1. ' GHULAM SAFDAR SHAH, C. J.-This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan calls in question the order of Labour Court, N.-W. F. P., Peshawar dated 13-5-75 by which the application of Khyber Tobacco Labour Union Mardan (hereinafter called the Union) under section 34 of I. R.
2. 0., 1969 was accepted and it was held that Khyber Tobacco Ltd., Mardan (hereinafter called the Company) shall pay to the workers of Union by way of statutory bonus one month's wages under Standing Order 10-C (1) of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the Ordinance).
3. ' The background of the case is that the company went into production in 1962. But until financial year ending 30-6-67, it continued to suffer losses. During July 1967, December 1967, however, it made profits and therefore paid to its workers in January 1968 a bonus at the rate of 12-1/2 per cent. Of their wages during 1967. It is conceded that for the subsequent years 1968 and 1969, the same practice was continued. On 19th January 1971, however, a fresh settlement was reached between the parties and it was agreed that workers would now be paid annual bonus equal to their two months' pay for the calendar years 1970, 1971 and 1972. This part of the agreement is contained in clause (6) of the settlement (Annex. G on record) which reads as under :- "6. Annual Bonus :
(a) It is agreed that all permanent employees of the company, who have completed one year's continuous service or more, as at 31st of December 19)0, will be paid an annual Bonus for the Calendar year 1970 equivalent to two months' pay (i,e, the rate of pay excluding Conveyance Allowance and other variable payments) admissible as at 31st of December 1970 ;
(b) It is also agreed that similar method of calculation for determining the quantum of Bonus will be followed for the subsequent operative period i,e, Calendar Years 1971 and 1972 of this agreement.
(c) Employees with less than one year's service but with a minimum of 6 months' continuous service, as at 31st of December of the previous Calendar Year Bonus for the year 1970-71 and 72 in accordance with following formula :- Rate of pay x 2 x number of months of completed years of service as at 31st December.
4. 12
(d) It is agreed that all temporary employees engaged on seasonal basis in the Leaf Department, who have completed a minimum of two months' continuous service during the season in a Calendar year will be paid an Annual Bonus for the Calendar years 1970, 71 and 72 and for the operative period of this agreement calculated on the following basis :- ' Rate of pay x 2 x months of completed years of service."
5. 12 ' Now this settlement was to last until 31-12-72. But on 26-10-72, the Union served a notice on the company terminating the said agreement and in the charter of demands attached therewith claimed the payment of for bonuses to its workers. In consequence of this notice, the parties entered into negotiations and by a fresh agreement dated -1-73 (Annex. H on record), by which the previous agreement of 19.1-71 was superseded, the company agreed to pay to its workers for calendar year 1972-73 bonus at the rate of 2 months of their basic pay in lieu of the bonus prescribed in Standing Order 10-C(1) of the Ordinance. The relevant part of this agreement reads as under : "As a result of negotiations between the company and Union, the following new Agreement is mutually arrived at in supersession of the under-mentioned Agreements which are hereby terminated with mutual consent :
(1) Agreement dated 19th January 1971.
(ii) Agreement dated 21st January 1972.
(iii) Agreement dated 26th April 1972.
6. Terms of Agreement
1. Bonus t ' The company agrees to pay an annual bonus at the rate of 2-1/2 months' basic pay in lieu of the bonus prescribed in Standing Order 10-C under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 on the following basis for the calendar years 1972 and 1973 : (a)All permanent employees of the company who have been in company's employment for a continuous period of one year or more as at 31st December of the year in respect of which bonus is payable will be paid an annual bonus equivalent to 2-1/2 month's basic pay (i e. The rate of scale pay excluding conveyance allowance and other variable payments) calculated on the basis of the rate of pay for the month of December of that year.
