' CH. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM ZIA, J.---Both the captioned appeals, having involved identical legal questions of facts and law are being disposed of through the proposed judgment.
2. The precise facts of Appeal No.60 of 2005 are that land comprising Survey No.100 of 29, measuring 1 marla, situated in Hajira Bazar, was allotted to respondent No.1 on 19-9-1969.
Subsequently, the land was renumbered as Survey No.150/100/29. The said khasra number has been further renumbered after settlement as Khasara No.247. It is claimed that the said land is in continuous possession of respondent No.1 who has constructed a triple story shop thereon. It is also 'stated that third story of the building was illegally allotted to the appellant on 30-4-1989. This allotment was challenged through an appeal before the D.R.C. Who accepted the same vide judgment dated 16-12-1996. The order of DRC was further assailed by the appellant before the Rehabilitation Commissioner on 19-1-1997. The Rehabilitation Commissioner inspected the spot and dismissed the appeal vide judgment and order dated 4-5-2000. The judgment and order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner was further challenged through a revision petition before the Custodian on 18-5-2000, who dismissed the same vide order dated 15-8-2001. On 27-8-2001, a review petition was filed against the judgment dated 15-8-2001, which was accepted through the impugned order and all the previous orders were revoked by the learned Custodian. This order was challenged through writ petition in the High Court on the ground that the land was allotted to respondent No.1 and a triple storey building has been constructed thereupon, therefore, the Custodian was not competent to re-allot the same land after dismissal of the earlier revision petition. It was further contended that third story of the building couldn't be allotted to appellant (non-petitioner in the High Court) in the circumstances of the case.
3. The writ petition was resisted by non-petitioner, appellant herein, by filing written statement on several grounds. It is stated in the written statement that the petitioner is neither aggrieved nor the disputed question of facts can be decided in the extraordinary jurisdiction. It was further stated that the Custodian has passed the impugned order in a lawful manner and jurisdiction has been exercised as being a special tribunal which is immune from scrutiny in writ jurisdiction.
4. The facts of Appeal No. 39 of 2008 are that survey No.91-min, measuring 5 kanals 8 marlas situated in village Bani Pasari, Tehsil Bagh was allotted to respondent on 28-5-1986. It is claimed by him that he was in continuous possession of the said land. The appellant herein challenged his allotment through a revision petition before the Rehabilitation Commissioner on 14-5-1991. The Rehabilitation Commissioner dismissed the revision petition vide his judgment dated 16-2-1997.
The respondent herein, challenged the order dated 16-2-1997 before the Custodian which was also dismissed on 4-6-1999. A review petition was filed by her before the learned Custodian on 13-8- 1999, which was accepted. The respondent, herein, challenged the order dated 13-8-1999 through writ petition before the High Court. The learned High Court, accepted the writ petition and declared the judgment of the Custodian as without lawful authority through the impugned order dated 9-10- 2007, hence, the present appeals with the leave of this Court have arisen. In the light of peculiar facts of this appeal, the moot legal point emerged in these appeals is whether the order passed by the learned Custodian while exercising powers of revision under section 12 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Rehabilitation Act, 1956, (hereinafter to be referred as the Act, 1956), is reviewable by him or not.
5. This Court in a case reported as Bashir Ahmed Khan v. Custodian and others, reported as (1992 SCR 149), while dealing with the review powers of the Custodian, has held as under:- "....The powers of appeal, revision or review of the Custodian under section 43 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act pertain to the orders passed under sections 20, 22 or 23 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act and not an order passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner regarding the allotment of an evacuee land under the provision of the Rehabilitation laws."
' Whereas in another case titled Azmatullah and another v. Ali Bahadur and another 1996 CLC 254, it has been held that:- "10...It may also be pointed out that no embargo has been placed upon the powers of the Custodian, while exercising the review powers in terms that he could cancel the allotment of an allottee under section 18-B only if the claim of an allottee has been processed in connection with the transfer of proprietary rights to him. The bare reading of the section 18-B shows that powers given to the Custodian under section 18-B(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) can be exercised by the Custodian at any time, even if no case is pending before him regarding the transfer of proprietary rights.
These powers of the Custodian are in addition to the powers of revision which he possesses under section 11 of the Rehabilitation Act."
