' K. E. CHAUHAN, J.-Mst. Karam Bibi, a refugee from Batala, District Gurdaspur (India) migrated to Pakistan at the time of the Partition of the sub-continent. She was holding land in Batala as a widow of her husband Sher Muhammad who had pre-deceased her. On coming to Pakistan she filed a claim form for that land which was verified and in lieu thereof, as pleaded in the writ petition, she was allotted land in village Bhopalwala, Tehsil Daska, District Sialkot. She died on the 30th of July 1963 and vide mutation of inheritance bearing No. 6071, dated 20-3-1968, one-third of her estate was mutated in the name of one Nazir Ahmad on the basis of her will and the two-third was mutated in the names of Munshi Khan (respondent No. 15) and Babu Khan (respondent No. 16) as her brothers, treating her as a "full owner" constituting as an independent and fresh stock of descent for regulation and devolution of inheritance of the allotted land.
2. Respondents 3 to 14 (who are described as descendants of sisters of her husband Sher Muhammad) filed an appeal which was rejected by the Collector/S. D. M., Daska on 31-5-1969. They filed a writ petition in this Court which was dismissed as not maintainable on 3-10-1973. The particulars of that writ petition are neither contained in the present writ petition nor the learned counsel otherwise furnished those to us.
3. It appears that in the meanwhile Munshi Khan, and Babu Khan (respondents N05. 15 and 16) sold land measuring 373 kanals and 3 marlas inherited by them from Mst. Karam Bibi in favour of Muhammad Ibrahim, (petitioner No. 1), Zulaf Hussain (petitioner No. 4) and one Umar Din vide mutation No. 6674 dated 1-6-1968 for a consideration of Rs. 2,40,000.00.
4. The aforesaid Umar Din also sold his share measuring 175 kanals 15 marlas in favour of Altaf Hussain (petitioner No. 2), Tajammal Hussain (petitioner No. 3) and Zulaf Hussain (petitioner No. 4) for Rs. 1,20,000.00 vide mutation No. 6700 dated 14-1-1969.
5. It may be mentioned that the view of this Court as reported in Sher Muhammad v. The Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner, Multan and 7 others (1) while interpreting the relevant provisions of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Laws etc, mentioned therein, was that land allotted to widows/females in Pakistan in lieu of land held by them in India under custom was to be treated as her full and absolute ownership and not merely a life-estate or a limited estate or ownership and that on their death the succession was to open considering them and not the last male owner as a fresh stock of descent. However, the Supreme Court in Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha v. Muhammad Shari and others (2) did not endorse that view and overruling the aforesaid judgment held on a proper construction of the relevant statutes and law etc.. That the land so allotted would retain the character of a life or a limited estate in the hands of the widows/ females in Pakistan, just as they held corresponding land in India before Partition because allotment in Pakistan was in lieu of land held by them in India, with the result that on their death they would not form a fresh stock of descent and the land so left by them will devolve on the heirs of the "last male owner." However, while giving this decision Hamoedur Rahman, C. J., who wrote judgment for the Court, on pages 810-811 wrote that, 'for the reasons given above I have come to the conclusion that these appeals must be allowed, the judgments and orders of the High Court set aside and all the cases remanded back to the Chief Settlement Commissioner to determine in accordance with the law hereby declared the persons entitled to inherit from the last male owner on the respective dates of termination of the limited interests of the female allottees in these cases according to the provisions of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1962. In so holding, I would also make it clear that this would not entitle the Settlement authorities to re-open the orders of mutation against which no appeals have been filed and which have become final".
