' MIAN ALLAH NAWAZ, J.---Regualr First Appeals bearing Nos.43, 48, 49, 50, 54 of 1980, No,27 of 1981 and Cross Objection No,37 of 1988 in R.F.A. No,27/81, under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act (shortly stated as the Act) are from the award rendered by the Senior Civil Judge, Bahawalpur/Reference Court, on 17-12-1980. R.FAs. Nos.43 and 54 of 1980 are by the owners while R.F.As. Nos.48 49, 50 of 1980 and R.FA. No,27 of 1981, are by the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (hereinafter referred to as P.B.C.) and the Cross Objection No,37/88 has been filed by Sufi Sardar Ahmad, one of the owner-claimants in R.F.A. No,27 of 1981. As such these are being disposed of by single judgment.
2. The few common facts essential for the adjudication of these appeals, are that an area measuring 10 acres, 1 Kanal and 16 Marlas, situated in Mauza Kharn, Tehsil and District Bahawalpur, was acquired by the Government of Punjab for the purpose of construction of building for Radio Pakistan, Bahawalpur. Notification under section 4 of the Act, was published on 7th February 1975.
The possession of the land was taken over by the P.B.C. On 27-4-1975. The Land Acquisition Collector, after hearing the owners under section 9 of the Act, determined the compensation at the rate of Rs,10,000 per acre by award dated 12-6-1975 by holding that acquired land was agricultural in nature.
3. Feeling unsatisfied, Muhammad Rafique, Abdul Aziz and Sufi Sardar Ahmad, claimed reference to the Court for determining the compensation under section 18 of the Act. It was alleged that the land was situated within the urban limits; was closer to Bahawalpur Stadium, the office of the Municipal Committee and had all the civic amenities, was, therefore, urban immovable property and was fit for building as well as commercial purposes. According to the owners, the value of the land was five to six rupees per sq. Ft. The References were marked to the District Judge, Bahawalpur, who sent the same to the Reference Court for decision. These references were contested. The Reference Court consolidated them. On the divergent pleadings of the parties, necessary issues were framed. Both the sides led oral as well as documentary evidence in order to substantiate their respective claims.
4. Upon the consideration of the evidence so adduced by the parties, the learned Reference Court concluded that the land was situated within the urban limits of Bahawalpur; was near to the office of Municipal Committee, was, therefore, not agricultural in nature. After the analysis of oral as well as the documentary evidence of claimants, it was found insufficient in quality and quantity to give a fair data for determining the market value of the acquire land. In the final analysis, the Reference Court relied upon the statement of Iftikhar Ali. P.W., the attorney of Muhammad Rafique, who had stated that the acquired land at the time of acquisition was in possession of the lessee, who was paying him rent at the rate of Rs,1,500 per acre. Taking this amount to be the basis for the purposes of calculation of market price, he assessed the same at the rate of Rs,30,000 per acre by multiplying amount with 20. Feeling dissatisfied, both the sides have come to this Court by filing these appeals.
5. On behalf of the appellants, Muhammad Rafique and Subedar Abdul Aziz, the arguments were led by Ch. Nasir Ahmad, Advocate, Mr. M.M. Bhatii, Advocate, argued the case on behalf of P.B.C. The learned Assistant Advocate-General entered appearance on behalf of the Province of Punjab and adopted the arguments of Mr. M.M. Bhatti, Advocate . Mr. M.A. Farani, Advocate, appeared for Sufi Sardar Ahmad.
6. On behalf of the appellants/owners, the following points were raised:-- That the leanred Reference Court erred in law by overlooking the sale transactions incorporated in mutations of sale bearing No,523, attested on 18-11-1973, mutation No,514 attested on 6-5-1973, registered sale-deed dated 3-10-1973, transaction of sale emobodied in mutation No,534, attested on 30-12-1974 and registered sale-deed dated 12-51976. From the examination of these sales according to the learned counsel, it was clear that these sales related to land situated in vicinity and of comparable quality. He added that the decision of the Reference Court, on account of overlooking of these sales, was bad in law and merited to be set aside. Elaborating his contention, the learned counsel submitted that the price of the land was not less than Rs,5 to 6 per sq. Ft. i,e.
Rs,3,40,000 per acre. If all these sales noted above, were clubbed together, the average price of land at the time of acquisition was not less than amount described above. The strength was sought from the rule laid down in Nawabzada Muhammad Saeed Khan v. The Collector, Land Acquisition, Multan and another 1990 MLD 1232.
