' MUHAMMAD TASNIM, J.---Applicant Naimat Khan son of Haji Ali Akbar is booked in Crime No,411 of 2008, under section 302, 34, P.P.C., Police Station Soldier Bazzar, Karachi. Initially applicant had applied for bail before learned trial Court on the ground of hardship and statutory delay, but such bail application was rejected by the learned trial Court per order dated 18-4-2012, Against the aforesaid order, applicant has approached to this. Court.
2. The case of the prosecution, as set-out in the F.I.R:, is that complainant Farhad Ali son of Khewa Din stated that his younger sister namely Zainab Bibi had married with Mutalib Khan son of Naimat Khan one and half years ago. They are related inter se. It is further stated that sister of the complainant has come to his house for 3/4 days due to annoyance with her husband Mutalib Khan. It is claimed that on 28-12-2008 in the evening time at 8-00 p.m. Naimat Khan came at the house of complainant and called his brother Irfan @ Kali outside from the house and stated that he wants to talk with him about his wife. It is further stated that brother of the complainant came out from the house and while talking with the Naimat Khan they started moving towards Ibrahim Shah Shrine. It is further stated that in the meanwhile complainant and his brother Afsar Ali were following them and when brother of complainant Irfan Ali and Naimat Khan reached on the road of Ibrahim Shah Shrine they saw that their brother-in-law Mutalib Khan and Haroon son of Fazal grappling started already there. Meanwhile Naimat Khan took out pistol and with intent to kill started firing upon the brother of the complainant Irfan Ali, due to this his brother got injuries and fell down. He was taken to Civil Hospital, but he died on the way. It is further claimed that police had arrested accused Naimat Khan, Mutalib Khan and their companion Haroon, hence the present F.I.R.
Was lodged against the aforesaid three accused persons.
3. Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Kazi, learned counsel for the applicant, has submitted that the case of the applicant is case of hardship as he remained in custody for more than three years and seven months. He further submitted that throughout the proceedings applicant has taken adjournments on 17 occasions and the total delay attributable to the applicant for such adjournments comes to 118 days. He further, submitted that even if 118 days delay, which is attributable to the applicant, is deducted from the total period for which applicant has remained in custody still applicant remained behind the bars for more than two years and nine months. Learned counsel further submitted that delay in trial for two years and nine months is not attributable to the applicant. He further submitted that there were as many as 16 prosecution witnesses out of which only three witnesses have been examined during three and half years and still 13 witnesses are to be examined by the prosecution. He further submitted that there is no likelihood of conclusion of trial in near future. He further submitted that for the last so many dates learned trial Court is lying vacant. Learned counsel for the applicant has also submitted that prosecution witnesses are not regularly attending the Court for their evidence. He referred diary-sheet of the learned trial Court dated 30-4-2011, 17-9-2011, 26-10-2011, 12-11-2011, 18-4-2012, 3-5-2012, 28-5-2012, 9-6-2012, 14-7-2012 and 4-8-2012 and submitted that on above dates of hearing prosecution witnesses were not in attendance in Court. He further submitted that initially for attendance of P.Ws. (summonses were issued and nowadays bailable warrants are being issued for their appearance in Court. Learned counsel for the applicant lastly submitted that applicant is neither hardened, desperate or previously convicted offender for any offence and the case of the applicant squarely falls within the ambit of newly added proviso in section 497, Cr.P.C., which entitles the applicant for grant of bail on the ground of statutory delay In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the following case-law:--
(I) NAZIR HUSSAIN v. ZIA UL HAQ AND OTHERS (1983 SCMR 72),
(2) ZAHID HUSSAIN SHAH v. THE STATE (PLD 1995 SUPREME COURT 49),
(3) HASSAN v. THE STATE (PLD 1996 Kar. 487),
(4) MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE v. MUHAMMAD BEHRAM AND ANOTHER (1998 PCr.LJ 358),
(5) ABDULLAH v. THE STATE AND ANOTHER (1985 SCMR 1509),
(6) SHABEER v. THE STATE (2012 SCMR 354),
(7) IRFAN YAQOOB v. THE STATE (SBLR 2011 Sindh 1205),
(8) JAMSHEED ALI v. THE STATE (2012 PCr.LJ 1022),
(9) GHULAM ABBAS alias ABASI AND ANOTHER'S (PLD 2005 Karachi 255),
(10) RIASAT ALI AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE (PLD 1977 SUPREME COURT 480),
(11) SHER ZAMAN v. MUHAMMAD AZAD AND ANOTHER (1978 SCMR 248),
(12) ABDUL HAMEED AND OTHERS v. THE STATE (2003 MLD 19),
(13) MUEEN AFTAB SHAIKH v. THE STATE THROUGH FIA KARACHI (PLD 2012 Sindh 261),
(14) TAJ MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE (2011 PCr.LJ 1910), and
(15) ORDER PASSED BY HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN IN CIVIL PETITION NO. 620-K OF 2011, DATED 11-8-2011 (SYED MAQSOOD AHMED v. THE STATE AND OTHERS).
