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2011 P.C.T.L.R. 1243

Imtiaz Ali Khan And 201 Others vs State Bank Of Paktstan, Karachi Through

Citation2011 P.C.T.L.R. 1243
CourtSindh High Court
Judge(s)Shahid Anwar Bajwa, Tufail H. Ibrahim
ResultPetition allowed

SHAHID ANWAR BAJWA, J. - Petitioners were all employees of State Bank of Pakistan. On or about October 23, 1997 Voluntary Golden Handshake Scheme (VGHS) was announced. All the petitioners opted under the Scheme. At that time they had more than 10 but less then 25 years of service, In the covering letter issued in connection with the Scheme it was stated as under:- "Under the Scheme, the staff and officers will be entitled to the retirement benefits available under the existing rules and regulations, In addition to normal retirement benefits, the State Bank will provide the following financial and benefit package under the Golden Handshake Scheme to all employees."

In the scheme in respect of the retirement benefits it was provided as under:-

(b) Employees Whose Services are less than 25 years i. Under Old Retirement Benefits Provident Fond own and Bank's contribution & Gratuity @. One month's Basic Pay for each completed year of service. ii. Under New Retirement Benefits General Provident Fund contribution. Although, such employees are not entitled to pensionary benefits, it has been decided, as a special Case and without creating any precedent to allow them compensation towards pensionary benefits equivalent to 50% Commutation of Gross Pension as a full and final settlement."

2. This Constitution petition was filed with the following prayers:- "(a) Declare the denial of pension to the petitioners discriminatory, arbitrary, mala fide both in law and facts and in violation of Article 25 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and therefore, without lawful authority;

(b) Direct the respondent Bank to pay the pension w.e.f. 16.12.1997 to the petitioners, including the mark-up as per bank rate for delayed above admissible payments, in the interest of justice;"

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners made the following submissions:-

(1) Under the Special Early Retirement Scheme announced on 1.4.2003, 100% Commutation of pension was allowed to all employees irrespective of their length of service. Therefore denial of same benefits to the petitioners would be violative of Article 25 of the Constitution, as it would constitute discrimination without any reasonable basis. Learned counsel in this regard referred to the following provisions contained in the Circular dated 21.4.2003:- "100% commutation for employees who had already opted for pension under Pension-a/m- Gratuity Regulations, 1980 or Gratuity for employees who had already opted for payment of gratuity under Payment of Gratuity Regulations, 1956, as a full and final settlement of Pensionary Benefits. Employees will accordingly, and in consequence, not be entitled to any monthly pension or other gratuity or other commutation."

2. Learned counsel referred to the State Bank Officers (Pension-cum-Gratuity) Regulations, 1980, which were issued in exercise of powers conferred under section 54 of the State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956 with the approval of the Federal Government. Learned counsel pointed out Rule 1(c) which states that this would be applicable to employees, who retired on or after the first day of May, 1977.

Thereafter learned counsel referred to Clause (i) of Rule 2 and Clause (1) of Rule 4 of the Rules and contended that petitioners are retired employees and ate therefore, entitled to pension under the rules. Said Rules 2(i) and 4(1) are as follows:- "2(i) "retirement" means retirement of an officer under the State Bank of Pakistan (Staff)

Regulations, and includes termination of service for any reason other than dismissal."

4(1) Pension. (1) An Officer who retires after completing not less than ten years of total qualifying service shall be entitled to a gross pension."

3. Learned counsel referred to, "To Whom lt May Concern" Certificate issued to other persons who Learned counsel claimed were similarly placed. This certificate states that they retired.

4. Learned counsel referred to a policy statement issued on April 11th, 1998 under the signatures of the Governor State Bank of Pakistan.

"3. Briefly, under the existing Pension Scheme an employee, who has rendered 10 years of services becomes entitled to pension. The pension thus earned after putting in 10 years of services is around 23.3% of the basic pay. This ratio of Basic Pay to pension gradually increases by about 2.3 per cent after every calendar year upto 30 years of services. Fifty (5) percent of the gross pension earned by the employee is commutable at the option of the employee."

Learned counsel referred to a number of case-law to which we shall refer at due place in the course of this judgment.

4. Mr. Khalid Anwar, learned counsel for the Respondent Bank made the following submissions:-

(1) Stale Bank of Pakistan Officers (Pension-cum- Gratuity) Regulations, 1980 are not applicable to the petitioners because petitioners did hot retire from service but they voluntarily opted for GHS and as a consequence they severed their relationship with the State Bank of their own violation and therefore are bound by the terms and conditions laid down by VGHS and not those of the 1980 Regulations which only apply to those employees who retire in the normal course.