(ii) That RFAs. Nos.48, 49, 50 and 27 were filed by the P.B.C., who is the beneficiary of the acquisition.
According to the learned counsel it had no right to file these appeals under section 54 of the Act.
Reliance was placed on Pir Khan through his legal heirs v. Military Estate Officer, Abbotabad and others PLD 1987 SC 485.
7. The learned counsel for P.B.C, was not able to effectively answer the objections regarding the maintainability of appeals brought by the P.B.C. He, however, was allowed to assist the Court as the learned Assistant Advocate-General stated that he will adopt the arguments of the learned counsel for P.B.C.
8. Mr. M. Mahmood Bhatti, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the P.B.C. Stressed that the sale transactions brought on record by the owners were completely irrelevant as they related to lands which were dissimilar to acquired land. Explaining his point further, it was urged that the sale embodied in mutation No,15 was situated on the western side of Degree College. Similarly the sale of land incorporated in mutation No,516 was situated on the northern side of the houses of Lal Mian Abbasi and Wasik-Billa Abbasi, which were situated quite close to the S.E., Collgcs, Government College for Women.. Furthermore, these sales related to small pieces of land and, could not become basis for determining the compensation of big tracts of land as in this case.
9. The learned Assistant Advocate-General, appearing on behalf of the Province of Punjab adopted the arguments of the learned counsel for P.B.C.
10. Mr. M.A. Farani, Advocate, appearing on behalf of Sufi Sardar Ahmad, adopted the arguments of Ch. Nasir Ahmad, Advocate. He, however, added that although his client has not filed appeal, still the Court had ample powers under Order XLI, Rule 33, C.P.C. To decide the cross-objection filed by his client. Reference was made to Balmram Singh v. Baldeo Singh AIR 1917 Lah. 423; Hira Nand represented by sons Harnam Singh and others v. Sheikh Mahbub Illahi AIR 1944 Lah. 174; Arjan Singh and others v. Mohan Singh and others AIR 1961 Punj. 287 V.38 C. 86; Messrs Galadari Cement (Gulf)
Ltd. v. District Judge, Khuzdar and others 1986 CLC 10; Mahboob Alam v. Zaman etc. PLD 1974 Lah.
218; Hamijan Bibi v. Sheikh Dargo Ali and others PLD 1964 Dacca 119; Mahmud Hassan and others v.
Lauti Ram and others AIR 1927 All. 453; Directorate of Industries & Mineral Development v. Messrs Masood Auto Stores PLD 1991 Lah. 174 and WAPDA and another v. Khanzada Muhammad Abdul Haque Khan Khattak & Co. PLD 1990 SC 359.
11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length and have given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by them. At the outset we would take up the objection of the learned counsel for owners-appellants, regarding the maintainability of the appeals by the P.B.C. This point came up for consideration in Pir Khan's case PLD 1987 SC 485. In this case the land was acquired for the purpose of construction of Pakistan Ordnance Factory, Havelian. The owners claimed reference under section 18 of the Act. The learned Reference Court assessed the market value at the rate of Rs,2,000 to Rs,3,000 per acre. The Military Estate Officer, Hazara Circle Abbotabad, and the Central Government through Defence Secretary, filed appeal before the High Court of West Pakistan. The owner took up the objection to the maintainability of appeals. The Division Bench of the High Court of Peshawar, rejected the contention and accepted the appeal to the extent of compensation by reducing the same. The owner filed an appeal under Article 185(2)(e) of the Constitution. Accepting the contentions of the appellant, it was held by the Supreme Court that the appeal filed by the Military Estate Officer and the Central Government was incompetent. It was held:-- "We agree and would add that the order of the Civil Court on reference made to it by the Land Acquisition Collector is not an independent order but merely a substitutive order, whereby the award of the Land Acquisition Collector is substituted by the order of the Civil Court, which order then becomes the award. Since, by virtue of subsection (2) of section 50 of the Act, the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector, is final and cannot be challenged, except by a party, which has expressly been conferred the right of appeal, hence respondents Nos.1 and 2 who did not have any such right, expressly conferred on them, did not have any locus standi to file an appeal. As already observed, no such right is to be assumed on any a priori ground and the fight of appeal can be exercised only if it has been expressly conferred on a party by Statute. Furthermore, neither the Central Government nor the Military Estate Officer, can be deemed to be parties who have been adversely affected by the order of the Civil Court. If the Central Government or the Military Estate Officer could get the land in question more cheeply by private negotiations they can refuse to accept the land at the price determined by the Court. They cannot have it both ways. Having chosen to set in motion, the special power given to the Government to acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act for public purposes, they are to be confined to those provisions and cannot claim further rights and higher privileges than those provided for under the provisions of the said Act.
