' This is a second appeal against the order of the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, dated 28-6-1976, whereby he dismissed the appeal of the present appellant against the order of the learned Rent Controller dated 15-1-1975 as time-barred and refused to condone the delay in the institution of the appeal.
2. The precise facts are that the appellant (Province of Punjab) is admittedly a tenant under the respondent. The tenancy as well as the rate of rent which is Rs, 140 (Rupees one hundered and forty only) p.m. Is admitted before me and was also admitted before the learned Rent Controller. The landlord filed an application for eviction of the tenant. In these proceedings the learned Rent Controller directed the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent at the aforesaid rate for the period 1-10- 1972 to 31-12-1973 (total Rs, 2,100) plus the rent for the month of January, 1974, by the 14th of March, 1974. The future rent was directed to be deposited by the fifteenth of the month following the one for which the rent was due. On 15-1-1975 it was conceded before the learned Rent Controller that the rent for the months of March and April 1974 had not been deposited till then and that the rent for the months of July 1974, August 1974, and October 1974, had also been deposited late. The learned Rent Controller on these facts struck off the defence of the tenant respondent and gave two months' time to it for delivering the possession to the landlord.
3. The tenant applied for a copy of the order of the learned Rent Controller on 7-2-1975. The copy was received by it on 27-2-1975. The appeal, however, was filed on 7-3-1975. Alongwith the appeal an application for condonation of delay was filed in which it was conceded that the appeal was barred by time by one or two days and that the delay in the institution of the appeal may be condoned. The actual pleadings in this respect were as follows:- "That there is a delay of 1 day or at the maximum 2 days in filing the appeal which is not intentional and deliberate but has been caused because the appellant which is a Government Department, received intimation of the appointment of new Government Pleader and instructions to contact him at late hours on 6-3-1975, to brief him in the appeal. This much delay was also due because the dealing official had been transferred."
' The learned Additional District Judge did not consider the cause above reproduced as sufficient and dismissed the appeal as time barred. Hence this second appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued that the Government has various responsibilities to discharge and that in the course of its official work some time is naturally to be consumed and therefore, due to the transaction of the official business some delay took place and the same should be condoned because the Government deserves to be given a special treatment in such matters. The contention has no merit. It was laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Province of East Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid Darji and others (1) that :- "This Court has also in several cases had occasion to point out that so far as limitation is concerned the Government cannot claim to be treated in any manner differently from an ordinary litigant, because of the fact that the Government enjoys unusual facilities for the preparation and conduct of their cases and its resources are much larger. If in spite of these facilities the Government cannot comply with the requirements of the law of limitation then it is for it to take steps
(1) 1970 SCMR 558 to have that law changed and not to ask the Courts to give a different interpretation to its provisions".
The law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts subordinate thereto and, therefore, applying the aforesaid law to the facts and circumstances of the present case, I find that the cause advanced by the appellant in filing the appeal late in the Court of the learned District Judge, Lahore, was not sufficient to condone the delay and the mere fact that it could not arrange the things in time, was no justificationto show special indulgence to the appellant. The order of the learned Additional District Judge which was thus quite in conformity with law on the subject calls for no interference in the course of this second appeal especially when it was within his discretion to condone or not to condone the delay, and also because with such discretionary orders this Court does not ordinarily interfere unless that discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, whimsically or perversely which, however, is not the case here as the learned Additional District Judge has simply applied the well-settled law on the subject.
5. The result is that finding the order of the learned Addl. District Judge, to be unexceptionable I dismiss the present appeal with no order as to costs. .