1. KHALIL-UR-REHMAN KHAN, J.---This petition for leave to appeal is directed against order dated 1- 121996 passed by a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan, whereby the Constitutional Petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed in limine, observing that the order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue, impugned in the Writ Petition was neither perverse nor the one which could be said to be without jurisdiction.
2. The case of the petitioner in the Constitution Petition was that the inclusion of Khasra No.33/5 in the Khata of the respondents is contrary to the concept of consolidation operation especially at a stage when Scheme of the village stood finalized with the tacit consent of the respondents. This tacit consent was alleged on the basis that the appeal against the acceptance of the Scheme was not filed in the. It was also asserted that impugned inclusion of hind in the Wanda is not reasonable and equitable as this piece of land in dispute was neither claimed by the respondents nor the same was in possession or ownership of respondents. These very pleas were repeated before us alongwith the additional plea that the order of the Member, Board of Revenue stands vitiated as Syed Riaz Hussain Shah, Mst. Musarrat Riaz, Imdad Hussain and Uzma Riaz, who are also the land owners in the Khata, were not heard by the Member, Board of Revenue, before allowing the impugned modification. Reference was made to proviso to subsection (4) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960.
3. Having heard the learned counsel at length and having gone through the orders passed by the Consolidation Officers as well as the order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue, we are of the considered view that the pleas raised are without merit. The Proviso to subsection (4) of section 13 of the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance provides that no order shall be passed reversing or modifying any proceedings or order of a subordinate Revenue Officer and affecting any question of right between private persons without giving those persons an opportunity of being heard.
3. Admittedly, rights of Syed Riaz Hussain Shah, Mst. Musarrat Riaz, Imdad Hussain and Ms. Usma Riaz have not been affected in any manner by modification in the Scheme pertaining to the petitioner and respondents. Only a piece of land measuring 4 Kanals of Khasra No.33/5 has been excluded from the Wanda of the petitioner and in lieu thereof 4 Kanals of land of Khasra No.34/2/3 Min. Has been included. This modification was effected after holding that the said land is contiguous to the main Block of the respondents and by taking the same away, the main plot of the petitioner does not get disturbed and that the said arrangement appears to be suiting the convenience of both the parties who were also found agreeable to the said modification. These findings were not challenged before us. It was not the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the land withdrawn from him was owned or possessed by him or that his entitlement was reduced in any manner. The question as to which piece of land. Khasra number or Killa Number should have been given to one r the other party falls for determination by the Revenue Authorities exclusively. The High Court, in Constitutional jurisdiction, cannot sit in judgment against decisions of Revenue Authorities in such matters. It has been so held consistently by this Court in chain of authorities, inter alia, Ghulam Qadir v. Member Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore and 4 others (1970 SCMR 292), Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others (PLD 1974 SC 139), Amir Din etc. v. Muhammad Malik etc. (1981 SCMR 834), Falak Sher and others v. Sharif and others (1989 SCMR 1096) and Allah Rehman and others v. Amtul Qayyum and another (1989 SCMR 1817).
4. In above view of the matter, High Court was right in holding that interference in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction was not warranted and e resultantly dismissing the Constitutional Petition. No question of public importance thus arises in this case which require examination by us.
4. Leave to appeal is, therefore, refused and the petition is dismissed.
5. MUKHTAR AHMAD JUNEJO, J.---For the reasons being given below, I disagree with my learned brothers Saleem Akhtar, J. And Khalil-ur-Rehman Khan, J. In respect of the order passed by them.
6. Petitioner Asad Riaz, who has sought leave to appeal against the judgment dated 1-12-1996 delivered by the Lahore High Court in dismissing his Writ Petition No.8122 of 1996, was allocated with four others 472 Kanals and 18 Marlas of land under consolidation as per Khata No.7 of Percha Zamindaran Eshtemal Arazi 1991 /92, Mauza Khonda. District Sahiwal. Said land included the land of Khata No.33/3 and Khata No.21/21/1-2, while respondents 2 to 5 were allotted Khasra No.34/2/3.
7. Subsequently, 4 Kanals were said to have been taken out from Khasra No.33/3 of Wanda of the petitioner, and were included in Wanda of the ,respondents 2 to 5. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner complained to the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Consolidation), who directed his staff to rectify the scheme Khata of the petitioner by including Khasra No.33/3 in Wanda of the petitioner.
8. The respondents 2 to 4 filed an appeal before the Additional Deputy Commissioner and Collector (Consolidation), which was accepted on 27-9-1994 with an observation that Khasra No.33/3 be given to the respondents 2 to 4 in lieu of Khasra No.34/2/3. Said order was challenged before the Additional Commissioner (Consolidation) through a revision petition, which was accepted on 17-5- 1995. The order dated 17-5-1995 was assailed before the Board of Revenue,, which under a judgment dated 16-10-1996 allotted Khasra No.33/5 out of petitioner's finally adjusted Wanda to the private respondents. Said order dated 16-10-1996 was assailed in Writ Petition No.8122 of 1996 in Lahore High Court. The same was dismissed under the impugned judgment. Hence this petition.
9. Mr. Khadim Nadim Malik, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the order dated 16-10-1996 by the Board of Revenue was contrary to section 13 of the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960 (hereinafter mentioned as the Ordinance) and that the other allottees of Khasra No.33/5 were not parties before the Board of Revenue. It was also argued that dispute between-the parties was in respect of Khasra Nos.33/3 and 34/2/3 while the Board of Revenue had given a decision in respect of Khasra No.33/5. Lastly, it was argued that in passing the impugned order by the Board of Revenue, Article 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 was violated.