6. These judgments of this Court dealing with the review powers of the Custodian require further clarification, therefore, for an authoritative judgment, these appeals were placed before the full Court. In addition to legal assistance by the counsel for the parties, the wisdom of the bar was also sought and the senior most advocates Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan and Mr. Abdul Rasheed Abbasi, have assisted the Court.
7. Mr. Asghar Ali Malik, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant, after detailed discussion of facts, focused his arguments on the question regarding the scope of the statutory amended provision of section 18-A of the Act, 1957. He contended that after the amendment introduced in the year 1987, the whole scheme of law regarding the remedies of the appeal, review and revision is to be controlled and governed, keeping in view the spirit of this amended provision. He submitted that under the provision of section 43(6) of the Act, 1957, there is no restriction on the powers of the Custodian to review the order passed by him in revisional jurisdiction under section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act. He further submitted that this Court, in a case titled Azmatullah and another v.
All Bahadur and another 1996 CLC 254, held that the Custodian's review powers are unlimited and very vast, thus, he submitted that the learned High Court fell in error of law and wrongly accepted the writ petition, hence the impugned judgment is not sustainable.
8. Conversely, Syed Nazir Hussian Shah Kazmi, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondents in both the appeals, strongly opposed the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and submitted that The Azad Jammu and Kashmir, the Act, 1956, and The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Rehabilitation Act, 1957, (hereinafter to be referred as the Act, 1957), are two independent statutes, dealing with the separate subject-matters. He submitted that the powers of appeal, revision and review provided under the Act, 1957, have nothing to do with the order passed under the Act, 1956.
The remedy against the order passed under the Act, 1956 shall only be that which has been expressly provided by the Rehabilitation Att. He further submitted that the Courts have already resolved this point in the cases titled Bashir Ahmed Khan v. Custodian and others (1992 SCR 149), and Faqir Muhammad v. Hazoori and another, reported as (PLD 1981 AJ&K 28).
9. Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan and Mr. Abdul Rasheed Abbasi, Advocates, the learned senior counsel, appeared as friends of the Court and rendered valuable assistance. Both of them unanimously submitted that the right of appeal, revision and review are creation of the statute and the same cannot be self assumed. In this regard, the case titled Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner Rawalpindi and others, reported as (PLD 1970 SC 1), has been referred. It is further submitted that according to the celebrated principle of law, the remedy against an order passed under a specific Act can only be availed under the provisions of that Act or Statute. The remedy of review, appeal and revision cannot be borrowed from any other Act. So far as the powers of the Custodian on original jurisdiction vested under the provision of section 18-A, 18-B of the Act, 1957 are concerned, it doesn't create any ambiguity and clearly speaks that if the Custodian passed any order while exercising the powers under this section, the order is passed in original jurisdiction and not in revisioinal or appellate jurisdiction. Thus, this order is subject to review and it doesn't by any stretch of imagination include any order passed in exercise of revisional powers under the provision of section 12 of the Act, 1956.
10. We have considered the arguments advanced at bar and also minutely studied the relevant provisions. We are of the considered view that the Act, 1956 and the Act; 1957 are two separate statutes dealing with the Evacuee Property and evacuee person. There is no cavil with the principle of law that remedy of appeal, revision or review are always creation of statute and A the same cannot be self assumed by any Court, tribunal or authority. Thus, for determination of legal proposition, where review powers are available to any tribunal, Court or authority, the basic touchstone is the impugned order. We will have to consider that by which of the authorities and under which provisions of law the order has been passed? In this case, the controversy among the parties relates to allotment, confirmation and cancellation of the allotment of the evacuee property and under section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act, the learned Custodian is vested with the revisional powers regarding these classes of cases. The Government, vide notification dated 21-9- 1959 has classified the powers of. Custodian regarding the following cases, which speaks as under:-- "In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of section' 12 of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act, XVII of 1956, as adapted under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Adaptation of Laws Act, I. Of 1959, the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government is pleased to order that revision petitions may be made only in respect of the following classes of cases namely:-- ' An order of allotment or cancellation of allotment of immovable property passed by Rehabilitation Board; ' An order of allotment, confirmation of allotment on appeal or revision, or cancellation ofallotment passed by a Rehabilitation Commissioner pertaining to immovable property of all kinds, whether urban or rural or pertaining to industrial or business concerns.
