MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J.---This appeal is directed against an order passed by the High Court on 1st of April, 1996, whereby the writ petition filed by Abdul Latif and others, respondents 1 to 4, was accepted.
2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, briefly stated, are that Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Extradition of Fugitive Offenders Act of 1984 was enacted by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council. Certain persons who were being proceeded under the said Act challenged the validity of the Act by filing writ petitions on the ground that when the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council enacted the said legislation it was incomplete in such a way that the said Council did not exist in .The eye of law. On 2nd of December, 1994, the High Court accepted the writ petitions and declared that the aforesaid Act was passed without any lawful authority. The Chairman of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council and 2 others preferred appeal before this Court. During the pendency of appeal, an ordinance known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Extradition of Fugitive Offenders Ordinance, 1995 was promulgated. When attention of this Court was drawn to the aforesaid Ordinance it was found that section 7 of the Ordinance contained the following Validation clause:-- -- "7. Validation.---Notwithstanding any judgment decree or order of any Court including High Court, everything done, all actions taken, notifications issued, orders or appointments made, proceedings initiated, jurisdiction or powers exercised under the provisions of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Extradition of Fugitive Offenders. Act, 1984, (Act 11 of 1984), shall be deemed to have been validly done, taken,' issued, made, initiated or exercised under this Ordinance. "
It may be stated that the validation clause reproduced above provided that it was to over-ride any judgment, or decree or order of any Court including the High Court and proceedings taken or initiated under the Azad Jammu and. Kashmir Council Extradition of Fugitive Offenders Act, 1984, which had been quashed by the High Court shall be deemed to have been validly taken or made.
In light of the validation clause this Court vacated the judgment of the High Court and also ordered the dismissal of writ petitions filed in the High Court.
3. The judgment of this Court mentioned above was passed on 21st of June, 1995. On 1st of April, 1996, the High Court accepted the writ petition filed on 5th of December, 1994 by respondents Muhammad Latif and others and has declared that the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Extradition of Fugitive Offenders Act, 1984 is ultra vires of the Constitution. In doing so the High Court has followed its earlier judgments which were set aside by this Court on 21st of June, 1995. The Chairman of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council sought leave to appeal against the impugned judgment of the High Court. A learned Judge of this Court sitting in Chamber granted the leave on the ground that the judgment of this Court was not brought to the notice of the High Court but the fact remains that the judgment under appeal runs counter to the binding judgment of this Court.
As the petition for leave to appeal was barred by limitation of 133 days so the question whether the delay should be condoned or not in the light of contentions of Mr. Umar Mahmood Kasuri the learned counsel for the appellant, was left open and observed to be decided in the Court and not by the learned Judge in the Chamber.
4. It has been contended by Mr. Umar Mahmood Kasuri, the learned counsel for the appellant, that the learned Additional Advocate-General who was representing the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council before the High Court did not inform the Council Secretariat that the judgment had been announced. It is also argued by Mr. Umar Mahmood Kasuri that the order passed by High Court is void against which no limitation runs. It is further contended that the matter is of great public importance which also is a valid, ground for condonation of delay.
5. I have given my due consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. The petition for leave to appeal is admittedly time-barred by 136 days. By excluding 3 days which were spent in obtaining the copy of impugned judgment of High Court the appeal is still barred by 133 days of limitation as the judgment under appeal was passed on 1st of April, 1996, whereas the petition for leave to appeal was filed on 14-10-1996. It is claimed that the learned counsel representing the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council delayed intimation about announcement of the judgment and that the petition is within time from the date of knowledge.
This Court has been persistently following the principle that knowledge of the counsel is the knowledge of the client and thus limitation starts running from the date of announcement of judgment if it is announced in presence of the counsel suffice it to say that it is an admitted position that the judgment under appeal was announced in presence of learned Additional Advocate-General who represented the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council in the High Court. In Allied Bank of Pakistan v. Ch. Amir Baz' Civil Appeal No.66 of 1996 decided on 1-3-1997, this Court rejected an application for condonation of delay which was based on the ground that the counsel did not inform within time that judgment had been announced. In that case it was observed by this Court as follows:----- "It is well-settled that knowledge of the counsel is knowledge of the client. The legal principle that it was duty of the client to find out the position of the case cannot be disputed."
