' SABIHUDDIN AHMED, J.---The petitioners were appointed on temporary assignment (as is evident from the only letter of appointment issued to the petitioner No,1 filed as Annexure 'A' to the petition) by respondent No, 2 i,e, Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd., on various dates between 12-10-1994 and 25-9-1996. The Petitioners Nos. 1, 7 and 8 are serving as Junior Clerks, petitioners Nos. 2 to 4 as helpers and petitioners Nos. 5 and 6 as watchmen, through no order purporting to terminate their services has been passed, the petitioners have approached this Court on the basis of certain apprehensions arising out of a memorandum from General Manager (P & A) of the respondent No, 2 addressed to Heads of Departments, Area Manager etc. And on account of certain statements appearing in the Press regarding large scale retrenchment of employees in the respondent No, 2 Corporation and have claimed the following reliefs:- "(a) Declare that the appointments of the petitioners are within the quota for Sindh and Balochistan/Sui Southern Gas Co. And after the petitioners have completed their probation period and training successfully, the petitioners are deemed to be appointed on regular basis.
(b) Restrain the respondents from taking any action of removal/termination of the services of the petitioners otherwise than due course of law; and
(c) Pass any other orders as deemed fit and proper under the circumstances of the case."
2. The case as set up by the petitioners is that, respondent No, 2 is controlled by the Federal Government i,e, the respondent No, 1 which also owns 90% of its share capital. The Rules of the company provide for reservation of Provincial quotas in employment in terms of the proviso to Article 27 of the Constitution and the petitioners were appointed against the quota reserved for the Province of Sindh. It is alleged that having completed one year of service on probation the petitioners' services could not be terminated except by way of disciplinary action under the Executive Service Rules of the respondent No,2. However, in view of the memorandum dated 26-9- 1997 and statements appearing in the Press they seriously apprehend termination of their services without recourse to such rules. It has also been urged that while retrenchment is being carried out in the respondent No,2 under direction from the respondent No,1 no such retrenchment is being effected in the Sui Northern Pipe Line Corporation, another Company controlled by the Federal Government in performing identical functions in the Provinces of Punjab and N.-W.F.P.
3. Without adverting to the merits of the case we entertain serious doubts as to the maintainability of this petition in view of the provisions of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, recently inserted through Act XVII of 1997 read with Article 212 of the Constitution. Under the aforementioned provisions service under the Corporation in which the Federal Government has a controlling share or interest has been declared to be service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under such Corporation is entitled to prefer an appeal to the Federal Service Tribunal in respect of any matter concerning the terms and conditions of his service; under Article 212(2) of the Constitution, no Court can entertain any proceedings in respect of any matter to which the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal extends. The legal position is well-settled through several reported decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court to the effect that when a matter properly falls within the domain of a Service Tribunal the jurisdiction of all Courts including this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution is clearly barred.
4. Mr. Rasool Bux Unar, learned counsel for the petitioners, however, contended that the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal could only be invoked to call in question an order passed concerning the terms and conditions of a civil servant and since no order has been passed so far the jurisdiction of this is not affected and the petitioners have justifiably invoked the same.
5. We have carefully considered this contention but regret our inability to subscribe to it. In the first place we are doubtful whether a cause of action has really accrued to the petitioner merely on the basis of an apprehension arising from general statement in the Press or an office Memorandum which does not even state that the service of the petitioners or of employees of categories to which they belonged are likely to be terminated. The scheme of the Service Reforms enacted in 1973, apart from other things contemplated establishment of high powered administrative Tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction for redressed of all grievances of which civil servant pertaining to their terms and conditions of service. The decisions of such Tribunals could only be questioned before the Honorable Supreme Court and that too only in cases involving substantial questions of law of public importance and upon leave to 'appeal being granted by the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of all Courts, including the jurisdiction of this Court conferred by Article 199 of the Constitution itself, was expressly barred in respect of any matter to which the jurisdiction of such Tribunals extended and all pending proceedings before any Court in such matters were required to abate by the mandate of Article 212 of the Constitution.
6. Against the above ethos it appears to be highly incongruous that while a person aggrieved by an order pertaining to the terms and conditions can only approach the Service Tribunal for redress, to the exclusion of all other Courts, one merely apprehending an action likely to be taken against him would be able to move this Court or for that matter even a Civil Court and obtain preventive relief. It may be observed that prior to the enactment of the Act XVII of 1997 only a person aggrieved by a final order passed by a department could prefer an appeal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act. Moreover, he had to prefer a representation/appeal before the higher authority and to wait those 90 days or till the decision of such representation before approaching the Tribunal. Nevertheless despite such stringent preconditions the superior Courts never allowed civil servant to circumvent the jurisdiction of such Tribunals and take upon themselves the power to adjudicate certain disputes on the plea that technically an appeal before the Tribunal at a particular point of time was pre-mature.
7. In the above context one may profitably refer to a Full Bench Decision of this Court, comprising of five Honourable Judges in the case of Abdul Bari v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1981 Karachi 290), it was held that "when the entire field of controversy that could possibly arise in respect of an order passed by departmental authority has been committed under the Constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, then Article 212 clearly bars the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain any part of such controversy in any proceedings. The argument that jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal being confined to entertain appeals from final orders, the jurisdiction in respect of other orders continued to remain in tact with High Court was expressly repelled. Their Lordships observed:- "However, it seems to us that if the impugned order although not final so far as the departmental authority passing it is concerned, is in the nature of a step towards the final order that may eventually be passed, apparently such interlocutory will eventually merged in the final order and in any case can be brought up before the Service Tribunal in an appeal from the final order. Clearly, therefore, such orders which are in the nature of interlocutory steps and are germaned to the final order which is appealable before the Tribunal, will also be outside the jurisdiction of the High Court."
