' The petitioners, who are 24 in number, are Printers and Publishers of various Newspapers in the country. They feeling aggrieved of the award made by the 6th Wage Board on 13-34996 which was published in the official gazette on 14-3-1996 have come to this Court by filing this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
2. The Wage Board which made the impugned award had been set up and established by the Federal Government under the Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 for fixation of rates of wages of the newspapers employees. The Board was headed by Mr. Justice Zia Mahmood Mirza, who at the relevant time was a Judge of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan and 18 other members, 9 of which were representatives of the employers while the other 9 represented the employees.
3. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Wage Board, interim increase in wages was allowed to the employees of the Newspapers and News Agencies by the Board on 31-12-1994 in terms of section 16(1) of the Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 w.e.i. 1-11-1994.
The first meeting of the Board was held on 23-10-1994 and the proceedings continued for a period of about one year and 6 months. The employees had submitted a memorandum of their demand to the Board to which reply was obtained from the employers. The Board also circulated a questionnaire to various newspaper establishments Bodies of Workers Unions/Organisations to elicit views and information concerning the organizational and financial structure and other alleged matters governing the determination of wages of the employees. Some of the newspapers establishments submitted their replies to the questionnaire while others did not respond. In support of their demands, the employees examined 78 witnesses while the employers examined 4 witnesses.
4. It appears from the record that during the course of proceedings before the Board the necessity of raising the wages by about 70% was conceded by all concerned including the employers viz., the petitioners. However, differences arose between the parties mainly on two questions, firstly, the date from which the increase was to be given effect to and secondly, the stage on which the employees were to be fitted or placed in the revised pay scales/grades.
5. In its award the Wage Board categorised the newspaper establishments into as many as 11.
Separate pay scales were fixed for various classes of employees details of which have been given in the schedule. The award was made effective w,e,f, 1-7-1995. It was further directed that the employees shall be adjusted in the new grades on the basis of point to point formula i,e, at the same stage at which they were under the old pay scales after giving them due allowance for the increments earned by them and their seniority.
6. The case was initially argued on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. Khalid Anwar and Min Saqib Nisar, Advocates, On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Abid Hassan Minto, Mrs. Asma Jehangir and Mr. Salman Akram Raja, Advocates were heard. In reply to their arguments, Mr. Makhdoom Ali, Advocate, who, in the meantime, had been engaged by the petitioners addressed the Court.
7. Although in the petition, the petitioners have challenged the award on multifarious grounds and many points were raised by Mr. Khalid Anwar, Advocate initially but towards the end of his arguments, the learned counsel confined challenge to the award to the following grounds:--
(i) That in view of section 9(2) of the Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973, a sitting Judge either of the High Court or of the Supreme Court could not have been appointed as Chairman and as Mr. Justice Zia Mahmood Mirza was at the relevant time a Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the constitution of the Board was illegal and the award rendered by it stood vitiated.
(ii) That the award could not be made retrospectively applicable w,e,f, 1-71995.
(iii) That the Wage Board had acted illegally in applying point to point formula while fixing the new rates of wages, and
(iv) That non-journalist employees could not have been treated at par with the working journalists and both the law and award were discriminatory and violative of Article 25 of the Constitution.
8. Taking up the question of appointment of a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court as Chairman of the Wage Board first, section 9(2) of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 which provides for setting up of the Board reads as under:- "Wage Board---(1) The Federal Government may, whenever it so considers necessary, by notification in the official Gazette, constitute a Wage Board for fixing rates of wages in respect of newspaper employees in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(2) The Board shall consist of a Chairman appointed by the Federal Government, who shall be a person who has been, or is qualified to be a Judge of a High Court, and as many members to advise the Chairman as may be appointed by the Federal Government, so, however, that one-half of the members shall be persons representing the newspaper employees and the other half, the employers in relation to newspaper establishments.
(3) ."
