1. ' ABDUL HAYES KURESHI, ACTG. C.J.-The petitioner, Miss Rahila Mumtaz, is the daughter of Mr. Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Ahmad Zai, an Advocate of this Court. The petitioner has stated that she, along with her father and family, permanently resides at Kotri since June, 1977. A Domicile Certificate of the father of the petitioner was issued by the District Magistrate, Dadu, on a date which is not legible, and such Domicile Certificate discloses her name. The petitioner has also produced a photostat copy of a National Identity Certificate application, and certificates issued by the Government of Pakistan, showing her address at Kotri. Besides, a certificate from a Municipal Councillor, Kotri, has also been produced to show that she is a resident of Kotri. The petitioner has also produced a certificate from one Mst. Gohar Sultana to show that she is residing in a house at Kotri with her father. Besides, an agreement has also been produced to show that the father of the petitioner has agreed to purchase a plot at Kotri from Mst. Gohar Sultana. Copies of affidavits of Haji Abdul Rashid and Abdul Aziz Baloch have been produced, wherein it is stated that the petitioner is residing at Kotri.
2. ' The petitioner had made an application for grant of Permanent Residence Certificate in Form 'C', as is prescribed by the Permanent Residence Certificate Rules. The District Magistrate, Dadu, had called for a Report, and the Assistant Mukhtarkar, Kotri, submitted a Report, on 19th February, 1983, stating that he had made enquiries, which revealed that the father of the petitioner was residing at Kotri is a house adjacent to Dargah Baba Salahuddin. It is stated in the Report that the father of the petitioner was settled at Karachi, and had acquired Domicile Certificate from that district in 1952, but he had renounced that domicile by swearing an affidavit, dated 4th November, 1982, before the Mukhtarkar and First Class Magistrate, Kotri, and thereafter he applied for a fresh domicile of Dadu district, which was also granted. It is stated that the applicant had got his previous Identity Cards issued in respect of residence at Karachi cancelled and obtained fresh ones from Dadu District. It was stated in the Report that the father of the petitioner was practising as a lawyer at Kotri for mire than three years, and, for such reason, there was no objection if domicile of Kotri within the district of Dadu may be granted to him. The District Magistrate, Dadu, passed an order, on 6th March, 1983 in the case of the petitioner. The relevant part of the order is reproduced hereunder :- " From the facts available on the record, it appears that the applicant was born at Karachi and has acquired primary and secondary education there. She has no fixed continuing, lasting stable abode at Kotri as she has no house of her own but she is residing at Kotri in the house owned by Mst. Gohar Sultana (sister-in-law of applicant's father). Besides she has failed to adduce any substantial evidence about her permanent residence at Kotri."
3. ' The District Magistrate, Dadu, declined to issue Permanent Residence Certificate to the petitioner.
4. ' Aggrieved by the order of the District Magistrate, Dadu, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Hyderabad Division, and such appeal has also been dismissed. The appeal was mainly pressed on the following grounds :
(1) That the petitioner was permanently residing at Kotri with her parents,
(2) that the father of the petitioner was domiciled in Kotri,
(3) that not having been born at Kotri was no ground to refuse the certificate,
(4) that the petitioner also held National Identity Card for Kotri, and
(5) that the petitioner's father had purchased the plot on which he intended to construct a house.
5. ' The rules, governing the grant of Permanent Residence Certificate, are stated in rules 3 and 4 of the Permanent Residence Certificate Rules. These Rules state as follows :- "3. -A person desirous of obtaining a certificate of Permanent Residence under these rules, shall make an application in Form 'A' to these rules to the District Magistrate of the area where he is permanently residing. The application shall be accompanied by an affidavit in Form 'B'.
4. If the District Magistrate, on perusal of the application and affidavit, and after holding such inquiry as he deems necessary, is satisfied that the applicant is entitled to a certificate of Permanent Residence for the purpose of admission to an educational institution or recruitment to the Public Service, as the case may be, he shall issue to the applicant such a certificate."
