' RANA BHAGWAN DAS, J.---By this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, the petitioner a student of Liaquat Medical College, Jamshoro seeks to adjudicate the order passed by Commissioner, Hyderabad Division i,e, respondent No,1 dated 12-12-1994 cancelling his domicile and P.R.C. Dated 7-12-1993 issued by District Magistrate, Thatta as without lawful authority and of no legal effect, he also seeks a direction against the Principal, Liaquat Medical College, Jamshoro i,e, respondent No,2 to continue his admission as student of M.B.,B.S. Alongwith the petition, petitioner moved M.A. No,103 of 1995 under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. Seeking to stay the operation of the order dated 12-12-1994 passed by respondent No,1 and a direction to respondent No,2 to continue his admission for study in M.B.,B.S. Pending the decision of petition. While directing notice of this application status quo was ordered to be maintained by respondent No,2.
2. Case of the petitioner in brief is that he is resident of village Ghano Mal Phadoomal in Deh Taraki Tapo Gujo, Taluka Mirpur Sakro, Districf Thatta. His family possesses agricultural land in Taluka Mirpur Sakro. His father who owned a shop at Dhabeji, District Thatta also purchased a shop at Sari, District Dadu. According to the petitioner his mother stayed with her husband at Dhabeji as well as at Sari. The petitioner himself was born at Sari on 20-7-1974 and was educated there up to 4th Primary Class. Ultimately the shop at Sari did not run well and his father and mother had to shift to their original home at Dhabeji in District Thatta. Accordingly the petitioner was transferred from Government Primary School Sari, District Dadu to Government Primary School Dhabeji, District Thatta on 20-4-1985. After completing his primary education he studied at Government High School, Gharo, Taluka Mirpur where he passed the Elementary Grade Drawing Examination held in 1989 and Intermediate Grade Drawing Examination held in 1990 both at Thatta Centre. He passed Secondary School Certificate from Government High School, Gharo whereafter he passed his Intermediate Science Examination (Pre-Medical Group) while studying at Government College, Thatta. It is maintained by the petitioner that he himself as well as his father continued to reside at Dhabeji as before where his father's name is entered in the Voters' list 1986-87 for non-Muslim constituency. Besides, the petitioner and his father had been issued National Identity Card showing their addresses as Dhabeji, District Thatta.
3. On 7-12-1993 District Magistrate, Thatta granted Permanent Residence and Domicile Certificates of Thatta District to the petitioner and certificate of domicile in District Thatta to his father. On his application for admission to Liaquat Medical College, Hyderabad after usual scrutiny he was admitted to the said College, where he started attending me classes w,e,f, 16-4-1994. It is urged that on 15-12-1994 (in fact is 12-12-1994) respondent No,1 i,e, Commissioner, Hyderabad Division without hearing the petitioner and his counsel passed an order cancelling the Permanent Residence Certificate issued by District Magistrate, Thatta in favour of the petitioner in appeal filed by the respondents Nos.3 to 7 under rule 8(i) of Sindh Permanent Residence Certificate Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules 1971). The petitioner has impugned the validity and legality of the aforesaid order on number of grounds including the meaning ground that he was not given an opportunity of hearing and the Commissioner did not grant adjournment for hearing his counsel who happened to be absent on that day.
4. In response to a pre-admission notice issued to respondents Nos.1 and 2 the latter has filed parawise comments contesting the petition. On behalf of the private respondents affected by the admission of the petitioner, respondent No,4 has filed a counter-affidavit contesting the maintainability of the petition as well as injunction application. It is the case of these respondents that the petitioner, his father Lekhoo Mal and grandfather are permanent residents of Deh Sari of Taluka Thano Bola Khan, District Dadu and not permanent bona fide residents of District Thatta. It is maintained that the petitioner was born and he received his primary education at Sari District Dadu; that this entire family is settled at Sari; that the Certificate from Union Council, Dhabeji obtained by the petitioner and his father are managed and obtained in the year 1993 for the purpose of obtaining P.R.C. And the Domicile Certificate of District Thatta. Primary Education Certificate of Lekhoo Mal, father of the petitioner-has been filed tending to show that he was born at Sari, District Dadu on 1-6-1932, admitted to Government Primary School, Sari on 1-4-1938 and left the School on 28-8-1945. It is urged that the petitioner's father Lekhoo Mal got issued his National Identity Card in his favour on 7-10-1978 showing his permanent address of Deli Sari, District Dadu.
