DECISION ' The appellant is aggrieved by the order dated 10-11-1997 passed by the learned Labour Court No. V at Karachi whereby grievance petitions filed under section 25-A of the I.R.O. by the abovementioned respondents were allowed.
2. Briefly stated the facts are that according to the respondents they had joined the service of the appellant in different capacities such as Clerks, Checkers, skilled workmen and semi-skilled workmen somewhere in the year 1992. That they were appointed after an interview taken by the officers of the appellant.
3. It is the case of the respondents that since the time of their appointment they were denied all the rights and fringe benefits granted to them under the labour laws. So much so that even the appointment orders were not issued in their favor. Benefits such as the medical facilities Uniform Allowance, Education Allowance etc; etc; were totally denied to them by the appellant. They had been raising protests from time to time but to no avail. Consequently on 18-10-1992, they sent a written representation to the appellant, but on 19-10-1992 their services were verbally terminated.
Accordingly grievance notices dated 15-1-1993 were addressed to the appellant and one Muhammad Hussain respondent No. 1. At this stage it would be proper to point out that this Tribunal is at a loss to understand as to why respondent No.1 Muhammad Hussain has been joined as a respondent in the original grievance petition and as to why grievance notices were addressed to him by the present respondents. This observation is made because perusal of grievance petition indicates that not a single word has been used in respect of Muhammad Hussain, as to in what capacity he came into picture so also no relief is claimed against him. In fact the respondents remained mum about the alleged role of Muhammad Hussain in the present litigation. The role of Muhammad Hussain came into light when the appellant i.e. respondent No.1 in its written statement categorically mentioned that the respondent workers were in fact employees of Contractor Muhammad Hussain. However, after taking the evidence of the parties the learned lower Court by a consolidated judgment allowed the grievance petition and directed the appellant to reinstate the workers with full back benefits.
4. The case of the appellant before the Labour Court has been that the worker respondents had been engaged by Contractor Muhammad Hussain as a result of a contract dated 5-1-1992 Annexure 'A' to the written statement. That the necessity to engage workers through Contractor arose as a result of an embargo placed by the Federal Government at the relevant time. It was denied that the legitimate rights and benefits were ever refused to the regular workers of the appellant organisation. It was submitted that since the respondent workers were workers of the Contractor hence the rights and benefits intended by the labour laws for permanent workers were not awarded to them.
5. The learned counsel for the respondent filed preliminary objections in regard to the maintainability of the present appeal. The main ground has been that Mr. M.L. Pasha who had signed and verified memo. of appeal was a small officer of the appellant as such he was incompetent to sign, verify or file the above appeal as he was neither a Director, Secretary, Attorney or Principal Officer of the company. It was also submitted that the appeal was not presented by Mr. M.L. Pasha himself but was presented by the counsel of the appellant. Some objections were also raised in regard to the quantum of the amount deposited in this Tribunal as back benefits.
6. The appellant met the abovementioned objections by filing Counter Affidavit of Mr. Qaiser Sultan, Director Administration of the appellant who had categorically mentioned that Mr. Latifuddin Pasha was a notified Manager of the appellant under the Factories Act and was holding the post of a Senior Manager. That Special Power of Attorney dated 12-11-1997 has been executed in his favour by the appellant. It was further submitted that the grievance petitions were disposed of through a consolidated judgment, as such joint appeal was competent. It was further submitted that under the law the pleader of the appellant was competent to put his signature on the memo. of appeal.
7. It is argued but for the respondent that no person even a Director of a Company can file a suit on behalf of the Company unless authorised by the Board of Directors of the Company, Reliance is placed on PLD 1971 SC 550 at 560-B, PLD 1964 Lah. 648 at 652, PLD 1963 Kar. 446, 1993 PLC 909 at 910, 1998 SCMR 1099; 1987 CLC 367 at 369 - 370, 1994 CLC 2413 Karachi, PLD 1966 SC 649 at 695, PLD 1978 Kar. 417 at 423 last para, 1988 SCMR 1089.