Since under the provisions of the Act, only a special and limited appeal is provided for against the award of the Court, which in the facts and circumstances of the case, would be availed of by the provincial Government nor the collector chose to file an appeal, the appeal filed by the Cenrtal Government and the Military Estate Officer, was indeed an appeal filed by `strangers' having no locus standi to file it."
' This principle was reiterated in Behram Khan and 54 others v. Military Estate Officer and 2 others 1988 SCMR 1160, and Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Ltd. And others v. Deputy Commissioner (East), Karachi and others 1989 SCMR 812 and recently has been reiterated in Iftikhar Hussain Shah and others v. Pakistan, through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and others 1991 SCMR 2193.
12. Guided by the enunciation of law by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the aforenoted case, we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that. P.B.C. Had no locus standi to file appeals. We accordingly dismiss the Regular First Appeals Nos.49/80, 50/80 and 27 of 1981 having been found incompetent.
13. Having set down the facts, the circumstances of these appeals, the arguments of the parties and having determined the question of maintainability of the appeals filed by P.B.C., we find that stage is set for examination of arguments of the parties on merit. Sections 23 and 24 of the Act enumerate the circumstances to be taken into consideration for assessing the price of the land acquired. Sections 23 and 24 of the Act are as follows:- "23. Matters to be considered in determining compensation.--(1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land ' acquired under this Act the Court shall take into consideration--firstly, the market value of the land at the date of the notification under section 4, subsection (1);secondly, the damage sustained by the person interested, by reason of the taking of any standing crops or trees which may be on the land at the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof thirdly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of severing such land from his other land; ' fourthly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earnings; ' fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the Collector, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business the reasonable expenses (if any) incidental to such change; and ' sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the declaration under section 6 and the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land.
(2) In addition to the market value of the land as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of fifteen percentum on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition.
24. But the Court shall not take into consideration,--firstly, the degree of urgency which has led the acquisition; ' secondly, any disinclination of the person interested to part with the land acquired; ' thirdly, any damage sustained by him which, if caused by a private person, would not render such person liable to a suit; ' fourthly, any damage which is likely to be caused to the land acquired, after the date of the publication of the declaration under section 6, by or in consequence of the use to which it will be put; ' fifthly, any increase to the value of the land acquired, likely to accrue from the use to which it will be put when acquired; ' sixthly, any increase to the value of the other land of the person interested likely to accrue from the use to which the land acquired will be put; or seventhly, any outlay or improvements on, or disposal of, the land acquired, commenced, made or effected without the sanction of the Collector after the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, subsection (1)."
' A plain look at section 23 of the Act shows that owner of the land is entitled to receive the market price of the land at the time of issuance of notification under section 4 of the Act. The word market value or market price has not been defined in the Act. This key word came into consideration before the Privy Council in Fraser v. City of Feasterville LR (1917) AC 194, where it was held:-- "It is the value to the seller of the property in its actual condition at the time of expropriation with all its existing advantages and with all its possibilities, excluding any advantages due to the carrying out of the scheme for the purpose of which the property is compulsorily acquired."
' This golden principle was reiterated with meticulous consistency in R.B. Lala Narsingh Das v.
Secretary of State of India 1925 PC 91; Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatriaju v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam AIR 1939 PR 98; Secretary of State v. Naresh Chandra Bose AIR 1926 Cal. 1000; Collector of Chingleput District Saida v. Kadir Mohideen Sahib AIR 1926 Mad.
731. Secretary of State v. Chuni Lal and others AIR 1931 Lah. 207; Sheikh Manzoor Hussain v. Multan Improvement Trust and another PLD 1972 Lah. 225; Malik Abdul Qayyum etc. v. Punjab Province etc. PLD 1979 Lah.
853.