4. Conversely, Mr. Mahmood A. Qureshi, learned counsel for the complainant has vehemently opposed the grant of bail and has submitted that delay in trial is attributable to the present applicant as he sought adjournment on 17 occasions, which are material dates and on such dates prosecution witnesses were in attendance. He further submitted that applicant has deliberately avoided to examine the prosecution witnesses and has delayed the proceedings. Learned counsel for the complainant has submitted that delay in trial is attributable to the applicant and he is not entitled to concession of bail on the ground of statutory delay in view of newly-added proviso in section 497, Cr.P.C. Through Act VIII of 2011 dated 20-4-2011. Learned counsel for the complainant has further submitted that applicant may not be enlarged on bail, but directions be issued to the learned trial Court for early conclusion of the trial. He also submitted that adjournment sought by the applicant could not be deducted from the period he remained in custody. To support his contentions, learned counsel has placed his reliance on the following case-law:--
(1) ABDUR RASHID v. THE STATE (1998 SCMR 897), and
(2) ASHIQ HUSSAIN AND OTHERS v. THE STATE (1989 SCMR 1580).
5. On the other hand, learned Assistant Prosecutor-General Sindh has adopted the arguments of the learned counsel for the complainant and has also opposed the grant of bail. He further submitted that trial is about to be concluded. He further submitted that applicant is partly responsible for the delay in trial and he is not entitled to for concession of bail on statutory delay.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record and the case-law cited at the bar.
7. Since the bail has been sought on the ground of statutory delay, it will be advantageous to reproduce the proviso to section 497, Cr.P.C. Which was added through Act VIII of 2011 dated 20-4- 2011, whereby amendment has been brought about through Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2011, which is as under:-- "Provided further that the Court shall, except where it is of the opinion that the delay in the trial of the accused has been occasioned by an act or omission of the accused or any other person acting on his behalf, direct that any person shall be released on bail---
(a) Who, being accused of any offence not punishable with death, has been detained for such offence for a continuous period exceeding one year or in case of a woman exceeding six months and whose trial for such offence has not concluded; or
(b) Who, being accused of an offence punishable with death, has been detained for such offence for a continuous period exceeding two years and in case of a woman exceeding one year and whose trial for such offence has not concluded: Provided further that the provisions of the foregoing proviso shall not apply to a previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or to a person who, in the opinion of the Court, is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or is accused of an act of terrosum punishable with death or imprisonment for life."
8. An examination of the newly-added provision in section 497, Cr.P.C., would show that where Court is of the opinion that delay in trial of the accused has not been occasioned by an act or omission of the accused or any person acting on his behalf, direct that such accused person be released on bail, who is accused of an offence punishable with death, has been detained for such offence for continuous period exceeding two years and trial has not concluded provided that the above benefit will not be available to a previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or to a person who, in the opinion of the Court, is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or is accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
9. It is admitted position that F.I.R. Was lodged on 28-12-2008, applicant was arrested on 28-12- 2008 and he was released on bail by the High Court on 16-2-2010. However, order of the High Court granting bail to the applicant was set aside by the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan vide order dated 2-4-2010. Thereafter applicant surrendered before the learned trial Court on 3-4- 2010 and eversince then applicant is in custody, which comes to 2 years, 6 months and 11 days.