Subsequently he got his N.I.C. Changed and revised N.I.C. Issued in his name in 1993 showing his permanent address at Dhabeji, District Thatta. With regard to enrolment in Voters' list, it was stated that Lekhoo Mal, his wife and other family members' names are entered in the voters' list of Deh Sari, District Dadu. A certificate from Mukhtiarkar, Thana Buta Khan to the effect that Lekhoo Mal s/o Ghaloo Mal resident of Deh Sari, Talaka Tliana Buta Khan is enrolled at Serial No,358 in the electoral roll prepared in the year 1986-87 is produced. All other grounds were denied and disputed with an assertion that Deputy Commissioner, Thatta has issued P.R. C. To the petitioner without verifying the record.
5. No affidavit-in-rejoinder was filed on behalf of the petitioner but Mr. Rasool Bux Palijo, Advocate for the petitioner on 10-3-1996 arranged to file his affidavit-in-office without swearing it before the Commissioner for taking oaths to show that on 7-11-1994 he was present before the Commissioner, Hyderabad when the hearing was adjourned to 12-12-1994 suo motu whereas on the subsequent hearing he could not appear before the Commissioner on account of his illness which was intimated to the Reader of the Commissioner.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated the facts and grounds leading to this petition and contested with vehemence and all emphasis at his command that the petitioner though born at Sari, is educated at Sari, District Dadu and Dhabeji as well Gharo both in District Thatta and his grandfather alongwith three other Muslim co-sharers having purchased a piece of land in 1967 in Deh Sonhari, Taluka Mirpur Sakro; his father being enrolled as voter in the electoral rolls of Dhabeji, District Thatta learned Commissioner was neither justified nor lawfully entitled to cancel permanent residence certificate issued in favour of the petitioner. He further submitted that by not providing an opportunity of hearing to him as counsel for the petitioner on the date of the impugned order learned Commissioner grossly violated the principles of natural justice by condemning him unheard.
7. Learned counsel referred to Rules 1971 promulgated by the Governor Sindh with effect from 20th July, 1971. Rule 1 lays down the requirements for eligibility of a person for admission to a Medical or an Engineering College or such other Educational or Technical institution as may be notified by the Government from time to time to produce a certificate of his permanent residence from the District Magistrate of the area where he is permanently residing. Rule 2 lays down that a person desiring to obtain a Certificate of Permanent Residence shall make an application on a prescribed form to the District Magistrate of the area where he is permanently residing. Rule 4 deals with the authority of the District Magistrate to issue the requisite certificate for the purpose of admission or recruitment to the public service after holding such enquiry as deemed necessary. Rule 5 postulates that a Certificate of Permanent 2esidence for the purpose of admission to an Educational Institution shall be issued in Form "C" while certificate for recruitment to the public service shall be issued in Form "D". Rule 6 provides the conditions for eligibility for grant of certificate in Form "C" and is relevant for the purpose of the controversy raised in this petition. For the sake of convenience it may be reproduced hereunder:
6. No person shall be eligible for grant of a certificate in Form "C" unless--
(i) he was born in any area forming a part of Sindh, and further--
(a) in the case of a person of legitimate birth, at the time of his birth, his father was domiciled in Sindh, or if he was born after the death of his father, the later, at the time of his death, was domiciled in Sindh, or
(b) in the case of a person of illegitimate birth, his mother, at the time of his birth, was domiciled in Sindh; or
(ii) in the case of a person who was not born in Sindh--
(a) his parents are domiciled in Sindh and have resided in Sindh for a period of not less than three years, except those employed by Central Government and autonomous/semi-autonomous Corporations in whose case three years residence may be waived; provided the official furnishes adequate evidence to prove that due to exigencies of service he was unable to fulfil that condition.
(b) if his parents are not domiciled in Sindh, he is domiciled in Sindh, and further has either resided in Sindh or has been educated in Sindh for period of not less than 3 years; or
(iii) his father or mother has been recruited to any specified service or post mentioned in clause
(b) of sub-rule (2) of rule 2.
8. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that permanent residence is quite different and distinguishable from present or temporary residence of a person and a District Magistrate is empowered to issue a certificate of permanent residence where a person is permanently residing.
As word "Permanent Residence" has not been defined in Rules 1971, learned counsel referred to the following cases:
(1) Miss Rahila Mumtaz v. Commissioner, Hyderabad (1984 CLC 53).
(2) Syed Muzaffar Ali Jafri v. Commissioner, Hyderabad (1984 CLC 1352).
(3) Kamal Nasir Khan v. Commissioner, Hyderabad and 2 others (1984 CLC 1578).
(4) Millat Sultan v. District Magistrate, Sanghar (1984 CLC 1862).
(5) Shamsher Ali v. Commissioner, Hyderabad and 2 others (1984 CLC 2742).
(6) Taj Muhammad v. Commissioner, Hyderabad and 7 others (1979 CLC 237).
(7) Samina Nighat v. P.R.C. Appellate Tribunal and 3 others (PLD 1983 Karachi 342).
(8) Shama Ahsan v. Province of Sindh (PLD 1984 Karachi 195).
(9) Nayyar Mumtaz v. District Magistrate, Karachi (1993 MLD 840).
(10) Abdul Sattar v. District Magistrate, Badin (1993 CLC 9).
(11) Miss Faryal Wali v. District Magistrate and others (1993 CLC 60).
9. In the case at Serial No,1, Abdul Hayee Qureshi, Acting C.J. (as he then was) took the view that rule 4 of Rules 1971 contemplates permanent residence as distinct from present residence or such residence as is adopted by exigency of circumstances in a person's life. Permanent residence means fixed, continuing, lasting, stable, enduring, abiding and not subject to change as distinct from temporary residence. Learned Chief Justice observed that concept of permanent residence as such is entirely different from concept of domicile.
10. In the case at Serial No,2, late Fakhurddin E. Shaikh, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench took the view that rule 4 requires the District Magistrate to hold such inquiry as he deems necessary and pass orders in respect of grant or refusing to grant P.R.C. According to his satisfaction. If he has committed any error of fact or law, then his order is liable to be corrected by the Commissioner under rule 8. In the case before the Bench District Magistrate and the Commissioner had given concurrent findings of fact that the petitioner and his father had left Thatta for good and settled at Hyderabad. This finding was based on the inquiry conducted by the District Magistrate and accordingly it was observed that the fact that one sister and one brother of the petitioner were at one time in the year 1975 granted P.R.Cs. For Thatta, would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that their younger brothers and sisters were, by the mere fact of their earlier P.R.C. Entitled to the grant of P.R.C. For the same District in the year 1981.
11. In the case at Serial No,3, the view expressed that the place of birth of a person by itself will not at all be a proof that he was a permanent resident of that place particularly when question arises not at time of birth but after some time and in this case after about 19 years.
12. In the case at Serial No,4, the view taken was that one of conditions for grant of permanent residence certificate under rule 6 was that applicant should have been born in any area forming part of Sindh and not that he should have been born in district for which certificate was required.
While referring to Mehrun Nissa v. Appellate Committee (1978 SCMR 439) learned Judges pointed out that mere issuance of domicile certificate to in favour of applicant or his father would not be sufficient to grant an application for P.R.C. Although the fact of domicile certificate may be taken as one of the piece of evidence to be considered for determining the question of P.R.C.
13. In the case at Serial No,5, the view taken in case of Miss Mehrun Nissa Baloch and Taj Muhammad's case was reiterated and reaffirmed highlighting the scope of permanent residence.
14. In Mehrun Nissa Baloch v. Appellate ammittee (1978 SCMR 439) Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a Certificate of Domicile of a person's father is a piece of evidence in support of claim for present residence certificate of relevant district. It was further held that rule 6 of Rules 1971 merely curtails powers conferred on District Magistrate under Rule 4 and a person even if a permanent resident of a district of Sindh is not entitled to permanent residence certificate unless his case fell under 1971 Rules. It was further held that rule 6 merely curtails powers conferred on District Magistrate under Rule 4 and does not confer on District Magistrate any independent power to issue permanent residence certificate.
