IRSHAD HASAN KHAN, ACTG. C.J.--This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Labour High Court, dated 23-4-1998 passed in Writ Petition No, 7705 of 1998.
2. The petitioner was employed as a Compositor in the Punjab Government Printing Press, Lahore. It is alleged that on 11-7-1976, he fell seriously ill and for all practical purposes remained blind until a complicated eye operation at Data Darbar Hospital, Lahore restored his eyesight. It is pleaded that during the period of his illness the petitioner had been regularly making applications for leave on the ground of sickness supported by medical certificates, but at no stage he received an intimation from the respondent that his leave applications were declined. He, therefore, assumed that he remained on sickness leave and was entitled to be paid his dues. In consequence, on 15-1- 1978 the petitioner claimed to have moved an.. application to the respondent-Press seeking permission to resume his official duties. It is pleaded that the petitioner was not permitted to resume his duty by the respondent-Press on the ground that the service record was destroyed in a fire incident. It is further pleaded that the petitioner had been making applications for a number of years to get his service record reconstructed. It is, however, not stated with particularity on which dates such applications were made. The case of the petitioner is that he had been penalized on account of the default of the respondent in that, loss of service record was not a valid ground to refuse permission to the petitioner to resume duty.
3. The petitioner moved an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) before the Labour Court praying therein that the respondent-Press be directed to either allow the petitioner to perform his duty and make payment of service benefits including pension and gratuity or any other relief appropriate to the circumstances of the case. The Labour Court vide order dated 25-1-1994 accepted the application and directed the respondent-Press to allow the petitioner to resume his duty with all back benefits.
Being aggrieved, the respondent-Press filed an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which was accepted by judgment, dated 10-3-1998 by setting aside the order of the Labour Court. The petitioner being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment, filed a Constitutional petition, which was also dismissed, inter alia, with the following observations: "(3) I am afraid there is no force in this writ petition. Learned Labour Appellate Tribunal has recorded a finding of fact that the grievance petition was barred by time. Learned counsel for the petitioners could not satisfy me as to how the said finding was vitiated, either being contrary to the evidence on record or violative of any legal provision. On his own showing, the petitioner remained absent from duty for about ten long years. No explanation is forthcoming for the inordinate delay in approaching the Labour Court. The only reason mentioned in this writ petition for this period of inaction, as given in para. 6, is 'that for a long number of years, petitioner was made to run from pillar to post seeking to get his service record reconstructed'.
It was further averred vide para 5 that the petitioner was told that he would be permitted to resume once his record was reconstructed. This explanation hardly constituted sufficient ground for condoning the delay of ten years in approaching the Labour Court.
Learned Labour Appellate Tribunal was, therefore, justified in a law in allowing the appeal of the respondent employer and dismissing the grievance of the petitioner. This writ petition is rejected in limine."
4. Dr. A Basit, learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently argued that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was not right in setting aside the order of the Labour Court, in that, the petitioner has been penalized without holding any inquiry. No show-cause notice or termination order was ever issued to him, therefore, the Labour Appellate Tribunal fell into an error in setting aside the order of the Labour Court and the same error was committed by the learned Judge in Chambers. Dr. A. Basit vehemently argued that under section 25-A, of the Ordinance, in adjudicating and determining a grievance petition the Labour Court was competent to go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case. The precise submission was that in view of the material available on record the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the petition filed under section 25-A of the Ordinance by the petitioner was justified on merits as well as in law. The Labour Court also condoned the delay in filing the grievance petition, which was within its competence and, therefore, the Labour Appellate Tribunal was not justified to interfere with the finding of the Labour Court. In support of his contention the learned counsel heavily relied on the findings recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 1, Lahore and particularly the findings recorded in paragraphs 7 to 13 thereof.
5. There is no cavil with the proposition of law advanced by Dr. A. Basit that the Labour Court in the exercise of its powers under section 25-A of the Ordinance, has full and complete powers to go into the questions of fact and to arrive at its own conclusion regardless of there being any defect in the procedure in the domestic proceedings. This Court has also taken the view in the case of Crescent Jute Products Ltd, Jaranwala v. Muhammad Yaqub and others (PLD 1978 SC 207) that the Labour Court can go behind a dismissal order and see for itself whether on facts, and in circumstances of the case, dismissal order was or was not justified both on merits as well on facts. It was further held that the intention of the legislature appears to provide a double check, one in the form of a domestic inquiry to be held by an employer and the other in the form of a judicial determination by the Junior Labour. Court itself'. The learned counsel has, however, conveniently overlooked the provisions of subsection (3) of section 37 of the Ordinance which expressly enables an aggrieved party to file an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal from a decision of the Labour Court made under section 25-A of the Ordinance. In the exercise of appellate powers, the Labour Appellate Tribunal may confirm, set aside, vary or modify the decision given under section 25-A, and exercise all the powers conferred by the Ordinance on the Labour Court, save as otherwise provided. Even otherwise, it is well-settled that the appeal being in continuation of the original proceedings, the appellate forum can pass any order which ought to have been passed by the original forum. In the present case, the Labour Appellate Tribunal has given cogent reasons in setting aside the decision of the Labour Court. The grievance petition was hopelessly time-barred and satisfactory explanation was not forthcoming on record regarding the inordinate delay having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. The conclusion reached by the Labour Appellate Tribunal is discernable from the available material on record. It, therefore, cannot be said that jurisdiction exercised by it in setting aside the decision of the Labour Court suffered from any legal flaw or infirmity. After thorough scrutiny of the material placed on record and perusing the detailed judgment, we are also of the view that the Labour Court was not justified in accepting a hopelessly time-barred grievance petition which was filed after a period of over ten years. No exception can be taken to the order passed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal allowing the appeal of the respondent-employer and dismissing the grievane petition. The impugned order of the High Court appears to be just and fair. It does not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference.
6. Resultantly, leave to appeal is declined and the petition dismissed.