Charge in the matter was framed by the learned trial Court on 26-8-2009 and out of 16 witnesses only three witnesses have been examined. The learned counsel for the applicant has placed on record diary-sheets of the learned trial Court commencing from 21-1-2009 till 4-8-2012 to contend that delay is not attributable to the applicant.
10. Perusal of the diary-sheet would show that applicant had obtained two adjournments i.e, 11-6- 2009 and 4-7-2009 prior to framing of the charge. Thereafter in the year 2009 applicant sought adjournment on five occasions i.e, 10-10-2009, 24-10-2009, 7-11-2009, 25-11-2009 and 16-12-2009.
Thereafter applicant sought adjournments on 3-4-2010, 28-4-2010, 2-6-2010, 25-9-2010, 9-10-2010, 23-10-2010 and 13-11-2010 but he did not seek adjournment in the year 2011 and 2012. The perusal of the diary-sheet of the learned trial Court further shows that delay in the trial is not solely attributable to the present applicant. Perusal of the diary-sheet further shows that on 22-1-2011 Presiding Officer was on leave and prosecution witnesses were in attendance. On 26-2-2011 process was ordered to be issued to the prosecution witnesses for their appearance in Court.
11. Learned counsel for the complainant has relied upon the case of Abdur Rashid (supra), wherein the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan while dealing with the third proviso of section 497, Cr.P.C., ' which was promulgated through Act No,XIX/94 on 14th November, 1994 has observed as under:-- "..Real object of introducing above referred amendment appears to be an effort to ensure that criminal trials are not unnecessarily protracted. It thus created an implied obligation upon the prosecution for taking effective measures to produce evidence so that cases of accused persons facing trials concerning respective categories contained in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of third proviso to section 497, Cr. P.C. Could be finalized expeditiously and within the .Period, stipulated by aforementioned provisions of law. Any slackness or incapacity of prosecution to conclude the prosecution side within the tune frame mentioned in clauses (a) and (b)supra, will provide an advantage to the accused for being released on bail. However, exception contained in third proviso unambiguously imposes a responsibility upon the accused for ensuring that delay in disposal is not occasioned or caused on account of him or any person acting on his behalf.
Therefore, it is crystal clear that if for any reason accused or his authorized agent which necessarily includes the advocate engaged for defence causes delay, then in such eventuality protection contained in the third proviso cannot be invoked. It may further be noticed that while ascertaining cumulative effect of ultimate delay in disposal of the lease, it would not be merely mathematical calculation of excluding such days for which adjournment was obtained by the accused or his counsel.
' Factually, if the witnesses are in attendance and matter is ripe for recording evidence; but defence does not proceed with the case, it may seriously affect the prosecution because on the next date, possibly, for some or the other reason, witnesses who had in fact appeared may not attend. Therefore, if effective hearing is got postponed by the accused or his counsel, then they are bound to face entire risk and such period which may be consumed in procuring presence and examination of those witnesses who earlier appeared in the Court when adjournment was sought on behalf of accused would be important factor for considering question of bail merely on statutory ground under third proviso to section 497, Cr. P. C. "
12. The other case, cited by learned counsel for the complainant, is the case of Ashiq Hussain and others (supra), wherein the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan while dealing with the third proviso of section 497, Cr.P.C. Has dealt with the issue in the following words:-- "A plain reading of this section clearly implies that if delay in the trial is occasioned because of any act or omission of the accused, then the Court can decline to allow bail, if a person accused of an offence punishable with death has been detained for such offence for a period exceeding two years and whose trial has not concluded. It is evident that calculation of the time constituting delay caused at the instance of the defence is not the intention of the law in the aforesaid section.
What we have to see is as to whether the conclusion of the trial has been delayed, in any manner, by an act or omission on the part of the accused. In the instant case it is evident that delay was partly attributable to the petitioners and therefore they are not entitled to the grant of bail under the aforesaid provision of section 497(1), Cr.P.C.