8. Reliance was also placed on PLD 1996 Supreme Court 684, PLD 1991 Lahore 381, 1987 CLC 367 and 1994 CLC 2413. It was argued out that the Authority Letter authorizing Mr. Pasha was not based on the Resolution of the Board of Directors and that the same was submitted in this Tribunal after the Preliminary Objections in respect of competency of Mr. Pasha to file this appeal were raised by the respondent.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Authority Letter and the Special Power of Attorney dated 29-8-1997 and 11-8-1997 have been submitted in this Tribunal alongwith CounterLAffidavit of Mr.Qaiser Sultan which was filed in this Tribunal in response to the Preliminary Legal Objections raised by the respondent in regard to the maintainability of the present appeal.
10. Mr. K.M. Nadeem learned counsel for the appellant referred to )rder XLI, Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code which runs as under:-- "1 (1) Every appeal shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or his pleader and presented to the Court or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf. The memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and (unless the Appellate Court dispense therewith) of the judgment on which it is founded."
11. Mr. K.M. Nadeem learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that there is Plathora of authorities by the Superior Courts that the Rules of Procedure laid down in C.P.C. are not intended for retarding justice on bare technicalities, that the Rules framed in the Code of Civil Procedure are rules made for the advancement of justice and they should not, as for as possible, be allowed to operate so as to defeat the ends of justice. It is also held in 1997 SCMR page 260 that the principal object behind all legal formalities was to safeguard primarily the interest of justice, mere technicalities, unless offering insurmountable hurdles should not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Reliance was also placed on 1970 SCMR 251, PLD 1972 Supreme Court page 9 and PLD 1989 Supreme Court 146.
12. Obviously the appellants have produced the Notification notifying Mr. Pasha as Factory Manager, further more Power of Attorney has also been produced which authorised him to plead in Courts on behalf of the appellant. Even if for the sake of arguments it is admitted that there had been no resolution of Board of Directors authorising Mr. Pasha to lead on behalf of the appellant, still in view of the authorities mentioned above such irregularity cannot be treated as insurmountable hurdle. Such Resolution if required can be produced even at this stage.
Furthermore, the provision of the C.P.C. quoted above clearly authorises the Pleader/Advocate of the appellant to sign present the Memorandum of Appeal. The present appeal alongwith Mr. Pasha has also been signed by Mr. K.M. Nadeem as an Advocate of the appellant.
13. I have carefully considered the submissions of both the learned counsel. I have also carefully gone through the case-law submitted by both the learned Advocates. The case-law submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent mostly pertains to the Civil Suits and not the Civil Appeals.
The provision of Order XLI, Rule 1 of the C.P.C. as quoted above leave no ambiguity that a civil appeal can be signed and presented not only by the party itself but by the Advocate as well. The present appeal also bears the signatures of Mr. K.M. Nadeem as counsel of the appellant. As such I am of the view that the objection in respect of the maintainability of the appeal has no force.
14. As regard the filing of the joint appeal, it may be pointed out that all the grievance petitions were consolidated in the Lower Court and evidence was recorded in only one of them and the same was treated as evidence in all the grievance petitions. They were disposed of by the same consolidated judgment. As such there appears no harm if a single appeal has been filed against all the respondents, in order to avoid the multiplicity of litigation.
15. As regards objections in respect of the deposit of back benefits the respondents have filed writ petition in the Hon'ble High Court of Sindh and the same is still subjudice. As such I am not going to discuss the same.
16. In view of the above discussion I am of the opinion that the Legal Objections in respect of maintainability of the present appeal are not of fatal nature and the same are disposed of in the same terms.
17. Objection has also been raised in regard to the non-maintainability of the written statement filed in the Labour Court by Mr. Merajul Hassan Officer of the appellant. It is submitted that the aforesaid written statement has not been properly verified as such it has no value. It is also submitted that Mr. Merajul Hassan has not been examined as witness in the learned Labour Court, hence the aforesaid written statement cannot be considered as a piece of evidence. Reliance is placed on PLD 1972 Supreme Court page 25.
18. It is well-settled law that the Legal Objections which were to be taken at the earliest opportunity i.e. before the original Court, cannot be A taken at a subsequent stage before the Appellate Court.
Even otherwise the perusal of all the grievance petitions filed by the respondent in the Labour Court including the grievance petition of Nasir Jamal would indicate that the same have also not been properly verified before the Oath Commissioner in accordance with law and rules. As such if the written statement is to be ignored then all the grievance petitions would also have to be dismissed for want of proper verification as required by the law. But in view of the above quoted authorities that the technicalities which do not create insurmountable hurdles in the administration of justice are to be ignored. I do not want to take such drastic step of dismissing all the grievance petitions for want of proper verification. It may also be pointed out that the Affidavit-in-Evidence filed by the respondent workers in the learned Labour Court have also not been properly verified. As such as a result of such irregularity I do not think it proper to discard the grievance petition. Affidavit-in- Evidence, written statement filed by the respondents on the ground that they have not been properly verified.