10. Facts of the case appearing from the past litigation are, that respondents Nos.2 to 5 were owners of the land in Square No.21 of Khewat No.3/3, Mauza Khonda, Tehsil and District Sahiwal, prior to the consolidation proceedings. Respondents Nos.2 to 5 claimed to have become owners of Khasra No.21/21 in Khewat No.3/3 by virtue of Mutation No. 528 attested on 16-1-1992. During consolidation proceedings Khasra No.21/21 in Khewat No.3/3 was taken away from the respondents No.2 to 5 and given to the petitioner. Respondents Nos.2 to 5 filed appeal before the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Consolidation), Sahiwal who under his order dated 27-9-1994 partially accepted the appeal and allowed respondents Nos.2 to 5 to have exclusive possession of Khasra No.3, Square No.33; while the petitioner was given Khasra No.2/3 of Square No.34. Said order dated 27-9- 1994 was reversed by the Additional Commissioner (Consolidation), Multan Division, who under his order dated 17-5-1995 passed in petitioner's Appeal No.90/Consolidation/94 took view that presence of the respondents Nos.2 to 5 had nowhere been marked in Register Scheme and they had been given field No.33/3 by the Consolidation Officer, only in compliance of such order by the ADC/Collector who gave no reasons for preferring the private respondents to the petitioner.
11. Another reason given for reversing the order of the ADC/Collector was that field No.33/3 was allotted to the petitioner by the previous ADC on the basis of his being in possession of the same and such order cannot be reviewed by his successor in office.
12. While deciding Revision Petition No. 1920 of 1995 directed against said order dated 17-5-1995, the Member (Judicial), Punjab Board of Revenue, under his order dated 16-10-1996 approved distribution of Khasra No.21/21 between the contesting parties in equal shares to be well justified and in keeping with principles of consolidation. Learned Member took note of the fact that Khasra No.34/2/3 is not acceptable to the private respondents while the petitioner is not willing to part with Khasra No.33/3. He ordered 4 Kanals of Khasra No.33/5 (northern side) to be given to the respondents Nos.2 to 5 and 4 Kanals of Khasra No.34/2/3/ to be given to the petitioner.
13. There is force in the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. Order dated 16-10-1996 passed by the learned member has dealt with Khasra Nos.33/5 and 34/2/3 while real controversy between the parties was in respect of Khasra No.21/21 in Khewat No.3/3. Learned Member has not dealt with the finding by the Additional Commissioner (Consolidation) that the respondents Nos.2 to 5 had not been marked in the Register Scheme and yet he has given them 4 Kanals of Khasra No.33/5.
14. Such broad mindedness has been shown by learned Member, when all owners of Khasra No.33/5 were not parties before him. There appears in the order dated 16-10-1996 some misreading of the orders passed by the lower functionaries mentioned above. For the said reasons the case requires re-examination and the case for leave to appeal is made out.
15. The extent to which a High Court can interfere with an order of an Authority or a Tribunal while exercising Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, has been defined and redefined by the superior Courts through various judicial pronouncements. When arty finding of fact is based on no evidence at all or on ignorance of material evidence or on consideration of inadmissible evidence or arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction, perversity or material irregularity in the conduct of proceedings causing palpable injustice, the jurisdiction of High Court can always be invoked to rectify the wrong and injustice occasioned to a party on the basis of admitted facts, as per the view taken in the case of Lal Muhammad v. Mst. Gul Bibi PLD 1986 Quetta.
185. The earlier view expressed by this Court in Muhammad Hussain Munir v. Sikandar (PLD 1974 SC 139) was that where a Tribunal has jurisdiction and it determines that question, it cannot be said that it acted illegally or with material irregularity merely because it came to an erroneous decision on a question of fact or even of law. Similar view was expressed in the case of Zulfiqar Khan Awan v.
16. Secretary, Industries and others (1974 SCMR 530) Said view underwent change with the passage of the. In the case of Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (PLD 1987 SC 447) the view taken was as follows:-- "The view that even if the order of a Tribunal is wrong in law, the High Court still cannot intervene in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction, is not justified.
17. It is not right to say that the Tribunal, which is invested with the jurisdiction to decide a particular matter, has the jurisdiction to decide it 'rightly or wrongly', because the condition of the grant of jurisdiction is that it should decide the matter in accordance with the law. When the Tribunal goes wrong in law, it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it, because the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide rightly but not the jurisdiction to decide wrongly. When the Tribunal makes an error of law in deciding the matter before it, it goes outside its jurisdiction. Therefore, a determination by the Tribunal which is shown to be erroneous on a point of law can be quashed under the writ jurisdiction on the ground that it is in excess of its jurisdiction. "
18. The law laid down by this Court in the case of Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan, applies to all the Tribunals and the Authorities invested with the jurisdiction to decide a particular matter, including the Revenue Authorities charged with setling the matters under the Writ Petition.
19. Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960. In this view of the matter, the orders passed by the Revenue Authorities are not sacrosanet to be immune from attack under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan.
20. In passing the order dated 16-10-1996, learned Member, Board of Revenue appears to have misread the orders dated 27-9-1994 and dated 17-5-1995 and to have misapplied his mind to the facts of the case. Learned Single Judge in the High Court has disposed of the matter in a perfunctory manner and has declined to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him by law.
21. For the foregoing reasons, while differing with my learned brothers, I grant leave to appeal to consider the points raised above and to determine, whether the order dated 16-10-1996 passed by the Board of Revenue was warranted by the Ordinance and whether the learned Single Judge in the High Court was justified in dismissing the Writ Petition under an order of the nature passed in this case.
22. ORDER OF THE COURT By majority opinion, leave to appeal is refused and the petition is dismissed.