' For the sake of convenience, I propose to decide these two appeals by this single order as they involve common questions of law and facts. Mrs. Maimoona Begum, the respondent in both the appeals is the owner of the property bearing No,R-483, Block 2, Federal 'B' Area, Karachi, consisting of two shops and a residential portion. Ehsan son of Shafi, appellant in F.RA. No, 349/1985 is the tenant of shop (Hamam) on a monthly rent of Rs,80; whereas Habeeb son of Bandeh Ali, appellant in F.RA. No,376/1985 is also a tenant of one shop on a monthly rent of Rs,85. On 20-7-1981, the respondent filed two separate applications under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as "the Ordinance") for eviction of the appellants from their respective premises on the sole ground of reconstruction of building after demolishing the existing old structure for her own use. The appellants contested the ejectment applications by filing separate written statements commonly pleading, inter alia, that the existing structure is sound enough for raising first floor residential accommodation for her (respondent's) use, that if she would desire to demolish it then she should either re-accommodate the appellants in the newly- constructed building or give them a suitable alternative accommodation. The approved plan of the proposed building was alleged to have been obtained fraudulently by suppression of facts.
2. After recording the evidence of the parties and hearing the arguments of both the counsel for the parties the learned Rent Controller vide impugned orders, has held that the respondent requires the premises in question for reconstruction, for her bona fide personal use and hence he has allowed the ejectment applications with a direction to the appellants to vacate their respective premises within two months from the date of his order. Hence these appeals.
3. Mr. Syed Inayat Ali, learned counsel for appellant Ehsan, in F.R.A. No, 349 of 1985, contended that the respondent has got the plan approved for reconstruction of the residential building at the site thereby providing no provision for construction of a shop. She has thus acted in a manner which would result in depriving the appellant of his vested legal right under subsection (4) of section 15-A of the Ordinance, which lays down that the tenant, who is directed to put the landlord in possession of the premises for reconstruction or erection of the building at the site, would be entitled to apply to the Controller for an order directing the landlord that he be put in possession of such area in the new building which does not exceed the area as the old building of which he was in occupation and the Controller shall make an order accordingly in respect of the area applied for or such smaller area, as considering the location, and type of the new building and the needs of the tenant, he deems just. The counsel, therefore, emphasized that since in the instant case, the construction of the new building would result in complete ouster of the appellant from the non-residential premises presently occupied by him, and it being in derogation of the specific provision of law made for the protection of the tenant, the learned Rent Controller should not have allowed the ejectment application. The counsel also drew my attention to a Single Bench authority of Balochistan High Court in the case of Muhammad Hafeez and another v. Muhammad Azeem and 9 others reported in 1984 CLC 1983, to contend that the respondent having failed to establish or prove her bona fide need for personal requirement, as pleaded by her in paragraph 2 of the ejectment application, hence the application for ejectment on the sole ground of reconstruction of the building was not a valid ground for ejectment. The shop in occupation of the appellant is being used exclusively for non-residential purposes and hence, according to Mr. Inayat Ali, it could not be got vacated for the use of respondent landlady for construction of residential building.
4. Mr. B.N. Bangash, learned counsel for the appellant in F.RA. No,376 of 1985, besides adopting the arguments of Mr. Syed Inayat Ali, Advocate also contended that since the respondent has failed to establish a case of her personal need, by not disclosing the number of her family members the particulars of the accommodation presently in her occupation, the respondent could not ask for the eviction of the appellant from the demised shop for reconstruction of the building. Relying upon the case of Muhammad Ahmed v. Rana Muhammad Rafique, 1986 MLD 1759, wherein Mamoon Kazi, J. Has held that "when insufficiency of existing accommodation was being pleaded by the appellant, then it became incumbent upon him to provide details about the accommodation available with him with particular reference to the number of rooms or total area covered by the building." It is further held in this reported case that in order to deprive the tenant of the rented premises on the ground of personal requirement, the landlord has to establish his bona fides and good faith clearly and definitely and where he fails to do so his application is liable to be dismissed.
In the instant case. Mr. Bangash so contended, the respondent has utterly failed to establish her bona fide requirement of the demised premises. Inviting my attention to the legal notice, dated 29- 4-1981 (Ex.8) served upon the appellant on behalf of the respondent, Mr. Bangash submitted that there is no mention therein of the alleged fact that the premises then occupied by the respondent was not sufficient for her needs and that she required the demised premises for reconstruction for her personal use. The counsel also submitted that in the ejectment application the respondent has given her residential address to be of a house in Kharadar, whereas in paragraph 2 of the application she has stated that she was residing in her in-laws' house without disclosing the particulars thereof.
5. None appeared on behalf of the respondent at the hearing of the appeal. Having given due consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants and having also carefully perused the evidence of the parties as well as the impugned order, I have reached the conclusion that there was no merit in these appeals. On the conclusion of hearing on 23rd April, 1990, I dismissed both the appeals by passing short order as under:- "For reasons to follow, the appeals are held to be devoid of force and they are accordingly dismissed. The appellant is, however, allowed 3 (three) months' time to vacate the premises."