' Revision petitions made in pursuance of section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act, will continue to be disposed of by the Custodian.
(Sd.)
' DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL"
' In these cases, the learned Custodian, under section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act, passed the orders dated 15-8-2001 and 4-6-1999.
11. The legislature has clearly expressed his intention in very unambiguous words under the statutory provision of section 13 of the Rehabilitation Act, which reads as following:- "
13. Order to be final.---Subject to the provisions of sections 11 and 12, an order passed by a Rehabilitation Commissioner, or Additional, Deputy or Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner, and every order passed under section 12 shall be final and shall not be called in question in any judicial proceeding in any Court."
' Thus, the cumulative study of these statutory provisions i.e. Sections 12 and 13 of the Rehabilitation Act, keeping in view the whole scheme of this Act, it becomes abundantly clear that the order passed under the provision of section 12 of the Act, by the learned Custodian, attained finality under the provision of section 13 of the Rehabilitation Act. Whereas the remedy of appeal, revision or review provided by the Rehabilitation Act, under section 11 only deals with the hierarchy of the Rehabilitation Authorities from Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner to Commissioner and there is no mention of Custodian, thus, it is clear that under the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, 1956 there is no express provision to vest the learned Custodian with the powers of review. Therefore, it can be safely held that the Rehabilitation Act, 1956 doesn't confer any powers of review upon the learned Custodian.
12. In the light of foregoing reason, it can be safely concluded that as the order passed by the Custodian while exercising the revisional powers vested in him under the provision of section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act, attained finality, therefore, the review powers vested under the provision of Evacuee Property Act, cannot be exercised by the learned Custodian in such classified cases. We are of the cons:a red view that the High Court, C in the impugned judgment has rightly held that the review petition filed before the learned Custodian against the orders passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction conferred upon him under the Rehabilitation Act, are not competent.
13. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the powers of Custodian under section 43(6) of Act, 1957, are very vast and unlimited, we are in agreement with the learned counsel for the appellant on this point but these powers are available relating to the orders passed under the provision of the Act, 1957. These powers cannot be exercised in relation to the orders passed under the provisions of the Act, 1956. The Act, 1957 contains a comprehensive scheme regarding the remedies of appeal, review and revision. The cumulative study of this Act makes it abundantly clear that these remedies are Confined to the orders passed by different authorities while exercising the powers vested in them under the provisions of the Act, 1957 and not under the provisions of any other law. It will be useful to reproduce here section 43 of the Act, 1957 which speaks as under:- "43. Appeal, revision and review.---(1) Any person aggrieved by a final order under section '20, section 22 or section 23 passed by a Deputy or Assistant Custodian may prefer an appeal to the custodian.
(2) The appeal shall be presented in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed.
(3) The Custodian to whom an appeal is preferred under subsection (1) may disposed of it himself, or make it over for disposal of an Additional Custodian.
' The Custodian may, at any time, either on his own motion or on application made to him within the prescribed period in this behalf call for the record of any proceeding for the administration of evacuee property, which is pending before or has been disposed of by, an officer subordinate to him, including an Additional Custodian, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or proprietary of any order passed in the said proceeding, and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit: ' Provided that the Custodian shall not pass any order revising or modifying any order affecting any person without giving such person and the Rehabilitation Authority an opportunity of being heard.
' The Custodian may dispose of a case under subsection (4) himself or, except when it relates to any order of any Additional Custodian, make it over to an Additional Custodian for disposal.
(6) The Custodian or Additional Custodian may on application made to him in this behalf within the prescribed period or of his pwn motion at any time and after giving notice to the parties concerned and the Rehabilitation Authority, review his own order or an order passed by his predecessor in office on any ground whatsoever as the justice of the case may require: ' Provided that no final order passed on or before the seventeenth day of November, 1956, declaring any person to be not evacuee or any property to be not evacuee property shall be reviewed.
' Proviso to subsection was omitted by the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act, 1958.
(6-A) The Custodian or Additional Custodian on application made to him in this behalf at any time or of his own motion after giving notice to the parties concerned may review his own order or judgment passed by his predecessor in interest so as to bring the order or judgment in conformity with amendment made in section 2 of the sad Act and the purpose for which it has been made: ' Provided that while reviewing such orders if a refugee is in possession of the evacuee land duly allotted to him he shall not be dispossessed therefrom unless compensation has been paid to them or he has been provided with alternate land by the Government.]