19. As earlier pointed out the role of Muhammad Hussain in the present litigation is of peculiar and strange nature. The respondent workers have sent joint grievance notices to the appellant as well as respondent Muhammad Hussain, whereby they had mentioned in their grievance notices that their services have been verbally terminated and that they should be reinstated in service forthwith. Obviously section 25-A of the I.R.O. speaks of bringing the grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured under any law, any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing either himself or through his shop steward or Collective Bargaining Agent. According to the definition of 'Employer' in section 2(viii) of the I.R.O. the 'employer' means any person or body of persons whether incorporated or not who employs workman in the establishment under a contract of employment. Obviously in view of the aforesaid definition there can be only one employer which may consist of a single person or a body of persons, but in any case there can be no two employers. Since the grievance notice was jointly addressed to respondent No.1 and respondent Muhammad Hussain as such the natural conclusion would be that the workers respondents treated Pak Suzuki Company as well as aforesaid Muhammad Hussain as their employer. This view also finds support from the fact that even the grievance petitions have been filed jointly against Pak Suzuki Company and Muhammad Hussain treating them as respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Similarly, in the prayer clause of the grievance petitions there is no specific prayer that respondent No.1 i.e. Pak Suzuki Company may be directed to reinstate the worker respondents, on the contrary there is common prayer that the respondents be directed to reinstate the workers. Under the circumstances the conduct of the worker respondents become very strange and suspicious when the perusal of the grievance petitions indicates that not a single word has been mentioned about respondent Muhammad Hussain though he has been impleaded as respondent No. 1 . Even not a passing reference has been made in the grievance petitions that Muhammad Hussain had any interest or role to play as such he has been impleaded as respondent No.2 in the grievance petitions. However, respondent Muhammad Hussain in his Reply Statement fully supported the contention of the appellant raised in their written statement that the respondent workers were in fact the employees engaged by Muhammad Hussain. Same stand was taken by Muhammad Hussain in his Affidavit-in-Evidence, but strangely enough at the time of cross-examination he totally backed out from the contents of the written statement and the Affidavit-in-Evidence stating that he did not know English and he did not know as to what was written in the written statement and the Affidavit-in-Evidence. In fact he went to the extent that he had filed false Affidavit-in-Evidence in this Court. Serious view is to be taken of such conduct of Muhammad Hussain, it seems that ignoring the sanctity of the Court, he had the audicity to admit before the Court that he had filed false Affidavit-in-Evidence. The learned Labour Court rightly discarded his Affidavit-in-Evidence and the cross-examination. Separate notice is being issued by this Tribunal to Muhammad Hussain to show cause as to why legal proceedings should not be instituted against him for filing false documents in the Labour Court. So far as the decision of this appeal is concerned I have not given any credit to the evidence of Muhammad Hussain. Since nothing was mentioned against him in the grievance petition and there was no prayer as such, his name has been deleted from the list of respondent vide this Tribunal's order, dated 12-51998.
20. Now coming to the merits of the case the learned counsel for both the parties have addressed lengthy arguments and have also cited a number of decisions by the Superior Courts. The learned counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on the following authorities: Mirza Muhammad Kazim
(1) 1987 SCMR 146;
(2) 1959 PLD Karachi 403;
(3) 1965 L L C 260-265;
(4) 1977 PLC 17 para. 19 (Karachi High Court);
(5) 1994 PLC 90-93 (Paras. 15, 16 and 17);
(6) 1990 PLC 6 relevant page at 10-11;
(7) 1996 PLC 45-48 para. 9;
(8) 1995 PLC 680;
(9) AIR 1974 Supreme Court 37 at page 43 paras. 30, 31, 33 and 34;
(10) IInd LLT 1978 pages 397-398 (Para. 5);
(11) Appeal No. KAR-124 of 1997 (para. 4) in the case of Star Textile Mills Limited v. Muhammad Farid Khan and others;
(12) 1991 PLC 908 - 912 para. C (Lahore High Court);
(13) AIR 1964 Supreme Court page 355 - 357 (paras. 7 and 8);
(14) Appeal No.KAR-323 of 1998 (paras. 5, 7, 8 and 9);
(15) Appeals Nos.445 to 555 of 1996 (paras. 11, 12, 13 and 14) in the case f Abdullah and others v. Dawood Cotton Mills;
(16) PLD 1993 Karachi 227, 236-C;
(17) PLD 1964 Supreme Court 536;
(18) PLD 1964 Supreme Court 337;
(19) PLD 1990 Supreme Court page 1;
(20) Appeal No. KAR-370 of 1998, Shah Su1m v. Messrs Hussain Weaving and Finishing Mills (paras. 7, 8 and 9); Mr. Ashraf Hussain Rizvi
(1) 1995 SCMR 257 N.A.
