' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This review petition has been directed against the judgment of this Court, dated 30-10-1998, whereby the appeal filed by tilt ,respondent was accepted and the suit filed by, the plaintiff-petitioner was dismissed.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the suit land measuring 56 Kanals, 5 Marlas situate in village Saliah, Tehsil Bhimber, was transferred through a sale-deed, dated 12-8-1991 for an ostensible consideration of Rupees one lac; the said sale-deed executed in favour of Asghar Hussain was presented for registration on the same day but some Commission was appointed to record the statement of the order and, thus, the sale deed was registered on 19-8-1991. A preemption suit was brought against this sale-deed by Muhammad Ghazan, plaintiff-petitioner, on the basis of sale- deed registered on 15-8-1991. It was contended by Asghar Hussain, respondent herein, that he had purchased the suit land on 12-8-1991 but Muhammad Ghazan has filed a pre-emption suit on the basis that he had also purchased the land from the same 'Khev.At' on 15-8-1991 and, thus, he was entitled to a preemption decree as being a co-sharer in the suit land because the vendee- respondent would be deemed to have purchased the land in dispute on 19-8-1991, when the sale- deed was registered and not on 12-8-1991 when it was executed. Thus, as the plaintiff-petitioner was not a co-sharer on 12-8-1991, when the respondent had purchased the land, his suit for pre- emption was not sustainable. The trial Court, after taking necessary proceedings, decreed the suit of the plaintiff-petitioner. Asghar Hussain, respondent-vendee, filed an appeal before the District Judge who accepted . The same holding that although the sale-deed min favour of the vendee- respondent was registered on 19-8-1991, yet in view of the provisions contained in section 47 of the Registration Act, the sale would be operative from the date of the execution of the sale-deed, i,e, from 12-8-1991 and not from 19-8-1991. Thus, the pre-emption suit filed by the petitioner, herein, was dismissed. However, on appeal to the High Court by Muhammad Ghazan, plaintiff-petitioner, the findings of the District Judge were set aside and that of the trial Court were restored. On appeal to this Court by the respondent-vendee, the judgment and decree of the High Court were set aside and the suit filed by the petitioner was dismissed observing that in view of the provisions contained in section 47 of the Registration Act, the sale-deed executed in favour of Asghar Hussain, respondent, would be operative and effective from 12-8-1991 when it was executed and not from 19-8-1991 when the same was registered. While forming the aforesaid view, reliance was placed on a case of the Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as Naseer Ahmad v. Asghar Ali (1992 SCM R 2300).
3. Raja Muhammad Siddique Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has argued that this court, while passing the judgment under review, has ignored the view taken by this Court in a case reported as Fazal Dad v. Muhammad Azim 1980 CLC 1817, wherein it has been held that section 47 of the Registration Act is applicable to the parties to a document and not to a third person. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the contrary view taken by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, referred to above, which has been followed by this Court is not a correct enunciation of the provisions contained in section 47 of the Registration Act. The learned counsel has argued that th view taken by this Court in Fazal Dad's case, referred to above, is also supported by other authorities on the point whereas the view taken by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Naseer Ahmad's case, referred to above, does not proceed on any earlier .Precedent.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the following authorities in support of his contentions:-- ' In case reported as Ram Saran Lall v. Mst. Domini Kuer (AIR 1961 SC 1747), the facts were that the suit of pre-emption was governed by one of the principles of Muslim law, whereby the first demand called 'Talabi-Mowasibat is to be made by an intending pre-emptor after the completion of the sale. However, the demand was made after the execution of the sale-deed but prior to the registration of the same. It was held that as the sale would be deemed to have been completed only after the registration of the sale-deed under the provisions of Registration Ace,- the said demand having been made before the registration of the sale-deed did not satisfy the requirement of making demand after the sale, because the same was made at the time when the sale-deed had not yet been registered.
' In case reported as Nabir Ganai v. Muhammad Ismail Ganai (AIR 1960 Jammu and Kashmir 112), it was held that the provisions contained in section 47 of the Registration Act are applicable to the vendor and vendee only; so far as a third person is concerned, he would not be adversely affected by the same. Otherwise, a third person who was not party to the sale-deed would face enormous difficulties despite the fact that he had no knowledge of the execution of the same.