(2) That condition of 10 years of service for entitling to pension is in the event of superannuation upon attaining age of retirement and not in the event of any other eventuality.

(3) Learned counsel referred to Regulation 19 of the State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations and contended that the said Regulation must be read in conjunction with the Regulations relating to Pension and Gratuity. The said Regulation 19 is in the following words:- "19. (i) An Officer or an Executive shall retire from the service:-

(a) On such date after he has completed twenty-five years of service qualifying for pension or other retirement benefits as the Governor may, in the interest of the Bank and for reasons to be recorded in writing in each case; or

(b) In any other case, on the completion of the sixtieth year of his age.

(ii) An employee in Clerical and Non-Clerical cadre shall retire on the completion of the sixtieth year of his age.

(iii) The Governor may, on the request of an employee allow him to retire on any day after completion of 25 years of service in the Bank."

4. Petitioners are not retired employees and therefore they are not entitled to pension.

5. The petitioners separated from employment in 1997 and after seven years they realized that they must have more benefits. Therefore the petition very badly suffers from laches.

6. The petitioners cannot claim benefits under the garb of the words "in addition to" normal retirement benefits because nobody is entitled to double benefits. Learned counsel relied upon State Bank of Pakistan v. Khyber Zaman and others (2004 PLC (C.S) 1213).

7. That State Bank of Pakistan does not have statutory rules and therefore this petition is not maintainable. Learned counsel relied upon State Bank of Pakistan through Board SBP and others v.

Agha Muhammad Aurangzeb (SBLR 2006 SC 143), Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v.

Tanweer-ur-Rehman and others (PLD 2010 SC 676) and unreported judgment by a Division Bench of this Court in Syed Nasim Ahmed Shah & others v. State Bank of Pakistan & others Const. Petition No. D-1708 of 2008 decided on 17.11.2009.

8. Regarding definition of retirement given in the Pension and Gratuity Regulations, learned counsel submitted that firstly the definition is "unless repugnant to subject or context" and secondly it does not and it cannot destroy or mar the very concept of retirement.

5. Exercising his right of reply, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that he had approached the Federal Service Tribunal where appeals abated in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2006 SC 602) and they approached this Court within 90 days thereafter.

Learned counsel submitted that in any case it is recurring cause because they are claiming pension every month and in view of dicta of Muhammad Ahmed v. Government of Sind and another (1999 SCMR 255) the petition is maintainable. Learned counsel relied upon Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. S.M. Ismail Naqvi and others (2010 SCMR 42) to contend that the petitioners are entitled to normal retirement benefits besides the benefits under the VGHS.

Learned counsel referred to Para 1 of the para wise comments filed by the State Bank of Pakistan, before Federal Service Tribunal in one of the appeals and pointed out that it was stated there that Regulations framed by the State Bank of Pakistan are statutory regulations and submitted that having pleaded so it is not available to the respondent to plead that State Bank of Pakistan Regulations are not statutory. Learned counsel relied upon Postmaster General, Eastern Circle (EP), Dacca and another v. Muhammad Hashim (PLD 1978 SC 61) to contend that if two interpretations of rules are possible, interpretation more beneficial to the employees should be adopted.

6. It may be pointed out that this Constitution petition was allowed vide order dated 6.2.2007 and Respondent Bank was directed to pay pension to those petitioners who had opted for pension under the Regulations of 1980 or who had joined service after the enforcement of those Regulations. This order was challenged by the Respondent Bank before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the order by this Court dated 6.2.2007 was not a speaking order therefore it could not be termed to be an order in proper form and in accordance with law. Consequently Civil Petition No. 235-K of 2007 was converted into appeal, lt was allowed and impugned order was set aside and matter was remanded to this Court for decision after affording full opportunity of hearing to both the parties.

7. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel and have also gone through the record as well as case-law cited at the bar.

8. Mr. Khalid Anwar contended that the petitioners were separated from employment in 1997 and they approached the Federal Service Tribunal after seven years in 2004 and therefore their petition is hit by laches. As narrated above the petitioners approached the Federal Service Tribunal in 2004 and upon pronouncement of judgment of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Mubeen-us- Salam's case their appeals before the Federal Service Tribunal abated and within 90 days of the pronouncement of judgment in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2006 SC 602) they approached this Court with this writ petition, In Para 109(c) of Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam's judgment it was laid down as under:- "109(c). The cases or proceedings which are not protected or covered by this judgment shall be deemed to have abated and the aggrieved person may approach the competent forums for redressal of their grievances within a period of 90 days and the bar of limitation provided by the respective laws, shall not operate against them till the expiry of stipulated period."