7. (b)All temporary employees in the Leaf Department, in connection with leaf buying, handling and operation C&C plant, who have completed a minimum of 2 months continuous service during the season in a calendar year in respect of which bonus is payable will be paid an annual bonus for the calendar years 1972 and 1973 calculated on the following basis : (Rate of pay last drawn x x number of completed months of service during the calendar year) +12
(c) All other employees other than those engaged in the Leaf Department as referred to in sub- clause (b) hereinabove, who have been in the employment of the company for less than one year but have completed 90 days continuous service as at 31st December of the year in respect of which bonus is payable will be paid an annual bonus for the years 1972 and 1973 calculated on the following basis : (Rate of pay as at 31st December of the year in respect of which the bonus is payable x 22 x number of completed months of service during the calendar year -12 (d)The bonus shall be paid during the month of January in respect of the previous calendar year.
8. ' In paragraph 8 of the agreement, it is provided that it would be valid for one year and 10 months with effect from 1st January 1973, and would remain binding on parties until the expiry of two months from the date on which notice is served by one party on the other intimating its intention to terminate the arrangement. It is common ground between the parties that in terms of the said agreement the company paid to its workers their due bonuses. But on 23-9-74, the Union served on the company two notices repudiating the said agreement and claiming that in addition to the bonuses paid to its workers, they should be paid the statutory bonus under Standing Order 10-C (1) of the Ordinance. On receipt of these notices the company replied on 28-9-74 that the repudiation of agreement of 8-1-73 by the Union was illegal and further that the bonus already paid to the workers also covered its obligation under Standing Order 10-C (1), ibid. It seems that the Union was not satisfied with the reply of the company. And consequently on 20-11-74 it served on the company a charter of demands claiming therein the payments to its workers of statutory bonus under Standing Order 10-C (1) by the first week of January 1975. This charter of demands was repeated by the Union in their subsequent letter dated 21-12-74. And it is agreed that in response thereto the company in its office order dated 22-12-74 offered to pay the said bonus to its workers at the rate of one month's wages for the financial year ending 30-6-74. Despite this arrangement, however, the parties could not reconcile their differences. And consequently the matter went before the Conciliation Officer. It seems that the Conciliation Officer also failed to resolve their differences and issued on 4-2-75 a certificate of failure on the basis of which the Union filed in Labour Court Peshawar an application under section 32 of I. R.
9. 0., 1969 claiming therein that its workers be paid for bonuses per year. During the pendency of this application, with which we are not eoncerned in the present proceedings, the Union filed in the same Court another application under section ?4 of I. R.
10. 0., 1969 claiming the payment to its workers of a statutory bonus under Standing Order 10-C (1) for the year 30-6-72-30,6-73. This application was contested by the company and in its written statement it denied its liability. The Labour Court however, in view of the evidence brought before it by parties, allowed the application of Union, vide its impugned order dated 13-5-75. In this respect, it would be proper to reproduce its reasons which are as under:-- "It is evident that provision with regard to the payment of 10-C bonus became effective on 13-4- 1972 and whence statutory bonus was payable after the close of the financial year ending on 30th June 1972. This position has been rather admitted by the respondent in para. 8 of the written statement. But the case of the respondent is that in view of the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 8-1-73 statutory bonus was not payable. I am of the view that the position taken by the respondent-Company is not legally tenable. Before the agreement Exh. P. W. 1/3, the agreement Exh. P. W.1/2 was in operation. According to the clause 6 of this agreement two months' pay was payable as annual bonus after the close of the calendar year. It was further stipulated that similar methods of calculation for determining the quantum of bonus will be followed for the subsequent operative period i,e,, calendar years 1971 and 1972. It is thus evident that as far as the agreement Exh. P. W. 1/2 is concerned it did not deprive the workers of the statutory bonus payable under section 10-C of the Standing Order.
11. ' Now we come to the agreement Exh. P. W. 1/3. This agreement came into force on 8-1.73 and according to clause 8(c), the operative period of this agreement was from 1-1-1973 for a period of one year and 10 months. In other words, the agreement Exh, P. W. 1/2 held the field till 1-1-1973. Thus on this date the workers had already earned statutory bonus payable on the close of the financial year 1972, i,e,, the year ending on 31-6-72 and further the workers had also earned part of the statutory bonus for the period beginning from 1-7-72 upto 31-12-72. It may be mentioned that there is no estoppel against the statute.
