Muhammad Azam Khan, C.J.--The captioned review petition is filed from the judgment of this Court dated 3rd May, 2011, delivered in Civil Appeal No, 45 of 2008.
2. The precise facts for the disposal of this review petition are that Mst. Muqarab Jan filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Sehnsa, for possession on the basis of right of prior purchase in respect of land comprising `Khewat' No, 86, 87, 77 and 78. She alleged that Defendants No, 2 and 3 sold the suit land to Defendant No, 1 vide sale-deed dated 19th February, 1995. She is a co-sharer and apart from being a co-sharer her land is contiguous to the land sold. She has prior right of purchase against, the vendee-defendant. After necessary proceedings, the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 30th January, 2002, decreed the suit. The petitioner herein, Muhammad Saleem, filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Sehnsa. The learned Additional District Judge, Sehnsa, vide judgment and decree, dated 28th February, 2004, partly accepted the appeal to the extent of `Khewat' No, 86 on the ground that the vendee-defendant has improved his status during the pendency of suit and he has become a co-sharer in `Khewat' No,
86. The Additional District Judge held that the plaintiff must possess and maintain right of pre-emption on three stages, i,e,
(i) at the time of sale, (ii) at the time of institution of suit and (iii) at the time of decree. After improving the status, the vendee had become a co-sharer in `Khewat' No, 86, therefore, the suit of the plaintiff to the extent of `Khewat' No, 86 was dismissed. Mst. Muqarab Jan filed an appeal in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court. A learned single Judge in the High Court accepted the appeal on 31st January, 2006. An appeal was filed before this Court by the petitioner, herein, which was dismissed by this Court vide judgment under review. Hence this review petition.
3. Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that under Section 6(a) of the General Clauses Act, a repeal in law will not affect the rights, privileges, obligations liability or penalty accrued/incurred to any person. The Court has not considered this aspect that by judge made law, a right existed in favour of the petitioner. The pre-emptor is obliged to prove the right of pre-emption at three stages, i,e,, (i) at the time of sale; (ii) at the time of institution of suit and (iii) at the time of decree. The law is settled on the point since the introduction of Right of Prior Purchase Act and Section 20-A of Right of Prior Purchase Act has taken away the said right.
The learned counsel argued that the cases reported as Said Hussain Khan u. Muhammad Hussain Khan and another [PLD 1996 SC (AJ&K) 25] and Muhammad Malik ;Yaqoob Javed Batalvi [2002 SCR 47] were referred by the petitioner but those have not been considered by the Court at the time of decision of the appeal. He further argued that in another appeal titled Sardar Begum v. Rehmat Ali where leave was granted on 24th February, 2005 which is still subjudice before the Court, an identical question is involved in that case. Since leave was granted in this case on the strength of that case, therefore, this case was to be heard along with that case. He submitted that Section 20- A of Right of Prior Purchase Act is n applicable to the pending cases. He referred to the cases titled Mst. Fatima Bi v. Farzand Ali [1992 SCR 236], Muhammad Hafeez Khan v. Mst. Sabiha Khanam [1995 SCR 316], Sardar Muhammad Latif Khan and others v. Ch. Muhammad. Latif and another [1998 SCR 379], Zaighum Saleem Khan v. Muhammad S. 'eem Khan and another [2000 SCR 246] and Mst.
Farhat Nasreen v. Muhammad Hussain and 2 others [PLD 1997 Kar. 204].
4. Ch. Muhammad Mahfooz, the learned counsel for Respondent No, 1, defended the judgment under review and referred to a case titled Zafar Iqbal v. Allotment Committee of Municipal Committee, Mirpur & others [1994 SCR 157].
5. At the very outset we may observe that this Court has the power to review its own judgment under Order XLVI, Rule 1 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978, in criminal cases on the ground of error apparent on the face of record and in civil matters on the grounds similar to those mentioned in Order XLVII, rule 1 of, C.P.C. when there is an error apparent on the face of the record, on discovery of some new evidence or new fact. The review cannot be granted on the ground that a party interprets the law in a different manner or a party is not satisfied from the judgment of the Court or a different view is possible. The remedy by way of review petition is different from the one by way of appeal. A party cannot be allowed to re-argue the whole case in the guise of review petition. In case titled State through Advocate-General v. Hakam Deen & 15 others [2005 SCR 374] wherein it has been observed as under: "..... The scope of review on a point of law unless it is prima facie in violation of any provision of Constitution or law is negligible. Consistent with this Court's earlier view on the point of review that the points finally resolved one way or the other cannot be reopened, unless there is a mistake apparent on the face of record. Even incorrectness of a decision on a particular issue or question falling for determination in a case can never be a ground for review nor can the review be allowed merely on the ground that a party to it conceives himself to be dissatisfied with the decision. It is the prerogative of the Court to pronounce what the law is or what does it mean, not for a party to expect in the way it wants."
In another case titled Malik Zafar Ali Awan and 3 others v. Muhammad Riaz Khan and 7 others [2001 SCR 96], it was observed as under: The petitioners want a different conclusion, one of their own choice and a new result to the effect that appeal before the Service Tribunal was time barred, which is not permissible in review jurisdiction."
