' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.---Present appeal, by leave of .The court, is directed against judgment dated 14-2-2005, whereby the learned High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court Larkana accepted respondents' Civil Revision Application No, 3 of 1999, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Court and restored that of the learned trial Court.
2. Facts of the case as tabulated in the leave granting order read as under:-- "2. Precise facts appear to be that through registered sale-deeds dated 30-8-1941 and 22-11-1941 Gobind Ram purchased the suit property from its original owners followed by mutation in the record of right in his name. On account of oversight, however, record of rights was not mutated in his favour in respect of 50 paisa share in the suit property original owned by Peeral son of Lal Bux Bhutto. Vide sale-deed scribed on 9-11-1946, one Andal Khan predecessor-in-interest of the private respondents/plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 5 purchased the suit-land from the said Gobind Ram, Andal Khan died in 1955 leaving behind respondents Nos.1 to 5 as his legal heirs. In the month of December, 1986 petitioners Ghulam Rasool and Karim Bux declared that they had purchased the suit-land from respondent-Nawaz Khan, to whom it had been allotted in satisfaction of his verified claim.
Respondent-Muhammad Saleh approached Mukhtiarkar, Garhi Yasin for mutation of record in his favour. The latter informed him that Revenue Record had been mutated in favour of petitioner Ghulam Rasool and Mst. Nawab Khatoon as a result of a registered sale deed and inheritance, mutation. Plaintiffs, therefore, tiled a suit for declaration of their title challenging the execution of sale deed by Gobind Ram in favour of Nawaz Khan, inheritance mutation in the name of Mst.
Nawab Khatoon and cancellation of sale-deed in favour of respondent-Ghulam Rasool as without lawful authority and for permanent injunction against respondents Nos. 1 to 5 from interfering with their possession and ownership.
3. The suit was contested on a variety of grounds and as many as 13 issues were struck. Both the parties adduced evidence. On assessment of evidence, trial Court through its judgment dated 29- 11-1997 decreed the suit as prayed. Petitioners filed an appeal before an Additional District Judge, Shikarpur, who allowed the same and set aside the'judgment and decree of the trial Court, respondents there upon were obliged to invoke revisional jurisdiction of the Sindh High Court, which was allowed vide its judgment dated 14-2-2005."
' The appellants sought leave to appeal against judgment dated 14-2-2005, which was granted to them by this Court, vide order dated 27-12-2005 to consider the following questions:-- "We have heard M/s. Naraindas C. Motiani and Muhammad Saleem Samo, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the parties and with their assistance gone through the impugned judgment and the record. The controversy between the parties indeed revolves around interpretation of section 47 of the Registration Act 1908 and the question as to what would be the actual date of execution of the sale-deed under the Registration Act and whether the transaction of sale by Gobind Ram in favour of Andal Khan required confirmation by Custodian Evacuee Property within the meaning of section 20 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957?"
3. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the alleged sale-deed between Gobind Ram and Andal Khan executed on 9-11-1946 and registered on 3-3-1947 will operate with effect from 3- 3-1947; that said sale-deed was not confirmed as required under section 20 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, therefore, it did not create any rights favouring respondents; that section 47 of the Registration Act was not applicable in this case and instead thereof section 49 of the Registration Act was relevant and that the learned High Court erred in law in allowing respondents' Civil Revision Application. He relied upon the judgments reported as "Jumma Khan v. Mahmud Khan (PLD 1973 Supreme Court 289) and Habibur Rehman v. Wandania (PLD'1984 Supreme Court 424)". Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents supported the impugned judgment.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the available record.
Admittedly, Gobind Ram executed sale-deed on 9-11-1946 favouring Andal Khan, which was registered on 3-3-1947 before the Sub-Registrar. The case of the appellants is that as the said document was registered on 3-3-1947, therefore, it will only operate and create rights favouring vendees from date of registration of the document notwithstanding the fact that the sale deed bears the date i,e, 9-11-1946. Section 47 of the Registration Act reads as under:-- "47. Time from which registered document operates:---A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration."
A bare perusal of the said provision of law manifests that a registered document shall operate from the time, day, when it was written and signed and it will create right, title and interest in favour of the transferee from the date of execution and not from the date of registration. In this case, as noted above, the sale-deed was written and signed on 9-11-1946, however, it was registered on 3- 3-1947, therefore, perforce of section 47 of the Registration Act it will deem to operate from 9-11- 1946 and not from 3-3-1947. The learned High Court rightly relied upon the case of "Attaullah Malik v. The Custodian, Evacuee Property (PLD 1964 Supreme Court 236) in which it was inter alia held that even if the sale-deed was registered on subsequent date though, it was executed on prior date then after the registration, the transfer operates in the words of section 47 not from the date of registration but from the date on which it would, if no registration was needed, have taken effect.
