' IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.---Petitioner aggrieved from the Certificate of Registration No,228, dated the 22nd October, 1992, issued by the Registrar of Trade -Union, whereby Euro Ceramic Limited Employees, Union, was registered under the relevant provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, has filed this Constitution Petition.
2. It is the case of petitioner that except one, all other. Office-bearers of the Union are employees of Contractor Messrs Rehman Associates, who in pursuance of Agreement, dated 1st January, 1991, employs his own Workers, pay them wages directly and the Workers discharge their duties under his' control and supervision. So far the petitioner's Organization is concerned that has nothing to do with the nature of the job of Contractor. The Workers of Contractor approached the respondent No,1, and got registered a Union by the name and design of Euro Ceramic Limited Employees Union, presenting themselves to be the employees of Petitioner's Organization, vide Certificate of Registration mentioned hereinabove. Thereafter, they get issued a Telegram, dated 27th November, 1992, intimating about the formation of Union and list of its office-bearers. As the petitioner is not employer of the Workers, who have formed the Union, therefore, he approached the respondent No,1 vide letter, dated 1st December, 1991, which was followed by another letter, dated 4th December, 1991, intimating that the said Union has been registered contrary to the provisions of relevant law. Despite of the fact that the letters mentioned above were duly received by Respondent No,1, but no reply was given, neither the grievance of the petitioner was redressed. As the Union has been registered in utter violation to the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, therefore, the petitioner has no efficacious and speedy remedy for getting cancelled the Registration Certificate, except by way of filing instant Constitution Petition.
3. The respondent No,3, in the counter-affidavit, vehemently repudiated the claim of petitioner and contended that all the members or employees of the Union are working in the petitioner's firm and also take part in its production. So much so, they are under the direct supervision of supervisory staff of petitioner's Organization. The employment as a Supervisor or as an Apprentice in an Establishment or 'Industry for hire or reward either directly or through a Contractor. The definition quoted above visualizes that a `Worker' or 'workman' even if he has been engaged by the Employer through a Contractor he would be deemed to be worker in the Establishment, provided the nature of his job is to remain engaged in the affairs of the Establishment, however, if Worker has been engaged by a Contractor for undertaking the work other than the job being carried out in the Establishment, he would not be deemed worker of the Establishment. For instance, if the Organization had engaged a Contractor for the purpose of constructing a building in the Establishment and to complete the construction work, Contractor engages Labour and also pays himself their wages, it would be deemed that said Workers had nothing to do with the Establishment as they were not engaged in its affairs by making production of the commodities being produced in the Factory and as the nature of their job is absolutely of different kind because they remain under the control of the Contractor, who is engaged in constructing the building. In this behalf in Mian Muneer Ahmad v. The State, (1985 SCM R P-257), Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down, as follows:-- "18. It is an admitted position that an employer is required to issue such tickets only to the persons employed by him as workers. This stands to reason because a Factory owner may need, for example, to erect an additional structure within the Factory premises and for this purpose he may employ a building Contractor on the terms settled with him. Naturally the Contractor would employ his own labour who would obviously not be the employees of the Factory. Nor would, in such a case the Factory Management be responsible for them in any manner and would not be required to issue attendance tickets to such workers under section 2 of the Schedule 2(g) of the Standing Orders Ordinance."
' In another case of Fareed Ahmad v. Pakistan Burmah Shell Limited, (1987 SCM R P-1436) it was laid down that intention of the Legislature by using word through a Contractor was to include amongst Workman or Employees not only persons, who had not directly employed by the Owner or Employer but also those, who were employed by them through such persons who undertake contract to supply labour. The word 'Contractor' in this behalf does not mean persons employed by Owner or an Employer of a Factory or the Company for performing any particular work or task to be done in relation to the running of the Factory or the Company. In view of above reports, following proposition can be deduced:-- "Whether in the instant case, Rehan Associates engaged workers for running of the affairs of the petitioner's Company or through the workers, he was carrying out another independent work which has no concern with the production etc. Of the petitioner's Establishment?"
7. In order to resolve the instant controversy, we have to refer the alleged agreements between petitioner and Rehan Associates. There are three Agreements out of which, two are executed on 1st January, 1991, whereas third one is of 2nd March, 1991. The language and the terms mentioned therein are quite similar to each other. On the perusal of these Agreements, it emerges that the Contractor undertook to execute contract of fifty workers at the rate of Rs,100 per worker (for three years). The remaining terms of the Agreement speaks in respect of the responsibility of the Contractor to make payments including wages etc. To the Worker, however, the contents whereof conspicuously are silent about the nature and the job which was assigned to the Contractor for carrying out in the Establishment.
8. It may be observed here that Mr. Tariq Mehmood, learned counsel has vehemently denied that the Workers have no knowledge about the execution of these documents nor he accepts them to be genuine and correct, therefore, the observations which are being made in respect of the Agreements that are being made without prejudice to the rights of the Workers who are the Members of the respondent's Union.
9. On the perusal of Agreements, we utterly failed to understand that what was the object 'of its execution because admittedly no independent job has been assigned by the petitioner's Organization to the Contractor. The apparent objection of executing such Agreements appears to be that Contractor has engaged himself for supplying the Labour to the petitioner for which, he is entitled to charge Rs,100 (per worker) for the period of three years. However, these documents are not sufficient to lead us to the conclusion that the Contractor agreed to perform a separate work which has no concern in any manner with the production or other affairs of the Factory. We are mindful of the fact that in Constitutional jurisdiction factual controversy is not to be gone into but in the interest of justice and to examine the case of the petitioner at (sic) we have referred to the above agreements, therefore, we are bound to draw the conclusion that Contractor whosoever he may be had engaged the labour not for doing the job other than which is being carried out in the Factory. In view of these conclusions, inference can also be drawn that actually the device adopted by the petitioner in raising the plea that the members of the Union are not the employees of the Organization, has been done with a view to deprive them from their legitimate right of forming the Trade Union.
10. The Registrar of the Trade Union is competent under the law to issue a Certificate after examining the documents which are required to be submitted before him. Since the Certificate of the Registration has been issued in, favour of respondent No,3, therefore, it would be presumed that the Members of the Union were found to be the Workers or the Workmen of the petitioner's Establishment and after exercising the lawful jurisdiction a Certificate of Registration was granted to them. So far the Employer is concerned, he does not come into the picture at the time of registration of the Union, therefore, no right of hearing can be extended to him and Registrar is bound to issue Certificate if all the requirement of law have been fulfilled.
'In such view of the matter, we are inclined to hold that no legitimate right of the petitioners Organization was denied, therefore, no irregularity or jurisdictional error has been committed by the respondent in not affording opportunity of being heard before the issuance of Registration Certificate.
' For the reasons discussed above, we are inclined to hold that there is no merit in this petition, which is dismissed with costs.