' IRSHAD HASAN KHAN, CJ.---Through this common judgment, we propose to dispose of the above 135 Civil Petitions bearing Nos. 1524 to 1529, 1576 to 1697, 1713, 1714, 1719 to 1721, 1776 and 1519 of 1999 arising out of a common judgment dated 23-8-1999 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No, 792-L of 1998.
2. Brief facts are that respondent No,2-United Bank Limited (here in after referred to as the respondent-bank) through its President, vide its order dated 10-10-1997 under the Retrenchment Scheme, terminated the services of the petitioners herein and other employees of various categories of the respondent-bank. Some of the aggrieved employees approached the departmental authorities for redress of their grievances, while others invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution). Some of the employees also approached this Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution.
3. In the case of United Bank Limited through President v. Shahmim Ahmed Khan and 41 others (PLD 1999 SC 990) this Court in somewhat identical matters passed in Civil Appeals Nos. 1487 to 1528 of 1998, decided on 25-5-1999, against somewhat identical judgments passed by the Federal Service Tribunal (Karachi) dated 28-7-1998, setting aside the judgment of the Service Tribunal rendered in favour of the employees of the respondent-bank, holding that the termination of the respondents therein from service was illegal and direction for their reinstatement in service was not legally sustainable. It was inter alia observed: "Although rule 15 of the Rules vested the appellant with the power to dispense with the service of an employee of the Bank by serving him three months' notice or pay in lieu thereof, but the management did not resort to this rule while terminating the services of respondents. The management in the Retrenchment Scheme allowed substantial benefit to the retrenched employees and, therefore, it cannot be said that the exercise of power by the management of Bank was opposed to the Islamic Principles of Adal-o-Ahsan. Mr. Akram Sheikh has also invited our attention to the commentaries of Bachaya Dr. Durga Das Basu on Article 21 of the Indian Constitution but these commentaries in our view do not advance the case of respondents any further. The 2 American cases cited by the learned counsel reported as Yick Wo v. Hopkins (118 US 356) and Slaughter House Cases (83 US 36) similarly have no application in the circumstances of the present cases."
4. Be that as it may, the writ petitions filed by the petitioners herein by invoking Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court against their order of termination were dismissed on ground of lack of jurisdiction, in that, the appropriate Service Tribunal alone had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the controversy raised in the writ petitions, in view of insertion of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 by Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1997 (XVI of 1997), with effect from 10-6-1997, whereunder the employees of the respondent-bank became civil servants by operation of law for purposes of availing remedy before the Federal Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal). It is not disputed that they could approach the Tribunal within a period of 90 days commencing from 10-6-1997, under section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the petitioners and other employees of the respondent-bank vide consolidated judgment dated 23-8-1999 on grounds of limitation as well as on merits.
5. Learned counsel for the parties has advanced arguments in support of their respective contentions. Ch. Mushtaq Ahmad Khan, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court and three of the petitioners present in person have also placed reliance on Sherin and 4 others v. Fazal Muhammad and 4 others 1995 SCM R 584 to contend that this was a fit case for condonation of delay before the Tribunal, in that, the writ petitions were filed by the petitioners before the High Court on account of mistaken advice tendered by their counsel. It was further argued that the litigants and their counsel, however, had acted with due care and caution and their conduct did not smack of neligence, therefore, filing of the writ petitions before the High Court which was a wrong forum could consitute a "sufficient cause" within the meaning of section 5 of the Limintation Act, 1908. The precise submission was that it was a fit case in which the delay in filling of appeal before the Tribunal should have been condoned.
6. Be that as it may, Ch. Mushtaq Ahmad and Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court for the petitioners, Muhammad Ishfaq Khan (C.P. 1713/99), Muhammad Asif (C.P. 1714/99) and Bashir Ahmad (C.P. 1519/99), petitioners herein in person and Raja Muhammad Akram, learned Senior ASC for the respondent-bank by consent agreed that the cases by remanded. To the respondent-bank for disposal to the extent indicated below:
(i) Adjustment of loans obtained by the petitioners herein from the respondent-bank shall be made strictly in accordance with the respective loan agreements executed between each of the petitioners and the respondent-bank.
(ii) The grant of pensionary benefits shall be available to those petitioners who are found entitled in accordance with the Service Rules of the respondent-bank in force at the time of termination of their services.
7. Resultantly, we convert these petitions into appeal and while maintaining the order of termination of the appellants herein remand the case to the respondent-bank for reconsideration to the extent agreed upon between the parties as indicated in paragraph 6(i) and (ii) above.
8. Needless to observe, that apart from the questions agreed upon between the parties for remand of the cases to the extent indicated above, the respondent-bank, if so advised, shall not be debarred to consider the grant of same facilities and benefits as granted to the employees of the National Bank of Pakistan/ Habib Bank Limited, allegedly in somewhat similar circumstances.
9. Pursuant to this remand order the respondent-bank shall finally decide the matter after providing opportunity of being heard to the appellants herein, as expeditiously as possible not later than four months from the date of receipt of this judgment.
10. If the appellants are aggrieved with the decisions that may be rendered by the respondent- bank pursuant to this remand order, they shall be at liberty to approach the appropriate Service Tribunal afresh for resolution of the disputes arising out of the consent order highlighted in paragraph 6(i) and (ii) above alone, after availing the departmental remedies, in accordance with law.
11. Accordingly, the above appeals are disposed of in the above terms. There shall be no orders as to costs.
12. This being a consented judgment shall not be quoted as precedent.