1974 SCMR 223, a plea similar to the one being raised in the present case was advanced that the counsel did not promptly informed the result of the case to the party. The appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation by holding that:--- "Even if the above explanation is to be taken at its face value, it would not constitute a sufficient cause for the condonation of long delay that has taken place in the instant case. The initial obligation was of the petitioners to enquire about the decision in their appeal or to arrange with their counsel to inform them about the decision if it is announced in their absence. Even if it he assumed that their counsel neglected to inform them that per se would not be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, when a valuable right has accrued to the respondents Nos. l to 3. We are not satisfied that all the petitioners were diligent or took due care in the matter."
6. The next two submissions pressed into service by the learned counsel for the petitioner shall be dealt with together. The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that the impugned order recorded by the High Court was void for which no period of limitation runs. The learned counsel placed reliance oh the definition of words 'void judgment' as defined in Blacks Law Dictionary 6th Edition at page 1574 which is to the following effect:--- "Void Judgment.---One which has no legal force or effect, invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place directly or collaterally. One which, from its inception is and forever continues to be absolutely null, without legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind parties or support a right of no legal force and effect whatever, and incapable of confirmation, ratification, or enforcement in any manner or to any degree. Judgment is a "void judgment" if Court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process."
The learned counsel strenuously contended that the matter involved in the instant appeal is of great public importance and in case the judgment under appeal is not vacated it is likely to create anomalous situation and serious complications. In view of the observations which I propose to make in the concluding part of this judgment I am of the opinion that I need not embark upon the question that the impugned judgment passed by the High Court is a void judgment or not as the matter in issue stood finally resolved by a previous judgment of this Court. The fact however remains that the impugned judgment runs counter to the previous judgment of this Court passed on 21st of June, 1993, and due to its repercussions it has assumed great public importance, needing resolution to avoid anomaly.
7. In the previous cases titled 'Chairman Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council and others v. Raja Nisar Ahmad' 1995 CLC 1958, 'Chairman Azad Jammu and Kashmir and others v. Muhammad Pervaiz'
1995 CLC 1958 and 'Chairman Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council and others v. Muhammad Shafi'
(1995 CLC 1958), while dealing with the Extradition of Fugitive Offenders Act, 1984, it was observed by this Court:--- "Thus, even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the actions taken against the petitioners-respondents were not justified under the impugned Extradition Act, 1984, after the promulgation of the Extradition Ordinance those would be deemed to have been taken under the Extradition Ordinance. This would, prima facie, mean that the concerned authority can take actions under the Ordinance and as such continue the actions already initiated under the Extradition Act, 1984. It follows that the relief given to the respondents by the High Court is no longer sustainable in view of the enactment of the Extradition Ordinance. In these circumstances, the judgment of the High Court has to be vacated as was done in Kashmir Timber Corporation's case."
With these observations the appeal being time-barred, is dismissed with no order as to costs.
BASHARAT AHMAD SHAIKH, J.---I am in broad agreement with the conclusion recorded by my learned brother Muhammad Yunus Surakhvi, J. In the proposed judgment but I would like to add a few lines by way of further elucidation with reference to the point raised by Mr. Umar Mahmood Kasuri that the judgment under appeal has created an anomalous situation and also that a matter of public importance was involved and thus a case for condonation of delay was made out. In this connection the learned counsel strongly relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Superintendent of Central Excise, Layallpur v. Ch. Faqir Muhammad PLD 1958 SC 167.
2. The facts in Faqir Muhammad's case were that on a writ petition filed by Ch. Faqir Muhammad the High Court of West Pakistan issued a prohibition to the Superintendent of Central Excise, Lyallpur, from demanding that Ch. Faqir Muhammad should take out a licence for the calendering of mill made cloth. The judgment of the High Court was challenged by filing a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan but the petition was time--barred by 57 days. In a petition for condonation it was explained that extra time was needed for consultation in a number of offices including the. Ministry of Law of Pakistan Government. This plea was rejected by observing that no extended period of limitation was provided for the Government as Government enjoyed unusual facilities for preparation of their cases as against those available to private litigants. However, delay was condoned on the ground that the Government could bring up the, matter before the Supreme Court in another case, but the decision in such a case, if favourable to the Government, will leave Ch. Faqir Muhammad's case as an anomaly within the licensing system.
It was observed that it was desirable' that this should be avoided and delay was condoned.
However the condonation was granted conditionally and it was ordered that the Superintendent of Central Excise shall bear the costs of the petition for leave to appeal filed by him as well as respondent's costs in the appeal as a condition of the appeal being admitted.
3. The delay in Faqir Muhammad's case was condoned in order to avoid the possibility that an anomaly in the licensing system may be created. It has to be, therefore, seen that whether any such situation in the present case. For doing so it is necessary to state the facts.