' There is no cavil with the proposition laid down by the honourable Supreme Court in the above referred two judgments, but both the judgments cited by learned counsel for the complainant are distinguishable on facts, hence they do not apply to the case in hand for the reasons that in the case of Abdur Rashid (Supra) occurrence took place on 1-1-1997 and the petitioner in the reported case was arrested on 17-1-1997. Charge was framed on 6-6-1997. Witnesses were present on 31-7- 1997, but their evidence could not be recorded and the matter was adjourned to 13-8-1997. On such date as well evidence was not recorded and the matter was adjourned to 8-9-1997. On 8-9- 1997 as well no evidence was recorded and the matter was adjourned to 22-9-1997. On 22-9-1997 though the prosecution witnesses were in attendance, but their evidence could not be recorded due to non-availability of defence counsel and the matter was adjourned to 4-10-1997. On that date as well evidence could. Not be recorded due to non-availability of defence counsel. On the next date of hearing learned Presiding Officer was on leave and the matter was adjourned to 29- 10-1997 when members of Bar were on strike and the matter was adjourned to 12-11-1997. From the perusal of above it is evident that from the date of framing of charge i.e, 6-6-1997 till 12-11-1997 the matter has been coming up in Court for recording of evidence of the prosecution witnesses on different dates but on all the occasions though the prosecution witnesses were present, but their evidence was not recorded due to delay on the part of the accused. In this background the bail application filed by the petitioner in the reported case on the ground of statutory delay was dismissed. Such order passed by the learned Sessions Judge was assailed before the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench who also rejected the bail application of the petitioner and the order passed by the High Court was upheld by the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the above referred case. If diary sheet of the case in hand is examined it will be noticed that charge in the matter was framed on 26-8-2009 and only three prosecution witnesses have been examined by the learned trial Court from 21-1-2009 till 4-8-2012, though on 17 occasions adjournment was sought by the present applicant, but all the adjournments were sought in the year 2009 and 2010, but no adjournment was sought by the applicant either in the year 2011 or 2012. Diary sheet of the trial Court further shows that in the beginning P.Ws. Appeared but in the year 2011 and 2012 they did not appear before the trial Court and for their appearance initially summonses were issued and finally the trial Court was forced to issue bailable warrants to P.Ws. For their appearance in Court for recording of their evidence as would transpire from the perusal of diary sheet of the trial Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case judgment cited by the learned counsel for the complainant in the case of Abdur Rashid (supra) is distinguishable on facts.
' With regard to other judgment cited by learned counsel for the complainant in the case of Ashiq Hussain and others (supra), it will be noticed from the perusal of the cited judgment that after investigation challan was submitted in the Court of Session on 6-10-1987. Thereafter case was transferred to the Additional Sessions Judge for trial and the petitioners were directed to appear on 8-10-1987. Subsequently on 28-2-1988 the case was transferred to the Special. Court for speedy trials Faisalabad. The petitioners filed Writ Petition No,1005 of 1988 to challenge the Notification issued by the Government entrusting the case of the petitioners to the Special Court for speedy trials. It further appears that in the said writ petition a partial stay order was issued permitting the Special Court to proceed with the case but not to announce the final judgment. It was for this reason that as many as 13 witnesses were examined till 23-4-1988, however the proceedings were stayed by the High Court per order dated 25-4-1988. In the aforesaid background the bail application of the petitioners was dismissed in the reported judgment. The facts of the reported judgment are entirely distinguishable with the case in hand as such of no help to learned counsel for the complainant.
