FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J.-- A case FIR No.11/97, dated 3.2.1997, under section 302 PPC was registered at P.S. Basal. District Attock. For the murder of Mushtaq Ahmad. After usual investigation, rife case was sent up and was pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Attock. The complainant party made an application before the learned trial Court that the deceased Mushtaq Ahmad was an employee of the Education Department. Government of the Punjab, whose case was required to be transferred to the Special Court constituted under the Anti-terrorism Act. 1997..
By the impugned order dated 24.9.1997, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Attock, accepted the application and directed that the case file be sent to the learned Sessions Judge, Attock, with a request for its transfer to the learned Special Court, Rawalpindi.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that assuming, but without conceding, the allegations levelled in the FIR and the Police Challan to be correct, the same could not constitute a terrorist act within the meaning of section 6 of the Anti-terrorism Act, 1997, so as to be triable by the Special Court constituted under the said Act. It was further submitted that the preamble of the said Act' clearly lays down the guiding principles that the said law was to provide for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences and for matters incidental thereto. It was argued that none of the ingredients justifying the transfer of the case from an ordinary Criminal Court to the Special Court were satisfied in the instant case. It was argued that the impugned order dated 24.9.1997 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Attock, was without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
3. On the other had, the learned Standing Counsel for Pakistan as well as the learned Assistant Advocate General, Punjab, have stated that since the case has already been transferred to the learned Special Court and is fixed for hearing cm 20.10.1997. The petitioner may be well- advised to move the said Court under section 23 of the Act for retransfer of the case to an ordinary criminal Court.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. Sub section (1) of section 12 of the Anti-terrorism Act, 1997, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or in any other law, all scheduled offences committed in an area in a Province shall be triable only by the Special Court exercising territorial jurisdiction in relation to such area; Sub section (3) of the said section further, inter alia, provides that any .Prosecution in respect of such offence shall be instituted only in the Special Court and if any prosecution in respect of such offence is pending, the same shall stand transferred (underlining is ours) to such Special Court. Section 6 creates an offence of terrorist act and the punishment thereof has been provided for in section 7 of the Act.
The Schedule of the said Act makes, inter alia, an offence under section 302 PPC exclusively triable by a Special Court if the victim is a member of police, armed forces or civil armed forces or is a public servant.
5. The provisions of section 12 make it clear that a scheduled offence is exclusively triable by a Special Court constituted under the Anti-terrorism Act, 1997 and that any case involving such an offence pending before any Court automatically stands transferred to the Special Court stands transferred to the Special Court. No formal or specific order is required to be passed by any Court in such a case. To our mind, the provisions of-section 12 of the Act are self-executing provisions which would have of their on force take effect, accomplish the object of legislation without requiring any specific or formal orders of transfer of a scheduled offence from any other Court to the Special Court. A case of scheduled offence automatically stood transferred to the Special Court and the actual sending the case file by the learned Additional Sessions Judge or the learned Sessions Judge was just a ministerial function which was not dependent on passing a judicial order.
6. There are other laws wherein similar self-executory provisions are found. Earlier, the Special Courts for trial of heinous offences specified by law were constituted for three years by adding Article 212-B in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan whereafter the said Constitutional provision stood repeated with effect from 26.7.1994. Consequently, the Special Courts for Speedy Trials (Repeal, Ordinance) 1994 was promulgated. Section 2 of the said Ordinance provided that all cases pending before the Special Courts at the time of such repeal would stand transferred to the respective Courts of Sessions and all appeals pending adjudication before the Supreme Appellate Courts would stand transferred to the respective High Courts. No specific judicial orders by the Special Courts or even by he Supreme Appellate Court were passed for the transfer of all these cases or appeals. Article 58 of the Constitution provides that the President shall dissolve the National Assembly if so advised by the Prime Minister and the National Assembly hall, unless sooner dissolved, stands dissolved at the expiration of 48 hours after the Prime Minister has so advised. Similar is the position of the dissolution of a Provincial-Assembly by virtue of Article 112 of the Constitution. The above provisions of the Constitution would clearly establish that the effect of the advice of the Prime Minister or Chief Minister is automatic at the expiry of 48 hours without there being any order of dissolution by the President unless the President proceeds to act on the advice earlier than the stipulated time. Article 89 of the Constitution lays down that an Ordinance by the President shall stand repealed at the expiry of tour months from its promulgation. No positive step is required for giving effect to this self-executing provision of the Constitution. Under Section 37(8) of the Industrial' Relations Ordinance, 1969, if an appeal is not decided by a Labour Appellate Tribunal within a period of 20 days, the stay order of the Tribunal against the reinstatement of a workman shall stand vacated on the expiration of the said period. Under section 14 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, if an appeal against the decision of a Returning Officer is not disposed of within the prescribed period, the same shall be deemed to have been rejected. Under Rule 4 of the Punjab Land Reforms (Procedure for Ejectment Suits) Rules, 1977, if a suit is- not disposed of within 60 days by the Court of an Assistant Collector, the case shall stand transferred to the Court of Collector concerned. No further steps are required to be taken-by the Court or the statutory functionaries for implementing the self- executory provisions which are to be distinguished from non-self-executory provisions. In the case of Sh. Masud Ahmad v. Pakistan (PLD 1976 SC 195), the provisions of section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act. 1973, provided for abatement of the proceedings pending before a Civil Court on the commencement of the Ordinance were considered by the Hon'able Supreme Court and it was held that under the substantive pan of section 6, the suit abated " forthwith" on the Commencement of the Ordinance. It was further held.