14. In Fazalur Rehman and others v. General Manager S.I.D.B. And another PLD 1986 SC 158 while considering the question of future use, His Lordship Mr. Justice Aslam Riaz Hussain held:-- "I would, therefore, like to emphasize that while determining the value of the land acquired by the Government and the price which a willing purchaser would give to the willing seller, only the "past sales" would not be taken into account but the value of the land with all its potentialities may also be determined by examining (if necessary as a Court witness) local property declares or other persons who are likely to know the price that the property in question is likely to fetch in the open market. In appropriate cases there should be no compunction even on relying upon the oral testimony with respect to the market value of the property intended to be acquired, because even while deciding cases involving questions of life and death the Court rely on oral testimony alone and do not insist on the production of documentary evidence. The credibility of such witnessscs would, however, have to be kept in mind and it would be for the Court in each case to determine the weight to be attached to their testimony. It would be useful, and even necessary, to examine such witnesses while determining the market price of the land in question because of the prevalent tendency that in order to save money on the purchase of stamp papers and to avoid the imposition of heavy Gain Tax levied on sale of property, people declare or show a much smaller amount as the price of the land purchased by them than the price actually paid.
' The 'previous sales' of the land cannot, therefore, be always taken to be an accurate measure for determining the price of the land intended to be acquired."
' The rule laid down in Fazalur Rehman's case was affirmed in Malik Aman and others v. Land Acquisition Collector and others PLD 1988 SC 32.
15. The question regarding assessme nt of compensation was considered by Division Bench of this Court in Nawabzada Muhammad Saeed Khan v. The Collector, Land Acquisition, Multan and another 1990 MLD 1232. After the survey of sections 23 and 24 of the Act and the cases noted above, following principles were held relevant in respect of assessment of compensation:--
(1) The market value or market price means the price property would fetch in the market. The price will be highest price a willing buyer would pay and a willing seller would accept both being fully informed and the property being exposed for a reasonable period of time.
(2) The market value may be different from the price a property can actually be sold at a given time. The market value is that price which it might be expected to bring if offered for sale in a fair market.
(3) In assessing the compensation the potential value i,e. The benefits, advantages arising from the present use and future use are to be taken into consideration.
(4) The inflationary trend and depreciation in currency of the country between the date of acquisition under section 4 of the Act and the date of award also should not be totally -ignored and be taken into consideration.
16. We find that survey of the case-law will not be complete without the examination of two judgments of Supreme Court of India reported in Special Land Acquisition Officer, Devangere v. P.
Veerabhadarappa etc. AIR 1984 SC 774 and Chimanlal Hargovinddas and 2 others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona and another 1989 MLD 2392. In Special Land Acquisition Officer Davengere's case, it was held:-- "The function of the Court in awarding compensation under the Act is to ascertain the market value of the land at the date of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act and the methods of valuation may be: (1) opinion of experts, (2) the prices paid within a reasonable time in bona fide transactions of purchase or sale of the lands acquired or of the lands adjacent to those acquired and possessing similar advantages, and (3) a number of years' purchase of the actual or immediately prospective profits of the lands acquired. Normally, the method of capitalising the actual or immediately prospective profits or the rent of a number of years, purchase should not be resorted to if there is evidence of comparable sales or other evidence for computation of the market value. It can be resorted to only when no other method is available."
' In Chimanlal Hargovinddas and 2 others v. Special Land acquisition Officer, Poona and another 1989 MLD 2392 following rules were laid down for the purpose of assessment of compensation:-- 1 The claimant is in the position of a plaintiff who has to show that the price offered for his land in the award is inadequate on the basis of the materials produced in the Court. Of course the materials placed and proved by the other side can also be taken into account for this purpose.
2. The market value of land under acquisition has to be determined as on the crucial date of publication of the notification under section 4 of the Land acquisition act (dates of Notifications under sections 6 and 9 are irrelevant).
3. The determination has to be made standing on the date line of valuation (date of publication of notification under section 4 as if the valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that day. It has also to be assumed that the vendor is willing to sell the land at a reasonable price.
4. In doing so by the instances method, the Court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance which provides the index of market value.
5. Only genuine instances have to be taken s account. (Sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of acquisition of land).
6. Even post-notification instances can be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate, (2) genuine, and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in development prospects.
7. The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations:--
(i) proximity from time angle,
(ii) proximity from situation angle.
11. Having identified the instances which provide the index of market value the price reflected therein may be taken as the norm and the market value of the land under acquisition may be deduced by making. Suitable adjustments for the plus and minus factors vis-a-vis land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition.