12. ' It may be further mentioned that vide the office order copy Exh. P.W. 1/8 the respondent has directed that statutory bonus be paid to the workers under section 10-C equal to one month's wages for the financial year from 1-7-73 to 30-6-74. Thus by its conduct the respondent has conceded to the workers the right of receiving statutory bonus in addition to the annual bonus even for the period when the agreement Exh. P. W. 1/3 was in operation."
13. ' Mr. Fazale Ghani Khan, the learned counsel for the company has assailed the impugned order of Labour Court on the following grounds :
(1) That the application filed before it by the Union under section 34 of I. R. O, 1969 was incompetent and therefore the Court has no jurisdiction in the matter.
(2) that the Labour Court was wrong to bold the company liable to pay to workers statutory bonus under Standing Order 10-C (I) of the Ordinance-not realizing that in the first place, the Union could not have legally repudiated the settlement agreement of 8-1-73 and in second place, the bonus already paid to the workers was also meant to liquidate the liability of the company from paying the said statutory bonus, and
(3) that in any event, the Union was estopped to claim bonus under Standing Order 10-C (1) of the Ordinance in view of the fact that it was bound by the settlement agreement of 8-1-73 under which its workers had already received bonus at the rate of 21 months' pay for the relevant period.
14. ' Leaving the first objection for the present, let us examine the other two contentions of learned counsel, the substance of which seems to be his insistence that the settlement agreement of 8-1- 73 was still valid and that the payment to the workers of Union of bonus agreed thereunder would disentitle them again to claim the statutory bonus under Standing Order 10-C(1) of the Ordinance.
15. The learned counsel, however, conceded that if upon the scrutiny of the agreement dated 8-1-73, it was found to be inconsistent with the provisions of Standing Order 10-C, the agreement would be void and in that event, he would be unable to press his objection. Proceeding from these premises, he argued that in the settlement agreement dated 8-1-75, which had superseded the previous agreement of 19-1-71, it was agreed that the company would "pay as annual bonus at the rate of 21 months' basic pay in lieu of the bonus prescribed in Standing Order 10-C under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968". And this, according to him, would debar the Union from claiming the said statutory bonus again from Labour Court. He pointed out that the rate of bonus and other terms and conditions agreed therein were more favourable to workers. And therefore even if the agreement in question is found to be inconsistent with the provisions of Standing Order 10-C (1), Ibid. It would be entirely legal in view of section 4 of the Ordinance which reads as under :- "4. Modification of Standing Orders.-The Standing Orders may be modified by means of a collective agreement and not otherwise : Provided that no such agreement shall have the effect of taking away or diminishing any right or benefit available to the workmen under the provisions of the Schedule."
16. ' In order to appreciate the contention of learned counsel, it would be necessary at this stage to reproduce the relevant provisions of Standing Order 10-C of the Ordinance which reads as follows :- "10-C. Payment of bonus.-(1) Every employer making profit in any year shall pay for that year within three months of the closing of that year to the workmen who have been in his employment in that year for a continuous period of not less than ninety days a bonus in addition to the wages payable to such workmen.
(2) The amount of the bonus payable shall-
(a) if the amount of the profit is not less than the aggregate of one month's wages of the workmen employed, be not less than the amount of such aggregate, subject to the maximum of thirty per cent. Of such profit ; 'Illustration 1.-If the profit is Rs, 1,20,000 and the aggregate of one month's wages of the workmen is Rs, 30,000 the amount of bonus payable shall be not less than the aggregate of one month's wages, that is to say, Rs, 30,000.
17. ' Illustration 2.-If the profit is Rs, 30,000 and the aggregate of one month's wages of the workmen is also Rs, 30,000 the amount of bonus payable shall be not less than thirty per cent. Of the profit that it is to say, Rs, 9,000.
