1. ' By this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 read with section 5 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, order, dated 14th September, 1996 passed in Family Suit No,47/96 by the Vth Court of Civil and Family Judge, Karachi (Central) has been asailed.
2. The impugned order directs the attachment of 1/4th of the salary of the petitioner and its deposit with the Nazir of the District Courts. Such order was to remain in operation until the petitioner rejoins the respondent No,1 alongwith the children and in case of her failure, for an year.
3. ' The facts giving rise to this petition are that the respondent No,12 filed Family Suit No,47 of 1996 against the petitioner for restitution of conjugal rights which suit came to be decreed on the basis of statement of the petitioher contained in the written statement filed by her, to the effect that she was willing to join the respondent No,1 and live with him as his wife, subject to his fulfilling the obligation/duties as husband to the best of his ability. During the pre-trial proceedings, before the Family Court, the petitioner demanded separate accommodation on the ground that she would not live with her in-laws. The respondent No,1 was thereupon directed, through judgment and decree dated 15-5-1996, to provide separate accommodation for the petitioner and the children and inform her about having made such arrangement. By the said decree, the petitioner was directed to join the respondent No,1 alongwith children within one week from the communication as above. On 26-5-1996, the petitioner was accordingly intimated about the arrangement of separate accommodation by the respondent. The petitioner, however, did not join the respondent No,1 in terms of the said decree. Consequently, the respondent No,1 filed an application for execution of the decree dated 15/16-5-1996. The petitioner in her objections to the said application for execution, pleaded that the house arranged by respondent No,1 was situated in farflung locality namely, Surjani Town and it would be difficult for the petitioner to continue her job with the respondent No,2 after taking up residence at the proposed accommodation. The application was granted by the impugned order dated 14-9-1996.
4. ' I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. On 19-1-1997, when this matter had come up for Katcha Peshi, before another Bench of this Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner was pointedly asked to argue and justify the maintainability of the petition since he could have filed an appeal against the impugned order of the lower Court. Time was granted for the above purpose to the learned counsel for the petitioner, at his request. Today, the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to judgment in the case of Lt.-Col. Mohsin Shah v. Mst. Qaseema Wahid and 4 others, reported in PLD 1995 Lah. 385 to substantiate his contention that the present petition can be filed notwithstanding tin provisions for appeal under section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Court Act, 1964. The learned counsel has referred to headnote (e) from the reported judgment and despite being asked to point out and read the relevant portion from the judgment itself, instead of the headnotes, was adamant and insisted that the proper mode of referring to a dictum laid down in a reported judgment is by reference to the headnotes alonge. It is pertinent to note that a lawyer's prime responsibility is to act fairly and assist Court in reaching a just and equitable conclusion as is in consonance with law. The word 'law' means not only the statutory and the delegated legislation but also the Judge-made law. The headnotes preceding a report are not a part of the judgment but are merely edited out of and on the basis of the judgment, by editors of the law-reports, to facilitate quick scanning. It is a matter of common knowledge that the headnotes at times are misleading and contrary to the text of the judgment. Therefore, it is neither safe nor desirable to cite a dictum merely by reference to head-notes. Such view finds support in the judgment reported in PLD 1988 SC 221 where the headnote of a reported case was found to be incorrect. I am of the view that the insistence on the part of the petitioner's counsel, as above, is wholly improper and uncalled for. The learned counsel was not acquainted with the facts of the judgment cited by him either. Anyway, going through the judgment, I find that the cited case had arisen out of a suit for recovery of maintenance filed by wife which was resisted by the petitioner-husband. The petition, in the reported case, had been filed under Article 203 of the Constitution which invests jurisdiction unto the High Courts to supervise and control the subordinate Courts. Such petition had been filed after the husband was granted time to file written statement in reply to amended plaint which he failed to do and the matter was ordered to proceed ex parte. The application for setting aside ex parte proceedings was also dismissed which order was assailed on merits. After detailed hearing, the objection urged on behalf of the wife regarding maintainability of the petition was disposed of as follows:--- "6. Now coming to the legal objection that the writ petition is not competent against an interim order. The case of Mst. Shereen Masood (supra) is a complete reply. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs could not substantiate his arguments with reference to any precedent.
5. Even otherwise after holding that the order is illegal it is in nobody's interest that the writ petition should be dismissed being incompetent. The result would be that ex parte decree could be set aside by the Appellate Court on this ground alone and case remanded to the trial .Court for fresh decision. This would be only involving in superficial technicalities rather than affording justice to the parties."
6. ' This petition is fixed for Katcha Peshi today and has not been admitted to regular hearing as yet.
7. The attention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was invited to the language of Article 199 of the Constitution and was asked to satisfy the Court as to how was interference possible in the present matter. The learned counsel, in reply, merely referred to headnote (e) in the above-cited judgment and urged that the petitioner should not be denied relief under Article 199 of the Constitution by resort to technicalities and that except for the ad interim orders passed in these proceedings, the respondent No,2 namely, Pakistan Insurance Corporation would have deducted 1/4th of the salary in terms of the impugned order. I am informed by the learned counsel for respondent No,2 that 1/4th salary of the petitioner was factually withheld for a month pursuant to the impugned order dated 14-9-1996. I believe that such relief in law and quite effectively, might have been granted in the appeal too. The petitioner could always urge all her contentions in appeal in regard to validity or otherwise of the impugned order. The invocation of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution instead of availing quite efficacious remedy before the appellate judicial forum cannot be approved at all. Indeed, Family Appeals preferred before the District Court are attended to preferentially and are disposed of within a much shorter span of time. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the proper course for the petitioner was to avail remedy under section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 and interference with the impugned order in these proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution, is not called for. Such position is in consonance with the law and equity. The learned counsel for the petitioner did not point out any glaring or manifest illegality in the impugned order as could render it void and without jurisdiction.
8. However, without going into the merits of the case and leaving it open to the parties to pursue their legal remedies as may be available, this petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.
9. ' At this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioner seeks order that the respondent No,2 may be directed not to deduct any amount from the salary of the petitioner for a period of one week from today. Such order is hardly called for since according to the learned counsel himself, the salaries are disbursed by respondent No,2 after 25th of every month. However, the learned counsel for the respondent No, 2 does not confirm such position and states that the salaries are paid towards and of the month. As a result of above judgment the pending application also stands dismissed.