It would be -advantageous to refer to the case of "Muhammad Sadiq v. Muhammad Ramzan (2002 SCM R 1821)", wherein this Court held that "There is no cavil to the proposition that the registered document will have precedence over the unregistered document if it was executed earlier in time as the title is determined from the date of execution and not from the date of registration of the document." This Court in another case reported as "Fazal Karim v. Muhammad Afzal (PLD 2003 Supreme Court 818)" adopted the same view and held as under:-- "20. The transaction had initiated from a registered agreement to sell dated 1-10-1979 while sale- deed was executed on 30-12-1979. Such deed was registered on 23-8-1981 while the proceedings before the First Appellate Court ended on 7-4-1981 due to the compromise discussed above. A confusion might arise at any stage that the transaction became effective on 23-8-1981 due to the attestation thereof by the Sub-Registrar, while, the list was not pending at that time, having been disposed of on 7-4-1981. This idea is negated by section 47 of the Registration Act which clearly lays down that a registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration. In this legal aspect of the matter, the transaction in hand, if genuine otherwise, would be deemed to be operative with effect from 30-12-1979, if not 1-10-1979."
' Supreme Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir in the case of "Muhammad Ghazan v. Asghar Hussain (1999 YLR 2480)" after referring to plethora of the case-law on the subject concluded that "in view of section 47 of the Registration Act, its application cannot be confined only to the parties to the document; it equally applies to a third person or for that matter to a pre-emptor.
Thus in view of provisions of section 47 of the Registration Act and the afore-noted case-law, it is held that' the sale deed executed between Gobind Ram and A Andal Khan will be operative and create C right, title and interest of the transferee/vendee in the said property from 9-11-1946 and not from 3-3-1947.
5. Now coming to the next contention of the learned counsel in respect of applicability of section 47 or 49 of Registration Act, suffice it to say that this plea was never raised by the appellants before the learned High Court rather their case before it, as canvassed by the learned counsel, recorded in para 9 of the impugned judgment, was that in view of section 47 of the Registration Act the registered document would operate from 3-3-1947, the date of registration of the document. In view whereof, the appellants are now precluded from taking a contradictory plea. In this behalf reference can be made to "Hashwani Hotels Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan (2007 SCM R 1131)" wherein it was held that if the impugned judgment is silent regarding ground raised before this court presumption would be that such ground was not raised and agitated before the High Court at the time of arguments.
6. Section 49 of the Registration Act reads as under:- "49. Effect of non-registration, of documents required to be registered.---No document required to be registered under this Act or under any earlier law providing for or relating to registration of document shall,---
(a) operate to create, declare assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, to or in immovable property, or
(b) confer any power to adopt unless it has been registered."
' Upon reading the said provision of law, it is clear that it does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In this case the question involved as to whether the sale-deed, which was executed on 9-11-1946 and registered on 3-3-1947 would operate from the date of its execution or registration, was amply covered under section 47 of the Registration Act. Section 49 of the Registration Act has different dimensions and has no applicability under the facts and circumstances of the present case. The plea of the learned counsel has no substance, as Section 49 of the Registration Act was not attracted in the present case, more so, when the appellants before the learned High Court themselves relied upon section 47 of the Registration Act.
7. As regards the next contention of the learned counsel viz, as to whether sale deed executed on 9-11-1946 and registered on 3-3-1947 was required to be confirmed by the Custodian. We have already held that the sale deed was executed on 9-11-1946 and it will operate from the said date, therefore, it was not required to be confirmed by the Custodian. The findings of the learned High Court were that the Custodian did not issue any notification declaring the property as an evacuee property and no such notification was even produced by the appellants. In view of our findings that registered sale deed will operate to create rights from 9-11-1946, it is held that the property could not have been declared as an evacuee property as it vested with the vendee before the creation of Pakistan.
8. There is another aspect of the case. Section 20(1) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957 provides a target date (first day of March 1947), whereafter no creation or transfer of any right or interest upon any property could be made on behalf of any evacuee so as to confer any right or remedy on any party thereto unless it was confirmed by the Custodian. As the sale-deed was executed on 9-11-1946 i,e, before the target date, therefore, it was neither a property left by evacuee nor required any confirmation by the Custodian, as the property vested with the vendees before the target date. As the property was transferred before the target date, therefore, it did not require any confirmation by the Custodian under section 20(1) of Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957.
9. As regards the judgments, relied upon by the learned counsel, suffice it to say that principles laid down in the said judgments are not attracted in the case in hand.
10. In the above perspective, we have examined the impugned judgment and find that the same is not only in accordance with the record of the case but also in consonance with the law on subject and we are not inclined to take a contrary view to the one adopted by the learned High Court. The learned High Court rendered a reasoned judgment and we are not persuaded to interfere in it and the same is hereby maintained. No misreading or nor-reading of the evidence on the record has been pointed out.
11. For what has been discussed above, this appeal lacking in merits stands dismissed with no order as to costs.