SARDAR MUHAMMAD IQBAL, J.-In subsection (6) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959) (hereinafter referred as the Ordinance), as amended by section 5 of Ordinance XXI of 1965, it is provided : "In proceedings under this section on the first date of hearing or as soon as possible after that date and before issues are framed, the Controller shall direct the tenant to deposit all the rent due from him and also to deposit regularly till the final decision of the case, before the fifteenth day of each month, the monthly rent due from him . . . . .
The question which has been referred to this specially constituted Division Bench is as to what is the correct interpretation of the phrase "before the fifteenth day of each month" as used in the aforementioned subsection. The tenants' plea is that the phrase be construed to mean including the fifteenth day of the month, whereas' the landlords plead that the word "before" excludes the fifteenth day of the month.
2. It is well established that in construing a statute it is the duty of the Court or a Tribunal to determine th--e expressed intention of the Legislature. The primary rule of interpretation undoubtedly is that if there is no indistinctness or conflict of thought in the language used in the statute as also there is no elasticity or vagueness inherent in it which may make it difficult to ascertain, with precision, the intention of the Legislature as expressed by the words used, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the Legislature. If the words are in themselves precise and unambiguous, and admit but of` one meaning, seldom any difficulty in interpretation arise Is The language in such cases has got to be taken as decisive of the intention of the Legislature and should not be departed from. However, in cases where there is doubt about the meaning of the words used in statute, a recognised method of construction is to take the words in the sense in which they would harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature had in view. But, if the intention is manifest, hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature. The difficulty in the instant case arose from the fact that it was considered that the word "before" in subsection (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance, though unambiguous, in the context in which it has been employed, viz. Before the fifteenth day of each month" includes the fifteenth day also.
3. In Kerr. v. Kennedy ((1942) 1 K B 409) it was observed : "in the absence of any judicial guidance or authority . . . . . . . Dictionaries can be consulted." In R. v. Peters ((1886) 16 Q B D 636) it was said by Lord Coleridge "that dictionaries are not to be taken as authoritative exponents of the meanings of words used . . . . . . But it is a well-known rule of Courts of law that words should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense". Craies on Statutes Law (Sixth Edition) says at page 161 : "No doubt reference to the better dictionaries does afford, either by definition or illustration, some guide to the use of a term in a statute". He also quoted the observations of Cozens-Hardy M. R. In Camden (Murquis) v. L .
R. C. ((1914) 1 K B 641) that: "It is for the Court to interpret the statute as best it may. In so doing the Court may no doubt assist themselves in the discharge of their duty by any literary help they can find, including of course the con--sultation of standard authors and reference to well-known and authoritative dictionaries". In re : Ripon Housing Order ((1939) 2 K D 838) reliance was again placed on Oxford English Dictionary to interpret the word "park" and in McVittie v. Bolton Corporation ((1945) 1 K B 281) reliance was placed on the said Dictionary for interpreting the word "rubbish".
Therefore, in the absence of any definition of the word in the statute, or of any judicial interpretation of that word with reference to the same statute or any other statute in pari materia, reference to standard dictionaries can be of assistance in assigning the meaning to that word. In Karnani Properties Ltd. v. Augustine (AIR 1957 SC 309) it was observed while interpreting the word "rent" that when a word is not defined in the Act, it must be taken to have been used in its ordinary dictionary meaning.
Since the word "before" is not defined in the Ordinance itself, we will have to look up the standard dictionaries to gather its ordinary meaning. The word " before" is defined in " A new English Dictionary", Volume I, by Sir James Murray, to mean "ahead, in advance, in front". With reference to the sequenced in time or order' it is stated : "In time previous or anterior to a time in question, previous to that or to this, earlier, sooner ; hence before-hand ; already, heretofore, in the past". As to point of time, it was defined to mean "preceding in order of time, previous to, or earlier than a point of time, date, or event".
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenants, however, relied on the definition of the word "before" as given at serial No. 9 of Sir James Murray's New English Dictionary aforesaid, where it was staled to mean "previous to the expiration of a future space of time", and to illus--trate it, it was stated : "I hope to be there before another year". But here, the word "before" has not been used with reference to a future space of time. It is used only with reference to a future date. And in that case the word is to be understood as defined at serial No. 8 of the said Dictionary to mean "previous to, or earlier than". Reliance was also placed on the judicial definition of the word "before" as given in paragraph 779 of the Words and Phrases Judicially Defined by Roland Burrows, Volume 1, where it was observed : "S. 7(31 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, . . . . . Provides that, on the bankruptcy of an employer, a workman's claim in respect of compensation or liability for compensation due by the employer which has accrued before the date of 'a receiv--ing order' shall be given a preferable ranking . . . 'Before' must, in my view, be read as equivalent to 'not after' ".