(7) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this section, and the other provisions of this Act, any order made by the Custodian, or Additional, Deputy or Assistant Custodian shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court."
14. A thorough examination of the statutory provisions in context with reference to the whole scheme of the statute reveals that it speaks of right of appeal regarding the orders passed under sections 20, 22 and 23 of the Act. Under the.Provision of subsection 4 of section 43, Custodian is vested with the revisional powers, which specifically speaks that he may call for the record of any proceeding for the administration of evacuee property, which is pending before or has been disposed of by an officer subordinate to him including an Additional Custodian, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or proprietary of any order passed in the said proceeding. Thus, according to the scheme of law, under subsection (6) the powers of review have been vested with the Custodian and Additional Custodian, clearly appears to be availed regarding the orders and proceeding which falls within the scope of sub-sections (1) and (4) of section 43 of the Act, 1957. It will not be out of context to mention here that the provision of subsection (7) further clarifies the legal position that this section deals with the orders made by Custodian, Additional, Deputy or Assistant Custodian and not the Rehabilitation authorities.
15. We highly appreciate the legal assistance rendered by the learned counsel Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan and Mr. Abdul Rasheed Abbas Advocates, the learned Senior counsel, who appeared as amicus curiae, They have rightly argued that the remedies of appeal, revision and review are always the creation of a statute and the same cannot be self assumed by any Court, tribunal or any authority. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that after amendment introduced in 1987, the Custodian can review an order passed under Rehabilitation Act, is misconceived. It has rightly, been argued by Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan and Mr. Abdul Rasheed Abbas, the learned senior Advocates, that through this amendment, the powers conferred upon the Custodian under section 18-A, are appellate and under section 18-B are original powers and in case of an eventuality stated in these statutory provisions, when the Custodian passes any order regarding the allotment or cancellation of allotment, this order will be treated as passed under original jurisdiction and not passed under section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, therefore, there is no conflict between both the provisions.
16. In the year 1987, an amendment in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, has been introduced for a specific purpose of granting the Proprietary Rights Transfer Order and through this amendment, a self-contained remedy has been provided under the provisions of sections 18-A and 18-B of the Act. Under the provision of section 18-A, against the order of refusal of the Rehabilitation Commissioner, to issue entitlement certificate, an appeal before the Custodian lies, whereas under the provision of section 18-B of the Act, the learned Custodian is vested with the original powers to cancel allotment for the reasons and conditions mentioned therein. The orders passed by the Custodian under sections 18-A(4), 18-B(1) attributed finality under subsection (3) of section 18-.
17. While taking into consideration the whole scheme of law laid down in the Act, it becomes clear that the Custodian is vested with the powers of passing the orders under the provision of amended sections 18-A and 18-B of the Act. Whereas under the provisions of section 43 of the Act, some classes of orders have been specified as contained in subsections 1 and 4 of section 43 of the Act, 1957. Section 43(6) which has conferred power of review upon Custodian and the Additional Custodian, speaks that any order passed by any of them or their predecessor in the office can be reviewed. In this statutory provision, the term 'any order' is of importance which requires interpretation.
18. No doubt interpretation of a statute or its provisions is the basic duty of the Court but the interpretation always has to be made subject to celebrated laid down principles. The Courts are always conscious while interpreting any statutory provision to give such meanings which do not render ineffective any word or portion of any statute but to advance the interpretation which harmonizes among different parts and provisions of the statute. In a recent case titled Qaiser Javed Malik v. Pervaiz Hamid and 2 others, reported as (2009 SCMR 846), the apex Court of Pakistan has observed as under:-- "6. It is settled principle of interpretation that the Courts should adopt an interpretation, which may give meanings of each word of an enactment taking into consideration the spirit of such legislation. An interpretation whereby any portion of an enactment is rendered ineffective is not to be adopted when clear meanings can be given to various provisions of an enactment in a harmonious manner as held by this Court in the case of Shahid Nab! Malik and another v. Chief Election Commission and 7 others, PLD 1997 SC 32, M. Aslant Khaki v. Muhammad Hashim, PLD 2000 SC 225, Hafiz Abdul Waheed v. Mrs. Asma Jehangir, PLD 2004 SC 219, DG Khan Cement Company Ltd., and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others, 2004 SCMR 456 and Shoukat Baig v. Shahid Jamil, PLD 2005 SC 530. We are of the view that in the instant case, the learned single Judge of the High Court upheld the concurrent findings of both the Courts after examining the record in its true perspective and held that no case calling for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was made out. Under the circumstances, no interference is warranted in the circumstances of the present petition."
