KH. MUHAMMAD NASIM, J. Through the captioned appeal the validity and legality of the judgment and decree passed by the High Court, on 21.09.2020, has been called in question, whereby the appeal filed by the appellant, herein, has been dismissed.
2. The brief facts for disposal of the instant appeal are that the appellant, herein, filed a suit for recovery of Rs.10,00,00,000/- as damages for defamation, against the respondents, herein, before the Additional District Judge Rawalakot on 03.01.2015. The respondents, herein, filed the written statements, wherein the claim of the appellant was refused in toto. The learned Additional District Judge framed issues in the light of the pleadings of the parties and directed the parties to lead evidence pro and contra. After necessary proceedings, the learned Additional District Judge dismissed the suit for want of proof, vide judgment and decree dated 30.03.2018. Feeling dissatisfied from the said judgment and decree, the appellant, herein, filed an appeal before the High Court, which has also been dismissed through the impugned judgment, hence this appeal.
3. The office has reported that the appeal is time barred by 15 days, therefore, the learned Advocate, representing the appellant was directed to meet the point of limitation at first. He submitted that the impugned judgment was announced by the learned High Court on 21.09.2020 but the counsel of the appellant before the High Court, did not inform the appellant. He submitted that the appellant is an old man and suffered from many diseases due to which he could not make contact with his counsel. After having knowledge, the appellant moved an application for issuance of the certified copies of the impugned judgment and decree and after obtaining the same, the appeal has been filed well within time. The appellant has also filed an application for condonation of delay, wherein the delay has been explained satisfactorily. As valuable rights of the appellant are involved in the matter, therefore, in the interest of justice, the delay may be condoned and the appeal be heard on merit.
4. Conversely, Sardar M.R. Khan, the learned Advocate, representing the respondents, forcefully opposed the arguments addressed on behalf of the appellant and raised the preliminary objection that the appeal is hopelessly time barred. The impugned judgment was delivered by the learned High Court on 21.09.2020, while the appeal in this Court has been filed on 05.12.2020. The limitation for filing appeal is 60 days, whereas it has been filed after 15 days of the prescribed period of limitation. He further stated that the appeal has been filed incompetently because the trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the appellant and the learned High Court has maintained the said judgment, hence, direct appeal is not maintainable. He prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
5. We have considered the arguments of the learned Advocates representing the parties and gone through the impugned judgment along with the record made available. The impugned judgment of the High Court was announced on 21.09.2020. The application for obtaining the certified copies of grounds of memo of appeal and impugned judgment and decree of the High Court was moved on 04.12.2020 and the same were supplied to him on the same day i.e. 04.12.2020, when the period of limitation had already expired. The appeal has been filed on 05.12.2020, after 15 days of the prescribed period of limitation. The appellant has furnished explanation in ground "E" of memo of appeal that the counsel of the appellant delayed intimation regarding the announcement of the impugned judgment and the appeal is within time from the date of knowledge. The same version has been taken in the application for condonation of delay. This Court has held in a number of pronouncements that knowledge of the counsel is the knowledge of the party. It is settled principle of law that the delay of each and every day has to be explained by the appellant for lodging the appeal after the prescribed period of limitation, whereas the appellant has miserably failed to furnish sufficient explanation for lodging the appeal after the prescribed period of limitation of 15 days. Our this view finds support from a case titled Chairman Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council v. Abdul Latif and 5 others 1997 MLD 2926, wherein this Court in para 5 has observed as under:- "5. I have given my due consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. The petition for leave to appeal is admittedly time barred by 136 days. By excluding 3 days which were spent in obtaining the copy of impugned judgment of High Court the appeal is still barred by 133 days of limitation as the judgment under appeal was passed on 1st of April, 1996, whereas the petition for leave to appeal was filed on 14.10.1996. It is claimed that the learned counsel representing the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council delayed intimation about announcement of the judgment and that the petition is within time from the date of knowledge.
This Court has been persistently following the principle that knowledge of the counsel is the knowledge of the client and thus limitation starts running from the date of announcement of judgment, if it is announced in presence of the counsel. Suffice it to say that it is an admitted position that the judgment under appeal was announced in presence of learned Additional Advocate-General who represented the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council in the High Court. In Allied Bank of Pakistan v. Ch. Amir Baz [Civil Appeal No.66 of 1996, decided on 01.07.1997], this Court rejected an application for condonation of delay which was based on the ground that the counsel did not inform within time that judgment had been announced. In that case it was observed by this Court as follows:- 'It is well settled that knowledge of the counsel is knowledge of the client. The legal principle that it was duty of the client to find out the position of the case cannot be disputed.