4. The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Extradition of Fugitive Offenders Act, 1984 was purportedly passed by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council. The actions taken under the said Act were challenged by several persons who were being proceeded against under the said Act on the ground that at the relevant time (1984) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council was not validly composed as the Council only consisted of nominated members while no elected members were included in the said Council. This contention was accepted by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court and the aforementioned Act was declared ultra vires. No invalidity was pleaded or declared in respect of the contents of the Act. In order to fill up the vacuum created by the judgment of the High Court the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Extradition of Fugitive Offenders Ordinance, 1995 was promulgated and a validation clause was also added in section 7 of the Ordinance which laid down that, notwithstanding any judgment, actions taken under the aforementioned Act of 1984 shall be deemed to have been validly taken under the Ordinance. The Ordinance promulgated in 1995 has run out its normal life and now a new Act, namely, the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Extradition of Fugitive Offenders Act has been enacted.
5. The judgment of the High Court was challenged by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council by filing appeal. When this appeal came up for hearing the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Extradition of Fugitive Offenders Ordinance, 1995 had already been promulgated. Therefore, this Court held in its judgment pronounced on 21st of June, 1996 that the promulgation of the Ordinance had changed the whole complexion because the grounds on which the writ petition was accepted had vanished and were not available. After analysing the situation in light of law Wd down by this Court in an earlier judgment reported as Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Kashmir Timber Corporation PLD 1978 SC (AJ&K) 42 the following conclusions were recorded;--- The validating provision of the Extradition Ordinance, reproduced above, stipulates that despite any decree or order of the High Court all acts taken, notifications issued, orders or appointments made, proceedings initiated, the jurisdiction or powers exercised under the Extradition Act, 1984, shall be deemed to have been validly done, issued, made initiated or exercised under the Ordinance. Thus, even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the actions taken against the petitioners-respondents were not justified under the impugned Extradition Act, 1984, after the promulgation of the Extradition Ordinance those would be deemed to have been taken under the Extradition Ordinance. This would, prima facie, mean that the concerned authority can take actions under the Ordinance and as such continue the actions already initiated under the Extradition Act, 1984. It follows chat the relief given to the respondents by the High Court is no longer sustainable in view of the enactment of the Extradition Ordinance. In these circumstances, the judgment of the High Court has to be vacated as was done in Kashmir Timber Corporation's case.
However, we may clarify that the respondents or any other person may challenge the Extradition Ordinance on any available ground. In absence of any such challenge section 7 of the Extradition Ordinance has to be given effect."
6. Now I may advert to judgment of the High Court which is under appeal. A deeper analysis of the judgment under appeal lead to the same conclusion. The judgment is brief and to the point. Its summary is that the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Extradition of Fugitive Offenders Act, 1984 was declared ultra vires by the High Court on 19th of March, 1995, but a fresh Act had been passed by the Council. After examining these facts the High Court passed the following orders;--- "3. As the Act challenged before the Court is that of 1984, which stands adjudicated upon as referred above, this petition also merits acceptance in view of the judgment of the Court declaring the Act as ultra vires of the Constitution. As the effect of newly promulgated Act has neither been challenged nor is in dispute before the Court, nothing shall effect the validity of that Act.
4. In view of the above, the petition stands disposed of accordingly."
7. From para. 3, reproduced above, it is clear that the High Court has declared that nothing shall affect the validity of the newly promulgated Act. It means that if any action is being taken under the newly enacted law it will be valid. Therefore, in my view, although the judgment of this Court pronounced on 21st of June, 1995 was not cited or taken note; of by the High Court, the effect of the judgment under appeal is also the same as that of the judgment of this Court and I do not find any practical inconsistency between the two. The actions taken under the Extradition Act of 1984 can be continued under the F newly enacted law and new actions can also be initiated. In my considered opinion para. 3,of the judgment extracted above, is so unambiguous that no hurdle can be created in smooth functioning of extradition proceedings. Thus formal setting aside of the judgment will only be an academic exercise. Even otherwise in presence of clear views expressed by this Court in the judgment of 21st of June, 1995, the judgment under appeal has to be ignored by those who are entrusted with the task of administering the extradition law.
8. A detailed analysis carried out above shows that there is no anomaly in the present case.
However, Faqir Muhammad's case does show that delay can be condoned in particular circumstances in light of the points involved in a case. However, that principle is not applicable here because, as already concluded, even if the delay is condoned it will not change or improve the situation in any practical way. I may also observe that the facts noted above show that no matter of public importance is involved in the case.
With these comments, I agree that the appeal may be dismissed.