15. In Taj Muhammad's case following the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Mehrun Nissa Baloch v. Appellate Committee (1978 SCMR 439) Division Bench of this Court took the view at "domicile" and "residence" in the context of the rules are not the words of interchangeable meaning. It has been held that "residence' implies some degree of permanence, although the word "residence" may mean very different things in different context but applied to natural persons as distinguishable from juristic persons like corporations, residence depends on personal facts. Place of birth, nationality and allegiance are not the tests nor is domicile. Voluntary choice and habitual and repeated action are mainly material, such as making a home, keeping an establishment, pursuing a settled object in or at a particular place. Referring to Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition), Volum 20, page 392) their lordships proceeded to lay down that requirement of rule 4 is not only residence but "permanent residence". The word "permanent" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary to mean fixed, continuing, lasting, stable, enduring, abiding not subject to change.
Generally opposed in law to "temporary", but not always meaning "perpetual". In the same Dictionary the expression "permanent abode" has been defined to mean a domicile or fixed home which the party may leave as his interest or whim may indicate, but which he has no present intention of abandoning.
16. In Samina Nighat's case a Division Bench of this Court held that Permanent Residence Rules are not statutory rules but administrative instructions for guidance of authorities concerned for purpose of determining eligibility of candidates applying for seats in Medical College in conformity with quota allocated by prospectuses of colleges. Such rules were issued in exercise of executive authority vested in Government to frame policy which rules still hold the field. Division Bench repelled the contention that the question of permanent residence being connected with the citizenship a subject of Federal Legislative List, therefore, the Governor was not competent to frame rules in respect of permanent residence. The Bench observed that the question of citizenship is quite independent of permanent residence. It is the subject of domicile which can be said to be ancillary to citizenship that is why the rules regarding issuance of Domicile Certificate are issued by the Central Government under the Citizenship Act. In a separate note Ajmal Mian, J. (as his lordship then was) concurring with the conclusion and reasonings suggested that disputes relating to Permanent Residence Certificate should be settled before admission to a professional college. His Lordships suggested valuable steps conducive for settlement of such disputes for consideration of the Provincial Government.
17. In the case at Serial No,8, the High Court dealt with the question of waiver of limitation and held that it was not permissible.
18. In the case at Serial No,9, the District Magistrate had cancelled the P.R.C. Issued by him. It was ruled that he cannot review his order except in case of fraud or misrepresentation and where there is also an error on the face of order itself.
19. In Abdul Sattar Siddique's case with reference to section 21 of the General Clauses Act it was laid down that District Magistrate could cancel P.R.C. If same was issued on practising fraud.
20. Similar view was reiterated in Miss Faryal Wali's case by another Division Bench of this Court but its not relevant to the facts of the case in hand.
21. On the other hand, Mr. Jhamat Jethanand, learned counsel for contesting respondents submitted that respondents having produced Birth Certificate of Lekhoo Mal father of the petitioner at Sari, District Dadu in 1932; his academic career in Government Primary School, Sari up to 1945, his original National Identity Card showing the address of his residence at Shri in District Dadu and obtaining a residence certificate in 1993; averments in the petition that the petitioner's father owned a shop at Sari which did not run well, mother of the petitioner staying with her husband at Sari as well as Dhabeji; insertion of the petitioner's father's name in the electoral roll of Deh Sari, District Dadu as certified by Mukhtiarkar, Thana Bula Khan and birth of the petitioner with primary education at Sari would tend to shove that in fact the father of the petitioner was permanently settled at Sari in District Dadu and the documents produced in support of the petition clearly tend to show that original abode of the petitioner right from the time of his ancestors was at Sari, District Dadu and these were manipulated and business shown at Dhabeji, District Thatta managed with a view to obtain Domicile Certificate and P.R.C. Against the quota reserved for bona fide permanent residents of District Thatta.