12. a balance-sheet of plus and minus factors may be drawn for this purpose and the relevant factors may be evaluated in terms of price variation as, a prudent purchaser would do.
13. The market value of the land under acquisition has thereafter to be deducted by loading the price reflected in the instance taken as norm for plus factors and unloading it for minus factors.
14. The exercise indicated in clauses (11) and (13) has to be undertaken in a commonsense manner as a prudent man of the world of business would do."
17. Guided by these principles, we herein proceed to determine the contentions of the parties. The evidence of the owners comprises of Muhammad Rashid, Malik Ghaus Bakhsh, Haji Muhammad Nawaz, abdul Aziz and Iftikhar ali who appeared as P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.3, P.W.4 and P.W.5, respectively.
P.W.1 deposed with respect to location of the land acquired. He stated that land was situated at the distance of 2000 ft. From the office of Municipal Committee, at the distance of 1000 ft. From the office of Brigade Headquarter, at the distance of 1600 ft. From Bus Stand and at a distance of 2600 ft. From Farid Gate, at a distance of 1600 ft. From Police Line, at a distance of 3000 ft. From the Post Office, and at a distance of 5000 ft. From Quaid-i-azam Medical College, and was near to Islamia University Girls College. In cross-examination he admitted that entire land was under cultivation at the time of acquisition. P.W.2, Malik Ghaus Bakhsh, deposed that land was fit for building purposes and in 1976 was being sold at the rate of 5 to 10 rupees per square ft. He admitted that land in the neighbourhood of Quaid-i-azam Medical College was never sold before him to any one. P.W.3 Haji Muhammad Nawaz also gave account of location of the land. P.W.4, abdul Rashid gave the statement to the same effect. He admitted in cross-examination that while land was acquired then; was no shop in its neighbourhood while when the land was acquired for the purpose of Quaid-iazam Medical College there were shops near the said land. P.W.5, abdul aziz (herein appellant) stated that he had obtained land by way orallotment in lieu of his claim; that land was being used for agricultural purposes and vegetables were grown over it at the time of acquisition.
P.W.6, Iftikhar ali appeared as attorney of Muhammad Rafique-appellant. He stated that the market price of the land at the time of acquisition was Rs,3,00,000 per acre and the land was fit for commercial as well as residential use. He admitted that this land was in the possession of the lessees and they were paying him its rent at the rate of Rs,1,500 per year. He stated that in 1976 the land in neighbourhood of acquired land was being sold at the rate of Rs,5 to 10 per square foot.
18. In addition to the oral evidence, the owners/claimants brought on record following documentary evidence:- Exh:P/2 is a Report of Tchsildar, who assessed the value of the land at the rate of Rs,5 per sq.Ft. At the time of acquisition. Exh.P/3 is the award of Reference Court dated 11-10-1975 in respect of the land acquired for the purposes of Quaid-e-azam Medical College, Bahawalpur. The land was acquired on 2nd July, 1971 and learned Senior Civil Judge assessed the price of this land at the rate of Rs,22,000 per acre. On appeal the compensation was enhanced to Rs,80,000 per acre by the High Court.
Exh.P/4 is the sale transaction having been made by Mst. Farida Begum in favour of Mirza Munawar Hussain who sold land measuring 3 Kanals 19 Marlas in consideration of Rs,40,000 Exh.P/5 is the sale transaction having been made on 6-5-1973, whereby one Shah Muhammad made the sale of 16 Marlas in favour of abdur Rashid in lieu of Rs,19,500.
Exh.P/6 is a registered sale-deed made by the Government in favour of Mst. Saeeda Begum to the extent of 3 Kanals and 4 Marlas in lieu of Rs 25 000.
Ehx.P/7 is the sale made by abdul aziz appellant in favour of Mushtaq ahmad Khan for 10 Marlas in consideration of Rs,12,500.
Exh.P/24 is the sale transaction entered into by Mst. Saeeda akhtar in favour of Mst. Naseem akhtar.
This relates to 1 Kanal for consideration of Rs,35,000.
Exh.P/8 is a registered sale-deed dated 18-9-1974. By this document 6/1-2 Marlas was sold for Rs,12,000.
Exh.P/9 is the registered sale-deed of Mauza Hansra. This was in lieu of Rs,16,800. It is dated 6-3- 1971.