9. Both Mr. Khalid Anwar and Mr. Makhdoorn Ali, Advocates emphasised that as no sitting Judge of a High Court and by the same analogy, of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, can be appointed as Chairman of the Wage Board inasmuch as section 9(2) of the Act postulates appointment of a person who has been or was qualified to be a Judge of the High Court and not of a person who was a Judge of the High Court as Chairman. According to the learned counsel, the idea in not permitting a sitting Judge of the High Court to be appointed as Chairman was to avoid any subsequent embarrassm ent to the Court while hearing a Constitutional petition, if filed against the award. The learned counsel compared the language employed in section 9 of the Act with section 12 which provides for setting up a Tribunal and subsection (4) of which ordains that the Chairman of the Tribunal shall be a person who has been or is qualified to be a Judge of a High Court. The attention of this Court was also invited to the Indian Law namely the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955 which is section 9(c) for appointment of person who is or has been a Judge of the High Court or Supreme Court.
10. In reply Mr. Abid Hassan Minto and Mr. Salman Akram Raja, Advocates, pointed out that the learned Chairman at the time of his appointment was not a Judge of the High Court but of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and there was nothing in section 9 of the Act which prohibits the appointment of a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court as Chairman. It was also stated that as the learned Chairman had remained a Judge of this Court from which post he had retired before his appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court he was qualified to be appointed as Chairman of the Board. The learned counsel for the respondents vehemently objected to entertain such an objection for the first time by this Court as no such plea was raised before the Wage Board at any stage.
11. On its plain reading section 9(2) of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 does not place any bar on the appointment of a Judge of the Supreme Court as Chairman of the Board. On the other hand, it permits appointment as Chairman of a person who has been a Judge of the High Court. Clearly, therefore, a person who has been a Judge of the High Court can be appointed as Chairman, even though he may be serving Judge of the Supreme Court. The language of the cited provision being clear and explicit, this Court cannot refuse to give effect to it on account of some underlying idea or an abstract principle.
12. As regards the contention of Mr. Khalid Anwar that the idea in not permitting the appointment of a Judge of the High Court was to avoid any subsequent embarrassment if the award is challenged before the High Court in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction and that on the same principle the appointment of a Judge of the Supreme Court was also barred. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel. As already observed, whatever be the underlying idea as the language of section 9(c) is unambiguous it has to be given effect to. Contrary intention cannot be spelt out on the basis of its so-called rational or objective. According to the well-established principle of construction of Statute, if the language is unambiguous, explicit and clear, no question of interpreting it arises and the language as used must be enforced.
13. In Pakistan Taxtile Millowner's Association Karachi and 2 others v. Administrator of Karachi and 2 others (PLD 1963 SC 137), the Supreme Court of Pakistan was pleased to observe that the words used in Statute must be given their ordinary and natural meanings and it is only when such an ordinary meaning does not make sense that resort can be made to discovering other appropriate meaings. Similarly, in Kh. Ghulam Sarwar v. Pakistan through the General Manager P.W.R. Lahore (PLD 1962 SC 142) the Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled that the principle enunciated in Commissioner for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Permsel (1891 AC 531) was that if the words of the Statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such a case best declaring the intention of the legislature. If the contention of the learned counsel is accepted it would amount to modifying the language used in section 9 (2) and to adding the words "Supreme Court" after the words "High Court" so as to read that Chairman must be a person who has been or is qualified to be a Judge of the Supreme Court. Since section 9(2) of the Act makes no reference.
To a Judge of the Supreme Court, a Judge of that august Court cannot be excluded subject, however, to the condition that the person to be appointed must have been a Judge of the High Court. The learned counsel contended that this approach was technical in nature and must not be adopted.
14. There is no merit in this contention. As already observed, this Court has to give effect to the obvious intention of the legislature which has to be gathered primarily from the words used in the Statute. Furthermore, even if this interpretation being technical in nature the objection which is being raised by the petitioners to hypertechnical inasmuch as it is not the case of the petitioners that by appointing a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court as Chairman the petitioners have been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever or any loss has been caused to any of their rights.