(2) AIR 1957 SC India 264;
(3) AIR 1964 SC India 355 at paras. 6, 7, 8 at p. 357;
(4) AIR 1974 SC India 37, paras. Nos. 28 to 36 pp. 43 - 45;
(5) PLD 1959 Karachi 403 (D.B. at p. 406);
(6) 1989 PLC 81 Karachi at page 85-C;
(7) 1976 PLC Lahore at pages 761 B, C, D and E;
(8) 1995 PLC 680 S.L.A.T.
(9) 1993 PLC 937 Full Bench N.I.R.C.
(10) 1977 PLC 17 Karachi;
(11) 1996 PLC 45 D.B. Quetta;
(12) Appeal No.636 of 1992, decided on 21-1-1993;
(13) Appeal No.323/88, decided on 11-5-1989;
(14) Appeal No.215 of 1997, decided on 6-11-1997;
(15) Appeal No.124 of 1997, decided on 4-9-1997;
(16) Central. Excise and Sales Act, 1944, pp. 25, 26 and 98 - 100.
ON THE POINT OF CONTRACTOR
(1) 1987 SCMR 1463;
(2) 1978 LLJ SC India p. 378 (Hussain Bhai Calicut v. Alath Factory);
(3) 1968 LLC p. 260 SC India D.C. Dewan Mohiuddin);
(4) 1.989 SCMR 888;
(5) 1990 PLC 6 (Karachi D.B.);
(6) 1981 PLC 908 (Lahore);
(7) D.B. Judgment in C.P. No. 409 of 1992 dated 22-12-1992 by High Court of Balochistan (now reported as 1996 PLC 45);
(8) 1987 PLC 94 by Mr. Justice Ali Nawaz Budhani;
(9) Unreported judgment dated 10-10-1989 in Appeal No.370 of 1989 by Mr. Justice Ahmed Ali U.
Qureshi;
(10) Judgment dated 24-4-1995 in Appeal No. ??? of 1995 by Mr. Justice Mushtak Ali Kazi (Now reported as 1995 PLC 680);
(11) 1994 PLC 90 by Mr. Justice Agha Ali Hyder;
(12) Judgment dated 2-4-1996 by Justice Mushtak Ali Kazi in Appeal No. 462 of 1996;
(13) Judgment dated 10-4-1997 in Appeals Nos. 546 to .555 of 1997 by Mr. Justice Mushtak Ali Kazi; 20-A. Similarly the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. K.M. Nadeem has placed reliance on the latest judgment of the High Court of Sindh at Karachi delivered on 7-5-1995 in Constitution Petition No. D-956 of 1992, 1987 SCMR 1463, 1985 SCMR 257, PLD 1978 Lahore 704, 1974 PLC Note 60, PLD 1966 Supreme Court 684, 1992 SCMR 19 and PLD 1994 Supreme Court 879.
21. I have carefully gone through the principles laid down by the Superior Courts in the abovementioned authorities. The nexus is that the employment through Contractor has been recognised and mainly the following criteria has been laid down for the guidance of the Labour Court to make a distinction between the employees of the establishment and the employees of the Contractor. The hard fact, however, remains that each and every case is to be decided on the basis of the evidence produced by the parties. So also the conduct of the parties in also to be taken in account. The main criteria seems to be as mentioned below:--
(1) Whether the Industry has administrative control over the workers;
(2) Whether the industry based for the work done by the worker?
(3) Whether the industry has power to reinstate and dismiss the worker?
(4) Is the work required to be performed by workman and continues to be of permanent nature and was related to process of manufacturing before finished goods were sent into market?