9. A reading of the above dicta of the Supreme Court makes it clear that the cases which abated in view of judgment of Supreme Court in Muhammad Mubeen-us- Salam's case, in respect of limitation and laches are governed, not by any other provision of law or principle, but by what is contained in Para 109(c). Under the above para period of limitation is 90 days starting from date of Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam's judgment has been prescribed. Since the petitioners came to this Court within the above-stated period of 90 days they cannot be shut out of the door on the ground of laches. Support to this view is also available in the case of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Tanweer-ur-Rehman and others (PLD 2010 S.C. 676). Therefore this contention by learned counsel for the Respondent Bank does not appear to be of much weight.

10. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that State Bank does not have statutory rules and therefore this Constitution petition is not maintainable. Learned counsel relied upon Agha Muhammad Aurangzeb Khan's case (Supra). The questions in the reported case was whether action was to be taken against the employee under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, or under the Regulations of the State Bank of Pakistan, In Para 10, the Supreme Court observed as under:- "10. So far the second contention, admittedly the SBP Staff Regulations, 1999 are not statutory rules hence have no statutory force whereas provisions of section 11 of the said Ordinance which reads as under has overriding effect over any other law." and consequently it held that action had to be taken under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000. Another judgment on this point is Chief Manager, State Bank of Pakistan, Lahore and another v. Muhammad Shafi, 2010 PLC (C.S) 1088. Section 54 of the State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956 provides as under:- "54. Powers of the Central Board to make regulations. (1) Subject to the approval of the Central Government, the Central Board may make regulations consistent with this Act to provide for all matters for which provision is necessary or convenient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act. 2(j) recruitment of officers and servants of the Bank including the terms and conditions of their service, constitution of superannuation, beneficial and other funds, with or without bank's contribution, for the officers and servants of the Bank; their welfare; providing amenities, medical facilities, grant of loans and advances; their betterment and uplift;"

11. It may be pointed out that prior to enforcement of Act II of 1994, words "subject to the approval of the Federal Government" existed in Sub-section (1) of Section 54 which words were deleted by the Act II of 1994. In this view of the situation it was held by the Supreme Court in Muhammad Shafi's case (Supra) as under:- "8. The omission of the aforesaid words subject to the approval from section 54 is meaningful. Rules framed by the Central Board of Directors which does not require approval of the Government, therefore aforesaid regulations may be termed as internal instructions of domestic rules/regulations having no status of statutory rules/regulations as law laid down by this Court in various pronouncements which are as follows:-

(i) Cadet College Kohat's case PLD 1984 SC 170

(ii) Zia Ghafoor Paracha's case 2004 SCMR 35."

12. In the present case, the Regulations which are under scrutiny and under which a right is being claimed are State Bank of Pakistan Officers (Pension-o/m-Gratuity) Regulations, 1980. The very opening words of the Regulations are as under:- "In exercise of the powers conferred by section 54 of the State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956 (XXIII of 1956), the Central Board of Directors of the State Bank of Pakistan with the approval of the Federal Government, makes the following regulations, namely:-"

13. To us the conclusion is inescapable that if any rule or regulations have been framed in pursuance of Section 54 prior to the promulgation of Act II of 1994. Such rules and regulations shall be statutory provided that they have been framed with the approval of the Federal Government.

However, if any rules and regulations have been framed after promulgation of Act II of 1994 they would not be statutory. Therefore since State Bank of Pakistan Officers (Pension-cum-Gratuity)

Regulations, 1980 were framed prior to coming in force of Act II of 1994. Regulations of 1980 are statutory in nature and therefore this Constitution petition is maintainable in respect of the matters governed by statutory Regulations of 1980 and since in this petition the right claimed is a right under the Regulations of 1980 though read with VGHS, this Constitution petition is held to be maintainable.

14. Mr. Khalid Anwar next contention was that Regulations of 1980 are not applicable to the petitioners because the petitioners did not retire from service but were separated from employment under VGHS and the Regulations applies only to those employees who retire in normal course. Combined with this learned counsel referred to Rule 19 as well as the provisions that pension entitlement is after 10 years of service. Mr. Khalid Anwar referred to Regulation 19 of the State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations (incidentally these Regulations are not statutory) and contended that retirement is what is encompassed by the Regulation 19 quoted above. Word "retirement" is also defined in the Regulations of 1980 (which Regulations are statutory). This definition has been reproduced above and says that retirement means, retirement of an officer under the State Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Regulations. Had it stopped here Mr. Khalid Anwar would have been perfectly correct in arguing that retirement means retirement under Staff Regulations.