(b) if the amount of the profit is less than the aggregate referred to in paragraph (a), be not less than fifteen per cent. Of such profit.
(3) The bonus payable to a workman entitled thereto under clause (1) shall bear to his monthly wages the same proportion as the total bonus payable by the employer bears to the aggregate of the wages referred to in paragraph (a) of clause (2) and shall be paid either in cash or in N. I. T.
18. Units of equivalent value at the option of such workman.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the right of any workman to receive any bonus other than that payable under clause (1) to which he may be entitled in accordance with the terms of his employment or any usage or any settlement or an award of a Labour Court established under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 196) (XXIII of 1969)".
19. ' It is common ground between the parties that when agreement dated 8-1-73 was executed by them, Standing Order 10-C was on the statute book. Now a look at the language of clauses (1) and
(4) of that older would show that on 8-1-73 each worker of the Union was, in addition to the wages payable to him, entitled to a bonus on the profit made by the company, provided he had remained in employment of the company for a continuous period of not less than 90 days in the year in which the profits had been made. The learned counsel did not dispute this position. However, he argued that since the terms and conditions and the rate of bonus mentioned in agreement dated 8-1-73 were more favourable to workers, clause (1) of Standing Order 10-C, ibid , would be deemed to have been modified under section 4 of the Ordinance. We find no force in this contention. A look at the relevant provisions of the agreement would show that they are unfavourable to workers than the corresponding provisions of Standing' Order 10-C of the Ordinance. The requirement of clause
(1) of the Standing Order is that any worker, remaining in the employment would company for a continuous period of not less than 90 days in a year, was entitled to a profit bonus, but according to the agreement this period in one year; under the Standing Order an ex-worker of the company would be entitled to receive profit bonus, but under the agreement he has been deprived of this right; under the Standing Order and employer is required to pay to his workers profit bonus within 3 months of the closing of accounting year (which, in the present case, is admitted to be 30th June of each calendar year), but under the agreement the payment is postponed to 31st December of each year; even the formula at which an employer is required under Standing Order pay to his workers the profit bonus is more beneficial than the one laid down in the parties' agreement. For example, let us take the hypothetical case of a worker who has remained for a period of 3 months in the employment of a B company drawing, say, Rs, 240 per month as his wages. Now the rate of profit bonus, to which he would, under the agreement dated 8-1-73 be entitled, would be :- "Rate of pay last drawn x 2-1/2. x number of completed months of service during calendar year."
20. ' And consequently he would get Rs, 150 on that account on the following calculation : "240 x 5/2 x 3 x 1/12 = 150 ' Under the formula laid down in the Standing Order, however, he would be entitled to receive Rs, 240.
21. ' The learned counsel, however, argued that since the workers had, under the said agreement, received bonuses in lieu of bonus under Standing Order 10-C (1), in all fairness, the Labour Court should have rejected their application in which again they had claimed the same relief. The learned counsel for the Union, however, countered this argument saying that long before the coming into force of Standing Order 10-C of the Ordinance, by which an employer is required to pay to workers profit bonus, the workers of the Union had been receiving from the company annual bonuses. He, therefore, argued that the payment of these bonuses by the company had nothing to do with its statutory liability under the Standing Order, nor indeed would the workers be estopped to insist upon the realization of their statutory right thereunder. Elaborating his contention, he pointed out that the bonuses paid to the workers, prior to the coming into force of Standing Order 10-C, were not linked with the profits of the company; the obligation to pay these bonuses had become a part of the wages of workers and therefore the company was bound to pay them over and above the statutory profit bonus under the Ordinance. In support of his contention, the learned counsel referred to the folio Ning dictum from a judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of Messrs M. Tilak & Co. v. Third Industrial Tribunal and others (1) :- "Bonus is a concept of many connotations. It may be the term of the contract of employment in which event the question if such bonus is payable out of profit only when the wages fall below living standards will depend on the terms of such contract of employment. It is within the range of economic and legal possibility that in a particular contract of employment it is stipulated that bonus will be paid irrespective of profits or living standards. It may be a cash incentive to a greater efficiency and production even when there is no question of absence of living wage. Akin to this conception of bonus is the case of a bonus annexed to the employment by custom or social practice such as customary bonus and Puja or festival bonus. In case of such customary and traditional bonus, the question of profit may or may not arise at all and such customary and traditional bonus will depend on the content and terms of that custom or the tradition on which the claim for bonus is made. Each claim for bonus must depend on the facts of such claim. No doctrinaire view about bonus is possible or desirable. This much, however, is judicially settled that bonus is not deferred wages. It is a narrow and static view that considers bonus as always ex gratia payment or a glorified tip or Bakhshish or a mere cash patronage payable at the pleasure of the employer. In the industrial jurisprudence of modern economic society, it is a legal claim and a legal category whose potentialities are not as yet fully conceived, but struggling to formulate. It is a vital instrument of industrial peace and progress dynamic in its implication and operation."