' Mr. Rasool Bux Unar, learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to refer to any judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court or any other binding precedent which could persuade us to take a view different from the one taken in the above case. Moreover, we are of the opinion that when the Constitution requires a particular kind of controversy to be decided by an exclusive forum the mandate of the Constitution cannot be allowed to be defeated by merely choosing to approach a different forum at a particular point of time. The correct test in our opinion would be to see whether the question required to be ultimately resolved is of such nature that could be determined only by the Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction or otherwise. We are fortified in this view by the observations of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Anis v. Abdul Haseeb (PLD 1994 SC 539) to the following effect:-- "15.--We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the controversy before the High Court was, whether private respondents were eligible for consideration for promotion to Grade-18 as Assistant Collectors along with the private appellants. The above question could not have been decided without reference to the terms on which the private respondents were given higher grade, namely, Grade-17 upon the up gradation of the posts of Appraiser and the Principal Appraisers pursuant to the above order of the late President Muhammad Ziaul Haq, which in turn will involve consideration of the above various notifications, rules relating to the appointment or promotion as Assistant Collectors of Customs and the interpretation of section 23 of the Civil Servants Act etc. The above matters pre-eminently fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, therefore, the High Court had wrongly assumed jurisdiction in the present case, which did not vest in it. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Sindh High Court and of the Lahore High Court relied upon by Mr. Ali Ahmed Fazeel, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court, do not correctly enunciate the legal position."
9. Mr. Rasool Bux Unar, learned counsel for the petitioners, however, argued that the petitioners had complained of violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 25 and 27 of the Constitution and only this Court and not the Service Tribunal has been empowered to enforce fundamental rights by the Constitution. The argument, we regret to say is patently misconceived. We do not see how violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 25 can be complained off on the basis of the assertion that while employees in the respondent No, 2 Corporation, functioning in the Provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan are being retrenched, no such retrenchment is being effected in Sui Nothern Pipe Line Corporation which is performing similar functions in the Provinces of Punjab and N.-W.F.P. Article 25 speaks of equal protection and not identical protection and the rights conferred thereby are always subject to reasonable classification. It is not possible for the petitioners to claim exactly the same facilities and privileges which are available to employees of a different Corporate entity, operating in a different area. Both corporations can formulate different policies regarding their employees depending upon their requirements. No material has been placed on record to indicate that the economic viability, the operational needs and the state of employment .In both the Corporations was identical.
10. With respect to Article 27 it was contended that the petitioners were employed against the quota reserved for residents of Sindh and Baluchistan and in case their services are terminated such action would amount to violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 27. A bare perusal of Article 27, however, would show that it does not protect regional quota, but only the rights of all citizens to have equal opportunity for public employment irrespective of their place of their residence and by way of exception a provision has been made to enable the Government to specify reserved post for residents of a particular area, for a limited duration. Such reservation was only permitted for a period of 20 years from the commencing day i,e, up to 12-8-1993, whereas according to the petitioners own showing all of them were employed after the aforesaid date.
Therefore, in case they were appointed merely because they were the residents of the Provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan their initial appointments (being violated of the rights of residents of other areas) and not their apprehended termination would be unconstitutional.
11. Finally Mr. Umar argued that notwithstanding the bar contained in Article 212 this Court would still have jurisdiction to interfere in case the apprehended action was mala fide or violative of the principles of the natural justice. This contention, in our view is also untenable. In the first place it is too far-fetched to attribute mala fides to an action which has not yet been taken. Moreover, as has been authoritative held, inter alia, by the Full Bench of this Court in Abdul Bari's case all questions of mala fide, coram nonjudice etc. Can always be decided by Service Tribunal. Once a matter is found to be within the domain of a Service Tribunal our jurisdiction is barred. Only a Tribunal of competent jurisdiction can decide under what circumstances the petitioners could be entitled to an opportunity of being heard.
12. At this juncture it may be pertinent to mention that we are conscious that the respondent No, 2 being State owned Corporation are repositories of public power and the exercise of such power must be just fair and free from any tained of arbitrariness. This inherent limitation on the exercise of power is well-recognized in several recent pronouncements of our superior Courts and has been given statutory recognition in terms of the newly inserted sections of the General Clauses Act.
Indeed even where relations between the parties have been contractual and such contracts are not specifically enforceable, transgression of such limitation on the exercise of public power can be checked through the judicial process. Even in cases where employees of State owned Corporation have been found not entitled to any statutory protection enforceable through Article 199 and have been held to be governed by the rule of Master and Servant contracts (which are not specifically enforceable). The Honourable Supreme Court has held that petitions calling in question action which are mala fide, violative of principle of natural justice or contrary to law are maintainable. One may refer to the judgments in the cases of Wali Ahmed Khan v. K.D.A. (1991 SCMR 2434 and Anisa Rehman v. P.I.A. (1994 SCMR 2233). We are not sake that any mala fide or illegal action of the respondent No, 2 in respect of its employees would be sacrosanct or non-justiceable but only that such matters having been committed to the jurisdiction of a Service Tribunal under Act XVII of 1997 our jurisdiction is barred by the mandate of Article 212 of the Constitution.
13. In the circumstances, we hope that respondent No, 2 being conscious of the limitations on the exercise of power would only take such action as is just, fair and permissible under the law and even if an action not warranted by law is taken earlier Service Tribunal if moved would grant relief to an aggrieved party.
14 For the above reasons we dismiss the petition in limine by short order announced on 22-10-1997.