6. Though the judgment of the Supreme Court was of a declaratory nature clarifying the law already existing on the subject and the Supreme Court had simply settled the controversy and doubts if any regarding the correct interpretation of the relevant Rehabilitation and Settlement Laws etc., but at the same time as it contained an observation that it was not to affect those cases where no appeal had been filed or which under the earlier (wrong) interpretation had become final, therefore, to remove that clog and to clarify the matter further in that respect the Provincial Legislature rose to the occasion and "for the removal of difficulties of the lawful heirs of last male holders in respect of limited estates held by refugee females and to protect their rights with respect to the said property", and also considering it as "expedient to extend the benefit of the decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan to the persons aggrieved by the "earlier, erroneous view", on the subject on 31-3-1975, promulgated the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal of Difficulties) Act XXV of 1975 which was retrospective with effect from 15-3-1948-(the date when Custom as a rule of succession was abolished and was substituted by Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act IX of 1940-indicating that the persons aggrieved from the earlier erroneous decisions of old cases which may have become final and in which no appeals may have been filed would also be eligible to avail of the correct law on the subject by filing necessary applications and having recourse to the remedies provided in the Punjab Act XXV of 1975. It is well settled that when a Court interprets a particular section or a provision of a statute, the
(1) PLD 1968 Lab. 234 (2) PLD 1971 SC 791 that interpretation is supposed to be in existence right from the time and date when that section or provision was enacted and from that point of view when the Supreme Court gave interpretation of the law on the subject, the obviously it was supposed to be in existence right from the beginning of the relevant law or statute interpreted by the Supreme Court. As decisions Courts affect only the cases and the parties which are before them, therefore, naturally the Supreme Court in keeping with that principle had to observe that their decision was confined to the cases before them and would not affect other cases which were not sub judice before any forum or which had otherwise become final. However, the Legislature from its own point of view feeling the injustice which in this way may ensue to a large number of persons due to no fault of theirs, but due to earlier wrong interpretation of law by all concerned, promulgated the Punjab Act XXV of 1975 to give relief to aggrieved persons and provide new remedies in that respect. Some salient features of this Act are :
(I) that while removing the difficulties which may have cropped up due to earlier erroneous interpretation of the relevant law, it declares that all decrees, judgments or orders passed in any suit, appeal or other proceedings by any Court or other authority treating a refugee female allottee as full owner of the allotted property, shall be of no legal effect ;
(ii) that old decisions, judgments and decrees or orders shall be decided afresh and a person aggrieved can make an application for that purpose within one year from 31-3-1975 ;
(iii) that similarly, alienation made by the aforesaid female refugee allottees or orders regarding their successions can be challenged in an appropriate forum within one year from 31-3-1975 ;
(iv) that persons who have acquired any rights from female refugee allottees by alienation or otherwise shall have no right to plea adverse possession against any lawful heir.
7. In that background respondents Nos. 3 to 14 then filed an application before the E. A. S. 0., Sialkot (respondent No. 2) for determining the succession of Mst. Karam Bibi afresh in the light of the above law. (The date of institution of that application has not been given in the writ petition and was neither provided to us by the learned counsel). The matter is still pending before the aforesaid official. However, the petitioners who are purchasers of the said land as mentioned earlier have come up in writ petition taking objection to the validity of the Punjab Act XXV of 1975.
This writ petition was heard along with certain other similar writ petitions and the present judgment will deal with and dispose of the various objections which the respective learned counsel raised before us.
8. The first point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the Provincial'
Legislature possessed no power under 1973 Constitution to enact Punjab Act XXV of 1975, inasmuch as, the subject-matter dealt with in this Act did not fall under any of the heads or items on which a Provincial Legislature could make laws. As will be clear from the Preamble of the Punjab Act and its salient features reproduced above, it is essentially in its pith and substance an Act which deals with succession to agricultural land. This, therefore, brings us to the question as to whether making of laws with regard to "succession of agricultural land", is a Federal Subject, a Provincial Subject or a Concurrent Subject, and whether the Punjab Legislature could or could not make a law thereon.
The relevant entries in the Fourth Schedule which provide the distribution of Legislative Lists are :
(a) Entry No. 37 in the Federal Legislative List, Part I, which reads, "works, lands and buildings vested in, or in the possession of Government for the purposes of the Federation (not being military, naval or air force works), but as regards property situate in a Province, subject always to Provincial Legislation, save in so far as Federal Law otherwise provides".
(b) Entry No. 6 in Concurrent Legislative List which reads, "wills, intestacy and successsion, save as regards agricultural land"
(c) Entry No. 9 in the Concurrent Legislative List which reads, "contracts, including partnership, agency, contracts of carriage, and other special forms of contracts, but not including contracts relating to agricultural land", and
(d) Entry No. 11 in the Concurrent Legislative List, which reads, "transfer of property other than agricultural land, registration of deeds and documents".
