' TALAT QAYUM QURESHI, J.---This order shall dispose of Writ Petitions No,74 of 1995 (Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Qazi Tariq Javed and others) and Writ Petition No,139 of 1996 (Qazi Tariq Javed v.
Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd.).
2. Qazi Tariq Javed was employed in Allied Bank of Pakistan initially as Naib-Qasid and subsequently as Assistant. He was charge-sheeted for misappropriation of Rs,127 while performing the duty of collection of WAPDA bills on complaint of concerned consumer. He was dismissed on 30-9-1985. After availing the departmental remedies, he approached Labour Court, Haripur to challenge the order of his dismissal. After recording evidence of both the parties, Labour Court reinstated him with 50% back benefits vide order, dated 27-5-1993. The respondent-bank preferred Appeal No,58 of 1993 before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, N.-W.F.P. But the same was dismissed vide order, dated 25-11-1993.
3. Qazi Tariq Javed also filed appeal against the order of the Labour Court, dated 27-5-1993 whereby he was reinstated with 50% back benefits. His grievance was that he should have been given full back benefits at the time of reinstatement. His appeal too was dismissed by order, dated 25-11-1993 as both the, appeals were disposed of by the learned 'Appellate Tribunal by single order.
4.
4. M/s. Allied Bank of Pakistan has now filed Writ Petition (W.P. No, 74 of 1995) calling in question both the orders, dated 27-5-1993 and 25-11-1993 passed by Labour Court, Haripur and Labour Appellate Tribunal, N.-W.F.P., whereas Qazi Tariq Javed has also filed Writ Petition No,139 of 1996 challenging both the orders whereby he was denied 50% back benefits.
5. Qazi Rashidul Haq, Advocate, the learned counsel representing M/s. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd.
Argued that findings of the Labour Court, Haripur, dated 27-5-1993 and Labour Appellate Tribunal, dated N-W.F.P., 25-11-1993 are against the law on the subject and facts of the case. Under the .Labour Laws, the labour Court could not go into the details to probe into findings of Inquiry Officer on facts. The Labour Court could only see whether the dismissal was in accordance with law or not and proper procedure was followed by employer while dismissing the employee. In the case in hand, proper inquiry was conducted against respondent No,1 wherein he was given complete opportunity of defence. The Inquiry Officer found the guilt of misappropriation and concealment in respect of respondent No, 1 . The same was examined by the competent Authority of the bank who dismissed respondent No,1 on 30-9-1985.
6. Repelling the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Fazal Gul, Advocate, the learned counsel representing Qazi Tariq Jawaid respondent No,1 in Writ Petition No,74 of 1995 and petitioner in Writ Petition No, 139 of 1996 argued that under subsection (5) of section 25-A it was the domain of the Labour Court to see as to whether the finding of the domestic inquiry had been held in consonance with law and rules. The labour Court has full and complete powers to enter even into question of facts and to arrive at its own conclusions. In this case, the Labour Court after recording evidence of the parties reached to the conclusion that the respondent No,1 Qazi Tariq Javed was not guilty of misappropriation, hence he was reinstated in service. The findings of the learned Labour Court were concurred by the learned Labour Appellate Court N.-W.F.P. He further argued that the learned Appellate Labour Court as well as Labour Court while not granting 50% back benefits to the petitioner (in W.P. No,139 of 1996) committed illegality. When the petitioner was found innocent by the competent Court then there was no justification to withhold 50% back benefits. The petitioner during his dismissal period remained unemployed and suffered huge financial losses, hence he was entitled for full back benefits.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully.
8. So far as the question raised by Mr. Rashidul Haq Qazi, Advocate, that the Labour Court, under the law, could not probe into the findings of the Inquiry Officer on facts and it could only see as to whether proper procedure was adopted by the employer while dismissing the employee. This contention has no merit. In subsection (5) of section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 it is laid down: "In adjudicating and determining a grievance under subsection (4) the (Labour Court) shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case."
From the language of the statute it is clear that the Labour Court has the jurisdiction to go behind a dismissal order as to see for itself as to whether on the facts and in the circumstances of concerned case it was justified or not, both on merits as well as law. If the Labour Court finds serious defects and irregularities in the inquiry which has resulted in causing of miscarriage of justice or if the Inquiry Officer has not taken into consideration the relevant evidence or has misread evidence then the Labour Court would not be debarred to set at naught such an inquiry report. A similar question came up before Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in case "Crescent Jute Products Ltd., Jaranwala v. Muhammad Yaqoob etc." PLD 1978 SC 207 wherein it was held: "In subsection (5) of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), it is laid down that in adjudicating and determining a grievance under subsection (4), the (Labour Court) shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case. From the language of the statute hereinbefore reproduced it is clear that the Labour Court has the jurisdiction to go behind a dismissal order and to see for itself as to whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the concerned case it was justified or not, both on merits as well as law. The words 'shall go into all the facts of the case' are a clear guide with regard to the wide scope of the enquiry which a Junior Labour Court undertakes under section 25-A. These words indeed have been used with a purpose and have to be given full effect so as to achieve the result desired. These words show that when a case is brought before Junior Labour Court, the scope of enquiry is wider than for example the scope of a Tribunal examining only the legality of an order impugned before it. The words 'shall go into all the facts of the case clearly signify that the Junior Labour Court has full and complete powers to enter even into questions of fact and to arrive at its own conclusions regardless of there being no illegality of procedure in the domestic proceedings.