13. To meet the above judgments cited by advocate for complainant leaned counsel for the applicant has invited attention of the Court to the order dated 11-8-2011 passed by the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in C.P.No,620-K of 2011, wherein their lordships while dealing with the bail application on the ground of statutory delay and considering the amendment brought about in section 497, Cr.P.C., which was inserted by Act VIII of 2Q11 dated 20-4-2011, has dealt with the issue in the following words:- "6. We have carefully considered the submission made before us by the learned Advocate Supreme Court and Additional D.P. G.A. And perused the material placed on record. Indeed, vide two earlier orders dated 17-12-2009 and 2-11-2010, passed in C.P. No,D-2550 of 2009 and 1297 of 2010 respectively, petitioner was refused bail upto the level of High Court, with directions for the Accountability Court to conclude the trial preferably within a period of three months, but these facts by itself are not sufficient to deny the benefit of section 3 of Act VIII of 2011 dated 20-4-2011 to the petitioner, which came into force later on and has given him an independent right for grant of bail on the ground of statutory delay, subject to certain conditions provided therein. For convenience sake, the said newly introduced provision of law is reproduced as under: - "3. Amendment of section 497, Act V of 1898. ---In the said Code, in section 497, in subsection (1)--
(i) in the first proviso, after the word "Years" the words "or any woman" shall be inserted;
(ii) the second, third and fourth provisos shall be omitted; and
(iii) in the fifth proviso, for the full stop at the end a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following provisos shall be added, ' namely:- ' Provided further that the Court shall, except where it is of the opinion that the delay in the trial of the accused has been Occasioned by an act or omission of the accused or any other person acting on his behalf, direct that any person shall be released on bail -
(a) Who, being accused of any offence not punishable with death, has been detained for such offence for a continuous period exceeding one year or in case of a woman exceeding six months and whose trial for such offence has not concluded: or
(b) Who, being accused or an offence punishable with death, has been detained for such offence a continuous period exceeding two years and in case of a woman exceeding one year and whose trial for such offence has not concluded; ' Provided further that the provisions of the forgoing proviso shall not apply to a previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or to a person who, in the opinion of the Court, is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or is accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life."
(1) Reverting to the proceedings of the case at hand before the Accountability Court, we find there is no denial of the fact that even before framing of charge, for no fault on his part, the petitioner remained in judicial custody for a period of over 11 months and even thereafter, as discussed above, for delay in the proceedings of the case for a period of over nine months, he is not responsible to the extent that he can be denied the benefit of above reproduced provision of law, which entitles him for grant of bail if he had remained in continuous custody for period exceeding one year, as in the instant case.
(7) This being the position, this civil petition is converted into appeal and allowed, impugned order dated 20-6-2011 is set aside and the petitioner is admitted to bail on his furnishing solvent surety in the sum of Rs,1 .5 million and P.R bond in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court."
14. In the case of Nazir Hussain (supra), the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan while dealing with the bail application on the ground of statutory delay has observed under:--
9. The ground of delay for grant of bail in cases falling within the prohibition contained in subsection (1) of section 497, Cr.P.C. Before the effective amendment, was undoubtedly controlled by the discretion of the Court concerned. The facts varied from case to case and accordingly the discretion exercised was creating some anomalies. That is why the Legislature intervened and the law was made more certain. One of the changes effected in the statute from the previous practice in the exercise of discretion, was that the grant of bail on expiry of certain specified period and, under certain conditions was made a matter of right and not only of discretion. We do not agree with the learned counsel that the use of the word 'shall' in the third proviso, is in the meaning of 'may'. Learned counsel failed to notice that while in first proviso the word 'may' has been used, in the second and third the word 'shall' has been used with a view to highlight it.
Moreover, reading 'may' for the word' shall' in third proviso would be in large majority of cases to the detriment of the accused and his liberty, when it becomes due in the context of bail. We accordingly repel the argument of the learned counsel and hold that word 'shall' in third proviso will have to be read in its ordinary sense. That being so, there is nothing in the entire proviso, its main part as also sub-clause (b) to show the grant of bail on ground of delay in cases covered thereunder has been left (in' a general way) to the discretion of the Court. We also do not agree with the argument that the matter being entirely of the discretion of the Court it is empowered to take into account the expected/apprehended delay."
15. In the case of Zahid Hussain Shah (supra), the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan once again while dealing with the bail application on the ground of statutory delay has observed:- The right of an accused to be enlarged on bail under the 3rd proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. Is a statutory right which cannot be denied under the discretionary power of the Court to grant bail.
The right of an accused to get bail under the 3rd proviso of section 497(1), Cr. P. C. Is not left to the discretion of the Court but is controlled by that provision. The bail under the 3rd proviso (ibid) can be refused to an accused by the Court only on the ground that the delay in the conclusion of the trial had occasioned on account of any act or omission of the accused or any other person setting on his behalf. The bail under the 3rd proviso ibid can also be refused by the Court if the case of the accused fell under the 4th proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. In all other cases the Court must grant bail. In the case of Wazir Khan v. State 1983 SCMR 427, the petitioner was refused bail by the High Court under the 3rd proviso to section 497, Cr.P.C. On the ground that the delay in the trial had occasioned on account of abscondence of the co-accused in the case."