15. It is a common ground between the parties that at the time of his appointment the learned Chairman was not a Judge of the High Court but was a Judge of the august Supreme Court of Pakistan. It is also not disputed that the learned Chairman had remained a Judge of this Court and had retired as such. As at the time of his appointment the learned Chairman was not a Judge of the High Court, section 9(2) of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 did not in turn operate as a bar to this appointment as a Chairman especially when the learned Chairman had been, at one time, a Judge of the High Court.
16. There is also force in the contention of the respondents' learned counsel that in the facts and circumstances of the case the petitioners should not be permitted to raise this objection for the first time before this Court. The petitioners not only accepted by their conduct the appointment of the learned Chairman but willingly participated in the proceedings and thus atleast acquiesced in his appointment without any demur or objection. The proceedings, as already mentioned lasted for a period of more than one year and six months. If the objection has been raised at the earlier stage proper measures could have been taken to rectify the so-called defect. The award made by the Wage Board cannot be allowed to be nullified on such a belated objection at this stage.
17. Various judgments like Muhammad Afzal v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan and another (PLD 1967 SC. 314), Haji Abdul Sattar v. Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and others (1984 SCMR 925), Malik Rehmatullah and another v. Mian Muhammad Shaft and another (1986 SCMR 496) have been cited by the petitioners' learned counsel to contend that it was never too late to raise a jurisdictional objection which can be entertained at any stage especially when the question was purely one of law. It was emphasised that there was no estoppel against the Statute nor could consent confer jurisdiction on a Tribunal when there was none.
18. There can be no cavil with the principle enunciated in the precedents cited by the learned counsel. But it is important to note that the jurisdiction of this Court which the petitioners seek to invoke is discretionary and equitable in nature. One of the recognised principles on the basis of which interference can be refused is the conduct of the petitioners which must be such so as to entitle them to the grant of relief even if the impugned order be void.
19. Mr. Makdoom Ali, however, relying on Pir Sabir Shah v. Shah Muhammad Khan, Member Provincial Assembly, N.-W.F.P. And another (PLD 1995 SC 66) and Mian Manzoor Ahmad Wattoo v.
Federation of Pakistan and 3 others (PLD 1997 Lahore 38) argued that relief under Article 199 of the Constitution cannot be denied on account of conduct of the petitioners. The reliance of the learned counsel on the two cited cases is wholly misplaced as the nature of the controversy in those cases was wholly different. The ratio of those two cases applies only when there is a violation of Constitutional provisions or of fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution and not otherwise.
There is a long list of precedents which support the view that as the power under Article 199 being discretionary the Court cannot refuse to exercise it in favour of the petitioner whose conduct has been unsatisfactory or in view of the circumstances which make it inequitable to interfere.
20. In the famous case of Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (PLD 1973 SC 236) the classic statement of Hamoodur Rehman, C.J. (as he then was) may be re- produced with advantage:-- "An order in the nature of a writ certiorari or manadmus is a discretionary order. Its object is to foster justice and right a wrong. Therefore before a person can be permitted to invoke this discretionary power of a Court, it must be shown that the order sought to be set aside has occasioned some injustice to the parties. If it does not work any injustice to any party, rather it cures a manifest illegality, then the extraordinary jurisdiction ought not to be allowed to be invoked."
' This principle was followed and reiterated in Syed Ali Shah v. Abdul Saghir Khan Sherwani and others (PLD 1990 SC 504).
21. Mr. Makhdoom Ali further contended that, in any case, such an objection even if raised could not have been entertained by the Board or the Chairman. In this respect he cited Akhtar Ali Pervaiz v.
Altaf ur Rehman (PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lahore 390). The effect of observations relied upon by the learned counsel which appear at page 204 of the report stands diluted by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sabir Shah's case (supra), particular reference may be made to the judgment of Fazal Karim, J. (as he then was) at page 251 of the report.
