' By this Constitutional petition the petitioner management has called into question the validity of the proceedings under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1936) on the ground that the authority constituted under the Act has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the application filed by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 for self and on behalf of 220 co- workers for payment of their delayed/illegally deducted wages in connection with their employment in the petitioner establishment.
2. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 filed an application on 21-11-1995 before the authority under the provisions of sections 15 and 16(2) of the Act for a direction for payment of their wages as estimated by them or as the authority may find to be due and for compensation at ten times of the delayed wages or as deemed just and proper by the authority. Basis of the claim preferred by the respondents is that the Managing Director and General Manager of the petitioner establishment being persons responsible for the payment of their wages did not pay the same for the period from October, 1992 to December, 1993. An earlier application filed by them for the said period was accepted by the authority constituted under the Act and a Constitutional petition preferred by the management was dismissed by Circuit Court, Hyderabad of the Sindh High Court vide order dated 16-3-1995. The application before the respondent No, 1 is, however, confined to the period from January, 1994 to October, 1995.
3. On receipt of notice the petitioner filed written statement before the authority under the Act raising legal objections as to the maintainability of the application for want of jurisdiction on the part of respondent No, 1 because the same did not pertain to a 'factory' but the respondent No, 1 vide order dated 4-9-1996 overruled the objections and proceeded to hear the application for a decision on merits. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner filed this petition on the grounds mainly that the petitioner establishment ceased to be a ' factory' as defined under the Factories Act, 1934, for the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in paragraph 3 of their application had conceded that the petitioner stopped the production of the ' factory' since March, 1992. Besides it was not disputed that there was no manufacturing process since March, 1992, therefore, the premises ceased to be a ' factory' since March, 1993.
4. The next ground urged in support of the petition is that admittedly there was no manufacturing process during the period for which the wages were claimed i,e, January, 1994 to October, 1995 whereas the provisions of Act, 1936 are applicable to employees who were employed in a ' factory'.
As both the contentions on their face value appeared to have an element of attractiveness the petition was admitted to regular hearing and the proceedings before respondent No, 1 were initially stayed for a period of six weeks from the date of admission which have been extended from time to time commencing from 6-2-1997.
5. Both the respondents filed counter-affidavit to the petition controverting the grounds urged in support of the petition.
6 Adverting to the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner it ay be observed that the learned counsel emphasised on the definition of factory' as contained in clause (j) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1934 which has been incorporated in section 2(i) of the Act, 1936. The definition of ' factory' reads as under:--
(j) "factory" means any premises, including the precincts thereof, whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on (or is ordinarily carried on with or without the aid of power), but does not include a mine, subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1923 (V of 1923).
7. Thrust of the argument of the learned counsel is on the terminology used in the defining clause and more particularly on the words where on ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or is ordinarily carried on. In this context learned counsel heavily relied upon averments in para. 3 of the application filed by respondents before the authority under the Act stating that the opposite party stopped the production of khe factory' since March, 1992 due to mutual dispute between the Directors. From these averments learned counsel desired to persuade this Court to hold that during the period from March, 1992 onwards there was neither any manufacturing process on any day in the preceding twelve months nor were the workers actually working or employed in the ' factory' with the necessary corollary that respondent No, 1 would have absolutely no authority and jurisdiction to adjudicate an application for award of delayed wages. I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel which is too far-fetched and not borne out by the material on record. The inference drawn from the averments made by the respondents in their application is not properly spelt out in the circumstances when it is noticed that the employment of the workers was neither terminated nor was the factory' itself closed with or without the permission of the Labour Court. An innocent averment in the pleadings to the above effect in my view is not by itself sufficient and adequate to warrant an inference having far reaching effects and results. Since the workers represented by office-bearers of the Union namely respondents Nos. 2 and 3 continued to be employed in the petitioner management it is highly difficult to subscribe to the view of the learned counsel that the respondent No, 1 has no jurisdiction to proceed with the claim or that the proceedings pending before the said authority are coram non judice.
8. Having dealt with the aforesaid preliminary objections touching the jurisdiction of respondent No, 1, I called upon the learned counsel for petitioner as to why these objections could not be raised before the said authority and/or such objections taken in an appeal provided under the law from a final order, learned counsel expressed the difficulty of the petitioner management by pointing out that the authority may not only award the delayed wages claimed by the respondents but may also award compensation equivalent to the ten times of the delayed wages which may be unbearable for the petitioner management. Be that as it may, since no appeal is provided under the Act, 1936 from an order assuming jurisdiction by the authority constituted under the Act, 1936 it is doubtful whether the petitioner can be permitted to circumvent the law by impugning such decision by way of a Constitutional petition. Moreover, I am of the view that assuming for the sake of argument that the authority under the Act while adjudicating upon the claim preferred by the respondents acts in excess of jurisdiction or without jurisdiction the wrong can be effectively remedied in an appeal from a final order. To my mind the petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground as well as the superior Courts have generally deprecated peace-meal decision of a cause which only tends to multiply the litigation and consume valuable time of the Courts as well as the parties. Since spirit behind the enactment of Labour laws and more particularly Act, 1936 is to regulate the payment of wages to certain classes of persons employed in industry and to develop harmonious relationship between the workers and the management, resort to fragmentary decisions would neither be expedient in the interest of justice nor advance the object of law. On the part of the petitioner management recourse to Constitutional jurisdiction in my view is not only ill- conceived and ill-advised but also founded on ulterior motives.
9. On the question of entertaining a Constitutional petition from an interlocutory order it would be advantageous to refer to some of the decided cases. In. Ibrahim v. Muhammad Hussain (PLD 1975 SC 457) the view taken was that fragmentary decisions of this character have been described by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nanehal v. Umrao Singh AIR 1931 PC 33) as most inconvenient which tend to delay administration of justice. In Abdul Rehman v. Mir Ahmed Khan (PLD 1983 SC 21) their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that peace meal decisions on pleas of jurisdictional nature and similar matters are not permissible notwithstanding case being an appeal case or one praying in writ.
9-A. In the latest case decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court reported as Muhammad Siddik v. Shahjehan Begum (1997 CLC 436) it was laid down that the purpose of not providing an appeal from interim order was to avoid piece meal decision and to ensure expeditiou's disposal of case under the law. Such object could not be defeated by device of challenging such interim orders in Constitutional jurisdiction.
10. Lastly, before parting with this judgment, it may he observed that the extraordinary jurisdiction under the Constitution being always discretionary in nature no party has a right to invoke it as a matter of course. In the peculiar circumstances of this petition it would neither be just nor expedient in the public interest to exercise such discretion in favor of a party evidently not inclined to grant due rights to its own employees. Needless to observe in the earlier round of litigation between the workers and the petitioner management, the petitioner after loosing its case before the lower forum approached this Court in Constitutional Petition No,S-26 of 1994 but without any success.
11. For the aforesaid facts and reasons there is no substance in this petition which is without any merit. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.