A comparative study of these entries will show that contracts about and transfers of or succession to agricultural land have been considered as independent and specific heads by the Constitution- makers and that is why they specially made mention of them in Items Nos 6, 9 and 11 of the Concurrent List for the purpose of particularly excluding them from that List. They are not included in this specific form in the Federal Legislative List either with the result that they constitute residuary items which are the exclusive domain of the Provincial Legislature and from that point of views the Provincial Legislature was competent to make laws regulating course of succession of agricultural land allotted to females as mentioned above or regarding contracts or transfers thereof and matters incidental or ancillary thereto. Similar view was taken with regard to these items by the Privy Council in Megh Raj and another v. Allah Rakhla and others (1) with regard to entry No. 7 (Wills, intestacy and succession, save as regards agricultural land), Entry No. 8 (transfer of property other than agricultural land.. . .) and Entry No. 10 (Contracts, including partnership, agency, contracts of carriage, and other special forms of contract, but not including contracts relating to agricultural land of the concurrent list as occurring in the Government of India Act, 1935, where it was held that on proper construction of these entries the aforesaid incidents of agricultural land were exclusively reserved to the Provinces. No doubt Entry No. 37 of Federal List is of a general nature dealing with land vested in or in possession of Government for the purposes of the Federation but again as regards property situate in a Province, it is to be subject always to Provincial Legislation save in so far as any Federal Law otherwise provides. Here it should be kept in mind that no Federal Law provides otherwise on the subject of succession to or contracts .About, and transfers of, agricultural land allotted to refugee females and from that point of view the Punjab Act does not suffer from any infirmity of the kind suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Rather the course of devolution of agricultural land even otherwise according to the relevant laws on the subject was the same which is enunciated by or accepted by the Punjab Act. Moreover, the land in dispute admittedly being situated in the Province of Punjab, the Provincial Legislature of Punjab could, safely
(1) PLD 1947 P C 25 legislate about its course of succession. Still another thing to be taken note-of is that after permanent settlement of lands of the kind involved in this case under the Displaced Persons (Land)
Settlement Act XLVII of 1958, it ceased to vest in and belong to Central/Provincial Government and it did not suffer from any of the incidents contemplated in Entry No. 37 so as to create any clog on the powers of the Provincial Legislature to legislate about its succession etc.
9. When confronted with this situation, learned counsel for the petitioners referred to Item No. 38 of the Concurrent List which is headed as "Evacuee Property" and submitted that the land in dispute was at some time evacuee property on which refugees were settled and the present legislation from that point of view being in respect of evacuee property, it would be void in so far as it may come in conflict with the existing laws like the Displaced Persons (Land) Settlement Act XLVII of 1958 or other Rehabilitation Laws in general-(no particular provision whereof was, however, referred to before us by the learned counsel)-which allegedly permanently settled land on allottees which meant that those allottees even if females were to constitute a fresh stock of descent for the purposes of determining its succession. For this he relied upon Article 143 of the Constitution, marginal heading whereof is "Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial Laws", and which states that, "if any provision of an Act of a Provincial Assembly is repugnant to any provision of an Act of Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of any existing law with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List,. Then the Act of Parliament, whether passed before or after the Act of the Provincial Assembly, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the Act of the Provincial Assembly shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void." The contention suffers from various infirmities. Firstly, at the time when the Punjab Act XXV of 1975 was promulgated on 31-3-1975, long before thereto all evacuee lands had lost their character of being evacuee property in 1959, by issuance of relevant notification(s) under section 4 (2) of Act XLVII of 1958, inasmuch as, all evacuee interest thereafter in such, lands got extinguished by operation of law. See Haji Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Siddiq (1). Secondly, the argument is based on a miscomprehension of the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Land) Settlement Act, 1958, or as a matter of fact of all other Rehabilitation and other relevant laws etc., because none of them, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha v. Muhammad Shaft and others, provided that female allottees would become full owners of the land allotted to them so as to constitute a fresh stock of descent for succession thereto. Thirdly, the pith and substance of the Punjab Act being succession to agricultural land, it was a specific head by itself which as a-residuary item fell exclusively within the Provincial sphere of Legislation and it is not justified to place it under any other head-just to create confusion or uncertainty. Fourthly, the law involved in this case is not about evacuee property stricto senso but about regulating the succession of allotment rights and determining their nature and extent. That there is a distinction between evacuee property on the one hand and allotment rights whether of the confirmed allottees or of permanent transferees on the other hand, was pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case hereinbefore mentioned, namely, Haji Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Siddlq, where a question arose whether a pre-emption suit could be filed
