1. ' WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.---The appellant, through leave of the Court, has called in question the order of the Lahore High Court dated 9-6-1991, whereby his appeal against his conviction and sentence by the Judge Special Court (Suppression of Terrorist Activities, Gujranwala Division, Gujranwala), was dismisseing order is to the following effect:-- "After hearing the learned counsel, we consider it fit and proper to examine the case of the petitioner on merits on re-appraisal of the evidence so as to see whether the conviction is justified on merits or not."
2. ' The allegation against the accused/appellant is that he led the police to his residential house wherefrom Klashnikov Exh.P.1 was recovered on 19-5-1989 at about 8-30 P.M. For which he could not produce any license. Challan against him was put in the Special Court which framed charge-sheet against him to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. The appellant put in appearance before the learned trial Court on 13-5-1990 but thereafter absented himself and did not appear in spite of warrants of arrest issued against him and proclamation under section 87, Cr.P.C. Duly published in three daily newspapers. On his failure to attend the proceedings a counsel to defend him was appointed and he was tried in absentia. On the appraisal of the evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned Special Court, vide its order dated 22-8-1990, found him guilty for possessing an unlicensed Klashnikov Exh.P.1 and by convicting him under section 13/20 of the Arms Ordinance sentenced him to five years' R.I. And a fine of Rs,10,000 or in default further one year R.I.
3. The Klashnikov Exh.P.1 was confiscated to the State. The appellant after arrest filed appeal before the Lahore High Court alongwith an application for condonation of delay. However, the learned High Court was not satisfied with the explanation offered for the belated submission of appeal and by dismissing the application for condonation of delay, dismissed the appeal vide order dated 9- 6-1991. Hence the instant appeal through leave of the Court.
4. ' We have heard Mr. Ghulam Mahmood Qureshi, Advocate, for the appellant, Mr. M. Nawaz Abbasi, Assistant Advocate-General, Punjab, for the State, and have perused the record of the case. The learned counsel for the appellant, as usual, submitted that the recovery was not witnessed by independent witnesses of the locality and that provisions of section 103, Cr.P.C. Had not been complied with. He also submitted that the occurrence took place on 19-5-1989 on which date Ordinance XX of 1988 promulgated on 7-11-1988 whereby the schedule appended to the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 had been 'amended to include "a light or heavy automatic or semi-automatic weapon such as Klashnikov, a G-III rifle or any other type of assault rifle" had lapsed under Article 89 of the Constitution on account of its having not been placed before the Parliament and in consequence emphasised that the Special Court trying the appellant had no jurisdiction and the impugned order is thus unsustainable. The learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, submitted that the official witnesses produced in the case had no personal grudge against the appellant so as to implicate him falsely in the present case and that in the peculiar circumstances of the case in hand the provisions of section 103, Cr.P.C. Were not attracted. He cited Ordinance X of 1989, Ordinance I of 1990 and Act V of 1990, and submitted that the Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities had the jurisdiction in the matter and the impugned order passed by it did not suffer from any jurisdictional error.
5. We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties. It is now well-settled that police officials are as good witnesses as any other citizen and unless any mala fides is established against them, their deposition cannot be brushed aside simply on the bald allegation that they belong to the police department responsible for maintaining law and order. The main thrust of the arguments of the learned counsellor the State was that the provisions of section 103, Cr.P.C. Were not attracted 'because the recovery was made during the course of investigation of a criminal case which led to the recovery of Klashnikov Exh.P.1. To properly appreciate the plea of jurisdiction raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, it would be advisable to reproduce the relevant law conferring jurisdiction on the Special Court.. The Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts)
6. Act, 1975 (hereinafter to be referred as The Act') was promulgated on 1st February, 1975, whereby Special Comp were constituted for the trial of offences enumerated in the schedule appended to it.
7. The sub-clause (c) of the schedule is relevant for the decision of the controversy in issue and the original text of which is quoted below:-- "(c) any offence punishable under the Arms Act, 1878 (XI of 1878), or any offence punishable under any of the following sections for the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 (West Pakistan Ordinance No,XX of 1965), namely, sections 8, 9 and 10, if committed in respect of a canon, grenade, bomb or rocket."
8. ' Through amending Ordinance XX of 1988 the words "or a light or heavy automatic or semi- automatic weapon such a Klashnikov, a G-III rifle or any other type of assault rifle" were added to clause (c) after the word 'rocket'. This amending Ordinance was promulgated on 7-11-1988 and had to be placed before the Parliament within four months under Article 89 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and since it was not placed before the legislature the same stood repealed on 6-3-1989 whereafter the Special Court ceased to have jurisdiction as a Special Court to try offences under the Arms Ordinance regarding the possession of Klashnikov etc. As per the amendment made through the aforementioned amending Ordinance. However, vide Ordinance X of 1989 promulgated on 3-9-1989 the lapsed Ordinance was re-promulgated and according to section 4 thereof again "rocket, or a light or heavy automatic or semi-automatic weapon such as Klashnikov or any other type of assault rifle" was substituted with a further specific addition treat the same shall be deemed to have been so substituted on 7-11-1988. This Ordinance was also not placed before the Assembly and resultantly lapsed on 2-1-1990. This was followed by another amending Ordinance (Ordinance I of 1990) dated 17-3-1990 through which the wording of earlier lapsed Ordinance was incorporated in the schedule of Terrorist Act ibid. However, before the expiry of four months Act V of 1990 was passed on 16-2-1990 whereby the earlier addition through amendment was made permanent part of the Schedule appended to the Terrorist Activities Act ibid and the amendment was deemed to be substituted on the second day of November, 1988.
9. The above resume of amendments made in the Act of 1975 makes it abundantly clear that the Special Court was invested with the powers to try offences under the Arms Ordinance in respect of Klashnikov with effect from 7-11-1988. No doubt, on the date of recovery of Klashnikov Exh.P.1 from the possession of the accused/appellant the amending Ordinance had lapsed but through the subsequent amending Ordinance the lapsed provisions were re- introduced with effect from 7-11- 1988 and through the last Act with effect from 2-11-1988. Needless to emphasized that the Act ibid is a procedural law and legally operates retrospectively but in view of the clear provision contained in the subsequent amending Ordinances and the Act V of 1990 whereby the amendments were deemed to be retrospective, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the Special Court had now jurisdiction to try the offence with which the accused/appellant was charged and its order convicting him is perfectly within jurisdiction.
10. ' The accused/appellant was tried under section 13 read with section 20 of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965. Section 13 provides punishment for the possession of unlicensed arms while section 20 empowers the Court to confiscate recovered arms and ammunition. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, we are inclined to reduce the sentence of imprisonment from 5 years to 3 years. The sentence of fine imposed upon the accused/appellant is set aside.
11. Sentence reduced.