1. ' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.--- This appeal has been directed against the judgment of the Shariat Court whereby the respondent was granted bail.
2. ' The brief facts of the case as stated in the F.I.R. Are that on 13-6-1992, complainant alongwith Muhammad Amir, Muhammad Imran, Attiqur Rehman and Muhammad Nazir, was sowing seed of maize crops in the land when Muhammad Behram and others suddenly appeared and launched attack on the complainant party. Muhammad Behram, accused-respondent, is alleged to have caused injuries to Muhammad Amir on his abdomen which resulted in his death; he also caused injuries to Muhammad Imran and Muhammad Siddique on their leg and finger, respectively.
3. Previously, the accused was released on bail by the Shariat Court but on appeal me same was recalled by this Court observing that in the circumstances of the case the respondent was not entitled to bail. Thereafter, the appellant sought bail on the ground that he was entitled to be released on bail in view of the amendment in section 497, Cr.P.C. Which envisages that if the trial of an accused charged with an offence punishable with death is not concluded within two years and the accused has been continuously confined to jail, he may be released on bail subject to certain conditions envisaged in the aforesaid amendment. The trial Court dismissed the bail application observing that the accused-respondent being a desperate criminal was not entitled to bail.
4. However, on appeal, the Shariat Court came to the conclusion that even after deducting the period which was consumed in the proceedings of bail, the accused has been continuously remained in detention for two years and nine months, so far as the question pertaining to the accused being a desperate criminal was concerned, the Shariat Court expressed the view that in the circumstances of the case, it could not be said that the accused-respondent was a "hardened" or "desperate" criminal as envisaged under section 2 of the amending statute. It is against the aforesaid order of the Shariat Court that the complainant has come up in appeal seeking the cancellation of the bail of the accused-respondent.
5. ' We have heard the arguments and perused the file. Sardar Muhammad Mukhtar Khan, the learned counsel for the appellant, has argued that the respondent was not entitled to bail because he was a "desperate" and "hardened" criminal in view of the fact that he caused the death of Muhammad Amir by causing him dagger blows on abdomen and also caused injuries to two other members of the complainant party. The learned counsel has also maintained that the view taken by the trial Court was not open to exception because the trial is about to be concluded; only the statement of one prosecution witness remains to be recorded. The learned counsel cited the following authorities in support of his contention: ' In a case reported as Gulzar Ahmad v. The State 1995 PCr.LJ 1494, it was held that as the delay in the trial was caused due to the absence of the accused or their counsel and the bulk of prosecution evidence had already been recorded, the accused was not entitled to bail.
6. ' In case reported Muhammad Hafiz v. The State 1992 PCr.LJ 2614, the accused was refused bail observing that as he had acted in a "desperate" manner and the delay in the conclusion of the trial could not be attributed to the prosecution, he was not entitled to bail. The facts of the case were that deceased was taken by the accused from his house on the pretext to harvest the wheat crops but subsequently he killed him in a callous and brutal manner by inflicting as many as nine injuries on the suspicion that the deceased had illicit relation with his sister.
7. ' In a case reported as M. Idrees v. The State 1990 PCr.LJ 655, it was observed that the accused was involved in thirteen cases of murder and attempted murder, he had also made a murderous assault on the brother of the complainant and repeated it on the complainant. Thus, it was observed that the accused appeared to he of a dangerous character and was not entitled to bail being a "hardened", "desperate" and " dangerous " criminal.
8. ' Sardar Rafique Mahmood Khan, the learned counsel for the respondent, opposed the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. He has argued that the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinguishable and are not attracted to the facts of the case in hand.
9. He has argued that there must be some material on the record to show that the accused was a "desperate" and "hardened" criminal. The learned counsel has argued that in this case the accused respondent has also sustained injuries in the incident, as is evident from the prosecution case. He has further submitted that the parties had a fight as a result of some dispute with regard to immovable property. Thus. The learned counsel strenuously maintained that there is no room for argument that the accused was "hardened" and "desperate" criminal and thus he was not entitled to bail. The learned counsel has cited the following authorities in support of his contention: ' In case reported as Moundar v. The State PLD 1990 SC 934, it has been held that words "hardened", "desperate" or "dangerous" criminal must be considered in view of the material placed before the Court so as to support the allegation that the accused was not entitled to bail, despite the expiry of the statutory period.
10. ' In case reported as Wazir and another v. The State PLD 1986 Kar. 646 it has been observed that mere fact that the appellants allegedly committed two murders per se is not sufficient to dub them as "desperate", "dangerous" and "hardened" criminals within the meaning of fourth proviso to subsection (1) of section 497, Cr.P.C.
11. We have given due consideration to the arguments and perused the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the parties. It may be stated that the mere fact that the accused-respondent allegedly caused two injuries with dagger to the deceased and injured two other members of the complainant party does not, per se, bring him within the purview of "desperate" or "hardened" criminal, especially so when he also allegedly sustained two injuries in the Incident. While dubbing a person as a "hardened" or "desperate" criminal each case has to be decided in view of the material on the record and not on the basis of mere allegations. So far as the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial has almost been concluded and thus it was not desirable to allow the concession of bail is concerned, we are of the opinion that when c statement of one of the witnesses has yet to be recorded, it cannot be said that the trial has been concluded. The trial would be deemed to be concluded only when the statements of all the prosecution witnesses have been recorded, the statement of the accused under section 342 and the statements of the defence witnesses, if any, have also been recorded. Thus, it cannot be said that in the instant case it was in the fitness of the things to refuse the bail to the accused, despite the fact that he remained in the custody for more than two years and nine months, as has been held by the Shariat Court. A reference may be made to a judgment of this Court titled Muhammad Riaz v. The State 1998 PCr.LJ 320 wherein the aforesaid proposition has been dealt with in detail.
12. ' In light of what has been stated above finding no force in this appeal it is hereby dismissed.