(5) Since how long services had been rendered and whether the appellant of emoluments was made from Coffers of the Company?
(6) Whether the goods when marketed, bring back proceeds to Treasury of Company itself?
(7) Since how long the worker had been performing his duties and putting in labour in connection with manufacturing process?
(8) Whether the Contractor is a genuine person and has not been set up for denying the benefits under the labour laws to the workers?
22. I intend to examine the evidence on record in the light of the abovementioned guide lines. The allegation of the respondent workers so mentioned in the grievance petition and the Affidavit-in- Evidence has been that they were directly appointed by the Appellant Company after an interview and medical examination. In the original grievance petitions the date of the appointment is given as 19-10-1992, i.e. a day after their alleged termination on 19-10-1992. But it appears that afterwards they realised their grave mistake of giving the date of appointment as 19-10-1992, hence they moved an application before the learned Labour Court for the amendment of the relevant para. of grievance petition about the date of appointment. The learned Labour Court without applying its mind allowed the aforesaid amendment and instead of 19-10-1992 a period of two years was mentioned in all the grievance petitions. This fact clearly indicates that the worker respondents did not even know about the correct date of their appointments. Normally in such cases as the case is under hand, the burden of proof lies on the establishment to prove that the employees in dispute were in fact the workers of the Contractor and not of the establishment. But in the present case the petition is different. As pointed earlier the workers have addressed common grievance notice to the company as well as to alleged Contractor Muhammad Hussain. So also aforesaid Contractor Muhammad Hussain has been impleaded on respondent No.2. So also in the prayer clause there is no specific prayer that the appellant Company be directed to reinstate the workers, but there is common prayer that the respondents be directed to reinstate the workers. In paragraph No.7 of the Affidavit-in-Evidence by respondent Nasir Jamal it is clearly mentioned that the services of the appellant were never terminated by respondent No.1 . Furthermore, respondent Nasir Jamal in the last paragraph of his cross-examination clearly admitted that aforesaid Muhammad Hussain was Contractor in the appellant Company, and he did not know if his contract was ever terminated. All these factors collectively lead to the inference that in the present case the burden lies on the workers to establish that they were not the employees of the Contractor but were that of appellant Company.
23. Even otherwise the evidence on record produced by the workers themselves could not establish their claim that they were the employees of the Company. The reasons for reaching to such conclusions are enumerated as under:--
24. Admittedly no appointment order, interview letter, Medical certificate, and any other document has been produced by the workers to show that they were directly appointed by the appellant Company, or that the appellant Company had any administrative control over them. So much so that they have failed even to mention as to in which Department of the Company they were working and in what trade they were engaged. They failed to give the name of the Department and the name of the person who used to supervise their work on behalf of the Company. Similarly there is no mention of the product which was being manufactured or produced through the labour done by them.
25. Perusal of the grievance petition and the Affidavit-in-Evidence of all the workers clearly indicate that the duties, name of the, Department and other details in respect of the work done by them have not been mentioned. In all the grievance petitions and in the Affidavit-in-Evidence there are general allegations to the following effect:-- PARAGRAPH 5 OF GRIEVANCE PETITION
5. That the applicant was doing the same job in the same section, on the same floor and on the same machine and tools as other worker in the section.
PARAGRAPH 6 OF AFFIDAVIT-IN-EVIDENCE
5. The applicant was working shoulder to shoulder, with permanent workers, at the same machine with the same jobs and doing the same work, as done by the permanent workers, under the strict control and discipline, of the officers mentioned hereinabove, who are employees of respondent No,l."
26. The abovementioned assertions manifestly prove that in fact the petitioners were not permanent workers, and were not working in a specific Department and were not doing specific duties and were not producing a particular product. So much so that workers Nasir Jamal, Imtiaz Hussain, Muhammad Saleem, Nasim Ahmed, Muhammad Bashir, Javed Gilani, Shaikh Imran Ahmed and Nadeem Shahab whose designation in the grievance petitions and the Affidavit-in- Evidence has been shown as Clerks/Checkers have claimed in the aforesaid paragraphs that they were working on the same machines in the same Department shoulder to shoulder with the permanent workers. I am at loss to understand as to how the Clerks and Checkers were working in the Machine Shop and were participating in the production of finished goods.
