' RASHEED AHMED RAZVI, J.---This order will dispose of the main petition as well as miscellaneous application filed by the petitioner seeking suspension of the main judgment dated 7-5-1995 passed by the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi.
2. This is the second round of litigation. The respondent No, 3 who was an employee of the petitioner as Senior. Head Cashier while posted at Var Branch in Thatta, was allegedly involved in commission of defalcation and misappropriation. The petitioners, after holding preliminary enquiry on 13-12-1979, issued a charge-sheet and after a departmental enquiry the respondent No, 3 was formally dismissed on 24-7-1980 against which he filed a departmental appeal. Before the decision of the said departmental appeal, the respondent No, 3 filed a Constitutional petition which was disposed of on 26-5-1982 by a consent order through which the respondent No, 3 was allowed to file another departmental appeal on the undertaking of the petitioners not to raise the point of limitation. On 19-9-1992 the said appeal was rejected and the respondent No, 3 served a grievance notice. He then moved the Labour Court No, VI, Hyderabad which dismissed his grievance petition.
Then he went into appeal before the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal which was allowed against which the petitioner filed a Constitutional Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, 1973 which was numbered as C.P. D-192 of 1987. On 17-7-1992 a Division Bench of this Court comprising of Mr. Abdul Rahim Kazi and Mr. Muhammad Aslam Arain, JJ. (as they then were) after considering the case of National Bank of Pakistan v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal 1990 PLC 1971; Iftikhar Ahmed and others v. President, National Bank of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 53, Naeem Wahid v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal 1984 PLC 352, Muhammad Mateen Hashmi v. National Construction Company 1989 PLC 278; Ganga R. Sudhani v. Standard Bank Limited and others 1985 SCM R 1511; Karachi Port Trust Workers v. Karachi Port Trust and 2 others 1988 SCM R 922; Vice-President, National Bank of Pakistan, Gujranwala v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and 7 others 1985 PLC 846; National Bank of Pakistan v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi 1991 PLC 213; Muhammad Bashir v.
Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore 1991 SCM R 2087 came to the conclusion that the employees of the National Bank of Pakistan who fall within the category of "worker" or "workman" are entitled to seek recourse before the competent Labour Court constituted under section 35 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which has the jurisdiction to entertain, try and adjudicate the grievances of the workers employed in the said bank and other financial institutions.
However, the case was remanded to the Labour Court with the following observations: (See 1993 PLC 57): "In view of the above discussion, we have come to conclusion that the present respondent No, 2, if he is covered within the definition of worker or workman could seek the remedy before the Labour Court. However, a perusal of the judgment of the Labour Court shows that no specific finding has been given by the Labour Court on this point as to whether the present respondent No, 2 is covered by the definition of the worker or workman. It appears that the Labour Court has proceeded in the matter on the assumption that the respondent No, 2 does fall within the definition of worker because the Labour Court has observed that the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance are applicable to the employees of the petitioner-Bank. The learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal has held, 'I, therefore, hold that the appellant was a workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968'. The Labour Appellate Tribunal has not given any reasons in coming to such conclusion. All that is said in the order is the reproduction of the submissions of the counsel for respondent No,
2. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that from the outset before the Labour Court, the present petitioners had taken the plea that the respondent No, 2 was not the worker or workman and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the Labour Court to have determined this point first. It is not that every employee of a National Bank of Pakistan can be termed as a worker or workman. The employees of the nationalized Banks would include managerial or supervisory nature and their duties may not pertain to manual or clerical work. In the instant case, the petitioners have contended that the respondent No, 2 was the Head Cashier, who had certain other Cashiers working under him and he used to do only the supervisory work. For these reasons, it would be necessary for the Labour Court to decide this issue first.
' In this view of the matter, we are of the view that this is a fit case for remand to the Labour Court with the direction to give finding on the issue 'whether the respondent No, 2 is covered within the definition of worker or workman?' Consequently, we allow this petition with the above observations, set aside the judgments of the two Courts below and remand the case to the Labour Court No, VI, Hyderabad to give fresh findings with regard to the issue framed by us above. There will be, however, no order as to costs."
3. The learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court No, VI, Hyderabad vide judgment dated 28-10- 1992 held that the applicant falls within the definition of worker/workman as defined in section 2(xxviii) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Against this finding the petitioner went in appeal before the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, at Karachi which was dismissed vide impugned judgment dated 7-5-1995 and the case was remanded back to the Labour Court to record further evidence, if produced and to decide whether the dismissal of petitioner was in order and whether he can seek redress for reinstatement under provisions of (I.R.O.), 1969. The learned Appellate Tribunal, in view of the fact that it was a very old matter, however, directed the Labour Court to give priority to the hearing of the said case and to finally decide the same as soon as possible. The petitioners have impugned the said judgment in this Constitutional petition.
