MUHAMMAD BASHIR KHAN JEHANGIRI, J.--This appeal with the leave of the Court is directed against an order of a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, whereby he dismissed on 26- 4-1992 W.P. No,1598 of 1983 filed by the appellant.
2. The facts of the case noted in the leave granting order are that the appellant was granted land on lease in the following Schemes in Chak No . 654/GB , Tehsil Jaranwala:---- S.No,Name of Scheme Area K - M
1. 15 years Scheme 48 - 18
2. Grow More Scheme 44 - 18
3. Temporary Cultivation Scheme 18 - 05 The appellant approached the concerned authorities for conferment of proprietary rights in terms of the Temporary Cultivation Scheme vide Notification No,3215-79/3973(II) dated 3-9-1979 issued by the Government of Punjab in pursuance of the provisions of subsection (2) of section 10 of the Colonization of Government Land Punjab Act, 1912. This application was disallowed by the hierarchy in the concerned Revenue Department. The writ petition filed to challenge the dismissal of his claim was also not entertained on the grounds which have been furnished in the following paragraph:--- "Learned counsel for the petitioner admits that the petitioner has obtained land under Grow More Food Scheme as well as under 15 yearslease scheme in addition to the grant of land under five yearslease scheme. It is, also admitted that the petitioner had not opted to retain one of the grants.
Paras. 3 to 7 of the policy letter dated 3-9-1979 contemplate of option to be exercised by a lessee including his family members can have only one grant of share or interest herein under these conditions or any other scheme issued by the Government. The petitioner has not exercised the option to retain one of the grants and admittedly having obtained more than one grants, he cannot seek benefit of the said policy letter."
3. Leave to appeal was granted to consider if clauses (3) and (4) of the Scheme ibid are read together, whether the lessee can have proprietary rights up A to the subsistence holding notwithstanding the bar contained in sub-clause (b) of clause (4) of the Scheme.
4. In order to appreciate the controversy raised in this appeal, it would be appropriate to reproduce hereunder clauses (3), (4) of the Scheme:--- "3. Eligibility.--Any person holding State land on temporary cultivation lease who is either landless or owner of less than a subsistence holding and has been in continuous cultivating possession of the leased land since before Kharif 1977 may be eligible for the purchase or proprietary rights in such land--
(i) in the case of a lessee who is landless up to a subsistence holding; and
(ii) in the case of a lessee who is owner of less than a subsistence holding, up to that area by which he falls short of a subsistence holding.
4. Ineligibility.---(a) Any lessee who is owner of a subsistence holding or does not cultivate the land himself shall not be eligible for the purchase of proprietary rights in the leased land and shall surrender it peaceably to the Collector immediately on the expiry/termination of his lease.
(b) A lessee including members of his family can have only one grant or share or interest therein either under these conditions or under any other scheme issued by the Government."
5. Mr. Hamid Ali Mirza, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, besides pressing into service the provisions of Clauses (3) and (4) as aforesaid, also invited our attention to clause (8) of the Scheme which reads as under:--- "8. Allotment of permanent grant.---After a lessee has exercised his option and supplied information with regard to his eligibility the Collector may, after verification of his claim, grant him, on permanent basis, so much of the land under his possession as he may be entitled to get under clause (3)."
6. We find that clause (5) of the Scheme is also relevant for resolving the controversy which is also reproduced hereunder:--- "5. Size of grant.---The size of the grant under these conditions shall be one subsistence holding or thereabout per family. The family for this purpose shall include the lessee's parents, minor children, husband, wife or wives and dependents."
The learned counsel for the appellant contended that if clauses (3) and (4) of the Temporary Cultivation Scheme supra are read together, the object manifestly appears to be that a lessee can be validly granted proprietary rights up to the subsistence holding notwithstanding the bar contained in sub-clause (b) of clause (4).
7. Mr.- Ehsan Sabri, learned Assistant Advocate-General, Punjab, appearing on behalf of the respondents, reiterated the contention which had found favour with the Revenue Authorities and the learned Judge in the High Court that the lessee can have only one grant wherein the other limit of the area for grant of proprietary rights had been fixed and that it does not mean that the land allotted in various Schemes can legally be clubbed together so as to bring it within the ambit of a subsistence holding..
8. The interpretation by the learned counsel for the appellant that reading of clauses (3), (4) and
(8) of the Temporary Cultivation Scheme supra to gather the object appears to be that the lessee is entitled to the grant of proprietary rights up to subsistence holding notwithstanding the restriction imposed in sub-clause (b) of clause (4), is correct. Under clause (3) rights of ownership may be granted to a person holding State land on temporary cultivation lease who is either--
(i) landless; and
(ii) owner of less than a subsistence holding; and
(iii) has been in continuance cultivating possession of leased land since before Kharif 1977.
