1. IKRAM AHMED ANSARI, J.---Through this petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 18- 9-1995 passed by respondent No,1, the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi, passed in the proceedings of Appeal No, HYD-583 of 1991 - National Bank of Pakistan v. Marghoob Ahmad and others whereby the appeal of respondent No,4 (National Bank of Pakistan) was allowed. The prayer of the petitioner in this petition is that the said order of respondent No,1 be set aside and an order for reinstatement of petitioner with continuity of services with back benefits and allowances from the date of his suspension and other privileges like increments, bonuses recreation allowances etc. The brief facts of the case of petitioner are that originally in the year 1964 he was appointed in the service of respondent No,4 bank as Junior Clerk and subsequently in the year 1977 he was promoted as Grade-III Officer. It is also stated in the memo. of petition that service of the petitioner was governed by the provisions of Wage Commission Award and West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. It is also stated that despite good record of petitioner on 10-11-1986 respondent No,4 charged the petitioner with certain irregularities committed in granting agricultural interest-free loan to the Harries between the months of January to June, 1986. At the relevant time, it is contended, that he was working as a Manager of Jati Branch of respondent No,4 bank. The petitioner, in the circumstances of the case, filed grievance petition before the respondent No,2 on the ground that since the dismissal of the petitioner from service of respondent bank was wrong and illegal, therefore, order be passed for his reinstatement etc. The respondent No,2 passed a favourable order to the petitioner which was agitated by the respondent No,4 bank before the respondent No,1 who vide impugned order dated 18-9-1995 set aside the Order passed by the respondent No,2 and allowed the Appeal of the respondent No,4 bank with direction that the back benefits, if any, deposited may be refunded to the respondent-Bank.
2. On 19-8-1998 when this petition came up for hearing before us the learned Advocate for petitioner was called absent without any intimation, however, the learned Advocate for respondents Nos.3 and 4 was present, therefore, this petition was dismissed for non-prosecution. Later on the learned Advocate for petitioner filed in the matter a restoration application notice whereof was issued to the learned Advocate for respondent. Finally the matter came up for hearing before us on 25-8- 1998. Since the restoration application was supported by the personal affidavit of learned Advocate for the petitioner, therefore, the petition was ordered to be restored to its original position, however, at the time of hearing on 25-8-1998, the learned Advocate for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 contended that in view of insertion of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act this petition has abated in law and as such it cannot proceed or be heard on merits. At this point of time the learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that in order to argue the point of abatement he needs time and as such the hearing of the case was adjourned to 1-9-1998, when we heard the arguments of the learned Advocate of the parties and reserved the order.
3. Submission of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is that the objection of the learned Advocate of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 that the present petition is hit by the newly inserted section 2-A in Act LXX of 1973, vide Service Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 1997 is not tenable in law. He submitted that the position of the present petition is different from the case of the petitioners who had approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan by filing several petitions, leading petition being Civil Petition of 1997 and others, Syed Aftab Ahmad v. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, which petitions have been decided on 16-4-1998. Contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is that his client is "workman" within the meaning of provisions of Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance of 1968) and the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as I.R.O., 1968) and had sought remedy against the respondents Nos.3 and 4 as a workman, under the said two statutes. He also argued that the petitioner, a Bank worker is not governed by the definition of "workman" or "worker" as defined in the Factories Act, 1934, Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and Railways Act, 1890 and as such the case of the petitioner is not hit either newly inserted section 2-A or the aforesaid Supreme Court judgment dated 16-4-1988. Learned Advocate for petitioner his submitted that in view of the case of The Income Tax Officer Investigation Circle-I, Dacca and another v. Sulaiman Bhai Jiwa and others reported as PLD 1970 SC 80 the newly incorporated section 2-A in the Service Tribunal Act, 1973 should be treated to be prospective and not retrospective, therefore, the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court while passing the aforesaid judgment dated 16-4-1998 should have taken into consideration the referred case of PLD 1970 SC 80, he also relied upon the case of Choudhry Muhammad Saleem v. Fatal Ahmed and others, reported as 1997 SCMR 315. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that in the circumstances of the case the petition of the petitioner is neither hit by the newly inserted section 2-A nor section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, and also not by Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and therefore, this petition has not abated.