By use of these words the intention of the Legislature appears to provide a double check, one in the form of a judicial determination by the Junior Court itself. In other words the intention of subsection
(5) of section 25-A appears to provide another form in determining the grievance afresh after considering the facts on which any impugned dismissal is based. If that was not so, then there was no occasion for using .The words 'shall go into all the facts of the case', which, in our view, define the jurisdiction of the Junior Labour Court as a Tribunal of facts, with regard to the matters which may have been dealt with by domestic tribunal or the employer. Therefore, if the Legislature in its wisdom has chosen the words of far-reaching consequence, we do not see how their meaning can be whittled down and the provision construed in a limited sense as it (for example) the Junior Labour Court was hearing a second appeal within the meaning of section 100, C.P.C. Or a revision under section 115, C.P.C. The reason is also not far to seek, because, as pointed out earlier, it was intended to provide a forum to check against arbitrary, capricious, and camouflaged dismissal."
9. Likewise in another case "National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Labour Court No,7 and others" 1989 SCM R 1372 it was held: "Labour Court reinstated employee in service finding that domestic enquiry had not been held in consonance with law and rules and that no charge had been established against him. Such finding was maintained by Tribunal as well as High Court. The judgment of High Court was not against the law. Leave to appeal was refused."
10. Moreover, this argument had neither been raised in the written statement by the Bank nor was agitated before the Labour Court as it clear from the judgment. It was, however, for the first time raised before Labour Appellate Tribunal which was properly replied.
11. In the present case no doubt inquiry was conducted by Mr. Farukh Niaz, Inquiry Officer, but he did not hold respondent No,1 guilty of misappropriation. In the concluding paragraph of his inquiry report, dated 7-2-1985, he stated: "In my opinion the mistake can be termed misappropriation as well as the two portions of the bills (one for the party and one for the WAPDA Office) bear different amount noted by accused himself.
However, he has refunded the amount of Rs,127 to the consumer on his assertion. Report is submitted for your kind perusal."
12. Moreover, the complainant has not proved his complainant as he failed to appear in support of his allegations. The bank failed to prove that it had established the charge of misappropriation before the Inquiry Officer. The Presiding Officer Labour Court, Haripur vide his order, dated 27-5- 1993 held that the charge of misappropriation was not established against the respondent No,1, therefore, the dismissal order was set aside and the respondent No,1 was held entitled to 50% of the back benefits and costs of the case. The order of the learned Presiding Officer was upheld by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, N.-W.F.P. We, therefore, find no illegality in the orders passed by the Presiding Officer Labour Court, Haripur, dated 27-5-1993 and the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, dated 25-11-1993.
13. So far as the argument of Mr. Fazal Gul, Advocate the learned counsel representing Qazi Tariq Javed that denial of full back benefits by the two Courts below are against the law and facts is concerned, this argument has no force at all. Qazi Tariq Javed in his statement before the Inquiry Officer had admitted that on 7-7-1985 he had collected a total of 104 bills in one hour totalling Rs,8,287, besides preparing some demand notices for the parties. He also admitted that he committed mistake in cash handling on previous 4 occasions. He had credited excess amounts than the amount collected in WAPDA's account which on the potation of the Revenue Officer WAPDA was debted to WAPDA's account later on. Even on the day of occurrence the actual cash was found short by Rs,5. He had also admitted that this incidence has also happened due to his mistake and the consumer/complainant has exploited the same due to old misunderstanding and grudge, which had arisen when he (Qazi Tariq Javed) pressurized him to pay the bank outstanding dues. He also admitted that on consumer's/complainant's statement on the Holy Qur'an he has already paid him Rs,127 on 23-7-1985 in presence of all the staff of the branch but he did not obtain receipt from him. All this indicates that there were lapses on the part of Qazi Tariq Javed, as such the Labour Court as well as the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, in the peculiar circumstances of the case did not find petitioner, Qazi Tariq Javed entitled to full back benefits. We would not like to interfere with the concurrent findings of both the Courts of competent jurisdiction, as such dismiss both the writ petitions with no order as to costs.