22. The other legal objection raised by the learned counsel was in respect of the procedure adopted by the Board. At the very outset it may be stated that this point was not raised by Mr. Khalid Anwar, Advocate when he argued the petition but it was pressed into service by Mr. Makhdoom Ali, Advocate, when he was replying to the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents. On this ground alone, this plea does not deserve any serious consideration. Be that as it may, even on merits this objection is not tenable.
23. The learned counsel for the petitioners elaborated that no notice was issued by the Board to the various newspaper establishments in the country nor were they granted any opportunity of being heard or to lead evidence. He emphasised that the Chairman erred in treating the employees' members as representatives of the petitioners as once those members had been appointed to the Board they ceased to be representatives of the employers.
24. The contention of the learned counsel is misconceived besides being belated and afterthought.
No objection at any stage of the proceedings to the procedure adopted by the 3oard was taken before it. Admittedly out of 18 members, 9 were representatives of the employers while other 9 represented the employees. According to section 9(1) of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 the members are appointed with a view to advise the Chairman. Consequently as their role is merely advisery and not adjudicatory in nature they did not cease to represent the employers or the employees, as the case many be and retain their representative character.
25. It may also be stated that neither the law nor the rules framed thereunder prescribe any particular procedure to be followed by the Wage Board of the Chairman for conducting the proceedings or holding meetings. That being so, it was open to the Board to adopt any procedure which does not militate against the principles of natural justice.
26. From the material placed on the record and the proceedings of the Board, it is evident that all the owners/of Printers/Publishers of the newspapers were fully aware of the constitution of the Board, proceedings being held by it and were given full opportunity to participate in the same. The petitioners Nos.l to 21 are members of the two Organizations of the newspaper employers. These two Organisations are incidently petitioners Nos.22 and 23 in the present petitions which shows that the interest of all the petitioners is joint and common. Those two organisations namely All Pakistan Newspapers Society (APNS) and Pakistan Newspapers and Periodicals Organisation had actively participated as representatives of employers in addition to the employers' representatives. The reply to the memorandum of demand filed by the employees was singed and presented by the two Associations. These two Organisations had also produced evidence in the form of 4 witnesses on behalf of the employers.
27. It is also evident on the record that on suggestions made by the Members of the Board a detailed questionnaire eliciting the views and relevant information from all the newspaper establishments in the country were sent to them, some of whom did not even care to send any reply. Both the parties namely the employers and the employees were called upon to produce evidence and they examined the witnesses which they wish to produce in support of their respective positions. In these circumstances, there is no merit whatsoever in the contention of the petitioners' learned counsel that the employers were not given sufficient opportunity of being heard.
28. It is next argued by Mr. Makhdoom Ali, Advocate that the award has been delivered by the learned Chairman alone and the other members of the Board were not party to it. According to the learned counsel the award was not even placed before the other Members of the Board as it did not bear their signatures.
29. This contention is not well-based. The award on the face of it has been made by the Board and nothing has been placed before me to show that the award has been rendered by the Chairman alone. A perusal of the award further shows that so far as the enhancement of wages to the extent of 70 per cent was concerned, there was complete consensus not only between the members but also between the parties. There were, however, two issues on which the members representing the employees and employers as also the parties were at variance namely the date from which the award is to take effect and whether enhancement should be on point to point fitment basis. In view of the difference of opinion the Chairman was called upon by the representatives to decide these questions which he did. It cannot, therefore, be argued that the other members of the Board were not consulted.
30. So far as the legal position is concerned, it is apparent on a bare reading of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 particularly section 9 thereof it is obvious that though the Board comprises of the Chairman and other members but the role of the members is only advisory in nature and they were appointed according to section 9 (2) to advise the Chairman. It follows, therefore, that the decision on the contentious issues had to be made by the learned Chairman and the other members are appointed to advise him and are not required to take any decision in the matter.