19. Another basic principle of interpretation of statute is that the Court should advance interpretation to harmonize different parts and provisions of the statute and the interpretation which manifest the intention of the legislature, be most in accord with convenience, reason and legal principle. This Court in the case titled Rafique Akhter Chaudhry v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government, reported as (PLD 1982 SC (AJ&K) 124), while dealing with the question of interpretation of statutes, enunciated a very comprehensive principle of law which is reproduced as under:-- "27. It is also permissible that the. Court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the rules or law by endeavoring to harmonize and reconcile every part so that each shall be effective. If full effect, however, cannot be given to the words of a rule or statute, they must be made effective as far as possible. It has also been frequently announced that where there is an irreconcilable conflict between the different provisions of statute, the provision last in order of position will prevail, because that law provision shall contain the latest expression of the legislative will. This rule is to be applied where an irreconcilable conflict exists between different sections of the same Act or rule.
Where two "coordinate sections" according to Halsbury, are apparently inconsistent an effort must be made to reconcile them. If this is impossible the later will generally override the earlier."
' On the principle of harmonized interpretation, the Apex Court of Pakistan in a case titled Mst.
Ameer Khatun v. Faiz Ahmed and another reported as PLD 1991 SC 787, has observed as under:-- "20. It is recognized principle of interpretation of statute that if a provision of law is presenting some difficulty in interpretation, it has to be so interpreted as to harmonize with the other provisions of the Act of which it is a part. It is only when there is a manifest and established failure to harmonize it with the other provisions that it either prevails over other provisions or yields to the other provisions. The second principle of interpretation of statutes relevant to the cases, is that the provisions of any particular Act are to be so interpreted as to harmonize and to remain consistent with the other laws having a relevance or nexus with the law sought to be interpreted. Finally, the third principle, attracted here, is that all laws in the field are to be so interpreted as to harmonize with the paramount law to which they must ordinarily conform and if they do not conform, they are struck down as ultra vires the paramount law,"
20. In the light of hereinabove referred legal precedents and enunciated principle, now we will have to consider the scope of review power of the Custodian as conferred by subsection 6 of section 43 of the Act, 1957. The provision states that the Custodian may review 'any order'. While dealing with the scope of the word 'any' the apex Court of Pakistan, in the case titled Inamur Rehman v.
Federation of Pakistan and others, reported as (1992 SCMR 563), has observed as under:-- ' In the first place subsection (2) uses the word 'any' with reference to a person or authority to whom any amount of money is payable by the person repatriating the foreign exchange. The other expression used is 'any claim' which can be represented in terms of money. These expressions are of very wide amplitude. The term 'any' according to the Black's Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition) page 86 means: one out of many; and indefinite number; one indiscrimi nately of whatever kind or quantity. With reference to case law it has been stated: Word any has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate 'all' or 'every' as well as 'some' or 'one' and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject matter of the statute.
' In a case titled Muhammad Yousaf v. M. Irshad Sipra and others reported as (CLC 1988 2475) it has been observed that the word "any" is of widest aptitude which speaks as under:- "... I feel that it would be of use to construe Article 63(1)(p) from another angle. It speaks of any law for the time being in force. The word 'any' came up for consideration before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Bank of Bahawalpur v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (PLD 1977 SC 164), the Supreme Court was pleased to hold as under:-- "As rightly held by the Full Bench on the basis of the Queen v. Rowlands and others, (1880) Q.B.D 5308 and Duck v. Bates (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 79) the word "any" is an expression of utmost generality removing all limitations or qualifications.'
' Reference may also be made to the case of Pakistan Tanneries Ltd. v. Sardar Hadayat Ullah Mokal and 5 others (PLD 1972 Lah. 880) and, in particular, observations occurring at page 896 of the report which are as under:- "The word 'any' also shows that in this respect the word "allotment" is not confined merely to allotments as defined in this Act, but is wider in scope to embrace all and any types of allotments or leases etc. It was laid down in Wooler v. North Eastern Breweries (1910) KB 247 that "any" is a word which excludes limitations or qualifications. It connotes wide Duck v. Bates (1883-4) 12 Q.B.D 79)."
