' The petitioner through this petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment passed by the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Service Tribunal on 18-3-1982. The facts giving rise to the controversy are that Ch. Muhammad Latif, respondent, a Registrar, Co-operative Societies in the Co-operative Department of Azad Jammu & Kashmir Government, was firstly transferred to the Revenue Department as Officer on Special Duty. Again he was deputed to the Department of Industries but in the same capacity. The respondent while working there in the Industry Department as an Additional Director, Industries was arrested on 25-12-1977. He was placed under suspension from the date of his arrest on the charge of having abetted the offences of misappropriation, forgery and cheating alleged to have been committed by the managements of dissolved Co-operative banks.
2. The arrest and suspension of the respondent from service was followed by initiation of disciplinary proceeding against him, under Azad Jammu & Kashmir Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1977, on the grounds of inefficiency, misconduct and corruption. Action having been taken under rule 6, sub-rule (2), he was charge-sheeted on 24-1-1978. Raja Lal Hussain, an Officer on Special Duty, was appointed as Inquiry Officer vide Notification No, Admin/S & G A D/l341- 49/78, dated 24-1-1978, to inquire into the allegation contained in the charge-sheet. Before the Inquiry Officer could start the inquiry he was replaced by Mr. Abdul Majeed Salahria, Secretary, Forests vide Government Order dated 20-4-1978. He too was replaced by Commission of Inquiry No, 2 vide Government Order, dated 6-5-1978.
3. After holding inquiry this Commission submitted the report of its findings to the Government on the basis of which the Government issued fresh show-cause notice to the respondent under rule 6, sub-rule 3(b) of Azad Jammu & Kashmir Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1977.
4. After having considered the report of the Commission, the show-cause notice and the reply of the respondent the Government found him guilty of inefficiency, misconduct and corruption and awarded him the penalty of compulsory retirement by order dated 8-11-1978. The review petition filed by the respondent against the impugned order also failed.
5. Dissatisfied with this order of compulsory retirement passed by the petitioner the responndent challenged its legality by way of appeal in the Services Tribunal. His appeal was accepted and the impugned order of his compulsory retirement was declared to be unlawful and without any effect on the grounds that disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent were conducted in flagrant disregard to the mandatory procedure prescribed in the relevant rules. The illegality thus committed while conducting the inquiry and action taken thereafter violated the whole proceedings.' The order passed by the Government with regard to the respondent's Compulsory retirement was, therefore, null and void. It is this order dated 18-3-1982, passed by the Service Tribunal, for the reversal of which leave to appeal is sought.
6. At the very outset Kb. Muhammad Saeed, the learned counsel for the respondent, raised a preliminary objection that the petition being time-barred and there being no sufficient cause for condoning the delay it is liable to be dismissed on this sole ground. In view of the importance of objection I am of the view that before considering the merits of the various grounds, listed in the petition for leave to appeal, the point of limitation must first be attended to. For the better and proper appreciation of merits of this preliminary objection various relevant dates must be listed in their chronological order. The impugned judgment of the Service Tribunal, to challenge the propriety and legality of which the petitioner now seeks leave to appeal, was passed on 18-3-1982.
However, before parting with the case the Tribunal issued the direction as contained in the last para. Of its judgment that the parties were to be informed about the order. The Additional Advocate-General applied for the supply of the copy on 20-3-1982. The attested copy of the judgment, sent by the Registrar, Service Tribunal, was received in the office of the Chief Secretary, Azad Jammu & Kashmir Government on 22-3-1982. The copy of judgment accompanying the petition for leave has a noting on it to the effect of its having been supplied on 24th and the petition for leave to appeal was filed on 26th of May, 1982.
7. The question now, therefore, requiring determination is that from what point of time the period of limitation started to run. Is it the date on which the judgment was announced or the date when the Additional Advocate-General applied for the copy or would it be the date when attested copy of the judgment was received by the Chief Secretary's Office? Yet another point needing consideration is with regard to the adjustment of the time spent in obtaining the copy of the judgment for purposes of section 12 of Limitation Act. Would it be from 20th March to 24th March, 1982, or the 22nd of March when an attested copy of the judgment had already been received by the office of Chief Secretary ?