31. In the present case, as is obvious, from the award itself, on the controversial questions, there were two advices, one given by the Members representating the employees and the other by the members representing the employers and as such the learned Chairman was perfectly justified in giving his own decision. The position stands further clarified by inferring to rule 8 of the Working Journalists (Wage Board) Rules, 1960 which provides that all matters considered at the meeting of the Board shall be decided by the Chairman in consultation with the members of the Board. The proviso, which is more important, says that the advice of the members in such matters shall not be binding on the Chairman. There is nothing in the Act or the Rules which requires that the award is to be signed by all the members in addition to the Chairman. On the other hand, as already observed, the role of the members being advisery in nature and the decision being that of the Chairman alone, obviously the award has to bear the signatures of the Chairman and the question of obtaining signatures of other members does not arise.
32. The learned counsel next attempted to argue that in any event the advice rendered by the members was binding on the Chairman. In support of this contention he relied upon the dictum of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the historical Judges' case reported as Al-Jehad Trust through Raeesul Mujahideen Habib ul Wahab ul Khairi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1996 SC 324). The reliance of the learned counsel on that judgment is wholly mis-placed inasmuch as the decision in that case proceeded on the doctrine of trichotomy of powers in the constitutional set-up and the wording of the relevant Article of the Constitution itself which are wholly different from the language of section 9 of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973.
33. Coming now to the merits of the case, it had already been observed that apart from the question of appointment of the Chairman, Mr. Khalid Anwar had candidly and fairly stated that he challenges the validity of the award on the grounds that the non journalists could not have been awarded increase in wages at the rates applicable to the journalists; the employees could not have been given the benefit of point to point fixation; and the date from which the award is made applicable.
34. Before proceedings to determine these questions it may be stated that overall impact of the award is increase in wages and salaries by about 70 per cent. It is evident from the record, particularly the observations of the learned Chairman in para. 11 that there was consensus among the parties so far as increase of wages by 70 per cent average was concerned. These observations are to the following effect:-- "....During the two days session, a number of issues came up under discussion and finally a consensus emerged between both the sides for allowing 70% average increase in the new pay scales but they could not agree on the date from which the Award should be made operative...."
' The minutes of the meeting of the Wage Board held on 7-11-1995 shows that the representatives of the employers had agreed to allow the benefit to the employees of increase by 70% provided they accepted the increase from October, 1995. It was thus an admitted position before the Board that keeping in view the rate of inflation, 70% increase in the wages was amply justified. Even otherwise there - was sufficient evidence before the Board to show that the rate of inflation during the 5 years in question was about 70%. The most important witness on which the learned Chairman has placed reliance was Mr. Islam Ahmad, Deputy Director-General Federal Bureau of Statistics, who produces the record. Though this witness initially stated that the total impact of inflation measured on the basis of changes in consumer price indices for the period 1991 to 1995 was 55.64% but he admitted that the compound effect of inflation for the said period was 69.38%. Though the employees had claimed the price-hike to be much higher but the learned Chairman keeping in view the evidence on the record apart from the admission of the parties was justified in holding that the increases in cost of living between 1990 to 1995 was about 70%. Be that as it may, as already observed, the learned counsel in the ultimate analysis did not challenge this finding of the learned Chairman and the increase granted in wages at the rate of 70%. To reiterate, the main objection in this behalf was that the wages should not have been fixed on the basis of point to point formula and secondly that the award should not have been made retrospectively applicable and thirdly, non-journalists could not have been allowed the similar benefit.
35. So far as the question of point to point fixation is concerned, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that point to point fitment formula should not have been applied by the learned Chairman while fixing the wages, as a consequence of which huge burden has been placed upon the petitioners which has made it almost impossible for them to run their business. It has also been argued by the learned counsel that while applying this formula the capacity of the petitioners to pay the increase had not been taken into consideration. It was elaborated that none of the earlier Wage Boards had applied place to place formula. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that the application of place to place formula was necessary so as to translate into reality the increase being granted in the salaries of individuals.