' The word 'any' used with reference to order in subsection 6 of section 43 of the Act, 1957 when is examined in the light of the hereinabove discussed principle of law enunciated by the superior Courts while interpreting the para materia, statutory provisions, in our opinion it becomes clear that the term 'any order' not only includes the order classified in subsections (1) and (4) of section- 43 of the Act, 1957 but also includes the order passed, while exercising the powers under the provision of the Act, 1957. However, it will be useful to clarify here that keeping in mind the whole scheme of law as hereinabove, discussed that the word 'any order" although is of widest implication, however, according to the over all spirit of the statute, it refers to the orders which fall within the purview of the statutory provision of the Act, 1957 and not the orders which are passed under the provision of any other statute or law.
21. Now the next legal proposition which emerged for consideration is that- whether the finality attached by sections 43(6) and 18-B(3) of the Act also bars review powers of the Custodian under the provision of section 43(6) is concerned, according to the celebrated principle of interpretation of statute, the Courts have to interpret the provision of statute in such a manner which harmonizes all the provisions of the statute. The statutory provision which occurs later in order will be given preference. Our this view finds support from the principle of law laid down by the apex Court of Pakistan, in the case titled Kamaluddin Qureshi v. Ali International Co., reported as (PLD 2009 SC 367), wherein it is observed that in the same statute, the subsequent section in enactment regulates the meaning of the earlier provisions of the enactment. For brevity, paragraph 11 of the hereinabove, mentioned pronouncement is reproduced as under:-- "11. At the same time, the effect of subsequent sections in an enactment with reference to the earlier provisions with respect to same subject-matter is that the meanings of the earlier provisions of an enactment are regulated by the subsequent sections of the same enactment as has been laid down in the cases of State of Behar v. S.K Roy AIR 1966 SC 1995, Nalinikant Ambala Moth v. IT Commissioner Bombay AIR 1967 SC 193, IT Officer Kanpur vs. Maniram, AIR 1969 SC 543, G.
Srinivasa Reddy v. Commissioner, Excise Board of Revenue, AIR 1973 A.P. 178, Messrs Mehboob Industries Ltd. v. Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. 1988 CLC 866, Bashir Ahmed v. Member (Colonies) Board of Revenue, PLD 1997 SC 294 and Allah Rakha v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2000 FSC 1.
' It shows that subsection (1) of section 10 deals only with appeals against order of winding up of a company.
' The above view finds further support from the provisions of the subsequent subsection (2) of section 10 of the Ordinance, which specifically worded "save as provided in subsection (1)". The second subsection is un-conditionally attracted to an appeal against "any order made or decision given by a Court" and is not restricted to an appeal preferred before or after passing of an order of winding up of a company nor to the value of the subject-matter. The legislature has not intended to place any restriction or impediment to the appeals filed under this subsection. Yet another important and significant aspect is that winding up orders passed are to be examined as to the various aspects for revival of the company to be determined on consideration of its further viability.
Effort is made to continue the business particularly in cases of a running company and any delay may lead to irreparable losses and drastic consequences as held by this Court in the case of Hala Spinning Mills Ltd. v. International Finance Corporation and another, 2002 SCMR 450".
' If the finality mentioned in section 18-B(3) of the Act, is extended to such extent that it also bars power of review exercisable by the Custodian, impliedly, means to curtail the scope of section 43(6) of the Act. Moreover, such interpretation may create conflict and inconsistency among different provisions of one statute. Keeping in view the golden principle of interpretation of statute "to save the intention of legislature" while harmonizing the different provisions and avoid inconsistency after examination of both the sections 18-B(3) and 43(6) of the Act, 1957, in juxtaposition, it can safely be held that the finality attributed to the orders mentioned in section 18- B(3) of the Act, referred to the other forums and Courts does not abridge, control or curtail the review powers conferred on the Custodian under section 43(6) of the Act.
' The findings of the High Court appear to be consistent with the principle of law mentioned hereinabove, thus, finding no force in these appeals, the same are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.