22. ' Notice may also be taken of a judgment from Lahore High Court in the case of Messrs The Attock Oil Co. Ltd. v. The Supreme Body of Oilfields League & Refinery Union, Rawalpindi (2). In that case, in which the judgment was written by the learned counsel for petitioner who was then a Judge, the same view has been taken. And it would suffice to reproduce from it the following dictum : "Taking into consideration the various decisions and the changed conditions of or society in which the rapid industrialization is taking place in the country bonus has to be regarded as deferred wages {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) AIR 1959 Cal. 797 (2) PLD 1970 Lab. 122 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' payable to employees which may be claimed by them as of right and it should be recognized as one of their right which they can claim from their employers under certain circumstances."
23. ' With respect, we wholly agree with this exposition. By looking at the philosophy of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Ordinance,
1. R.
0. Of 1969 and other similar legislative instruments, it is clear to us that gone are the days when the payment of bonus to his workers used to depend upon the pleasure of employer. It is common knowledge that a worker today is more conscious of his rights, he is always vigilant to improve his lot and through the instrument of collective bargaining agency invariably succeeds to extract from his employer more concessions entirely unrelated to the question of making profits or incurring losses. If in a given case, therefore, a worker had been able to make his employer agree to pay him bonus, it would be deemed to have become a part of his wages to which he would be entitled as a matter of right under the contract/settlement. The fact that this is so would appear to be supported by the language of clause (4) of Standing Order 10-C(1) in which toe intention of Legislature in this behalf has not been left to doubt whatever.
24. ' The case of the Union is that whatever bonuses were, before the coming into force of Standing Order 10-C, and the execution of settlement agreement dated 8-1-73, paid to its workers by the company were paid in the discharge of its contractual obligations, regardless whether it had made profits or incurred losses. The learned counsel for the Union, therefore, argued that, these bonuses would be deemed to have become a part of the wages of workers to which they would, in any event, be entitled in addition to the statutory bonus under the Standing Order for which the entitlement is dependent entirely on another consideration, namely, the making of profits by the company. In view of the above exposition of legal principles bearing on this point, we agree with the submission of learned counsel. And in order to see if his submission is factually borne out from record, let us proceed to examine the various settlement agreements reached between the company and the Union from time to time : ' The first settlement agreement on record is dated 2-10-67. In clause (5) of this agreement would be found the discussion on "Annual Bonus". And it is said therein that "all permanent employees who, as at 3Ist December 1967, have completed a minimum of six months continuous service shall be paid an Annual Bonus for the calendar year 1967 equivalent to one-twelfth of the basic wages earned in the calender year 1967, i,e, from 1st January 1967 to 31st December 1967". There is no mention in this clause nor indeed in any other clause of the agreement that the payment of bonus in question would depend on the company making profits.
25. ' The second agreement in the series is dated 9-12-68. And in there too (vide clause 1), the same position has been reiterated except that the rate of bonus was enhanced to 12-1/2 per cent. Of the earnings of workers during the calendar year.