The learned counsel explained that the fact the previous Wage Boards had given effect to that formula was not of any consequence particularly when the same formula has been made basis in case of other industries like Banks etc.
36. I am afraid, the contention of the petitioners' learned counsel cannot be accepted. The petitioners themselves had agreed that the salary and the wages payable to the workers be increased by about 70 per cent. In order to give effect to this proposal it was necessary that the benefit of the previous service and the seniority of the employees should be maintained. Be that as it may, this Court while hearing this Constitutional petition cannot interfere with the award merely on the basis that another view was possible or it can substitute its own opinion. It may also be mentioned that this formula has been applied in many other organisations while determining the wages like the nationalised Banks and Pakistan kirlines Corporation.
37. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that even though there may be some justification for treating the journalists working in the newspaper industry as separate class and to fix their wages on account of the nature of their duties but there was no occasion for giving similar treatment to the other employees of the newspaper establishments who were non-journalists. According to the learned counsel, the law in that respect was discriminatory and was violative of Article 25 of the Constitution and in any case the non journalists could not have been given increase in wages at the same rate as was being granted to the journalists. The learned counsel elaborated that the Chairman has erred in relying upon the wages payable to the employees of Pakistan Television Corporation and Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation which were not comparable employment.
38. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel. The Act on the face of it provides for fixation of wages of all newspaper employees, both journalist and non-journalists. The law was framed to ensure payment of wages and salaries of the persons engaged in the newspaper industry as a whole in recognition of the position that dissemination of news is vital to public interest. It was, therefore, necessary to ensure that all those persons who are engaged in bringing out newspapers should be free from shackle of economic misery and the resultant sense of despondency. The nature of duties being performed by the journalists may be unique and of more importance but it is equally clear that without the participation of other non-journalists employees it is not possible to bring out a newspaper. The legislature, being alive to this position, has chosen to frame the law for the newspaper industry as a whole which by itself is a separate class. This classification cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational and the question of violation of Article 25 of the Constitution which does not prohibit reasonable classification, does not arise. It may be noticed that the earlier law namely the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 1960 provides for fixation of wages of the working journalists only which was found to be unsatisfactory. The Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 which repealed the aforesaid Ordinance, therefore, provides for fixation of wages of both whole time journalists and whole time non-journalists and defined in sub-clause (i) and sub-clause (ii) of clause (8) of section 2 of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973.
39. There is also merit in the contention of Mr. Minto that the grant of better conditions of service only to the journalists as compared to other persons engaged in bringing out of the newspapers tended to create friction among the two sets of employees and was not congenial to the better relations inter se. It may also be mentioned here that relevant law in India namely The Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 was originally applicable only to working journalists but by subsequent amendment, provision has been made for fixing wages of the non-journalists also. In Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chairman Fourth Wage Board and Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad (1993 SCMR 1533), it was observed that the purpose of Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 is the betterment of financial condition of persons employed in the newspaper establishments and it should receive beneficial construction.
40. Much emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the fact that the Board has failed to pay proper attention to the question as to whether the petitioners have the capacity to pay the benefits which were being awarded. As has been rightly pointed out by the respondents learned counsel, the capacity to pay the employees was not challenged before the Board in the reply to the memorandum of demand submitted by the petitioners. Be that as it may, as is obvious from the perusal of the award of the Board itself that this aspect of the matter was very much present in the mind of the Board and was given due consideration. In particular the relevant observations made by the learned Chairman in para. 53 of the award may be reproduced below:-- "....With respect to the capability of the newspapers to pay, the employers have mainly relied upon what they described as 123% increase in the price of the newspaper as also the increase in the cost of other components such as ink, plates and graphic films which according to their witness Mr. Mansoor Rehman had gone up from 92% to 222% during the last 5 years. They also pleaded increase in electricity and telephone charges during the last 5 years which enhanced the cost of production. They also referred to the advancement in printing technology which made it imperative for them to divert the funds for acquiring the latest equipments. They also made a grievance of reduction in advertisement business and pleaded that any exra burden beyond their capacity would play havoc on them.