4. The respondent No, 3 has also challenged the order of the learned Court dated 28-10-1992 after remand from this Court in another Constitutional petition bearing No, D-98 of 1993 which was dismissed in limine. The grievance of respondent No, 3 in the said petition was that the petitioner- bank has failed to reinstate him in the service. Another Division Bench of this Court dilated upon the impact of the order dated 7-7-1992 passed by another Division Bench of this Court in C.P. D-192 of 1987 (1993 PLC 57). The petition was dismissed in limine and it was held as follows: "The net result of the judgment has been that although the learned Labour Court has decided the issue in favour of the petitioner but since no further directions was given by the learned Division Bench to decide the case of the petitioner afresh no further order was passed by the learned Labour Court in this regard. In our opinion, the only remedy which could be availed of by the petitioner, under the circumstances, was to apply for review of the judgment of this Court and to seek further directions in this regard. However, the petitioner did not seek such remedy but instead he chose to go before the learned Labour Court again for determination of the question in regard to his status as pointed out earlier. In view of the circumstances enumerated above, the learned Labour Court appears to be justified in declining to issue any further directions in its order dated 28-10-1992 after declaring the petitioner as a ' workman' as there were no such directions given in the remand order..."
5. We have heard Mr. Partab Roy, Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Salahuddin H. Ahmed, Advocate for the respondent No,
3. It was vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No, 3 not a worker/workman and was not entitled in law to move the Labour Court for his grievances. That the impugned judgment passed by Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi is in violation of the two orders passed by this Court. Accordingly to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal was not competent to remand the case to the Labour Court with the direction to record any further evidence and to decide whether the dismissal of respondent No, 3 was in accordance with law and whether the said respondent is entitled for reinstatement. Mr. Partab Roy has attempted to argue the question of worker/workman by again citing several judgments to show that the respondent No, 3 is not a worker or workman.
Mr. Salahuddin, learned counsel for the respondent No, 3 has supported the impugned judgment of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and has argued that the employee is trying his best since 1982 to seek redress of his grievances but the petitioner by filing the present petition is trying to frustrate the genuine need of such employee.
6. Mr. Partab Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner has attempted to argue the point that a grievance petition under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969 is not maintainable before a Labour Court and thereby has tried to re-open the findings of the previous litigation i,e, C.P. No, D-192 of 1987. It is now well settled that an employee of National Bank of Pakistan, who due to nature of his work falls within the definition of 'worker' or ' workman' has remedy under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969 before the Labour Court. For any further reference, see the case of National Bank of Pakistan v.
Punjab Labour Court No, 7, Gujranwala and others 1992 SCM R 1891. In this reported case, the officer was removed from services of the National Bank of Pakistan on the grounds of misappropriation committed at Begowal Branch after finding of a domestic inquiry. The employee challenged the said order before the Punjab Labour Court No, 7 at Gujranwala which proceedings resulted in the order of his reinstatement with all back benefits. The Bank preferred an appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore which was allowed on the two grounds that the employee was serving as a manager and as such does not fall within the definition of ' workman' and that the services of nationalized banks were governed by the Award of Wage Commission which could be enforced by the N.I.R.C. And the Labour Court had no jurisdiction. Thereafter, the employee challenged the order of the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore before the Lahore High Court through writ petition which was allowed. The Lahore High Court followed the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Iftikhar Ahmed and others v. President, National Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 1988 SC 53 and also held that the employee was a workman within the meaning of clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the I.R.O.
7. Before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was again argued that the employee was manager which fact was not denied by the employee as such he being Grade-III Officer was not entitled to maintain grievance petition. The contention was not accepted by the Supreme Court and the appeal was dismissed. It was observed in the said reported case 1992 SCM R 1891 that the employee was not having the power of attorney by the appellant Bank conferring on him the authority to perform functions of the manager and that the duties being performed by the employee were of clerical nature. In the instant case, the learned Presiding Officer of Labour Court No, 6, Hyderabad has dealt in detail the evidence brought on record as to the nature of the duties of respondent/ employee. It was admitted by the witness of the petitioner/Bank that the duty assigned to the respondent/employee at the relevant time was of handling cash transaction including counting and sorting out of currency notes. That none of the other staff was working under the respondent/employee. That he was not holding any power of attorney from the Bank nor he was assigned any supervisory duties in the Bank. In view of the admission of such facts by the witness of the petitioner/Bank, the learned Labour Court came to the conclusion that the respondent/employee falls within the definition of 'worker' and ' workman'. This fact was also noted by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal which has now reached the status of concurrent findings.
We see no compelling reason to disturb the same as there is overwhelming evidence in support of such findings.
8. Now the only grievance of the petitioner left to be decided is that the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal at Karachi was not competent to remand back the case to the Labour Court for decision whether dismissal of employee/ respondent was in order and whether he can seek his reinstatement under the I.R.O. Learned Labour Court has confined itself in giving decision only on the issue whether the respondent/employee falls within the definition of worker/ workman as defined in I.R.O., 1969 but refrained to give any consequential relief to the employee, on the grounds that this Court has remanded the caselbr the decision of this issue only. The same view was also held by this Court as reproduced hereinabove, in another Constitutional petition filed by the respondent/employee. (C.P. No, 98 of 1993: Abdul Jabbar Qureshi v. National Bank of Pakistan and 4 others). It is the order, dated 7th July, 1992 passed by this Court in C.P. No, D-192 of 1987 National Bank of Pakistan, Hyderabad v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and another 1993 PLC 57 which requires consideration and interpretation.