8. In view of the direction contained in the judgment that parties were to be informed, it can safely be taken that it was announced in the absence of the parties, 18th of March 1982, when the judgment was announced, naturally cannot be the starting point of limitation.
9. Kh. Muhammad Saeed, the learned counsel for the respondent, argued that even if the limitation be considered to have started from the date of the knowledge of the petitioner still the starting point would be 20th March when Additional Advocate-General applied on behalf of the Government for the issuance of the copy of the judgment. Since 60 days' period of limitation ended on the 19th of May, 1982, the petitioner could add only two days to his ordinary period of limitation by way of adjustment for the purpose of section 12, Limitation Act, as the attested copy of the judgment had been received by the Government on the 22nd of March, 1982.
9. After having made the necessary adjustment of two days the petition still ought to have been filed on the 21st of May, 1982. Whereas in fact it was filed on 26th. So there being delay of 5 days petition being time-barred was liable to be dismissed. The learned counsel further submitted that the time requisite under section 12 of Limitation Act, would be from 20th to 22nd of May and not 24th May, the date on which the copy of the judgment accompanying the petition for leave to appeal is shown to have been issued.
' The argument is that the petitioner having in his possession a copy of the judgment already supplied to him on 22nd of May, by the Registrar, Service Tribunal, no more time in fact was requisite for him to -get another copy for filing the petition for leave to appeal. The allowance given by section 12 of the Limitation Act must in this case be only that which was attributable to getting the first copy. The time requisite for obtaining the copy, mentioned in section 12 Limitation Act, is not the time requisite for obtaining the copy actually used ; but the time requisite for obtaining an earlier copy at least in cases where the petitioner had obtained one.
10. The argument on the face of it may sound plausible but it does not reflect the correct position of law. The time granted by Statute cannot be restricted by adding to it a limitation that where a petitioner or the appellant has got more than one copy of the judgment and decree, he ought, if he seeks exclusion of time for obtaining the copy, to use the first copy. All that the law requires is that if an appellant seeks the aid of section 12, Limitation Act, he will get only so much in excess of the proper time as is requisite, i,e, D properly required for obtaining the copy which he actually uses in petition or appeal. Anyway even if the date on which the copy accompanying the petition is shown to have been issued be taken into consideration even then the petition ought to have been filed on 23rd May.
11. Mr. T. H. Tariq, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that since the attested copy of the judgment, transmitted by the Registrar, Service Tribunal to the Government, was received on 22nd of March, 1982 it will be assumed for all intent and purposes that the judgment was announced on the day the petitioner was informed, i,e, 22nd March, 1982. With regard to the period which ought to be added to the normal period of 60 days by way of adjustment as time requisite under section 12, Limitation Act, according to him, would be 4 days, i,e, from 20th when the Additional Advocate- General applied to 24th when copy was issued. So, if these 4 days added to the normal period of limitation and taking 22nd March the starting point for limitation the petition, according to him, is well within time. The argument is without any substance and also illogical. The learned counsel expects the Court to take 22nd May as a starting point for limitation as, according to him, the judgment be deemed to have been announced on the day the petitioner got the information and not the 20th March, when the Government Advocate applied for the copy. But the time requisite, according to him, would be from 20th to 24th. The plain reading of section 12 of Limitation Act makes it clear that the time to be added in the normal period is the time' spent for obtaining the copy of the judgment and not the time previous to E the announcement of judgment. If the learned counsel feels that 22nd May be deemed to be the day of announcement of the judgment then the only period which could be adjusted would be from 22nd to 24th of March, 1982, and not from 20th to 24th. Even if assuming the argument of Mr. T. H. Tariq, the learned counsel for the petitioner, to be correct the petition would still be out of time. For the above-stated reasons I hold that the petition is not within time. There is delay of at least 3 days.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that since there is delay of only few days it ought to be condoned as lot of time is consumed in official processing by various Government agencies and the delay, therefore, is justifiable. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to AIR 1929 Sind 211, PLJ 1982 SC Azad J & K 184 and PLJ 1980 SC 370 and submitted that there existed sufficient cause on the basis of which delay in the present case ought to be condoned. The learned counsel for the respondent in reply contended that Government under the law does not enjoy any preference over ordinary citizen. Each party is to be treated at par and the law thus admits no preference to be extended to the Government. It is further argued that the delay no doubt can be condoned for sufficient cause ; but as there exists no sufficient cause justifying the condonation of delay in the present case he submits that petition ought be dismissed as time-barred. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on 1970 SCMR 55.5, 1975 SCMR91, 1971 SCM R 54 and PLD 1977 Lah.