I, therefore, now proceed to record my reasons therefor. The existing building is admittedly a commercial-cum-residential one. On the ground floor there are shops while in the upper floor there are residential tenements. This building is proposed to be demolished and on the site thereof a new building is intended to be constructed as per duly sanctioned plan (Ex.7). The approved plan is only for residential building and there is no provision in it for the construction of shops on the ground floor. The first question, therefore, arises is as to whether the respondent is legally obliged to construct a composite building on the site so as to make the provision of section 15-A (4) of the Ordinance workable. The plain and unambiguous language of section 15(2)(vi) of the Ordinance leaves no manner of doubt that the landlord is under no legal bar to reconstruct or erect a new building on the site of the same type which he has demolished for the purpose of reconstruction or erection of a new building at the site. It is not even so provided in any other law for the time being in force nor has the learned counsel for the appellants assailed the approval of the plan for new building on the ground of its being in derogation of some legal provision. It is thus manifestly clear that the landlord has an absolute and unfettered right to restore or erect a new building of any type either of the same type as the one demolished or of a different type than that of the demolished building on the site of the demolished building. It seems appropriate to refer to the following observations made by the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in the case of Messrs Delite House Ltd. v. Fayyaz Akbar (1988 CLC 1363). At page 1369 of the report in this judgment it is held as follows:- "On the plain language of the statute, if the landlord succeeds in proving that, he 'intends' to demolish the building to construct a new one in its place and has obtained the necessary sanction from the competent authority, he may not be asked to show that his intent lacked good faith or reasonableness. Section 17(2)(vi) of Rent Act, 1963 as regards its language was identical with section 13 (2) (vi) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (it is, in turn, identical with section 15(2)(vi) of the Ordinance). Cantonments Rent Restriction Act as has been said above by me does not limit or restrict the right of the owner to develope his property and it is this right which the respondent seeks to exercise. Comparative requirement of the premises by the tenant and his inconvenience in this behalf are immaterial. Therefore, even if elements of good faith and reasonableness are to be read in the context of section 17(2)(vi) there is nothing to doubt the credentials of the respondent in regard to his good faith and his requirement being reasonable."
6. At this stage, fortunately, I have been able to lay hands, of my own, to an authority of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Hadi alias Abdul Hadi Hasan and 2 others v. Syed Ali Haider and others (PLD 1983 SC 342), wherein a similar issue was involved. It was a case under sections 13(2)(vi) read with (5-B) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, which is identical to section 15(2) (vi) of the Ordinance. In that case also it was argued on behalf of the tenants that they were occupying the shop in the old building and the new building shall be residential building, it will not be possible for them to obtain the possession of the area in the new building corresponding to what they were occupying in the old building in view of the fact that there will be no shop in the new building. Repelling this contention, the Supreme Court held as under:-- "We observe that clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Ordinance also does not impose any restrictions or limitations as to what type of a new building may be built on the site of the old building, after reconstruction. We also note that there is no law which prevents a nonresidential building from being converted, after reconstruction, into a residential one. Consequently, if the contention raised by the petitioners was accepted and subsection (5-B) of section 13 was held to debar the landlord from making reconstruction, whereby shops could not be demolished and a residential building constructed on the site, this would amount to imposing a limitation which does not exist in law.
' The reading of both the provisions in harmony would yield the result that subsection (5-B) of section 13 comes into play only where the old building consisting of shops even after reconstruction retains the character of shops and also in those cases where the old building is a residential building and new building on re-construction is again built as a residential building. This subsection would not apply in cases where a non-residential building is, after reconstruction, converted into a residential building.
' In Abdul Bari v. Khadim Hussain PLD 1978 SC 78 this Court has already pointed out that the acceptance of the plea that shops cannot on reconstruction be converted into a residential building would result in preventing future development of the property, even though its environment and the requirements of the community at large may have changed. Similarly, in Ghulam Nabi v. Mushtaq Ahmad PLD 1980 SC 206 it was pointed out that 'whilst a landlord cannot evict his tenant except on the grounds prescribed in the said Ordinance, a tenant is free to vacate the demised premises after giving the contractual or statutory notice. As a tenant can terminate his lease unilaterally, it would be extremely unjust and unreasonable if the landlord's right to rebuild and develop his property was subject to the tenant's veto, and injustice is not to be lightly attributed to the Legislature'. In the instant case as the reconstruction in the building sought to be made by the landlord is to substantially develop and improve the property the landlord's requirement must be held to be bonfire and reasonable."
7. The above authority of the Supreme Court is a complete answer to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. I do not, therefore, feel called upon now to deal with this aspect of the case any longer in view of the above reproduced authoritative judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
8. In the result, the appeals stand disposed of as indicated above.