(1) PLD 1973 SC 347 regarding sale of allotment rights and their Lordships answered it in the affirmative. Objection was raised that as section 16 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act XII of 1957 debarred any Court from passing any order with regard to evacuee property, therefore, a pre-emption decree could also not be passed by a civil Court. A similar objection was raised on the basis of section 6 of the Displaced Persons (Land) Settlement Act XLVII of 1958. The objection was repelled and it was held that after acquisition by the Central Government, the property no longer remained evacuee property and that even rights of confirmed allottees or of permanent-transferees or persons who were permanently settled on the erstwhi'e evacuee property, were in the nature of real property by themselves and were pre-emptible. It is to be pointed out that rights of the kind of real property were held by the Privy Council in Megh Raj and another v. Allah Rakhia an others as to be included in word "I and" (and we must say that if they pertain to agricultural land) then they would be included in the word agricultural land. Fifthly, taking the argument raised at its face value, it does not advance the case of the petitioners because, so long as the- item referred to is in the Concurrent List, the Provincial Legislature would be well-competent to make law in respect thereto, especially when it conflicts with any existing evacuee property law has not been shown or proved before us.
10. The next point argued was that though the main object and pith and substance of the Punjab Act XXV of 1975, may be 'succession to agricultural land", but it dealt with contracts e.g , of sale or other transfers which the female allottees may have made of the agricultural land settled on or allotted to them and as such it did violence to the Contract Act IX of 1872 and similarly it made In- roads into the law of Limitation as contained in section 28 of the Limitation Act IX of 1908, when it disallowed plea of adverse possession and rather provided other periods of limitation in violation of the Limitation Act etc., for the purposes of availing of the remedies detained in the Punjab Act. Both these statutes, according to the learned counsel were, "existing laws" within the contemplation of this phrase as it occurs in Articles 268 (7) and 260 (1) and 143 of the Constitution and as according to the learned counsel they pertained to items in the Federal List/ Concurrent List, therefore, the Punjab Act could not prevail over them and its aforesaid provisions were void under Article 143 of the Constitution in the aforesaid two respects. The plea has no substance. AS mentioned above, the Punjab Act XXV of 1975, being in pith and substance essentially an Act dealing with succession to agricultural land, settled on or allotted to refugee females, the provisions regarding controlling its alienations and providing remedies and periods of limitation for enforcement of those remedies are properly incidental and consequential thereto. This was so held in Megh Raj and another v.
Allah Rakhia and others (I), maintained in Megh Raj and others v. Allah Rakhia and others (2) and re-affirmed in Megh Raj and another v. Allah Kakhia and others, (3) where a question arose regarding the constitutionality of the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act IV of 1938. That Act authorised restitution/redemption of certain old mortgages Of agricultural land on less onerous terms than contained in mortgage deeds and in accordance with the procedure laid down therein.
That Act fell under the head "Land" which was contained in Item No. 21 of Schedule 7 of Provincial Legislative List of the Government of India'
(1) AIR 1941 Lab. 177 (2) AIR 1942 FC 27
(3) PLD 1947 P C 25 ' Act, 1935. Argument was raised that it violated the provisions of the Contract Act and Limitation Act, just as it has been raised in this case, with a further contention that the said Act also affected the jurisdiction of Courts when it provided special remedies and was from that point of view void to the extent of its repugnancy to the Contract Act, Limitation Act and the C. P. C. The plea was not accepted in Megh Raj and another v. Allah Rakhia and others (I) and at page 30-31 of the report is contained a detailed discussion of the subject. Head-note (c) of that report sums up the matter in a precise manner and is worth reproduction. It states :- "Where the paramount legislation does not purport to be exhaustive or unqualified, but itself permits or recognizes other laws restricting or qualifying the general provision made in it, it cannot be said that any qualification or restriction introduced by another law is repugnant to the provision in the main or paramount law : Stock Motor Ploughs v. Forsyth (1932) 8 C L R 128), and Hum v.