9. There is one more case, National Bank of Pakistan v. Akhter Ali Bhatti and others 1991 SCM R 1148 which was not noticed by this Court while deciding previous petition. In this reported case, the respondent No, 1 was a Cashier in the N.B.P. And was removed from the service of N.B.P. Against which he preferred a grievance petition for reinstatement but the same was dismissed by the Punjab Labour Court. Thereafter, the respondent/employee filed an appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal which was accepted and the employee was ordered to be reinstated with full back benefits. Against this order, N.B.P. Filed a writ petition which was dismissed by the Lahore High Court. Being aggrieved with the order of the Lahore High Court, N.B.P. Went before the Supreme Court seeking leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal on the following consideration: "After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusal of the record of the case, we have come to the conclusion that it is not a fit case in which leave to appeal can be granted. Because the respondent No, 1 was removed from the Bank service on the charge of deliberately removing a small amount of Rs, 150 from two bundles of cash, received from Habib Bank Ltd. As back as on 9- 2-1982. Since then, he was busy in pursuing his case for his reinstatement in service, before different departmental agencies until 9-5-1983 when he was ordered to be reinstated in service by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, without back benefits. Thereafter, it was the petitioner who dragged the respondent No, 1 before the High Court as well as this Court, which is in our opinion a quite sufficient reward for his misdeed, in the form of monetary loss and mental torture which will be a good lesson to him for his future guidance."
10. The Courts are not required to enter into academic discussions or to grant a paper decree. If the order of this Court in C.P. No, D-192 of 1987 is to be interpreted in a manner that the case was remanded to the Labour Court only for the purpose of deciding the question of worker or workman and not to consider any other relief, then it would amount to frustrate the very concept of administration of justice. It is pertinent to observe that the argument of petitioner that after remand of the ease for determination of the issue of worker or workman, the learned Labour Court was not competent to decide the issue of wrongful dismissal or reinstatement amounts to extending relief to the respondent/employee by one hand and withdrawing the same by the other. In our humble view this was never the intention of this Court while remanding the case in C.P. No, D-192/87.
11. Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 enables a worker to bring his grievance to the Labour Court in respect of a right guaranteed or secured. Subsection (5) of the Ordinance, 1969 reads as under:-- "In adjudicating and determining a grievance in subsection (4) of the Labour Court shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case."
' In the earlier round of litigation the Labour Court did pass orders which were set aside by the Labour Appellate Tribunal and relief was granted to the respondent No,
3. The orders passed in the hierarchy of the special forums were questioned before this Hon'ble Court on the ground, that they had been passed without determining whether the respondent No, 3 was a workman i,e, without deciding the essential question on which the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the Tribunal was founded upon. This Court set aside the orders and directed the Labour Court to determine whether the respondent No, 3 was a workman or not i,e, to decide whether jurisdiction to grant relief existed.
Obviously, if such jurisdiction did not exist no question of further proceeding in the matter arises.
However, if the jurisdiction did exist the Labour Court was by law required to go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case.
12. By the remand order, this Court could have never intended to refrain the Labour Court from passing orders which under the law it was required to pass. In the case of Muhammad Sualeh v.
United Grain and Fodder Agencies PLD 1964 SC 97 (at 101) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has treated orders passed upon assumption of jurisdiction not vested by law or upon failure to exercise jurisdiction vested by law at the same level and had treated both such types of orders as nullities in law. Obviously, this Court did not intend to remand a case to the Labour Court for passing an order which would amount to a nullity in law. It is, therefore, clear that once the Labour Court had found that the respondent No, 3 was a workman it was required to pass an appropriate order under section 25-A(5) of the I.R.O., 1969.
13. The purpose of issuing a writ is to foster justice, to right a wrong and not to perpetuate injustice.
This rule was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali v.
Chief Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1973 SC 236 and is being followed by this Court as well as by the Supreme Court. The relevant portion is as under:-- "An order in the nature of a writ of certiorari or mandamus is a discretionary order. Its object is to foster justice and right a wrong. Therefore, before a person can be permitted to invoke this discretionary power of a Court, it must be shown that the order sought to be set aside had occasioned some injustice to the parties. If it does not work any injustice to any party, rather it cures a manifest illegality, then the extraordinary jurisdiction ought not to be allowed to be invoked."
14. The result of the above discussion leads us to the conclusion that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal at Karachi through which the case was again remanded to the Labour Court for determination of question of dismissal and reinstatement, is legal and proper and does not require interference from this Court. We are fully conscious of the fact that since 1982 the respondent/employee is knocking at the door of judiciary from one Court to another for redress of his grievance. We, therefore, direct the Labour Court No, VII, Hyderabad to proceed expeditiously with Case No, 180 of 1982 and to decide the same within two months. This petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. Consequently, M.A. No, 996 of 1995 has become infructuous which is also dismissed.