22. The submission of the learned counsel is not without substance. Documents placed on record as well as the surrounding circumstances reflect the intention, to settle and permanent residence of the petitioner and his father at Sari, District Dadu at least up to October, 1993 when the documents showing nexus of the petitioner's father with his business at Dhabeji, District Thatta were obtained to secure P.R.C. Of District Thatta. Obviously petitioner's father was born at Sari. He was educated over there. Initial N.I.C. Was obtained by him showing his residence at Sari which was not revised on 23-10-1993 just to make out a case for securing a domicile certificate with intent to obtain easy admission of the petitioner in a professional college on the basis of permanent residence certificate for District Thatta. To my mind photostat copies of entries in the record of rights tending to show the purchase of a piece of land measuring 28 Ghantas by Ghanoo Mal grandfather of the petitioner in partnership with Haji Bux and Muhammad both sons of Lutuf Ali and Mst. Amanat daughter of Lutuf Ali for a consideration of Rs, 300, mutation in the record of rights in favour of Lekhoo Mal and his brothers after the death of Ghanoo Mal in 1988, appearance of the petitioner at Elementary and Intermediate Grade Drawing Examinations in 1989 and 1990 at Thatta Centre and passing of Secondary School Certificate from the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Hyderabad through Government Boys High School, Gharo, residential certificate by Chairman, Union Council Dhabeji are not conclusive and substantive evidence of permanent residence of the petitioner and his father at Dhabeji within the territorial limits of District Thatta. As regarded entry in the electoral roll for Dhabeji town while the petitioner has filed photocopy of an entry in favour of Lekhoo Mal in the electoral list for Dhabeji town, respondents have produced a certificate from Mukhtiarkar Thana Bula Khan certifying that Lekhoo Mal s/o Ghanoo Mal resident of Sari Taluka Thana Bula Khan was enrolled at Serial No,358 in the electoral roll prepared in the year 1986-87 for Sari Taluka Thana Bula Khan. While certificate produced by the petitioner is dated 28- 9-1992, the certificate issued by Mukhtiakar Thana Bula Khan is dated 13-7-1994 counter-certificate or original record with regard to the electoral rolls for Dhabeji, District Thatta was produced by the petitioner to rebut the certificate issued by Mukhtiarkar Thana Bula Khan. At any event, this being a disputed question of fact cannot possibly be resolved in the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction.
23. There is another aspect of matter, namely, the grievance of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Commissioner, Hyderabad while deciding the appeal condemned the petitioner unheard as on the dates of impugned order though the petitioner was in attendance, Mr. Palijo was unable to appear before the Commissioner. It may be observed that by the impugned order Commissioner had not only cancelled the P.R.C. Issued to the petitioner but also P.R.C. Issued in favour of Muhammad Saqiq, Arshad Hussain, Dalip Kumar as well as Mudassir Hussain. Copies of the Court diary from the office of the Commissioner have been produced to show that on the earlier hearing i,e, 7-11-1994 the petitioner was present alongwith his counsel Mr. Rasool Bux Palijo but Mudassir Hussain and his counsel Pir Tariq Ahmed were absent and the hearing was adjourned to 12-12-1994. As observed earlier on this date though the petitioner was in attendance his counsel remained absent without any intimation. Now the main grievance of the learned counsel is that owing to his absence Commissioner ought to have adjourned the hearing to enable him to argue out the case and thereby Commissioner violated the principles of natural justice. There is no doubt that right of hearing is a valuable right available to a party and principles of natural justice are to be read in every statute even if not expressly provided for. The proceedings before the Commissioner, however, are administrative in nature and stretching the nature of such proceedings to quasi-judicial it would be too far-fetched to hold that the learned counsel was entitled to indulgence of adjournment as a matter of course. Needless to emphasise, these proceedings are required to the expeditiously concluded so that valuable time of the students is not unduly wasted and spoiled and admissions are finalized within time. If the learned Commissioner did not adjourn the proceedings in the absence of any prayer by the petitioner I do not think that he acted without jurisdiction or in contravention of the principles of natural justice. A perusal of the Court diary maintained by the Commissioner reveals that out of eight dates of hearing commencing from 18-7-1994 to 12-12-1994 Mr. Palijo was present only on 18-9-1989 and 7- 11-1994 whereas on all other hearings he remained absent. From the case diary it further transpires that on 18-9-1994 hearing was adjourned for the reason that representative of the District Magistrate's office was absent and the Commissioner was pre-occupied in a meeting whereas on 7-11-1994 hearing was postponed owing to the absence of appellants and their counsel. It may be further pointed out that on this date of hearing respondent Mudassir Hussain as well as his counsel Pir Tariq Ahmed were also absent which necessitated the adjournment of hearing. In the circumstances, it cannot be held that the Commissioner acted in hot haste or deprived the petitioner of right of hearing. For the absence of his counsel he should better thank himself rather than to blame respondent No,
1. In this context, learned counsel has referred to the following cases:--
(1) Arideshir Cowasjee v. Multiline Associate (PLD 1993 Karachi 237).