16. From the perusal of above quoted judgments of the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, it will be seen that through the amendment by section 3 of Act VIII of 2011 dated 20-4-2011 the applicant has been given independent right for grant of bail on the ground of statutory delay subject to certain conditions provided therein. It has been the consistent view of the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan while dealing with the bail application on the ground of statutory delay and the honourable apex Court has time and again ruled that above quoted newly-added amendment in the section 497, Cr.P.C. Is statutory right which cannot be denied under the discretionary power of the Court to grant bail. The right of an accused to get bail under the aforesaid amendment in section 497, Cr.P.C. Is not left to the discretion of the Court but is controlled by that provision. The bail under the newly-added proviso under section 497, Cr.P.C.
Can be refused to an accused by the Court only on the ground that the delay in the conclusion of the trial had occasioned on account of an act or omission on the part of the accused or any person acting on his behalf. The bail under the aforesaid provision can also be refused by the Court if the accused is previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or to a person who, in the opinion of the Court, is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or is accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
17. Learned A.P.G. Though vehemently opposed the bail application on the ground of statutory delay, but did not dispute the position taken by the learned counsel for the applicant that applicant is neither previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life nor is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or is accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
18. Similarly learned counsel for the complainant also opposed the bail vehemently but did not bring to the notice of the Court anything to suggest that applicant is previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or is accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life. In the circumstances of the case it will be seen that delay in trial of the case is not wholly attributable to the present applicant. It is also admitted position that more than two years have passed and the applicant is in custody ever since 3-4-2010. It is also an admitted position that there were in all sixteen prosecution witnesses, out of which only three have been examined and thirteen are to be examined. It is also an admitted position that more than two years have elapsed and there is no likelihood of conclusion of trial in near future. The case of the present applicant is fully covered under the newly-added proviso to section 497, Cr.P.C. Added by section 3 of the Act VIII of 2011 and he is entitled to bail on the ground of statutory delay.
19. With regard to the contentions of learned APG that only 13 witnesses are remaining to be examined by the prosecution, the trial is about to conclude and the applicant is not entitled to bail on the ground of statutory delay, the learned counsel for the applicant, to meet the above submissions, has relied upon the case of Muhammad Siddique (supra), wherein the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan while dealing with this aspect has dealt with the issue in the following words:-- So far as the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial has almost been concluded and thus it was not desirable to allow the concession of bail is concerned, we are of the opinion that when statement of one of the witnesses has yet to be recorded, it cannot be said that the trial has been concluded. The trial would be deemed to be concluded only when the statements of all the prosecution witnesses have been recorded, the statement of the accused under section 342 and the statements of the defence witnesses, if any, have also been recorded. Thus, it cannot be said that in the instant case it was in the fitness of the things to refuse the bail to the accused, despite the fact that he remained in custody for more than two years and nine months, as has been held by the Shariat Court. A reference may be made to a judgment of this Court titled Muhammad Riaz v. The State 1998 PCr.LJ 320 wherein the aforesaid proposition has been dealt with in detail."
20. Applying the above test to the case in hand, it will be seen that trial would not be deemed to have concluded when 13 prosecution witnesses are yet to be examined and in such circumstances concession of bail on the ground of statutory delay cannot be denied to the present applicant.
21. In view of the above settled legal position, the present applicant has made out a case for grant of bail on the ground of statutory delay. Accordingly, applicant is admitted to bail on his furnishing solvent surety in the sum of Rs, 10,00,000 (Rupees Ten Lacs) and P.R. Bond in the like amount to the satisfaction of learned trial Court.
22. Further, it is left open for the prosecution to move an application for cancellation of bail before learned trial Court in case applicant misuses the concession of bail or avoids or delays the pending proceedings, which be heard and decided on its own merits in accordance with law.
23. Since thirteen witnesses are remaining, the learned trial Court is directed to conclude the trial within a period of four months from the receipt of this order and pass judgment strictly in accordance with law. Learned trial Court is further directed to submit monthly progress report of this case to this Court through M.I.T-II.
24. Any observation made in the above order is of tentative in nature and shall not effect the case of the prosecution at the trial. Learned trial Court shall dispose of the case strictly in accordance