4. Learned Advocate for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 has submitted that with effect from 10-6-1997 section 2-A has been added in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 by Service Tribunal (Amendment)
5. Act, 1997 and by virtue of section 6 of Service Tribunals Act the petition has abated as the respondent Bank is wholly owned and controlled by the Federal Government of Pakistan. He submitted that the provisions of section 2-A are surely applicable to the Employees of National Bank of Pakistan by virtue of subsection (2) of section 3 of the Act in respect of matters relating to the terms and conditions of Service of Civil Servants including disciplinary matters as in such matters exclusive jurisdiction has been given to the Service Tribunal. He has also submitted that section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act provides that all the suits appeals and Applications regarding any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal pending irr any Court immediately before the commencement of this Act shall abate. The learned Advocate for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 has placed reliance on the judgment dated 16-4-1998 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Civil Petition No,1035-K of 1997 and other connected 57 petitions of similar nature including the Civil Petition No,120-K of 1997 of the respondent No,4 named above. He has also placed reliance upon other Single Bench cases of (1) Muhammad Javed v. K.E.S.C. reported as 1997 PLC (C.S.) 1220(2), Nehal Resheed Farooqui v. Pakistan State Oil, reported as 1998 PLC (C.S.) 62 and submitted that both the reported cases pertain to suits filed by officers of K.E.S.C. and Pakistan State Oil respectively, who came within the ambit of section 2-A of Service Tribunals Act and their suits were held to have abated. Reliance has also been placed on Division Bench judgments in the cases of Abdullah Chohan and others v. National Bank of Pakistan reported as 1998 PLC (C.S.) 264, and Dil Murad and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others reported as 1998 PLC (C.S.) 378.
6. The learned Advocate for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 in meeting the arguments/contentions of the learned Advocate for the petitioner with regard to the retrospective or prospective effect of aforesaid newly inserted section 2-A has drawn our attention to para. 2 of above-referred Supreme Court judgment dated 16-4-1998, wherein it has been held that "newly inserted section 2-A was applicable retrospectively.
7. As to the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that petitioner being a "workman" does not fall within the ambit of Civil Servants Act and as such is excluded from the purview of the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The learned Advocate for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 drew our attention to para. 4 of the above-referred Supreme Court judgment dated 16-4-1998, wherein in the said question has been dealt with as under:-- "4. As regards the third ground which found favour with the Service Tribunal in some of the cases, namely, that the petitioners were employed on contract basis or they were workmen excluded by the definition of 'Civil Servants' given in section 2(b) of the Act of 1973, i: may be observed that since we have held that the latter definition is not applicable to the employees covered by the newly enacted section 2-A as corollary, it must follow that the exceptions mentioned in clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 2 of the Act of 1973 will not be attracted to the petitioners' cases."
8. Learned Advocate for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 in view of the above passage of the Supreme Court judgment has submitted that the workmen who are employed in Government Organizations, as referred to in the said section 2-A, are also covered and as such their remedy lies with Service Tribunal.
9. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Advocates of the parties and have perused the referred judgments, particularly the judgment of the Humble Supreme Court passed on 16-4-1998 in 58 civil petitions of employees of Government/Semi-Government Organizations, and have come to the conclusion that newly added section 2-A to the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 by virtue of Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1997 became enforceable retrospectively and the petitioner being an employee, call it a workman or an Officer, he is nothing but a civil servant.
10. In view of the said newly inserted section 2-A and for the foregoing discussion we are of the opinion that service under the Corporations, banks and other institutions in which the Federal Government has the controlling share or interest is to be treated as the service of Pakistan and every person holding such post in such Corporation, bank or institution is a civil servant, therefore, for the redress of his grievances relating to terms, conditions etc., of his service and his removal from such service his remedy lies in filing appeal before the Service Tribunal. Further, under Article 212(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan no Court can entertain any proceedings in respect of matters to which the jurisdiction of the Service. Tribunals extends. As such we have come to the conclusion that in the changed circumstance and the law this petition is not maintainable and with effect from 10-6-1997 it stands abated.
11. For the foregoing we are satisfied that with effect from 10-6-1997, the date of issuance of Gazette Notification, whereby section 2-A has been inserted in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 the petitioner ceased to have any locus standi to pursue the above petition and/or invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court in respect of the controversy raised in his petition which we find to be not maintainable in the given circumstances of the case. Accordingly we hold that this petition has abated and is disposed of as such.