(2) Nusrathulla Chaurdhry v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1994 Lahore 353).
(3) Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation v. Abdus Sattar (1995 MLD 1563).
(4) Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan (PLD 1995 SC 66).
24. In the case at Serial No,1 while referring to earlier law on the subject it was held that in all proceedings by whomsoever held, whether judicial or administrative the principles of natural justice had to be observed if the proceedings might result in consequences affecting "the person or property or other rights of the parties concerned". This rule applied even though there may be no positive words in the statute or legal document whereby the power is vested to take such proceedings, for, in such cases this requirement is' to be implied into it as the minimum requirement of fairness. There is no 'cavil with the aforesaid proposition of law the fact remains that the petitioner was duly served with notice of the appeal, he had appeared before the authority in response to the notice and was provided an opportunity of hearing. In fact he was heard in person and there is nothing on record to indicate that he himself or his counsel had desired an adjournment of hearing even after a lapse of seven hearings. It is, therefore, difficult to subscribe to the view of the learned counsel that the petitioner in this case was condemned unheard.
25. In the case at Serial No,2, learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court reiterated the aforesaid rule and there can be hardly any dispute with the proposition of law as aforesaid.
26. In the case reported as P.T.C. v. Abdul Sattar, Shafi Muhammadi, J. (as he then was) dealing with the provisions of Order VII, rule 11, Order VII, rule 13, section 11 and Order II, rule 2, C.P.C. Expressed the view that technicalities cannot be permitted to defeat the rights of the contesting parties or to override the principles of natural justice.
27. In Sabir Shah's case, apart for a number of issues Hon'ble Supreme-Court did not approve of the plea of the learned counsel for the appellant that the question of disqualification was decided by a better designated forum which included the Chief Election Commissioner for the reasons that there was deprivation of jurisdiction of the competent Authority, namely, the Chief Election Commissioner. While there can be no cavil with the principle of law enunciated by the Supreme Court, I do not think how the principle laid down in the disqualification case is relevant to the facts of this petition. Indeed the petitioner could not insist to be represented through the lawyer of his choice as a matter of right and he could not dictate the authority to postpone the hearing by reason of absence of his counsel particularly when no prayer for adjournment was put forward.
Since the petitioner has been heard at great length by this Court through his counsel on facts as well as law he cannot be heard to say that the impugned order is liable to be set aside or that it may be remanded to the Commissioner for rehearing and passing a fresh order in the absence of any inherent defect or infirmity in the impugned order. There is no gain saying that the Commissioner had taken into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the petitioner's case and examined the record available before him as such he cannot be said to have acted without lawful authority or exceeded the sphere of his authority.
28. On scrutiny of the case-law referred at the Bar and relied upon by the counsel for private respondents as well following principles can be spelt out:
(1) That the petitioner must be a permanent resident of an area for which he claims permanent residence certificate;
(2) that the domicile of his father, permanent place of abode, primary and secondary education at the place, exercise of right of franschise in the election are relevant considerations for determining permanent residence;
(3) temporary absence from the permanent place of residence would not bar a petitioner to obtain P.R.C.;
(4) that there ought to be concrete evidence of the petitioner's permanent settlement at the place for which P.R.C. Is asked for.
29. Judged in the light of the aforesaid principles scrutiny of the material on record and after giving serious consideration to the facts pleaded and agitated at the Bar natural and irresistible conclusion that can be fairly drawn is that the P.R.C. Issued in favour of the petitioners was rightly and justly cancelled. No, exception can be taken to the impugned order which is unexceptionable.
30. For the aforesaid facts and reasons, there is no substance in this petition which is accordingly dismissed in limine.
31. With the dismissal of the petition, interim order directing maintenance of status quo by respondent No,2 stands recalled and both the applications are disposed of as infructuous.