6. ' Rule 4 seems to indicate that the District Magistrate can hold an enquiry to satisfy himself that the applicant is a permanent resident of the place from which he claims the certificate. Such enquiry is independent of rules 6 and 7 of the said rules. These rules were considered and interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Miss Mehrun Nisa Baloch v. Appellate Committee (1) and the relevant conclusions were recorded by the Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court at page 443 of the reported judgment in the following words "They curtail and are intended to curtail the powers conferred on District Magistrate under rule 4, and as even if a person is a permanent resident of a district of Sind, he is not entitled to a Permanent Residence Certificate unless he can bring his case under these rules. But as the converse does not follow, the petitioner was not entitled to a Permanent Residence Certificate solely on the ground of her father's domicile in Sind or on the ground that having come of age, she is now domiciled in Sind."
7. ' In the same judgment, in the last paragraph appearing at page 444 of the Report, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that there can be few better indicia of the residence of a student than the place of his primary education. In the case of Taj Muhammad v. Commissioner Hyderabad Division (2), a Division Bench of this Court considered the import and meaning of the words "domicile" and "residence". In paragraph 7 of the Report appearing at page 242. The learned Judges took the view that the words "domicile" and "residence" do not have interchangeable meaning, for, while the residence implies some decree of permanence, domicile was, more or less, a term, denoting place of birth. The learned Judges stated that voluntary choice and habitual and repeated action are mainly material, such as making a home, keeping an establishment, or, pursuing a settled object in, or, at a particular place. Halsbury's Laws of England were quoted, and the following passage was reproduced in the judgment :- "The place of residence of an individual is determined, not by the situation of some business or property which he is carrying on or owns but the reference to where he eats and sleeps and has his settled or usual abode. If he maintains a home or homes, he resides in the locality or localities where it or they are situate, but he may also reside where he habitually lives even if this is in hotels or a yacht or some other place of abode."
8. It may be stated that what rule 4 contemplates is permanent residence as distinct from present residence, or, such residence as is adopted by exigency or circumstances in a person's life. I would mean fixed, continuing, lasting, stable, enduring, abiding, and not subject to change as distinct from temporary.
9. ' A bare perusal of rule 4 of the Sind Permanent Residence Certificate Rules will indicate that such a certificate can be issued by a District Magistrate after holding an enquiry, and on being satisfied that the person applying for a certificate is entitled to a certificate showing permanent residence in a particular place. No doubt, the words "permanent residence" are not defined in the rules, and therefore, these words have to be construed in their ordinary linguistic sense. This concept is entirely different from the concept of domicile. In that respect, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hafiz Azizur Rehman v. The Domicile Scrutiny Committee (1), considered the true import and observed that the concept of domicile was consciously abandoned by the Sind Permanent Residence Certificate Rules.
10. The up shot of the above discussion leads to the conclusion that the mere fact of a person having a domicile certificate in a particular place is not sufficient to hold that he is a permanent resident of that place. A person will be entitled to such a certificate only if he can show that he has been permanently residing at the place from where he is seeking the certificate. We had asked the father of the petitioner, who had appeared as the Advocate, and he stated that the petitioner was born at Karachi, and had studied at Karachi until 1982, when she passed her class XII examination.
11. He has also stated that all these years he had a Domicile Certificate from Karachi, and his family was living with him. It was only in February, 1983 that the father of the petitioner, for the first time, applied to the District Magistrate for grant of Domicile Certificate (Annexure C/1 to the Petition).
12. Even the National Identity Certificates had been obtained in December, 1982. Likewise, the father of the petitioner had agreed to purchase a plot in Kotri only on 20th January, 1983. Admittedly, the petitioner, or, her father have no property, or, house in Kotri. It may also be stated that, if the petition was studying at Karachi until 1982 (when she passed her Intermediate Science Examination), it would be difficult to believe that she was residing at Kotri. We asked the Advocate for the petitioner as to whether the petitioner attended any classes at Karachi until 1982, and if she used to travel to Karachi every day from Kotri for attending her classes, the advocate avoided a categorical reply.
13. These were the facts, which have persuaded the respondents to decline the grant of Permanent Residence Certificate in favour of the petitioner. Such findings of fact have been recorded on the basis of material that was available, and such findings are rarely disturbed by the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction.
14. ' We see no force in this petition, and dismiss the same in limine.
15. ' A short order was passed, on 17th August, 1983 and the reasons for such short order have now been stated.