That there was no room for the argument that unless the Civil Court had declared the suit to have been so abated, the limitation for filing the appeal before the Tribunal would not commence. It was observed that indeed, the language of the statute is-pre-emptory and the proceedings in the suit abated ipso facto by operation of law and, therefore, no formal Order of the Court was necessary to terminate the proceedings before it.
7. The self-executory provisions have been defined in Balck's Law Dictionary as under:- "SELF-EXECUTING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: Term has reference to provisions which are, immediately effective without the necessity of ancillary legislation. Constitutional provision is self-executing if it supplies sufficient rule by which right given may be enjoyed or duty imposed enforced; Constitutional provision is not self-executing when it merely indicates principles without laying down rules giving them force of law."
Similarly, while the same provisions have been defined in Ballantine's Law Dictionary as under:- "SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS: A provision of a Constitution which is effective without legislation, no action by the Legislature being required to put it in operation. 16 Am J2d Const L94.
A Constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing when it takes immediate effect and ancillary legislation is not necessary to the enjoyment of the duty imposed. In short, if a Constitutional provision if complete in itself, it executes itself. Lanigaii v. Callup, 17 NM 627, 131 p. 627."
The distinction of the self-executory provisions and the non-self-executory provisions was elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the .Case of Qaialbash Waqf and others v. Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab, Lahore, and others (PLD 1990 SC 99 at Page 151 ) as follows:- "As most of the provisions found repugnant to Injunctions of Islam happen to be self-executory, they have of their on force taken effect, accomplished the object of the legislation leaving the mere implementation of it, to be completed on the strength of machinery provisions. Such self-executory provisions will remain unaffected by this decision. However, those provisions which have a prospective effect also and are not self-executory, shall get annulled from the date the decision declaring them repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam takes effect."
In the case of. Mst. Kaneez Fatima v. Wali Muhammad an4 another (PLD 1993 SC 901 at page 910), their Lordships held as under:- "The self-executing provision not only confers a right but it provides for its protection and a further duty is cast to enforce it without the aid of legislative enactment. There may be supporting legislative enactments which may flow from such self-executing provisions of the Constitution, but they will not change the character of the self executing provisions of the Constitution nor will they be dependent upon such supporting legislation. But where merely a policy has been laid down or some guidelines have been provided', they are dependent upon supporting legislations and enactments because without them the same cannot be enforced by themselves. Sometimes, as in Constitution of Pakistan, procedure is provided for enforcing or taking such non- self-executing provisions operative. Therefore, in such circumstances, the non-self-executing provisions of the Constitution serve as a beacon light for the enactment of laws by the Legislature and also for making rules and regulations which have the force of law."
8. In our opinion, no formal order, such as the impugned order was required to be passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge if the case otherwise was that of a scheduled offence which ipso facto stood transferred to the Special Court by operation of law. The expressions "notwithstanding " and "in any other Court" used by the Legislature in section 12 of the Act are in the nature of non- obstante clauses to which overriding effect will have to be given in relation to the provisions contained in other laws except the Constitution. The word "any" is ordinarily used to enlarge the amplitude of the term to which it is attached excluding all limitations or qualifications unless the context otherwise requires. It may also be interpreted as a substitute for all or every as the case may be. See the cases of Manzoor Qadir v. Mst. Amtul Hussain and 2 others (PLD 1971 Lahore 537), Pakistan Tanneries Limited v. Hadayatullah Mokal and 5 others (PLD 1972 Lahore 880), Allah Ditta v. The State through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Islamabad (PLD 1976 Lahore 823). Ch. Zahoor Elahi v. The State (PLD 1977 SC 273 at page 309), Inamur Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan and others (1992 SCMR 563) and Government of NWFP through Chief Secretary Vs Muhammad Irshad and 3 others (PLD 1995 SC 281).
9. A case disclosing a scheduled offence pending in any Court has, therefore, to be tried exclusively by the Special Court constituted under the aforesaid Act. The making of transfer applications, hearing of elaborate arguments, recording of evidence, holding of trial within a trial and passing detailed judicial orders/judgments by the transferee Courts are not ordinarily called for unless exceptional circumstances warrant such a course in doubtful cases.
10. However, once the case stand transferred to the Special Court, the said Court is empowered under section 23 of the Anti-terrorism Act/1997, to transfer a case where, after taking cognizance of an offence, it is of opinion that the offence is not a scheduled offence for the trial of such an offence to any Court having jurisdiction under the Code. The said Court while making an order of transfer or otherwise of a case may be guided by the observations made by the superior Courts in the cases of Azhar Hussain v. Government of Punjab and others (1992 P.Cr.L.J.2308)(Full Bench), Allah Din and 18 others v. The State and another (1994 SCMR 717) Younus Khan v. The State (1990 P.Cr.L.J. 1719), Yaqoob and 4 others v. The State and another (1993 P.Cr.L.J. 1-805), Liaqat Ali and 11 others v. The State (1992 SCMR 372), Muhammad Naeem alias Naima v. The State (1992 SCMR 1617), The State v. Syed Qaim Ali Shah (1992 SCMR 2192) and Muhammad Rafiq v. The State (PLD 1985 SC 225). The petitioner has, therefore, an adequate remedy and safeguard before the Special Court which may be, if so advised, invoke at the appropriate State of proceedings in accordance with law.
11. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is not maintainable and is disposed of accordingly.