Palmer (1926) 38 C L R 441)
' When the general rule laid down in section 37, Contract Act, that parties to a contract must either perform or offer to perform their respective promises is qualified by the words 'unless such performance is dispensed with or excused under the provisions of any other law' it cannot be said that a law which excuses performance of any particular kind of contract such as the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 4 of 1938, is inconsi ,tent with section 37 which must be taken as a whole. The impugned law will only be one of the special cases contemplated or saved by the main or paramount Act. The Punjab Act 4 of 1938 does not clearly or in terms take away any rights which a mortgagee may have under sections 69 and 70, Contract Act, and no particular provision in the Act can accordingly be said to be repugnant to those provisions of the Contract Act.
' Likewise the qualifying or saving words in sections 9 and 4, Civil P. C, preclude the contention that an Act which bars a civil remedy in certain cases such as the Punjab Restitution of Mortgages Act is repugnant to the provisions of the Civil P. C. r United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum AT R 1941 FC 16)
' The position becomes more obvious, if another test of repugnancy is applied, namely, whether there is such an inconsistency between the two provisions that one must be taken to repeal the other by necessary implication. For the application of this test, it will be immaterial whether the Central law is earlier or later in date than the Provincial law. If, for the sake of argument it is assumed that the Contract Act or the Civil P. C. Was passed after the impugned Punjab Act, it will be impossible to contend that section 37, Contract Act, or sections 9 and 4, Civil P. C., will have the effect of repealing by necessary implication the earlier Punjab law when they expressly save the operation and effect of other laws dealing with matters which in the absence of such special law will undoubtedly be governed by the general Central enactment. Consequently, the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act cannot be said to be repugnant to section 37, Contract Act, or the Civil P. C. If. However, it should be found that the substantive provisions of the impugned Act are to any extent void or inoperative. Any attempt to exclude attack on them by barring the jurisdiction of .Civil Courts will be open to criticism as "an attempt to do by indirect
(1) AIR 1942 FC 27 means' something which the Provincial Legislature was not entitled to do : Lethbridge Irrigation Trustee? Board v. Independent Order of Foresters (1940 A C 513)..
There is no provision in the Punjab Act 4 of 1938 which conflicts with the Limitation Act and even if there were any, the saving of special or local laws in section 29 (2), Limitation Act, would preclude the argument of repugnancy . . . . ."
11. Continuing with the above subject and taking up the plea regarding repugnancy to Contract Act IX of 1872 it may be mentioned to excuse repetition, that items Nos. 9, 6 and 11 of the Concurrent List show that succession whether testate or intestate as regards agricultural land constitutes special head by itself. Similarly, contracts relating to agricultural land also constitute special head in their own place. Same is the position of transfer of agricultural land. All these matters with regard to agricultural land have been made special items or heads by themselves and as such have been taken away from the field of Concurrent List which means that they thus being residuary items fall exclusively within the Provincial sphere. Contract Act as regards agricultural land, therefore is not an existing law with regard to any item in the Federal List or Concurrent List and as such it is not available for comparison with the Punjab Act XXV of 1975 to determine latter's repugnancy. As regards Limitation Act, no doubt Entry No. 3 of the Concurrent List reads as, "Civil Procedure, including the law of limitation and all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure on the commencing day ; the recovery in a Province or the Federal Capital of claims in respect of taxes and other public demands, including arrears of land revenue and sum recoverable as such, arising outside that Province", and as it does make mention of the law of limitation, so from that point of view, Limitation Act of 1908 was pleaded to be a law pertaining to the aforesaid item in the Concurrent List. However, in our opinion that Act is not available for comparison with the Punjab Act XXV of 1975, inasmuch as Punjab Act is in pith and substance not a law of limitation but a law regarding succession to agricultural land and its other provisions are all incidental or consequential thereto.