Exh.P/10 is sale-deed dated 4-11-1974. It relates to 1 Kanal 5 Marlas. It was sold for Rs,7,63,000 per acre. Exh.P/11 is the sale of 8 Kanals 5 Marlas by aqeel-ur- Rehman on 25-4-1973. This land was sold in lieu of Rs,1,57,000 per acre.
Exh.P/12 is the award of referee dated 1-11-1974. In this case notification was made on 2-4-1971 at the rate of Rs,76,000 per acre. Exh.P/13 is the registered sale-deed dated 29-9-1974 at the rate of Rs,2,40,000 per acre.
19. Against this evidence respondents were contended with producing Saifuddin as R.W.1 and Ghaus Bakhsh as R.W.2. Saifuddin furnished evidence with respect to location of land and its price.
According to him the land was being used for agricultural purposes and its price was not more than Rs,7,000 to 8,000 per acre; that the land was low lying and needed filling for the purpose of building. He admitted that he was the nephew of Zahoor Nazar who was working in Radio Pakistan.
Ghaus Bakhsh proved the statement of sales having been made in year 1974 to 1975. Neither the sale-deeds nor the mutations incorporated in statement of sales Exh.R-1 were produced in the Court.
20. We have carefully considered and assessed the evidence of parties noted in the preceding paragraphs. Much of the evidence is irrelevant and is not helpful for the resolution of the controversy. Exh.P/3 pertains to the land acquired for the purpose of construction of Quaid-i-azam Medical College, Bahawalpur. This land was situated before the city and was in the neighbourhood to B.V. Hospital, Bahawalpur. Clearly the quality of land was totally dissimilar to the land in dispute.
As regards Exhs.P/5 P/8, P/9, P/10, P/11 and P/13, are concerned, it is sufficient to note that the owners had produced no evidence to describe their location. It is not in dispute that the whole of the Bahawalpur City was encircled by road known as Circular Road. Bahawalpur Stadium was built in 1953. It is also not in dispute that there was no residential colony at the relevant site before the date of acquisition, where the land acquired is situated. There is also no dispute that this land was being used for agricultural purposes but the city had started expanding towards this side also. At the time of acquisition-notification, undeniably the Bus Stand had come into being., The building of Brigade Headquarter, had come into existence. We are, therefore, clear in our mind that the land acquired for the purpose of P.B.C. Was urban agricultural land with suitability of building purposes.
However, the evidence noted above, is not sufficient in quantity and quality to establish that the sale transactions incorporated in aforenoted documents were with respect to land of comparable quality. We are, therefore, clear in our mind that the learned Reference Court was eminently justified in overlooking the aforenoted documents. After having found so, we are left with Exhs.P.6 P.7 and P.24. These sale transactions fortunately relate to land situated in the neighbourhood of land in dispute. Exh.P/6 is registered sale-deed by which Central Government made the sale of 3 Kanals 4/1-2 Marlas in favour of Saeeda Begum in consideration of Rs,25,000, Exh.P/7 is the sale incorporated in Mutation No,534 attested on 30-12-1974 wherein abdul aziz son of Nizam Din is shown to have alienated 10 Marlas in favour of Mushtaq in consideration of Rs,10,500 while Exh.P/24 is the registered sale-deed dated 12-5-1974 by which Mst. Saeeda akhtar made the sale of 1 Kanal in favour of Mst. Naseem akhtar wife of Abdul aziz. The conspicuous feature of sale evidenced by Mutations Nos.534 and 543 is that the first sale was made by abdul aziz owner-appellant while the second sale-deed was executed by Mst. Saeeda akhtar in favour of Mst. Nasim akhtar wife of Abdul aziz. Clearly these sale transactions were made by the owner-appellants, who were making endeavour for enhancement of compensation. Seen from this background we are left with no doubt that these sale transactions were got recorded in revenue papers by interested persons and so could not be relied by this Court.
22. Having assessed the evidence of owners in the preceding paragraphs we are left with sale made through registered sale-deed dated 3-10-1973 by the Central Government in favour of Mst.
