' The circumstances in which this constitutional petition has arisen briefly stated, are as follows:-
2. The petitioner-Union was registered by the Registrar of Trade Union in the year 1971. It had raised certain demands, but there was a settlement arrived at between the petitioner and the Management sometimes in 1972. However, it was not to last long, as there was a fresh charter of demands and a notice for strike under section 26 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. While the matters thus stood between the parties, the registration of the petitioner-Union was withdrawn by the Registrar of 'Lade Union, Sind, by order dated 30-10-1974. As references have got to be made to the same, and also in view of the fact that the order is a brief one, it will be in the fitness of things to reproduce the same in extenso. It reads:- "It has been held by the National Industries Relations Commission, Islamabad, on a complaint by Services Hospital, Lahore, that the Industrial Relations Ordinance is not applicable to the Services Hospital, Lahore In view of this position Messrs Marie Adelaide Leprosy Centre is not covered under the definition of 'industry'. Moreover, the Fifth Sind Labour Court, in Application No, 214/73, under section 34 of the I. R.
0., 1969, entitled Adamji Foundation v. Adamji Foundation Workers' Union and another held that charitable hospitals, and such other like concerns, the object of which is to render service of humanity cannot be called as 'industry', and the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, cannot be applicable to them. In yet another case, an, Honourable Labour Appellate Tribunal, Sind (Application No, khan--683/74) held that Y. W. C. A. Is neither an industry nor a commercial establishment.
' In view of the above, it is clear that Marie Adelaide Leprosy Centre, which is engaged mainly in rendering service to humanity is not an 'industry'. The registration certificate of your Union bearing Registration No, 1531 is, therefore, hereby withdrawn.
' You are, therefore, requested to surrender the certificate in question immediately."
' This order came to be impugned by the petitioner in this Court, the respondent wherein was only the Registrar of Trade Unions. However, on an application by the Management under Order I, rule 10, C. P. C., they were ordered to be impleaded as a party to the proceedings. The petition was, therefore, amended accordingly.
3. The first question to see will be as to under what circumstances the registration certificate issued to a Trade Union under section 9 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance can be cancelled? It is true that the word used in the order is "withdrawal" of ceriificate, but obviously it meant cancellation.
There is a procedure prescribed for the same in section 10 of the said Ordinance, which reads as under :- "10. Cancellation of Registration.- (1) The registration of a Trade Union shall he cancelled if the Labour Court so directs upon a complaint in writing made by the Registrar that the Trade Union has-
(I) contravened any of the provisions of this Ordinance or the rules; or
(ii) contravened any of the provisions of its constitution; or
(iii) made in its constitution any provision which is inconsistent with this Ordinance or the rules ; or
(iv) dissolved itself or has ceased to exist.
(2) Where any person who is disqualified under section 7-A from being elected as, or from being, an Officer of a Trade Union is elected as an officer of a registered Trade Union, the registration of that Union shall be cancelled if the Labour Court, upon a complaint in writing made in this behalf by the Registrar so directs."
4. Suffice it to say that there was no direction from a Labour Court to the Registrar, It is not necessary, in the circumstances to refer to the case of Service Hospital Employees' Union v.
Registrar, Trade Unions. Lahore (1), which is based on a decision in a writ petition filed before the Lahore High Court, as there is a judgment of a Division Bench of ours in National Bank of Pakistan Peoples' Federation v. National Industrial Relations Commission, Islamabad (2) wherein it has been clearly held that a certificate of registration granted to a Trade Union can only be cancelled in a manner prescribed in section 10 of the said Ordinance.
5. What is more the learned Registrar of Trade Unions chose to withdraw the registration certificate on the basis of some orders passed by the Labour Courts, including an order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. He seems to have been cblivious of the observations of this Court in the case of A. F. Ferguson & Co. v. The Vth. Sind Labour Court, Karachi and another t3), which was decided earlier in 1973. Looking to the definition of 'industry', there can be no manner of doubt that a hospital is an 'industry'. The decisions, referred to in the impugned order earlier, however excluded organizations of a charitable, or, of a non-profit nature from the category of industry. In the precedent case, almost the entire gamut of cases from Indian jurisdiction came up for consideration, and the view of the Indian Supreme Court in State of Bombay and another v. The Hospital Mazdo6r Sabha and another (4) which held the field for a decade,
(1) 1975 PLC 100 (2) PLD 1975 Kar. 320
(3) 1974 PLC 98 (4) AIR 1960 SC 610 ' was preferred, as against the contrary view in Management of Safdar Jung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh Sethi and others (1). These cases from the Indian jurisdiction dealt with the interpretation of the word 'industry', as to be found in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which hardly had the wide amplitude of the definition of the word 'industry', as to be found in our Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The contention, that quid pro quo was necessary for bringing an activity under section 2 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, was repelled in the former case in the following words : "It has been urged before us that though profit motive may not be essential, it is nevertheless necessary that the person who carries on the activity should receive some consideration in return; and it is only if the test of quid pro quo is satisfied that an activity should be treated as an undertaking. Though this argument is put in a slightly different form, in substance it is really based on the idea that profit motive is necessary to make any activity an undertaking analogous to trade or business. If the absence et' profit motive is immaterial why should an activity be excluded from section 2 ( j) merely because the person responsible for the conduct of the activity expects no consideration, does not want any quid pro quo and is actuated by philanthropic or charitable motive? In our opinion, in deciding the question as to whether any activity in question is an ' undertaking under section 2 (j) the doctrine of quid pro quo can have no application."
