' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.--As the above entitled appeals arise out of the single judgment of the High Court, we propose to dispose of the same by this single judgment.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeals are that the land measuring 50 Kanals, 3 Marlas,. Comprising Survey Nos.1223 min and 1224, and the land measuring 50 Kanals, 3 Marlas, comprising Survey Nos. 1223, 1225 and 1226, situate in Village Mandi, Tehsil and District Kotli, was acquired by the Government through two separate awards dated 25-11-1987 and 26-11-1987 respectively. The appellants, herein, initiated two references against the awards contending that the compensation was not fixed according to the market value of the land acquired and that respondents Nos. 3 to 10 were not entitled to any share in the compensation as they were not co- owners in the land. The references were dismissed by the learned District Judge on merits.
Consequently, two appeals were preferred to the High Court which were dismissed through a consolidated judgment on the preliminary ground that the references before the District Judge were time-barred. The present appeals have been filed against the aforesaid order of dismissal of the appeals.
3. We have heard the arguments and perused the files. It has been contended by Raja Muhammad Siddique Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants, that once a reference is made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act by the Collector, the District Judge is not legally competent to go into the question as to whether the reference was time-barred or not. He has further argued that as the awards were not signed by the Collector, the appellants were not supplied the copies of the awards and, as such, the delay if any, was to be condoned. The learned counsel has cited following authorities in support of his contentions.
' In case reported as Leath Elies Joseph Solomon v. H. C. Strok AIR 1934 Cal. 758, it has been held that an award under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act is made only when it is drawn up and signed by the Collector, and not when it is settled what the award is going to be.
' In case reported as Secretary of State v. Bhagwan Prasad AIR 1929 All. 769, it was observed that making a reference is an act within the jurisdiction and authority of the Collector. Thus, once a reference is made by the Collector, the Court cannot go into the question that the application for reference by the owner was belated or not. It was further observed that as the Court does not sit in appeal over the Collector, the Land Acquisition Act does not give authority to the Court to go into the question which was not referred to it by the Collector.
' In Secretary of State v. Bhagwan Prasad AIR 1932 All. 597, it has been observed that after a reference has been made under the Land Acquisition Act, it is not open to the Collector or the Secretary of State to say that the reference was wrongly made, even if the question pertains to one of limitation.
' In case reported as Nazar Muhammad Khan v. Collector NLR 1980 Rev. Lah.
36. It was observed that if a time-barred claim is forwarded by the Collector for judicial determination to the Court, the Court is not competent to go into the question of limitation.
4. Mr. Muhammad Sharif Tariq, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondents, has controverted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. He has argued that the Collector, while forwarding a reference to the Court, acts in pursuance of statutory authority and, thus, if a time-barred reference is made to the Collector, he is competent to go into the question of limitation. Identical view was taken in cases reported as Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1971 Azad J&K 33 and Mst. Bibi Rahmania v.
Government through Director, Northern Regional Research Laboratories and Collector, Peshawar PLD 1971 Pesh.
191.
' Similarly, in case reported as Kothamasu Kanakarathamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1965 SC 304, it was observed that if a reference is made under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act for the apportionment of the compensation among the claimants, the Court has no jurisdiction to determine the question of quantum of compensation by reopening the award, because the Court is not competent to go behind the award of the Land Acquisition Officer. Thus, it was observed that a reference under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act would not invest the Court with the jurisdiction to consider the question of quantum of compensation, which was not directly connected with the reference regarding the apportionment of the compensation.
' In case reported as Panna Lal v. The Collector, Etah AIR 1959 All. 576, it has been observed that the Collector is competent to go into the question as to whether the reference satisfies the conditions laid down under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, because for exercising the jurisdiction under law, the Collector is required to determine as to whether the conditions precedents for making a reference have been complied with or not. Thus, it was observed that when an application was made beyond the period of limitation, the Collector can reject the application for making a reference to the Court.
' In case reported as The Land Acquisition Collector, Rawalpindi v. Lieut.-General Wajid Ali Khan Burki PLD 1960 Lah. 469, it was observed that when a reference is made to the District Judge, he is competent to go into the question as to whether the application before Collector was made within time or it was belated.
' In case reported as Ghulam Muhammad v. Government of West Pakistan PLD 1967 SC 191, a distinction has been drawn for making a reference under section 18 and under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. It has been observed that the scope of reference under section 18 and under section 30 is different. Under section 18 a reference is made if the dispute is with regard to the area or the quantum of the compensation or as to the apportionment of the same amongst the persons interested etc., whereas the reference under section 30 is strictly confined to the disputes regarding the method of the apportionment of the compensation or the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable. The subject-matter of the latter reference is limited to the disputes purely of title in which the Government is not directly interested.
' In Dr. G.H. Grant v. The State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 237, it has been observed that a person who is shown in that part of the award which relates to the apportionment of the compensation and was present either personally or through representative, or on whom a notice has been served under subsection (2) of section 12, if he does not accept the award, he must apply to the Collector within the time prescribed under subsection (2) of section 18 to refer the matter to the Court but if a person who has not appeared in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector, or if he has not been served with any notice, he may apply to the Court for making a reference under section 30 for the determination of his right to the compensation. It was further observed that under section 18 there is prescribed period of limitation but no such period has been prescribed under section 30.
5. We have given due consideration to the arguments raised at the Bar. The perusal of the judicial pronouncements on the point as to whether after a reference has been made by the Collector, the Court is competent to go into the question of limitation or not, has been subject of divergence of opinion amongst the judicial authorities. However, the point appears to have been finally resolved by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a case reported as Government of West Pakistan (now Government of N.-W.F.P.) through Collector, Peshawar v. Arbab Haji Ahmed Ali Jan PLD 1981 SC 516, wherein after reviewing the case-law on the subject, it has been observed that the jurisdiction exercisable by the Court under the Land Acquisition Act is not synonymous with the jurisdiction of a Court of appeal. It has been opined that the designated Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Land Acquisition Act cannot go beyond the reference made to it and hold that the same was violative of law because application for making reference was made beyond the period of limitation or for any other reason. The principle laid down in the aforesaid authority was followed in another case reported as Government of West Pakistan (now N.-W.F.P.) v. Mst. Asmatun Nisa PLD 1983 SC 109, wherein it was held that the question of bar of limitation for making an application to make a reference to the Collector cannot be gone into by the Court.
In case reported as Muhammad Rafique Khan v. Province of Punjab 1992 CLC 1775, the view taken by the Supreme Court of Pakistan has been followed and it has been held that the Reference Court could not go behind the reference, it can only go into the question which was specifically referred to it by the Collector. Thus, it was observed that Reference Court had no jurisdiction to determine the question of limitation; such function was within the domain of Collector who had sent the reference. The findings of the Reference Court that reference was time-barred was set aside as being without jurisdiction.
6. It is evident from the authorities cited above that after the dictum of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the matter stands settled. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in the aforesaid authorities of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and hold that the High Court was not competent to go into the question of limitation and dismiss the appeals on the ground that the applications for making references to the Collector were time-barred.
7. Before parting with the case, it may be observed that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants were entitled to. Condonation of delay because they were not provided the copies of the awards earlier, need not be attended to in view of the aforesaid finding.
In the light of what has been stated above, both the above entitled appeals are accepted and the cases are remanded back to the High Court with the direction that it shall rehear the arguments in the appeals and decide the same afresh according to law. In view of the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to the costs.