But unfortunately for the Stale Bank the definition given in the Regulations of 1980 does not stop here, lt goes on to say "and includes termination of service for any reason other than dismissal." lt needs no authority to contend that where the word use is includes it enlarges meaning of the words and phrases occurring in the body of the Statute. Reference may be made to Don Basco High School v. The Assistant Director Employees Old Age Benefits Institution and others (PLD 1989 SC 128). One may also refer to Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, where at page 270 it is written as under:- "Sometimes, it is provided that a word shall "mean" what the definition section says it shall mean- in this case, the word is restricted to the scope indicated in the definition section. Sometimes, however, the word "include" is used "in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include." In other words, the word in respect of which "includes" is used bears both its extended statutory meaning and "its ordinary, popular, and natural sense whenever that would be properly applicable." (Emphasis supplied).

15. Termination of employment is a genus of which dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, resignation, retirement etc. Are species and termination of employment can be brought about in many ways, In this regard reference may be made to Telephone Industry of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal and others (1988 PLC 221), Shaikh Shafiq-ur-Rehman and others v. Chairman Sialkot Dry Port and others (2007 PLC 35) and M/s. Fazal Shafiq Textile Mills, Karachi v. Rehmat Khan and others (1972 PLC 364).

16. Word 'termination' is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as follows:- "Termination. End in time or existence; close; cessation; conclusion. Perruche v. Allen, 156 Conn. 282, 240 A2d 912, 914.

Word for purposes of insurance, refers to the expiration of a policy by lapse of the policy.

Waynesville Sec. Bank v. Stuyvesant Inc. Co., Mo. App., 499 S.W. 2d 218, 220.

With respect to a lease or contract, term refers to an ending, usually before the end of the anticipated term of the lease or contract, which termination may be by mutual agreement or may be by exercise of one party of one of his remedies due to the default of the other party. As regards a partnership, term refers to a winding up and cessation of the business as opposed to only a technical ending (as upon the death of a partner) which is a dissolution. A dissolved partnership may terminate or may be continued by a partnership of the remaining partners, including perhaps the estate or heirs of the deceased partner.

Under the Uniform commercial Code, "termination" means legally ending a contract without its being broken by either side."

In Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Eleventh Edition, the following meaning is given to the word 'terminate':- "terminate 1. Bring to an end, end (a pregnancy) before term by artificial means, (of a train or bus service) end its journey. 2. (terminate in) have an end at (a specified place) or of (a specified form).

3. Chiefly N. Amer, end the employment of.

4. Euphemistic, chiefly physical end or extremity of (an area)."

In Judicial Dictionary by K.J. Aiyar 13th Edition, the following is stated about word 'termination':- "Termination. Of service. The decisions of Supreme Court in Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India (1953 SCR 655), AIR 1953 SC 250 and Shyam Lai v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1955) 1 SCR 26, AIR 1964 SC 369] clearly establish that termination of the services of a person employed by the government does n6t amount in all cases to dismissal or removal from service. [Hartwell Prescott Singh v. Uttar Pradesh Government AIR 1957 SC 886 at 887].

The essential element of termination is that as soon as the services of a person are terminated, all bonds rights and liabilities are immediately snapped; there is no continuity of any right or benefit .Whatsoever after termination, except perhaps such rights and benefits are expressly provided by the statute. [Bholanath v. Union of India (1992) 19 ATC 188 at 196 (all)].

The expression in ordinary parlance may include termination for misconduct; but in the light of rules and prevailing practice, the meaning of that word has come to be restricted to contractual termination unconnected with any idea of punishment for misconduct [Devraj Urs v. General Manager Mysore State Road Transport Corporation (1970) 2 Mys LJ 496, 1971 Lab IC 469, AIR 1971 Mys.

99 (106)]."

17. To us it appears that termination, in the context of relationship of employer and employee, means to bring the service to an end by any mode whatsoever, In common parlance dismissal, although technically a species of termination (no wonder under Standing Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 dismissal is included in the genus of termination) is stated in contradistinction to termination. Retirement is also species of termination. Moreover in Regulation 2(i) it is stated that retirement includes termination of service for any reason other than dismissal. Even if the petitioners opted for the VGHS, it was a termination by contract between the employer and employee and in view of the specific definition of retirement provided in the Regulations of 1980 such a termination would be included in retirement.