26. ' The third agreement is dated 19-1-71. And in this agreement, which was for a period of three years (i e., 1-1-70-31-12-72), the position in regard to the payment of bonus to workers is the same as in the previous two agreements except that in there the bonus was said to be calculated on the following formula :- "Rate of pay x 2 x number of completed years of service as at 31st December x 1/12".
27. ' It is clear, therefore, that before the coming into force of Standing Order 10-C and the execution of agreement dated 8-1-73, the workers of Union had been receiving contractual bonuses entirely free from the consideration of the company making profits or incurring losses. Obviously, therefore, these bonuses, having become a part of the wages of workers, would be recoverable by them as a matter of contractual right. And on the coming into force of Standing Order 10-C, they would have the right to claim the additional bonus guaranteed therein, provided it could be shown that the company, had amongst others, made profits during the financial year. It would, therefore, follow that if by the scrutiny of agreement dated 8-1-73 it is found that the said right of workers were in any way prejudiced, the agreement in question would be void for want of consideration or else for being in conflict with the provisions of Standing Order 10-C of the Ordinance.
28. ' Now it is true that according to this agreement the workers had, in lieu of the bonus under Standing Order-10-C agreed to receive bonus at the rate of 2-1/2 months of their basic pay for calendar years 1972 and 1973 in full and final settlement of all their demands. But this agreement seems to be void. A look at the second clause of this agreement appearing under the head "short recital of the case" would show that the previous agreement of 19-1-71 continued to remain in force until 8-1-73. And under the said agreement, which was for two years and was to last until 31-12-72, the workers were entitled to receive annual bonus for each calendar year. It is common ground between the parties, however, that Standing Order 10-C came into force on 13-4-72. And if this be so, then from that date the workers became entitled to profit bonus and on 13-6-72, which was admittedly the closing day of the financial year of the company, they must be deemed to have earned two months' bonus in addition to the two contractual annual bonuses for 1972 to which they were, under the agreement of 19-1-71, already entitled. We also agree with the view taken by learned Labour Court that for the subsequent period 1-7-72-31-12-72, the workers had earned further statutory bonus of which they could not be deprived by the agreement of 8-1-73 for two- fold reason: (1) The company, being already liable to pay them two annual bonuses under the agreement of 19-1-71, it cannot be said to have offered any additional consideration to workers for the subsequent agreement of 8-1-73, and (2) that the agreement of 8-1-73, besides being in conflict with the provisions of Standing Order 10-C, would not debar the workers to claim statutory bonus guaranteed by the law, as estoppel cannot be pleaded against statute. In these circumstances, the learned Labour Court seems to have rightly awarded to workers statutory bonus under Standing Order 10-C for the financial years ending on 30-6-72 and 30-6-73. And in this regard clause (4) of that Order clearly supports him.
29. ' The learned counsel for the company, however, referred to the following judgments :
(1) M. M. Ispahani Ltd. v. Ispahani Company Office Employee's Association, Chittagong and another PLD 1960 SC (Pak.) 151.
(2) Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd, Chittagong v. The Chairman, Second Labour Court of East Pakistan and 18 others 1972 PLC 190.
(3) Messrs Paris Mills (Sabina Ltd.), Karachi v. Paris Mills Workers Union and another 1970 PLC 166.
(4) Nairang Cinema Employees' Union v. Messrs Nalrang Cinema Karachi and another 1970 PLC 587.
30. (5)General Tyre & Rubber Employee? Welfare Union v. General Tyre & Rubber Company of Pakistan Ltd. PLJ 1975 Tr. C. (Lab.) 25.
31. (6)International General Insurance Co. Of Pakistan Ltd. Karachi, v. Staff Union 1975 PLC 564.
32. ' But they are distinguishable. It is true that in all these cases the effect of awards of Industrial Tribunals, decisions of Labour Courts and settlement-agreements between employers and workers had been considered and it was held that the workers would be estopped from repudiating the terms thereof. However, unlike the present case, in which the effect of Standing Order 10-C of the Ordinance has fallen for consideration, in all these cases it was found as a fact that employers had paid to their workers only profit bonus. Whereas in this case, the company had always paid to the workers annual bonuses which had nothing to do with making profits or incurring losses.