' Mr. Mansoor Rehman admitted in cross-examination that the price of newsprint in 1990 was 546 U.S. Dollars per metric tone while in 1994, its price was 400 US Dollars. He also admitted that the exorbitant rise in the price of newsprint took place only in 3rd quarters of the year 1994. He further admitted that price of newsprint has been fluctuating during the last 10 years and the possibility of the prices coming down in future cannot be ruled out. Reference may also be made to the admission made by Mr. Mansoor Rehman that there has been unprecedented expansion in Jang Group of Publications during the last five years. It also stands admitted by the said witness that the price of ordinary copy of Daily Jang, Karachi in the year 1990 was Rs,3 and on Friday, its price was Rs,3.50 which prices have now been raised to Rs,7 and Rs,9 per copy respectively. Price of the newsprint having increased only in the 3rd quarter of the year 1994 could not have affected the profitability of the newspapers in the preceding years. Even otherwise, it is an admitted position that there has been an increase of 60% to 100% in the cover prices of different national dailies from 1990 to April, 1995 and after May, 1995, the cover prices of all the national newspapers were increased by 100%. Similarly, prime advertising rates i,e, the commercial rates were admittedly increased by 27% to 69% in different newspapers. Furthermore, on scrutiny of the data provided by Herald Private (Ltd) and the Nawa-e-Waqt, I find that their gross profits had increased moved repidly than the rate of inflation. It may pertinently be stated that the gross revenues of Herald Private Ltd. Increased from Rs,172.3 million in 1989 to Rs,323.3 million in 1994, i,e, an increase of 88% during the five years period, its gross profits also increased from Rs,41.5 million in 1989 to Rs,79.4 million in 1994 indicating an increase of 91%. Similarly, gross revenues of Nawa-i-Waqt increased from Rs,186.4 to Rs,264.7 showing an increase of 52.7% and its gross profits increased from Rs,92.2 million to Rs,60.7 million which is an increase of 107.9% from 1989 to 1994. In one case, even the net profits have almost doubled. Needless to observe that the employees' assertion that the wealth and assets of all the employers have multiplied over the years, that all of them own their own printing presses and sky rise plazas has not been specifically denied by the employers in their reply Memorandum and what they have stated is only this "It has been pointed out by some of the employees that the employers have made huge investments in the newspaper industry and modernized it. It is certainly better than what is in India and is at par with developed countries. This spirit needs to be encouraged for ensuring healthy trend in the industry. Any effort to grant cut throat increase to employees due to this factor may result in choking of the industry leading to closures/diversion of capital to other avenues/industry, rendering newspaper employees jobless."
' In view of the aforenoted evidence particularly the facts admitted by the employers' own witness and other relevant material available on record, I am satisfied that the newspaper establishment of all the categories are sufficiently possessed of the capacity to pay the extra financial burden rasulting from a revision of wage structure of their employees. It may pertinently be observed that the final award would result only in a nominal increase over the interim relief already granted by me which the employers had accepted without any demur.
41. In the same context it was argued by the petitioners' learned counsel that the Wage Board by failing to advert to the question of capacity to pay has acted contrary to Article 19 of the Constitution which grants the right of free speech and also freedom of press. Relying on the judgment in Independent Newspapers' case supra and various Indian Judgments it was argued that any measures which directly or indirectly put restraints on the publication or curtail circulation of the newspapers due to any factor including rise in costs of production and price of the newspapers should, as far as possible, be avoided.
42. There is no quarrel with this proposition, but as already observed it was not the case of the petitioners before the Board that the increase in wages would result in decreasing the circulation nor was any evidence to that effect produced. On the other hand, the respondents produced documents to show that the circulation of the newspapers was increasing day by day. Moreover, as already mentioned, the petitioners themselves had agreed to the increase in salaries to the extent of 70%.