55.
13. In order to determine the existence or non-existence of the sufficient cause for condonation of delay in the present case I propose to examine the various authorities referred to by the learned counsel of the respective parties and the principle enunciated therein. The facts in case titled Secretary of State v. Gurmukhdas and another (1), were that in appeals against the order of District Judge, Hyderabad applications on behalf of the Government were moved for extension of the period fixed by law for presentation of appeals. The learned Judges in that case observed that although Act makes no distinction between the Government and the private individual but it is obvious that in considering an application under section 5 of Limitation Act distinction must be made between a private individual who has only himself to consider whereas the same cannot be said of the Government. I have given my earnest consideration to the problem and an unable to persuade myself to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner for the following reasons :-
(a) facts of that case are quite distinguishable from the facts in the present case. In that, judgment appealed against was that of District Judge, Hyderabad and naturally good deal of time was required for getting the copies of necessary documents and for their onward transmission to the relevant department of the Government. The learned Judges in view of facts in that case found that the Government treated the matter urgent. It was also held that there were difficulties in connection with Sind cases which were not felt in any other Province ;
(b) Since section 5 of Limitation Act and Azad Jammu & Kashmir Supreme Court Rules make no distinction between the Government and the private individual, it would tantamount to doing violence to the basic norms of interpretation of Statute by giving it imaginary meanings. Besides, accepting this broad based principle, as enunciated by the learned Judges in that case, would really reduce the statutory provisions and the rules to redundancy. With great respect to the learned Judges in that case I am constrained to say that the principle, broadbased as it is, is not sound one ; and
(c) Moreover, the acceptance of this principle would also militate against the golden principle "Equality before law" held so dear and respected by all the civilised societies. It will also be volatile of the principle of Islamic Jurisprudence. The facts contained in cases reported in PLD 1983 SC (A J& K) 1 and PLJ 1980 SC 370(?), referred by the learned counsel, are quite distinguishable.
14.- Delay no doubt can be coadoned under section 5, Limitation Act, and Order XIII, rule 1 of Azad Jammu & Kashmir Supreme Court Rules for {FOONOTE}}
(1) AIR 1929 Sind 211 ' sufficient cause. The question, therefore, for determination is as to whether there exists any sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the present care. The petitioner had the knowledge and two copies of the judgment, on provided by the Registrar, Service Tribunal and the other obtained by the Additional Advocate-General. Law Secretary to the Azad Government had only to direct their counsel to file the appeal. The petitioner has two very efficient and senior counsel as Advocate- General and Additional Advocate-General. There is no explanation, whatsoever, as to why the petition for leave to appeal could not be filed within time. Where and at what stage of the so-called processing the delay occurred. Mere statement that matter had to be processed by the different Government agencies is really no explanation at all and cannot be regarded as a sufficient cause.
To hold it otherwise would, in fact, amount to rendering the observance of requirement of Limitation Act and the Supreme Court Rules redundant. After giving my earnest consideration to all the circumstances involved I hold that the Government is not entitled to any preferential treatment as compared to ordinary citizen. In case of delay each day of it has got to be satisfactorily explained.
On account of delay a valuable right accrues to the other party and in order to deprive him of such a right there must exist a very convincing and a sufficient cause. Under Supreme Court Rules a petition for leave to appeal beyond time is liable to be dismissed summarily in absence of sufficient cause. I am supported in my view by the principle as enunciated in PLD 1983 SCIAJ& K) 1, 1974 SCM R 223, 393, 1970 SCMR 558(a), 1971 SCM R 54 and PLD 1977 Lah.
55.
' For the foregoing reasons I hold that petitioner has not been able to show sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.