Saeeda Begum. Through this sale-deed land measuring 3 Kanals 4/1-2 Marlas was sold in favour of 'vendee in consideration of Rs,25,000. According to this document, the price of the land in the locality in which the land acquired was situated, came to be Rs,62,015.50 per acre. This document of sale could not have been ignored or overlooked by the Reference Court. The approach of the Reference Court in straightaway rejecting this document without any reasonable basis, cannot be commended or approved. As such, this document was relevant and pertinent for taking into consideration for the purpose of assessment of market price of the land in dispute. The difficulty with which we are concerned is the date of the sale transaction and the extent of land. This sale was made on 3-10-1973 and pertained to 3 Kanals and 4/1-2 Marlas. Such a transaction cannot be made the basis for assessm ent of the price of a big tract of land. It is settled principle of law that when a large block of land is required to be valued, price of sale relating to small tract of land cannot be mathematically followed. Furthermore the prices had to be taken into consideration which were prevalent at the time of acquisition notification under section 4 of the act. For this exercise no hard and fast rule can be laid down. Method had to be worked in accordance with human experience and general knowledge. In such cases when large block of land is required to be valued, appropriate deductions had to be made in setting aside the land for carving out road, leaving open spaces for the purpose of construction of buildings. The escalation of the prices is to be taken into consideration. Normally allowance for setting aside the land for roads and open spaces is to be given by 20/25 per cent. Of the land acquired. Similarly escalation of prices is to be considered to the extent of 15 to 20%.
23. After taking into consideration the factors noted above we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the price of Rs,62,015.50 per acre is a fair compensation which can be awarded to the appellants. In the light of foregoing discussion we accept the appeals filed by the owners, increase compensation from Rs,30,000 to Rs,62,015.50 per acre. The appellants shall be entitled to 15% solatium under the law. They shall be further entitled to benefit under sections 28 and 34 of the act.
24. Before parting with this judgment, still we have to determine the right of Sufi Sardar ahmad, who lodged cross-objections bearing No,37/88 in R.FA. No,27/81. This RFa was dismissed as having been found incompetent on account of want of locus standi on the part of appellant P.B.C. It is relevant to note at this stage that Sufi Sardar ahmad alongwith owners claimed reference which was dismissed by the Referee-Court holding that it was barred by time. It is a settled principle of law that the Court cannot go behind the Reference and possess jurisdiction to determine only such questions as are referred to it specifically. The designated/Reference Court has no jurisdiction to determine question of limitation. This function is within the sole domain of the Collector who sends reference under section 18 of the act. Reference be made to Govt. Of West Pakistan (Now Government N.-W.F.P.) through Collector Peshawar v. Arbab Haji ahmad ali Jan and others PLD 1981 SC 516 and Government of West Pakistan (Now N.-W.F.P.) and 2 others v. Mst. Asmatun Nisa and 6 others PLD 1983 SC 109. Applying this principle to the facts and circumstances of this case we have no doubt in our mind that the finding of the Reference Court that the Reference-application filed by Sufi Sardar Ahmad was barred by time was wholly without jurisdiction and totally illegal. This finding cannot be sustained. The question for consideration is as to whether we can grant relief to Sufi Sardar ahmad in view of the fact that he had not filed the appeal against the award rendered by the Reference Court. It is sufficient to note that he filed cross-objection in R.F.a. 27/81. Even otherwise the Court had ample power under Order XLI, Rule 33, C.P.C. To grant relief to a party who has neither filed appeal nor cross-objection. Reference be made to Balram Singh v. Baldeo Singh aIR 1917 Lah. 423, Mahmud Hasna and others v. Lauti Ram and others aIR 1927 all. 453, arjan Singh Dedar Singh v. Mohan Singh Bur Singh and another AIR 1961 Punj. 287, Hamijan Bibi v. Sheikh Darog Ali and others PLD 1964 Dacca 119, Mahboob alam v. Mir Zaman etc. PLD 1974 Lah. 218, Messrs Galadari Cement (Gulf) Ltd. v. District Judge, Khuzdar and 6 others 1986 CLC 10, WaPDa and another v. Messrs Khanzada Muhammad abdul Haque Khan Khatak & Company PLD 1990 SC 359, and The Directorate of Industries & Mineral Development Government of the Punjab through its Director, Lahore and 3 others v. Messrs Masud auto Stores, through Masood Ahmad Malik Partner, Lahore PLD 1991 Lah.
174. In result we also accept cross-objection No,37/88 in R.F.a. No,27/81 filed by Sufi Sardar ahmad.
He shall also be entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs,62;015.50 per acre. He shall also be entitled to 15% solatium under the law and the benefit under sections 28 and 34 of the act.
' There shall be no order as to costs.