' In case reported as Gosto Behari Das v. Smt. Rajabala Del (AIR 1956 Cal. 449), while interpreting section 26-F of Bengal Tenancy Act, it was observed that the person claiming to pre-empt on the basis of having become a co-sharer, can be so regarded only after the registration of the sale- deed on the basis of which he claims to *be a co-sharer. However, so far as the interpretation of section 47 of the Registration Act is concerned, the learned Judges expressed doubt about the correctness of the view that the said provision applies only to the vendor and vendee and not to a third person. This authority goes against the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner rather than supports him.
' In case reported as Fazal Dad v. Muhammad Azim (1980 CLC 1817), the facts were that in a pre- emption suit one of the questions which came up for consideration was about the starting point of limitation. It was held by the Court that as the possession of the suit land was obtained by the vendee one day before the execution of the sale-deed, his possession could not be regarded to be the possession 'under the sale' and, thus, the limitation would start under Article 10 of the Limitation Act from the date of the registration of the sale-deed. However, it was further observed by the Court that the provisions of section 47 of the Registration Act are applicable only to the parties -to .The document and are not relevant so far as the pre-emptor is concerned. For the aforesaid view, the reliance was placed upon the cases reported as Ragho v. Sakhararn (AIR 1922 Nagpur 200), Ram Gopal v. Dr. Balkunth Nath Sharma (AIR 1947 All. 252) and Mst. Sardar Begum v. Syed Masoom Shah (AIR 1945 Pesh. 9).
' In case reported as. Muhammad Meherali Mondal v. Muhammad Karam Ali Sarkar (PLD 1965 Dacca 305), it was observed that the application of section 47 of the Registration Act is to be confined between the transferor and the transferee and not between the transferee and the third party.
' In case reported as Mst. Khurshid Begum v. Muhammad Fazal (PLD 1981 SC (AJ&K) 103), it was observed that under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the sale contemplated under section 20 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act means a complete sale, i,e, sale after the registration of the sale-deed under section 61 of the Registration Act.
4. In reply, Mr. Zafar Hussain Mirza, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondent, has controverted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. He has submitted that the view taken by this Court is supported by the view taken by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in an identical case. He has submitted that plain reading of section 47 of the Registration Act does not admit of an interpretation in terns that the said provision is not relevant in case of a third party and its application is only confined to the parties to the sale-deed or any other document which is compulsorily registerable. The learned counsel has argued that the interpretation suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner runs counter to the well-settled principles of rule of interpretation that the Courts are to interpret the law as it is and not as it should be; he has further submitted that a Court of law is not empowered- to read the words in a provision which are not there. The learned counsel has contended that as it has not been envisaged in section 47 of the Registration Act that its application would be confined only to the parties to the document, it cannot be said that the same would apply only to the parties to the document and not to a third person. The learned counsel has argued that the view taken by this Court in Fazal Dad's case, referred to above, is based on the authorities which had not only been overruled but the observations made by the Court were not relevant to the facts of the said case. He has maintained that in that case, the question of starting point of limitation was the subject-matter of the controversy between the parties. The Court came to the conclusion that the possession was delivered to the vendee one day prior to the execution of the sale-deed. Thus, it was observed that as the possession was taken one day prior to the execution of the sale-deed, it cannot be said that the possession was taken 'under the 'sale', as the same was taken before the execution of the ' sale-deed. Thus, the question of application of section 47 of the Registration Act was not necessary to be resolved in the said case. The learned counsel has cited the following authorities in support of his contentions:-- ' In case reported as Naseer Ahmad v. Asghar Ali (1992 SCM R 2300), the facts were that a sale- deed regarding the disputed land was executed on 8-9-1974, i,e,, a day before the institution of the suit. It was presented for registration on 9-9-1974 but the same was registered on 10-9-1974. It was observed that the High Court has committed an error in holding that as the document was registered after the institution of the suit, the transaction was of no avail to the appellant, because the High Court had ignored the provisions of section 47 of the Registration Act according to which after registration, the document would be operative from the date of its execution and not from the date of its registration.
' In case reported as Jainulla v. Anu Mai (PLD 1964 Dacca 12), while dealing with section 47 of the Registration Act, it was observed that the question of title should be determined with reference to the date of execution of the sale-deed and not the date of its registration.