It may, however, be observed that the quotation is from R. v. Arkwright ((1848) 12 Q B 960) where Denman, C. J., also observed that "such a construction is open if the context and sense of the enact--ment so require". So, it was in the context of that enactment that the word "before" was so interpreted and the word "before" was to be understood in that sense in all the statutes. Learned counsel then referred us to D. G. Mehta v. B. D. Chudasama (AIR 1956 Born. 113). In that case the notice served by the landlords ran "you are to remember that if for any reason these fields have not been handed over to us before 31-3-1950, you are to band over possession thereof to us for our personal cultivation before the above-mentioned date". The learned Judges of the Division Bench held that the expressions "before the 31st March 1950" and "you are to hand over possession to us for our personal cultivation before the above-mentioned date", taken together meant that the tenant was called upon to hand over possession of the fields not on the 31st of March 1950 itself, latitude being left to him to choose his own time on that day, but even on any date before 31st of March 1950. It was observed that since the language used was really slipshod it was difficult to come to the conclusion that the tenant must necessarily have understood the notice to mean that he was required to hand over possession of the properties upon the expiry of a full and clear year.
There is nothing in the judgment to show that by the use of the word "before" the landlords meant also the 31st of March 1950. On the other hand, the Judges were of the view that upon the language of that notice the tenant could contend that he was required to hand over possession of the properties to the landlord on any date before the 31st of March 1950, it may be 1st of January 1950, or 10th of January 1950 or 15th of January 1950 or 1st of February 1950, 10th of February 1950 or 15th of February 1950 or 1st of March 1950 and so on. Applying the test to the case in hand, the word "before" as used in subsection (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance would mean on the 1st day of the month, 5th day of the month or 10th day of the month and so on, but before the start of the 15th day of the month. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel instead of being any help to him runs counter to his contention. Learned counsel then relied on Dagger v. Shephered ((1946) 1 A E L. R 133) where the landlord gave notice to his tenant to quit the house "on or before March 25 next". It was held by the Court of Appeal that the notice to quit served on the tenant was valid and effective, since it specified the date, I e. March 25, 1945, on which the tenancy was to end. Their Lordships observed that the insertion of the words "on or before" in the notice to quit was, on a proper con--struction, an offer to the tenant to accept from him a determination' of the tenancy on any earlier date than that named on which he would give up possession of the premises. The words "on or before March 25" were, therefore, inter--preted to mean "on a date earlier than the 25th". The words "immediately before the first day of January 1957" mentioned in section 3(1)(2)(a)
(b) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act (XII of 1957) came up for interpretation before a Division Bench of this Court in Ghazi Muhammad v. Custodian of Evacuee Property (PLD 1960 Lah. 862). In subsection (1) of section 3 it was stated that "notwithstanding anything con-- tained in this Act, no person or property not treated as evacuee or as evacuee property immediately before the first day of January 1957, shall be treated as evacuee or, as the case may be, as evacuee property, on or after the said date". Kayani, C. J. While interpreting the phrase "immediately before the first day of January 1957" held that where a sale of` evacuee land by an evacuee was confirmed on 2nd December 1953, the property to which it related was, therefore, undoubtedly not treated as evacuee property "immediately before the first day of January 1957", i.e. On the 31st of December 1956. There is no doubt that the word "immediately" preceded the word "before" but it should not make any difference for the reason that if the interpretation of the tenants is accepted that before the "fifteenth" means before the expiry of the fifteenth of the month then "immediately before the first day" would have been construed to mean "immediately before the expiry of the first day". When the word "before" precedes a certain date, it clearly excludes that date.
In Ata Hussain v. Muhammad Taqi (PLD 1963 B J 53) where the Rent Controller acting under subsection (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance, as it then existed, had ordered the tenant to make the deposit of the amount before the 5th, Rizvi, J., observed that it " would evidently mean that the deposit was to be made before the 5th of every month ".
5. The Legislature used the word "before the fifteenth day" in subsection (6) of section 13 and it carries no other meaning except the one that the payment should be made earlier than that date.
If it had intended that the payment could also be made on the 15th also, there would have been no difficulty in their way to have made a provision to that effect. Wherever the Legislature had any such intention they have also used the words "by or before" the expiry of a certain date. The expression "by" indicates the utmost limit of time being the end of the expiry of the date or period indicated. Similarly, the words "before the expiry of " a date mean before that date expires. We have also noticed in a number of statutes that where the date mentioned is also to be included, the words used are " on or before ", which clearly means that if the word "on" is not used along with the word "before" that limiting date is not included. In the absence of these words and there being no other indication in the Ordinance that the Legislature had intended to use the words "before the fifteenth day of each month" to include the fifteenth as well, we see no reason to depart from the ordinary meaning of the word "before".
6. On the above view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the words "before the fifteenth day of each month" used in subsection (6) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (V of 1959) mean that the deposit of the monthly rent is to be made on or before the 14th day of each month, and the phrase will not include the fifteenth day.