9. It is a common ground between the parties that the appellant satisfies all the afore noted conditions. The hierarchy in the Revenue Department have, however, pressed into service sub- clause (b) of clause (4) ibid holding that since the appellant was the lessee in more than one schemes under the Colonization of Government Land Punjab Act (V) of 1912, he was disentitled to lay claim, to the benefit under the statement of the conditions for purchase of Proprietary Rights in State Land Grant on Temporary Cultivation Leases. The respondents have interpreted sub-clause
(b) in isolation ignoring clauses (3), (5) and (8). Clause (5) ibid caters for the size of the grant which shall be one subsisting holding or thereabout per family. Similarly in pursuance of clause (8) ibid if a lessor has exercised his option and had furnished information with regard to his eligibility the Collector may after verification of his claim grant him on permanent basis so much of land under his possession as he may be entitled to get under clause (3). (Underlining is by us for emphasis). The distinctive reading of sub-clause (b) of clause (4) ibid would obviously render clauses (3), (5) and (8) ibid superfluous. This interpretation of the Scheme as a whole would not be harmonious and consistent with the expressed intention of the Scheme for the "purchase of proprietary rights in the State land granted on temporary cultivation leases". In this context we may refer to the N.S. Bindra who has in terms quoted in his Treatise, 'The Interpretation of Statutes6th Edition, page 449 the Irish Judge Burton, J., in Warburton v. Loveland (1828) Hud and Bro 632, 648 and approved by Lord Fitzgerald in Bradlaugh v. Clarke (1883) 8 AC 384 which is as under:--- "I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If, however, that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience."
10. Besides the above paragraph the following illuminating observations of Lord Herschell quoted in Aghore Chandra v. Rajandni ILR 60 Cal. 289 are very relevant in the case in hand: "The true meaning, the exact scope and significance of any passage occurring in a. Statute may be found not merely in the words of that passage but on a comparison of the same with other parts of the statute, and the intention of the Legislature ascertained in that way."
11. Another well-recognised principle of interpretation of statutes enunciated in Jai Kishan Srivastva v. Income-tax Officer, Kanpur and another AIR 1960 Allahabad 19 a Full Bench case from Indian Jurisdiction is that though a sense of the possible injustice of an interpretation ought not to induce Judges to do violence to well-settled rules of construction, (but) whenever the language of the Legislature admits of two constructions, the Courts act upon the view that the Legislature could not have intended to bring about obvious injustice, so that the Courts should accept that possible interpretation which would lead to proper justice.
12. It would thus be seen that if on a true construction of two provisions of the same statute two views are possible, one resulting in an anomaly and the other in harmony, it is the duty of the Court to adopt the latter and not the former. The Court in such cases should make an endeavour to harmonise the various provisions of the Act and reconcile it, if possible, instead of making the provisions inconsistent or repugnant to each other.
13. A bare reading of clause (8) conjunctively with clauses (3) and (4) would show that the words "only one grant or share or interest therein or under any other scheme issued by the Government" occurring in sub-clause (b) ibid seem to be relatable to the entitlement of the claimant under clause (3) which obviously lays down the eligibility and has got nothing to do with the bar contained in sub-clause (b) of clause (4). The words "so much of the land under his possession as he may be entitled to get under clause (3) "employed in clause (8) ibid bring out the intention of the Rule Makers that the grants under other Schemes can be clubbed together so as to confer title on a claimant to the extent of a subsistence holding. If a claimant is in possession of few Kanals of land under two or three different Schemes, it could not be said that he would be held disentitled to the few Kanals contained in other than one Scheme although it would be negligible and far lesser than the subsistence holding. This construction would not be in consonance with the intendment manifested in clause (8) which refers to the eligibility referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (3) providing for the entitlement up to the outer limit of subsistence holding.
14. In the light of what has been discussed above, we are of the considered view that the learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court, while dismissing the writ petition, has not properly followed the provisions of clauses (3), (4), (5) and (8) of the Scheme and thus has fallen into an error to decline the relief to the appellant. In this view of the matter, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order of the learned Judge in the High Court is set aside, the orders dated 13-1-1982, 5-9-1982 and 6-12-1982 respectively passed by the respondents are quashed. They are further directed to confer upon the appellant proprietary rights in land up to a subsistence holding in accordance with the Temporary Cultivation Scheme issued by the Government of Punjab vide Notification No,79/3973(II) dated 3-9-1979. No order as to costs.