' In case reported as U. On Maung v. Maung Shwe Hpaung (AIR 1937 Rangoon 446), it was observed that in view of the provisions contained in section 47 of the Registration Act, the period would run under section 54 of the Provincial Insolvency Act from the date when the document was executed and not from the date of its registration.
' In case reported as Ghulam Abbas v. Muhammad Sharif (1994 M LD 1853), it was observed that after the registration of the sale-deed, the same would be operative from the date when it was executed and not from the date when it was registered.
' In case reported as Ch. Muhammad Ibrahim v. Ch. Ibrahim (PLD 1975 Azad J&K 20), it was held that a sale-deed which was executed on 1-6-1965 and was registered on 5-6-1965, would have precedence over the sale-deed which was executed and registered on 4-6-1965 because after the registration of the sale-deed executed on 1-6-1965, it would be operative from the date of its execution under section 47 of the Registration Act and not from the date of its registration.
' In case reported as Gopal Ram v. Lachmi Misir (AIR 1926 All. 549), it was observed that although a document so long as it remains unregistered is not valid, yet as soon as it is registered, it would take effect from the date of its execution and not from the date of its registration.
5. We have given due consideration to the arguments raised at the Bar. The question which needs resolution is as to whether the application of section 47 of the Registration Act is confined only between the parties to the document or it also extends to any third party or for that matter to a pre-emptor. For elucidating the matter, it would be expediens here to reproduced below section 47 of the Registration Act:-- "47. Time from which registered document operates.--- A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would ,have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration."
' Evidently, section 47 does not envisage that this provision would be applicable only to the parties to a document and not to a third person. The contrary view taken in some of the authorities cited by the leaned counsel for the petitioner that the application of the aforesaid provision is confined only to the parties to the document cannot be endorsed for the simple reason that this runs counter to the plaid reading of the aforesaid provision of law. It needs hardly any authority that while interpreting a statutory provision, a Court of law should not read the words in such a provision which are not there. Thus, we are of the opinion that the view taken in some of the authorities which confine the application of the provisions contained in section 47 of the Registration Act to the parties to the document only is not sustainable as being artificial one. It would be expedient here to reproduce the view of the learned Judges in case reported as Gosto Behari Das v. Smt. Rajabala Del (AIR 1956 Cal. 449), referred to above. While dealing with the question, their Lordships have observed as under:- "6. I confess that the question is not free from difficulty. If section 47, Registration Act is treated as limited to successive transfers of the same property, the difficulty undoubtedly disappears but the language of the section is sufficiently wide to cover transfers of different properties as well. Again, if the principle of the section is to apply, as between the vendor and the vendee, there must be some good reason as to why it should not apply as against third parties. I invited the learned Advocates to furnish the reason, but they were unable either to find it in the reported cases or to supply it themselves. The difficulty to my mind remains unsolved."
6. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to the authority of this Court reported as Fazal Dad v. Muhammad Azim (1980 CLC 1817) is concerned, the perusal of the facts of that case reveals that in that case the question of starting point of limitation in a preemption suit was under consideration in view of Article 10 of the Limitation Act. Before dealing with the question, it would be expedient here to reproduce below Article 10 of the Limitation Act:-- "10. To enforce a rightofpre- emption whether therightis founded on law, or general usage, or on special contract.One year.When the purchaser takes, under the sale sought to be impeached, physi--cal possession of the whole of the property sold, or, where the subject of the sale does not admit of physical possession, when the instrument of sale is registered."