18. Retrenchment was affected in United Bank in 1997 when more than 5000 officers were retrenched from employment. Golden Handshake benefits were also paid to them and in terms, for those with less than 25 years provision almost identical to the provision quoted in Para 1 above was made in the retrenchment Circular dated 9.10.1997, The matter meandered and reached the Supreme Court, In United Bank Limited through President v. Shamim Ahmed Khan and 41 others (PLD 1999 S.C. 990) action of retrenchment on the part of management was upheld. At page 997 benefits identical to benefits quoted in Para 1 were allowed. After this judgment by the Supreme Court in the second round in Akram Zahoor and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2000 SCMR 1232), though by consent, the Supreme Court ordered payment of pension in the following words:- "(ii) The grant of pensionary benefits shall be available to those petitioners who are found entitled in accordance with the Service Rules of the respondent bank in force at the time of termination of their service." lt was claimed by United Bank that those with less than 25 years service were not entitled to pension: Thus in the third round Federal Service Tribunal agreed with contention of the management and the matter ended in the Supreme Court. CPLA No. 2292/2001 was decided on 23.11.2001. The Supreme Court quoted Rule 17 of the UBL Staff Service Rules, 198l, which is almost identical to Rule 19 quoted above. Thereafter the Supreme Court quoted from Staff Circular No. 192 which was in the following words:- "3(a) Pension shall be payable if the total service of an officer/executive at the time of retirement or death is 10 years or more. Gratuity shall be payable if the service of an officer/executive at the time of retirement or death is more than 5 years but less than 10 years." and then the Supreme Court held as under:- "A bare reading of the above Rules and Circular would show that pension is admissible only to those employees of the respondent-Bank who retire after completing the requisite service and not to those whose services are terminated. The services of the petitioners were terminated in implementation of the Retrenchment Scheme, therefore, they are not entitled to the pensionary benefits claimed by them."

19. Distinction between UBL and the present case is that whereas in United Bank's case it was specifically stated that pension is to be paid if service at the time of retirement or death is 10 years or more, in the case of Regulations of 1980 firstly a definition of retirement is provided and secondly in Regulation No. 4 it is provided that an officer who retires after completing not less than ten years of total qualifying service shall be entitle! To gross pension. Retirement itself can occur in a number of ways: (i) upon attaining age of superannuation; (ii) disability and medical grounds; (iii) optional retirement at the option of the employee after he has put in prescribed service; (iv) Retirement by employee after the employer has put in prescribed minimum service; (v) compulsory retirement as a punishment after due disciplinary process.

20. As held above the word retirement has an extended meaning in the case of State Bank and it includes termination for any reason whatsoever except dismissal for misconduct. Therefore, the conclusion is inescapable; petitioners termination under VGHS in term of definition given in Regulation No. 2(i) is retirement for the purposes of Regulations and therefore under Regulation No. 4 they are entitled to full pension. Support to this view is also available both from the Circular which accompanied VGHS as well as certificates which have been issued by State Bank to other employees who were separated under VGHS.

21. Mr. Khalid Anwar's contention was that no body is entitled to double benefits. He relied upon Khyber Zaman's case (Supra). Facts of that case were that under the Golden Handshake Scheme it was provided that Benevolent Fund Grant equivalent to 10 years be paid in lump sum in advance at the time of settlement of dues, as a final payment. The Supreme Court held as under:- "5. A bare perusal reveals that there can be no other payment after "final payment" and BFG equivalent to ten years payment whereof was to be made in lump sum. The said portion of the scheme from whatever angle it may be examined cannot be stretched too far to include payment of BFG on monthly basis for then years or till the age of seventy years, lt is not understandable how any deletion, amendment, addition or insertion can be made by us in GHSS specially when it is free from any ambiguity and does not call for scholarly interpretation, In fact the lump sum BFG was in lieu of monthly BFG/or fifteen years which was to be paid under the normal/existing rules. We are afraid that both the benefits under GHSS as well as existing rules cannot be obtained, In fact the respondents had "impliedly" surrendered their "claim" to receive BFG on monthly basis for fifteen years or upto the age of seventy years "in lieu of lump sum payment" equivalent to ten years BFG."

22. The question before the Supreme Court under consideration in Khyber Zaman's case was Benevolent Fund Grant and it was specifically provided in respect of Benevolent Fund Grant that the payment was as finally payment and payment was made in lump sum whereas in case of pension it is specifically stated that normal retirement benefits shall be paid. Therefore claim by the petitioner is not a claim for double benefit.

23. Result of the above discussion is that this Constitution Petition is allowed and the Respondent Bank is directed to pay pensionary benefits to the petitioners in accordance with Regulation No. -4 of the State Bank of Pakistan Officers (Pension-cum-Gratuity) Regulations, 1980.

This Constitution petition stands allowed in the above terms.

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