' FAZAL-E-MIRAN CHAUHAN, J.-Through this revision petition, the petitioner has called in question the judgments and decrees, dated 12-2-2005 and 20-3-2006 passed by Civil Judges 1st Class, Jhang and the learned lower appellate Court, respectively.
2. Facts giving rise to the filing of the present revision petition are to the effect that respondent/plaintiff Abdul Ghaffar filed a suit for possession through preemption with regard to the Exchange Mutation No,2109, dated 31-1-1994 measuring an area 47 Kanals 17 marlas situated in Mauza Pebber Wala Tehsil and District Jhang on the ground of being Shafi- ' e-Sharik, Shafi-Jar and Shafi Khalit. The petitioner/defendant appeared in the Court and filed a contesting written statement denying the preferential right. Lie asserted in the written statement that Mutation No,2109, dated 31-1-1994 is in fact an exchange mutation which is not preemptible. From the divergent pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:-
(1) Whether the plaintiff has superior , right of pre-emption qua the vendee/defendant? OPP.
(2) Whether the plaintiff has made Talbs according to the law of land? OPP.
(3) Whether the disputed land was actually purchased by the defendant in consideration of Rs,40,000 and entered the Mutation of Exchange No,2109 just to cause damage to . The right of pre- emption of the plaintiff? OPP.
(4) Whether the ostensible sale price of Rs,2,50,000 was not fixed in good faith and was also not actually paid? OPP.
(5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get this land by law of preemption in. Consideration of Rs,40,000 OPP.
(6) Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action and locus standi to file this suit? OPD.
(7) Whether the suit has not been correctly valued for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction, if so, what is the correct valuation? OPD.
(8) Relief.
3. The parties led their evidence in support of their respective pleas. The learned trial court after recording and appreciating the evidence of both the parties decreed the suit vide its judgment and decree, dated 30-1-2003. The petitioner assailed the judgment through an appeal. The learned Additional District Judge, vide judgment and decree dated 4-6-2003 set aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court and remanded the case to the learned trial Court re-framing the following issues:- Issue No,3. Whether the plaintiff paid Rs,2,50,000 to the vendors as sale price of the property in dispute in good faith and was actually paid? OPD.
Issue No,4. If above issue is not proved in affirmative, whether the disputed property was actually purchased by the defendant* in lieu of Rs,40,000 and entered Mutation of Exchange No,2019 just to cause damage to the right of the plaintiff? OPP.
Issue No,4-A. If the above issues are not proved, then what was the market value of the property in dispute at the time of sale? OPP.
4. On post remand proceedings again the parties produced their evidence and the learned trial Court vide its judgment and decree, dated 12-2-2005 decreed the suit, which was upheld by the learned lower appellate Court vide its judgment and decree, dated 20-3-2006, hence this revision petition.
5. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that when the fact of sale comes within the knowledge of a pre- emptor through any source, he shall make Talb-r-Muwathibat i.e, immediate demand made by pre-emptor in the sitting or meeting (Majlis), in which he has come to know of the sale, declaring his intention to exercise the right of pre-emption. Where a pre-emptor has made Talb-i-Muwathibat under subsection (2) of section 13, he shall as soon thereafter as possible but not later than two weeks from the date of knowledge make Talb-i-Ishhad by sending a notice in writing attested by two truthful witnesses, confirming his intention to exercise the right of pre- emption. The requirements of Talb-i-Muwathibat under subsection 2 and Talb-i-Ishhad under subsection (3), he shall make Talb-i-Khusumat by filing a suit in the Court of competent jurisdiction to enforce his right of pre-emption. Further argued that Talb-i-Muwathibat connotes to a jumping demand i.e, an immediate demand made by a pre-emptor on acquiring information about the same. It is also interpreted by the Courts the word jumping demand means, immediate demand made by a pre-emptor in the same meeting 'and sitting without any loss of time as soon as he receives the information about the same. Further submits that as a great emphasis and importance is to be given to this word in making of Talb-i-Muwathibat and it is necessary that as soon as the pre-emptor acquired knowledge of the sale of preempted property he should make immediate demand for his desire and intention to assert his right of pre-emption without the slightest loss of time. According to the dispensation which has been reproduced hereinabove after performing Talb-i-Muwathibat, in terms of section 13 (2) of the Act, the pre-emptor has to perform Talb-i-Ishhad as. Soon as possible but not later than two months from the date of knowledge of performing Talb-i-Muwathibat, therefore, to give full effect to the provision of sections 2 and 3 of section 13 of the Act, it was necessary and mandatory to mention in the plaint, dated, place and time of the performance of Talb- i-Muwathibat because from such date, the time provide by the statute i.e, 14 days under subsection 3 of section 13 of the Act shall be calculated. Further argued that as it has been held in Mian Pir Muhammad and another v. Faqir Muhammad through L.Rs, and others (PLD 2007 SC 302) that in the suit for pre-emption, wherein the date, place and time of Talb- i-Muwathibat and date of issuance of notice performing Talb- i-Ishhad. In terms of section 13 of the Act is not provided would be fatal in the preemption suit. In the instant case, in para. 9 of the plaint, it is only date and place and the names of witnesses in whose presence, the information was received and Talb-i- Muwathibat was performed is mentioned but time of Talb-i-Muwathibat is missing, thus as laid down in the cases of Haji Muhammad Saleem v. Khuda Bakhsh (PLD 2003 SC 315) and Fazal Subhan and 11 others v. Mst. Sahib Jamala and others (PLD 2005 SC 977) approved and upheld by the case Mian Pir Muhammad (supra), the suit filed by the petitioner was not maintainable for non-mentioning of the time when Talb-i-Muwathibat was performed by him.
6. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent argued that the view taken by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case Mian Pir Muhammad (supra) is prospective effect and not retrospective effect and those cases which have been decided prior to the decision of this case. In this context he placed reliance to the case of (PLD 1968 SC 101), a settled case, in which it was observed by the honourable Supreme Court that a decision by the Courts is not binding vis-a-vis the cases of those who have not come to the Court for the redressal of their grievances. Beside this, -learned counsel for the respondent has nothing to argue and he conceded that the view taken by the Supreme Court is final and is to be followed by the Subordinate courts and even by the High Court.
7. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
8. Admittedly in para. 9 of the plaint, it is recorded that respondent/pre-emptor came to know about the sale on 1-4-1994 when he along with Zulfiqar and Lai Khan was present at Adda Iqbal Nagar Mauza Tehsil and District Jhang when Haji son of Chiragh came there and informed him about the sale. On receiving information, the responclent/pre-emptor immediately announced his right of pre-emption and stated that he would like to exercise his right Of pre-emption.
Conspicuously, time at which on the day and was informed him about the sale is missing. This fact is not denied by the learned counsel for the respondent. In view of the recent law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan reported in the case of Mian Pir Muhammad and another v.
Faqir Muhammad through L.Rs, and others (PLD 2007 SC 302) as under:- ' "As soon as the pre-emptor acquired knowledge of the sale of pre-empted property he should make immediate demand for his desire and intention to assert his right of pre-emption without the slightest loss of time. According to the dispensation which has been reproduced hereiiiabove after performing Talb-i-Muwathibat, in terms of section 13(2) of the Act, the pre-emptor has another legal obligation to perform i.e, making of Talb-i-Ishhad as soon as possible after making Talb-i- Muwathibat but not later than two weeks from the date of knowledge of performing Talb-i- Muwathibat, therefore, the question can conveniently be answered by holding that to give full effect to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of section 13 of the Act, it would be mandatory to mention in the plaint date, place and time of performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat because from such date, the time provided by the statute i.e, 14 days under subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act shall be calculated. Supposing that there is no mention of the date, place and time of Talb- i- Muwathibat then it would be very difficult to give effect fully to subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act, and there is every possibility that instead of allowing the letter of laws to remain in force fully the pre-emptor may attempt to get a latitude by claiming any date of performance of Talb-i- Muwathibat in his statement in Court and tfeen on the basis of the same would try to justify the delay if any, occurring in the performance of Talb-i-Ishhad. Same view was taken by the Supreme ourt in earlier judgment reported as Haji Muhammad Saleem v. Khuda Bakhsh (PLD 2003 SC 315) and Fazal Subhan and 11 others v. Mst. Sahib Jamala and others (PLD 2005 SC 977), wherein it was held by the Honourable Supreme Court that furnishing of the date time and place in the plaint is necessary to establish the performance of Talb- i-Muwathibat and date of issuing of notice of Talb-i-Ishhad terms of section 13 of the Act is not provided it would be fatal for the pre-emption suit. Following the dictum laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court, it is held that Talb-i- Muwathibat in its real perspective reveals that it is a demand which is known as jumping demand and is to be performed immediately on coming to know of sale then to determine whether it has been made immediately, mentioning of time would be strictly in consonance with the provision of section 13 of the Act. This view has been confirmed by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Rana Muhammad Tufail v. Munir Ahmad and another (PLD 2001 SC 13) where the leave of appeal was declined maintaining the judgment of the High Court as there was four hours delay in making the Talb-i- Muwathibat from the time of receiving the knowledge of the same."
' In the instant case, the respondent/ petitioner has failed to mention the time besides day and place when he received the information on 1-4-1994.
9. Learned counsel for the respondent further argued that suit was. Filed on 1-1994 and decreed on 12-2-2005, the appeal was also dismissed on 20-3-2006, thus, the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court reported Mian Pir Muhammad and another (supra) is not to be applied- retrospectively and the suit has been rightly decreed by the learned trial Court. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel have no force. This Court settled that when a Court interprets a particular section or a provision of a statute, then that interpretation is supposed to be in existence right from the time and date when that section or provision was enacted and from that point of view when the Supreme Court gave interpretation of the law on the subject, then obviously it was supposed to be in existence right from the beginning of the relevant law or statute interpreted by the Supreme Court. The decisions of Supreme Court affect only the cases and the parties who are before them, therefore, naturally the Supreme Court in keeping with that principle had to observe that their decision was confined to the cases before them and would not affect other cases which were not sub judice before any forum or which had otherwise become final. In the case reported as Mian Pir Muhammad and others (supra), the interpretation given by the Supreme Court would deem to be in existence from the time and date when the section or provision was enacted.
Reliance can be made to the case of Muhammad Ibrahim and 2 others v. Province of Punjab through Secretary (Rehabilitation) and 15 others (PLD 1977 Lahore 399).
10. For the foregoing reasons, this revision petition is accepted and the judgments passed by the trial Court, dated 12-2-2005 as well as by the learned lower appellate Court, dated 20-3-2006 are set aside. Resultantly, the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff shall be deemed to have been dismissed.