' In Fazal Dad's case, it was held that as the possession was not taken 'under the sale', the starting point of limitation would be the date of the registration of the sale-deed; the possession was taken one day before the execution of the sale-deed. Thus. The question of the application of section 47 of the Registration Act was not directly involved in the said case. The question of the application of section 47 of the Registration Act would be relevant where the limitation would start from the date of the possession 'under the sale'. In such cases, the question may arise as to whether the date of sale would be the date on which the sale-deed was executed or the date when the same was registered. Thus, the observations of the Court that the provisions of section 47 of the Registration Act are not applicable in case of third person or for that matter to' the pre-emptor were beyond the scope of the controversy in that case. Even otherwise, the perusal of the judgment shows that while making the observations' that section 47 of the Registration Act does not apply to a third person, reliance was placed upon the cases reported as Ragho v. Saidultrani (AIR ;922 Nagpur 200), Ram Gopal v. Dr. Ballwin!) Natb Sharma (AIR 1947 All 252) and Mst. Sardar Begum v. Syed Masoom Shah (AIR 1945 Pesh. 9). It may be observed that the view taken in Ragho v. Sakharam (AIR 1922 Nagpur 200), and Mst. Sardar Begum v. Syed Masoom Shah (AIR 1945 Pesh. 9) was not followed in case reported as Ram Gopal v. Dr. Balkunth Nath Sharma (AIR 1947 All. 252); in fact the view taken in Ragho v. Sakharam (AIR 1922 Nagpur 200), was overruled by the Nagpur High Court itself in a case reported as Mahomed Bashir Khan v. Mst. Kulsum Bibi (AIR 1937 Nagpur 1). So far as the case reported as Ram Gopal v. Dr. Balkunth Nath Sharma (AIR 1947 All. 252) is concerned, the case law on the point of application of section 47 of the Registration Act to a third person was discussed in detail and it was held that the application of section 47 cannot be confined only to the parties to the document rather the same is equally applicable to third person or for that matter to a pre- emptor. After discussing two authorities of the Privy Council, the learned Judge has observed as under:-- "11. Three cases of this Court cited on behalf of the respondent are 14 AU 382 (Bindheshri v. Somnath Bhadry), AIR 1926 All. 549 (Gopal Ram v. Lachmi Misir) and AIR 1927 All. 545 (Mahomed Bashir Khan v. Mst. Kulsum Bibi. In the first case the suit was brought by a Zamindar for Zar-i-Chaharum and the period of limitation under Article 120 was 5 years from the date of the sale. The sale-deed was executed on 20-1-1909, but was not registered until 29-1-1909, although it was presented for registration on the date of execution. The suit was instituted on 28-1-1915. It was held that the suit was barred by limitation, the right to sue having accrued to the plaintiff from the date of execution.
The judgment, which is a short one, shows that the deciding factor in the opinion of the Bench which decided the case, was that section 47, Registration Act, made the deed effective from the date of execution. This decision seems to me to be very relevant although this suit was not a pre- emption suit. The plaintiff was, as in a pre-emption suit, a third party, namely. The Zamindar. The decision also meets an argument which was advanced on behalf of the appellant that registration might conceivably not take place until after the period of limitation, if taken from the date of execution, had expired. That objection would apply just as much to a suit brought by a Zamindar for Zar-i-Chaharum as to pre-emption suits. The case in AIR 1926 All. 549 (Gopal Ram v. Lachmi Misir) also supports this view. ThiSsuit in the case was a preemption suit, but it was held that Article 120, and not Article 10, applied because the suit was in respect of ,a lease and not of a sale. This however, does not affect the principle which was applied by the Bench,. That principle being that although a document, so long as it remains unregistered, is not valid, yet as soon as it has been registered, it takes effect from the date of its execution. When the law has given to a transaction a retrospective effect, it must have that effect. This case appears to me to be direct authority of this Court in favour of the view taken by the lower appellate Court. Again in the last case of 1927 it was held that a transfer sought the pre-empted would come into force on the date of the deed of sale and not when it was registered in view of section 47. Although the sale-deed is incomplete till the formality of registration has been gone through, once that requirement is fulfilled the sale takes effect from the date of its execution. The Bench which decided this case referred in this connection to the observations of their Lordships in 54 J.A. 89 (Kalyanasundaram Filial v. Karuppa Mooppanar)."
It is evident from the above analysis of the case law relied upon in Fazal Dad's case that the view taken in that case is not based on correct appreciation of the authorities purported to have been relied upon in that case. Thus, we are of the opinion-that in view of section 47 of the Registration Act, its application cannot be confined only to the parties to the document; it equally applies to third person or that matter to a preemptor. Hence, the contrary view taken in Fan] Dad's case stands overrated.
' In the light of what has been stated above, finding no force in this review petition, the same is hereby dismissed with costs. Review .