27. Again all the Payment Sheets Exhs. A/1 to A/21 filed alongwith the Affidavit-in-Evidence of Nasir Jamal indicates that all of them were the employees of Contractor Muhammad Hussain. Similarly the Social Security Cards produced alongwith the Affidavit-in-Evidence of Nasir Jamal further indicate that they were employees of Contractor Muhammad Hussain.
28. Again it is admitted fact that none of the respondents was the member of the C.B.A. or any other Union. That no facilities which are given to the permanent workers were being given to the respondents.
29. Similarly it has been admitted in the cross-examination by Nasir Jamal that the regular and permanent workers were being provided with the uniforms by the appellant Company but no such Uniform was being provided to them. He has further admitted that the Wage Sheets were being prepared by Contractor Muhammad Hussain. He has further admitted that he knew that Muhammad Hussain was Contractor in Pak Suzuki and that he knew Muhammad Hussain and his brother Muhammad Saleem since last 2 years when he came in the employment. He further admitted that none of the respondents were allowed hospitalization at the expense of the appellant Company. He further admitted that none of the respondents was even confirmed by the appellant Company. Similarly none of the respondents was ever promoted, demoted or charge- sheeted by the appellant Company.
30. No Pay Slip or other document has been produced by the respondent E to show that in fact they were employees of the appellant Company. The most important factor is that during the alleged period of 2 years not a single protest or complaint was made to any authority to the effect that the appellant Company was not issuing appointment Letters to the respondents and they were not being treated at par with the other regular workers of the Company. No reason has been given by the respondent as to why they were discriminated by the Company as against the permanent workers. Only one document dated 18-10-1992, Exh. A/1 has been produced alongwith the grievance petition to show that protest, was made by the respondents. But that document is not signed by any of the respondents or any of workers of the appellant Company. It is mentioned in the aforesaid document that it is written by all the daily wages workers of Pak Suzuki Motor Company.
Obviously since this document is dated 18-10-1992, hence the amendment was made in the grievance petitions whereby the date of appointment was changed from 19-10-1992 to a period of 2 years.
31. It has been observed in a number of cases that the workers are initially recruited by the Contractors, and they perform their duties without any protest and without raising any objection that the benefits are not being given to them. They work throughout years together, but as soon as the contract comes to an end by one or the other reason, they immediately approach the Labour Court with a prayer that they were not the workers of the Contractor but were in fact the workers of the concerned Establishment. This practice is highly deprecated.
32. Similarly there is no evidence to show that the respondents were contributing to the Provident Fund, or they were getting any benefit as a result of settlement between the C.B.A. and the appellant Company. Similarly nothing has been produced to .show that they were getting House Rent Allowance, Conveyance allowance and other benefits. Similarly no Bedge Card has been produced. Similarly no service record has been produced and there is no evidence to show that they were getting casual, sick and Annual Leave.
33. Since the respondents miserably failed to discharge their burden of proving that they were the employees of Pak Suzuki Company, hence there is no need to discuss the evidence led by the appellant Company.
34. The learned counsel for the respondents have also pointed out that under Standing Order 20 of the Standing Order Ordinance, 1968 the employer of the Industrial and Commercial Establishment shall personally be held responsible for the proper and faithful observance of the Standing Orders whether or not the workmen of such establishment are employed through Contractors. Reliance is placed on 1978 LLJ 397, 1965 LLC 260 and 1989 SCMR 888. It is further contended that in view of the aforesaid authorities the services of the respondents would not have been terminated by a ye Pal order. On the other hand the learned counsel for the appellants has plated reliance on 1991 PLD 547, 1985 CLC 2111, PLD 1985 Lahore 169, 1976 PLC 758, 1993 PLC 124, PLD 1997 Karachi 109 and 1987 SCMR 1463.
35. As discussed above the respondents had addressed grievance notices and had presented the grievance petitions against two employers i.e. Pak Suzuki Company and Contractor Muhammad Hussain. I have come to the conclusion, as mentioned above, that they had failed to prove that they were the employees of Pak Suzuki Company, hence the only conclusion is that they were the employees of Contractor Muhammad Hussain and their services came to an end at the time of termination of the Contract between Pak Suzuki Company and aforesaid Muhammad Hussain.
Hence the appellant Company was not responsible to observe the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance in respect of the respondents
36. For these reasons the present appeal is allowed and the impugned to order dated 10-11-1997 is hereby set aside.