In various other cases the same principle was reiterated by this Court. In Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Qureshi v. Azad Government and others [1993 SCR 111] and Rehmat Bibi v. Ghazanfar Hussain [PLD 1983 AJK (SC) 25] applications for condonation of delay were dismissed on the same ground, namely, that knowledge of the counsel is knowledge of the party. The view of Supreme Court of Pakistan on this point is also the same. In Muhammad Nawaz v. Mst. Sakina Bibi [1974 SCMR 223], a plea similar to the one being raised in the present case was advanced that the counsel did not promptly inform the result of the case to the party. The appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation by holding that:- "Even if the above explanation is to be taken at its face value, it would not constitute a sufficient cause for the condonation of long delay that has taken place in the instant case. The initial obligation was of the petitioners to enquire about the decision in their appeal, or to arrange with their counsel to inform them about the decision if it is announced in their absence. Even if it be assumed that their counsel neglected to inform them that per se would not be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, when a valuable right has accrued to the respondents Nos.1 to 3. We are not satisfied that all the petitioners were diligent or took due care in the mater."
In view of the settled position regarding the principle that knowledge of counsel is the knowledge of client I am not persuaded by the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant and thus the pea regarding the condonation of delay on the aforesaid ground is hereby repelled. In our considered view the delay of each day has to be explained by a party seeking the condonation of delay which has not been satisfactorily explained."
Similarly, in a case reported as Faiz Akbar v. Mst. Nasim Begum and 8 others (2003 YLR 2729) it was observed by this Court in para 9 as under:- "9. In this case the decision was announced by the Custodian in presence of the counsel for the parties. We have repeatedly laid down that knowledge of the counsel is the knowledge of the party.
If any authority on this subject is required, the case titled Chairman Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council v. Abdul Latif and 5 others (1997 MLD 2926) can be referred. In the present case there is no affidavit of the counsel for the respondents that the judgment was not announced in his presence nor he has filed any affidavit that he could not convey the decision to the contesting respondents in time. The respondents, in their writ petition, have not mentioned the date when they got the knowledge of the decision of the Custodian nor the source through which they got the information that decision has been given against them by the Custodian. The vague pleading in this regard even supported by a vague affidavit, in our view, does not furnish sufficient cause for the condonation of delay in lodging a writ petition in the High Court. The writ petition, therefore, was suffering from laches and was liable to be dismissed on this ground."
In another case titled Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Qureshi v. Azad Government and others [1993 SCR 111] it was held as under:- "..........The petition has been filed in this Court on the basis that in cases in which judgment is not announced after intimating the parties, limitation runs from the date of knowledge. This proposition is correct but the fact remains that knowledge of the counsel is the knowledge of the party.
6. There is another aspect of the case that the appellant herein, filed the suit for recovery of Rs.10,00,00,000/- against the respondents, herein. The learned Additional District Judge dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 30.03.2018. Against the above mentioned judgment and decree the appellant herein, filed an appeal in the High Court. The learned High Court maintained the judgment and decree of the trial Court through the impugned judgment dated 21.09.2020. The appellant has challenged the said judgment by way of direct appeal in this Court. While attending the objection raised by the learned Advocate, representing the respondents regarding the maintainability of the appeal, it would be appropriate to reproduce here, the relevant provisions of law, i.e. Article 42(11)(d) and (e) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, which reads as under:- "(11) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir from any judgment, decree, final order or sentence of the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
(a)....
(b)....
(c)....
(d) if the amount of value of the subject matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance was, and also in dispute in appeal is, not less than fifty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by Act of the Council and the judgment, decree or final order appealed from has varied or set aside the judgment, decree or final order of the court immediately below; or
(e) if the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value and the judgment, decree or final order appealed from has varied or set aside the judgment, decree or final order of the Court immediately below; A glance reading of the above provisions shows that a direct appeal lies in this Court when the value of the subject matter in the Court of first instance and in the appeal is not less than fifty thousand rupees and the High Court has altered or varied or set aside the impugned judgment or decree of the Court immediately below. The perusal of the record reveals that the learned High Court through the impugned judgment has neither varied nor set aside the decree of the trial Court. Even otherwise, when the learned counsel for the appellant was confronted with this legal proposition, he was unable to controvert the same. Similar proposition come under consideration of this Court in a case titled Azad Government and 3 others v. Muhammad Reshim Khan and 38 others (Civil Appeal No.236 of 2015), delivered on 08.02.0216, wherein it was observed as under:- "Leaving aside the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties the examination of record reveals that through the impugned judgment the learned High Court has neither varied nor set aside the decree/final order of the Reference Judge (the Court immediately below). Thus, in this state of affairs according to the provision of section 42(11)(d) and (e) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, no direct appeal is competent."
In another case reported as WAPDA and others v. Taj Begum and others (2014 YLR 2649) it has been held by this Court as under:- "The proposition in hand relates to Section 42(11)(d) and (e) of the Act, which provides that the appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir from any judgment, decree or final order of the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir if the amount or value of the subject matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance was and also in dispute in appeal is not less than fifty thousand rupees or such other sum, as may be specified in that behalf by the Act of the Council and the judgment, decree or final order appealed from has varied or set aside the judgment, decree or final of the Court immediately below."
In view of the above, we are convinced that the appeal filed by the appellant is not maintainable as the same was filed incompetently as well as being time barred. Therefore, there is no need to attend the other questions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant.
Resultantly, this appeal stands dismissed with no order as to costs.