The same view was reiterated in The University of Delhi and another v. Ram Nath and others (2).
The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, could hardly countenance any different construction. It is true that the activities of the respondent Hospital are of a charitable nature. But the scheme of the Ordinance also is of a beneficial nature-to ameliorate the conditions of the workman in general.
Wherever the Government wanted to provide B protection and cover, it has done expressly, as in the case of any person, employed in the police, or any of the Defence Service of Pakistan and any service or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan, including an Ordnance Factory, etc., as to be found in subsection (3) of section 1 of the said Ordinance.
6. Otherwise too, the learned Registrar should have chosen to remember that no order to the prejudice of the petitioners should have been passed without giving them due heating. The rule of audi alteram partem is so firmly entrenched in our legal jurisprudence that no liberties can any morel be taken with the same. That, by itself, is enough to quash the impugned order.
7. It was, however, contended by Mr. A. K. Brohi that, if the registration of the petitioner-Union was not under section 8 of the Ordinance it had to be totally ignored. Support was sought from the ratio laid down in Nawab Syed Raunaq All etc. v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (3) and Wall Muhammad and others v. Sakhi Muhammad and others (4). There is no quarrel with the proposition of law referred to. But what are the facts on which this argument has been propped?
The first is that the respondent No, 2 was a charitable institution, and the Ordinance had no applicability. That has already been dealt with. The second ground was that four out of five office- bearers of the petitioner, including the General Secretary and the President, were already dismissed from service before the
(1) AIR 1970 SC 1407 (2) AIR 1963 SC 1873
(3) PLD 1973 SC 236 (4) PLD 1974 SC 106 ' alleged elections of the Union for the year 1974 were held, while only twenty-five per cent of the posts could be filed by non-employees. This assertion has been made in the counter-affidavit dated 4-2-1975 tiled by Lt. Col. (Retd.) A. L. D.' Cunha, Executive Director of the answering respondent. These facts have been controverted in the affidavit in rejoinder dated 12-5-1975 filed by Muhammad Hameed Khan, the General Secretary, in paragraphs 5 and 6, it makes out that petitions for their re-instatement were pending, and that the dismissal of Muhammad Sullaiman took place during the pendency of the present petition. According to it, the only person, who was an outsider, was one Mr. Kohistani. Thus. Facts disputed will be involved, which cannot be gone into in these proceedings under the writ jurisdiction. Otherwise too, these events do not relate to the point of time when the D registration took place in 1971. So there is no force in this contention either.
(See the case of A. F. Ferguson & Co referred to earlier).
8. It was also contended that, to begin with, the petition was filed in the name of the Union, and, then later on, as an afterthought, the words "through the General Secretary" came to be added in ink. The situation, therefore, had been retrieved. It is, however, said that the petitioners forgot to use their pen when the amended petition was filed. This lapse on the part of the petitioners may not be commendable, but the verification again is by the General Secretary in express terms. Nothing will, therefore, turn on the same, being a continuation of the earlier proceedings.
9. There was a further argument that, according to the Constitution of the petitioner-Union only the President, or, the Managing Committee was authorized to institute any proceedings, and the instant petition, otherwise too, was at the instance of the General Secretary. The reply was that he had been so authorized by a resolution passed by the Managing Committee. A copy of the resolution dated 3-8-1974 has been placed on the record. It is further said that, though a written statement had been filed under the signature of the respondent No, 1, there WAS no plea that the amendment in the Constitution was not communicated to him There was no rebuttal by him in regard to the amendment even after the affidavit-in-rejoinder had been filed. So even, this contention must fail.
10. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order is not in the exercise of lawful authority, and therefore of no legal consequence. As a result, it is hereby quashed, and the petition is allowed.
However, the parties will bear their own costs.