bear their own costs.
24. The appellant is allowed four months time to deliver vacant possession to the respondent.