It was further in the above referred case in Paragraph 7 as under: " ....t may be observed that the Court may review its judgment on the ground of an error apparent on the face of record or in civil proceeding on any ground similar to those mentioned in Order XLVI, Rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code. This Court in a number of cases has held that the review is not permissible on the ground that a party is not satisfied from the judgment or wants a different conclusion than the one reached by the Court, is not permissible, in review jurisdiction."
Similarly in the case reported as Syeda Tasneem Kazmi v. Education Department and 8 others [2011 SCR 155], it was held as under:-- "5. The petitioner wants the decision from this Court of her own choice which is not permissible under law. The petitioner wants a new order on facts which is not permissible in review jurisdiction.
6. It may be observed that the Court is competent under Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules to review its judgment on the grounds similar to Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the, C.P.C. The Court can review its judgment if there is an error apparent on the face of record or some new evidence is brought on record. The petitioner failed to pointed out any error apparent on the face of record. She wants only fresh judgment by this Court which is not permissible.
6. The Court, while resolving all the questions raised by the counsel for the petitioner, in Paragraph 6 of the judgment under review, observed as under: "6, The legal position that a plaintiff must have a right, of preemption at three stages, i,e,, (i) at the time of sale, (ii) at the time of institution of suit and (iii) at the time of decree, is not creation of statute nor it is incorporated in any of the provisions of Right of Prior Purchase Act. To bring in conformity with the injunctions of Islam, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a case reported as Haji Rana Muhammad Shabbir Ahmed Khan v. Government of Punjab Province, Lahore [PLD 1994 SC 1] declared that after the institution of the suit, the improvement in the status to defeat the right of pre-emption is un-Islamic. In the light of said judgment, Section 20-A was incorporated in the Act.
It is a celebrated principle of interpretation of statutes that if a right is accrued to a party prior to the repeal of law, the repeal would not affect the right accrued. No provision of Right of Prior Purchase Act provides for improvement of status by the vendee. The interpretation of Section 20-A has not taken away any statutory right of any party. It is a new provision incorporated to bring the law in conformity with the injunctions of Islam. No question of repeal of law is involved in it."
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the ground that the cases titled Said Hussain Khan v. Muhammad Hussain Khan and another [PLD 1996 SC (AJ&K) 25] and Muhammad Malik v.
Yaqoob Javed Batalvi [2002 SCR 47] were referred but not considered in the judgment under review. In Paragraph 9 of the judgment under review the effect of the case titled Said Hussain Khan v. Muhammad Hussain Khan and another [PLD 1996 SC (AJ&K) 25] has been considered and it is held that the proposition resolved in the said case deals with the amendment of Section 14 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act, where while repealing the old section new class of pre-emptors has been incorporated in the light of right of the rule of prior purchase under Islam. The case was considered and it is not relevant for resolving the present controversy.
8. In case titled Muhammad-Malik v. Yaqoob Javed Batalvi [2002 SCR 47], it was observed that a vendee can improve his status during the pendency of the suit. The prior right of purchase should exist on three dates, namely, at the time of execution of sale-deed, at the time of institution of suit and at the time of decree. In the referred case, the suit was filed in the year 1993. The sale was pre- empted and the decree was passed before the insertion of Section 20-A in the Right of Prior Purchase Act, 1993 BK. Section 20-A was neither referred before the Court nor it was considered in the case. The case has no application.
9. In the case titled Zaighum Saleem Khan v. Muhammad Saleem Khan and another [2000 SCR 246], the Court has held that although a wrong decision is no ground for review but all the same if it is found that the decision of a Court is patently against the law of land, the judgment can be corrected in exercise of review jurisdiction because the policy of law is to administer justice according to law and not in violation of the same. The proposition resolved in the said case is correct. The law in the judgment under review is correctly applied according to the canons of interpretation.
11. In the case titled Muhammad Hafeez Khan v. Mst. Sabiha Khanam [1995 SCR 316], the effect of repeal of law was considered. While considering the effect of amendment in Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, it was observed that it is not necessary for the purpose of Section 6 of General Clauses Act that the repeal of a statute or any provision thereof should have been expressly made.
Such a repeal can take place by necessary implication i,e, by subsequent legislation on the subject which tantamounts to supersede the earlier legislation..
12. In the case titled Mst. Fatima Bi v. Farzand Ali (1992 SCR 236, the effect of repeal of, Section 14 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act was considered. Instead of a particular class who have right of prior purchase, new class of pre-emptors was introduced. While interpreting Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the Court observed that persons who had a right under old law, their right of prior purchase is intact if accrued to them before amendment. New law will not affect the rights accrued to them. The case deals with different situation and is not applicable.
12. The case titled Sardar Muhammad Latif Khan and others v. Ch. Muhammad Latif and another [1998 SCR 379], deals with the proposition that the judgment of the Supreme Court has binding effect on all the Courts. The law laid down in the referred case is correct and the judgment under review is delivered while considering the law laid down by this Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan on the principles of interpretation of statutes.
13 In the case reported as Mst. Farhat Nasreen v. Muhammad Hussain and 2 others [PLD 1997 Kar.
204], it has been correctly laid down that word 'law' means not only the statutory and delegated legislation but also includes judge-made law.
14. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred 1983 CLC 2963. There is no case on this page of the report.
The result of the above discussion is that finding no force in this review petition, it is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.