12. The last point was that the Punjab Act XXV of 1975 has interfered with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha v. Muhammad Shaft and others where it was observed that the said decision was not to affect the transactions vast and closed and nor was it to effect cases in which no appeals etc. Were at that time pending. It was submitted that the Provincial Legislature had no jurisdiction to pass any law which affected or purported to set aside the judgment or decree of the Supreme Court. By purporting to open past and closed transactions or cases in which no appeals were pending, the direction as contained in the said judgment, it was pleaded, has been violated. The plea has no merit. It was laid down in Messrs Mamukanjan Cotton Factory v. The Punjab Province and others (I) that a Legislature otherwise competent to legislate on a particular subject can undertake remedial or corrective legislation even though there be a judgment of a superior Court to the contrary and that when a matter in such a situation comes before a Court it will apply the latest disposition by legislation even though it be retrospective. Reliance was then placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on Article 189 of the Constitution which is headed as "Decisions of Supreme
(1) PLD 1975 SC 50 ' Court binding on other Courts" and states that "any decision of the Supreme Court shall, to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on all other Courts in Pakistan". This Article has no relevancy, inasmuch as, it does not contain any fetters on legislative powers of the Provincial Legislature which in its own sphere is supreme and can enact even retrospective laws. Courts are simply interpreters and not Legislatures, and if, therefore, a Legislature makes a law on a subject, it cannot be struck down on the ground that it nullifies a decision given by a Court while interpreting some earlier law. The matter need not be gone into in further details as it is concluded by Messrs Mamukanjan Cotton Factory V. The Punjab Province and others, where certain earlier law was held by the High Court as illegal whereafter a new law was made with retrospective effect curing the lacunae of the earlier law. The contentions of Mr. A. K. Brohi, Advocate, who appeared in that case and the views of the- Court are succinctly summed up in the head-note of that report which is, worth reproduction. It states that the argument of the learned counsel "in a nutshell was that the validating Ordinance purports to enable the Provincial Government to retain and claim, what according to the judgments of the High Courts, the Government could not have, at the material time, levied and collected. 1 hese judgments are rendered by the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution itself. The validating Ordinance on the other hand, is sub-constitutional legislation, which according to counsel cannot undo or destroy what he described as the 'end product' of the Constitutional jurisdiction. The argument is without substance and one which if accepted would indeed lead to startling results.. It would strike at the very root of the power of Legislature, otherwise competent to legislate on a particular subject, to undertake any remedial or curative legislation after discovery of defect in an existing law as a result of the judgment of a superior Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. The argument overlooks the fact, that the remedial or curative legislation in also "the end product" of constitutional jurisdiction in the cognate field. The argument if accepted, would also seek to throw into serious disarray the pivotal arrangement in the Constitution regarding the division of sovereign power of the State among its principal organs, namely, the executive, the Legislature and the judiciary, each being the master in its own assigned field under the Constitution". The Supreme Court in this respect also referred to its earlier decisions in Haji Dosa Ltd., Karachi v. The Province of Punjab (1) ; Commissioner of Sales Tax (West), Karachi v. Messrs Kruddsons Ltd. (2) ; Province of East Fakistan v. Mehdi Ali Khan (3) and Saeedur Rahman v. Chief Election Commissioner (4). In the face of the above clear enunciation of law the contention raised cannot be accepted.
13. The upshot of the above discussion is that the present writ petition has no merit and is liable to be dismissed which we hereby do with no order as to costs. Before parting with this case, we want to clarify that the present writ petition(s) are being dismissed in so far as they challenge the vires of the Punjab Act XXV of 1975 and we have not attended to the various other points which may be open to the persons concerned within the framework and under the Punjab Act 1975 itself and which pleas they will be entitled to raise before the appropriate forums where proceedings for reopening of succession or challenging alienations etc., may be going on or may be instituted in accordance with law.
(1) 1973 SCMR2 (2) PLD 1974 SC 180 (3)PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 387 (4) PLD 1965 SC 157