33. ' In view of all this discussion, therefore, the two objections of learned counsel must be held to have no force in them.
34. ' We have also not been impressed with the contention of learned counsel for the company that since in the agreement of 8-1-73 the company had agreed to pay to workers bonus at the rate of 2-1/2 months' of their basic pay, it must be held that the agreement was reached for valid consideration. A look at the various agreements would show that the company initially agreed to pay to workers bonus at the rate of 1/12 of their wages for 1967, 12-1/2 per cent. Of their wages for 1968 and 1969 and at two months' wages for 1971. It is, therefore, obvious that from 1967 onward the company went on increasing the rate of bonus to workers. And therefore the rate of bonus agreed to be paid by it under agreement dated 8-1-73 was in manifestation of the same practice. Besides, the rate of bonus in agreement dated 8-1-73, which was meant to be in lieu of bonus under Standing Order 10-C of the Ordinance, was wholly unfair to workers. And in that regard, we have already sufficiently dealt with this point by arithmetical calculation.
35. ' This leaves us with the first objection of learned counsel. He argued that in this case all that the Union demanded in their application under section 34 of I. R.
0. Of 1969 from Labour Court was a decision as to the interpretation of the provisions of parties' agreement dated 8-1-73 and thus the said application would have laid under section 50 and not under section 34. In order to appreciate this contention, section 34 and clause (1) of section 50 of I.
36. R.
0. Of 1969 had better be reproduced :- "34. Any collective bargaining agent or any employer may apply to the Labour Court for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any award or settlement."
37. "50.-(1) If any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provisions of an award or settlement, it shall be referred to the Tribunal constituted under this Ordinance.
38. ' The application under section 34 of the Union is on record. And by its perusal it would be seen that in substance what they have claimed therein was the payment of statutory bonus under Standing Order 10-C of the Ordinance. It is true that in the body of application reference was made by them to agreement dated 8-1-73 saying that it was got executed from them by deceit. But they had sought no declaration to that effect. In point of fact, they had confined their prayer only to the relief of statutory bonus under Standing Order 10-C. And it would be proper to reproduce from their application the prayer-clause which is as follows :- "Under the circumstances, it is prayed that this petition may please be accepted with costs and the respondent be directed to pay the statutory bonus under Standing Order 10-C for the financial year ended on 30-6-72 and for the financial year ended on 30-6-73 within a week of the acceptance of this petition, to all the eligible workers of the respondent Company, in accordance with the provisions of the said law."
39. ' Be that as it may, in view of or finding that the agreement dated 8-1-73 is in conflict with the statutory provisions of Standing Order 10-C of the Ordinance, the company would be disentitled to any relief in these proceedings which cannot be invoked in aid of injustice. Assuming for a moment that the impugned order of Labour Court is, for the reasons advanced by learned counsel, without jurisdiction, nonetheless it has done complete justice between the parties and to set it aside in these proceedings now would tantamount to perpetuate against the workers of Union a state of injustice. In this respect, we would like to quote from the well-known judgment of Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (1) the following dictum with advantage:- "An order in the nature of writ of certiorari or mandamus is a discretionary order. Its object is to foster justice and right a wrong. Therefore, before a person can be permitted to invoke this discretionary power of a Court, it must be shown that the order sought to be set aside had occasioned some injustice to the parties. If it does not work any injustice to any party, rather it cures a manifest illegality, then the extraordinary jurisdiction ought not to be allowed to be invoked.
40. In the same manner, in the instant case, if the High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962, came to the conclusion, as it has in fact done that the orders of the Deputy Claims Commissioner verifying the claim of the appellants were illegal and without jurisdiction, it could legitimately refuse to set aside the order of the Officer-on-Special Duty, even though the latter was clearly without jurisdiction."
41. ' This petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. But in view of the rather difficult questions of law involved in it, we would leave the parties to bear their own costs. {{FOOT NOTE}}