43. It was also argued by the petitioners' learned counsel that while fixing wages for non-journalists, the Chairman has acted illegally in drawing comparison between the wages being paid to the non-journalists employees of the newspaper and the employees of other Organisations like Pakistan Television Corporation, Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation and Provincial Information Department. In this respect the learned counsel has relied upon the Independent Newaspaper's case supra.
44. It is ironical to note that both in their reply to the memorandum of demand of the employees it was the employers viz., the petitioners who wanted the Board to draw comparison between the employees of the Organisations mentioned above and the newspaper employees. This is borne out not only by a perusal of the reply to the memorandum of demand, a copy of which has been placed on the record but also the award itself. Be that as it may, the petitioners having agreed to 70% increase in the wages of the newspaper employees without any reservation as to the nature of duties being performed by any one of them cannot now raise this objection.
45. Taking up the question of the date of enforcement of the award, the representatives of the petitioners before the Board had initally wanted the award to come into force w,e,f, 1-11-1995 while the respondents suggested 15-4-1995 as the date for that purpose. The matter was referred to the Sub-Committee comprising of representatives of the employees and a representative of the employers. In the subsequent discussion, Mr. Arif Nizami, representing the employers, agreed to 1- 9-1995 as the date from which the award be made effective. The employees, however, insisted that the effective date should be 15-4-1995. The learned Chairman in his wisdom decided that the award should be given effect to from 1-7-1995 which was almost the middle of the two dates and from which the financial years starts.
46. There is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the award could not be made applicable retrospectively from a date prior to the announcement of the award. Section 10(2) of the Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 authorises the Board to specify a date from which award was to come into operation. The discretion exercised by the Chairman in fixing 1-7-1995 as the date of enforcement is neither arbitrary nor capricious so as to justify interference by this Court.
47. Before parting with this case it may be stated that while exercising Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution this Court does not sit in appeal over the decisions rendered by the special Tribunal nor can the decision of such a Tribunal be set aside by taking another view of the matter or substituting the opinion of the Tribunal. It has time and again been held by the superior Courts that interference in the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction with the order of Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction is only permissible when the order was without lawful authority and either fails to take into account the relevant factors provided by law or takes into account irrelevant or extraneous considerations or where the material on record has been misread or ignored. None of these eventualities has been shown to have arisen in the present case. The Board has recorded statements of 78 witnesses who were produced by the employees and of 4 witnesses from the employers side. The statements made by them and other material placed on the record has been fully discussed in the award particularly in paragraphs 36 to 47. The learned Chairman was also fully conscious of the criteria laid down by the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973. He after referring to section 9 of the Act and the definition of "wages" in the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 has in para. 49 of the award observed as under:-- "Criteria for fixing the rates of wages for the newspaper employees is laid down in section 10 of the Act which in relevant aspect reads as follows:-- 10(1) In fixing rates of wages in respect of newspaper employees, the Board may take into consideration the cost of living, the prevalent rates of wages of comparable employments, the circumstances relating to the newspaper industry in different regions of the country, and any other circumstances which to the Board may seem relevant.
(2) ..
(3)
' Four factors contemplated in the aforequoted provision which the Board has to take into consideration for fixing the rates of wages are (i) cost of living (ii) the prevalent rates of wages of comparable employments (iii) the circumstances relating to the newspaper industry in different regions of the country and (iv) any other circumstances which may seem relevant to the Board."
48. This clearly shows that four factors which have to be taken into consideration while determining wages by the Board were fully present in the mind of the learned Chairman. The award not only discusses all aspects of the matter in detail and does not suffer from any legal infirmity muchless jurisdictional error so as to justify any interference by this Court in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons this petition fails and is dismissed. However, in view of the nature of the controversy involved in this petition the parties are left to bear their own costs.