DECISION The Impugned Award was passed by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court No. V on the 26th of March, 1974, under section 32(1-A) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the 'Ordinance*). The facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal briefly put are these. 2.
The respondent is a Collective Bargaining Agent. That an Industrial Dispute arose between the parties earlier to the present one in 1972 which concluded with a Settlement dated the 8th of June, 1972 between the parties. Para, l2 of the said Agreement reads as under: "It is mutually agreed that the period of operation of this Agreement will be for two years with effect from lst June, 1972 and will continue to be binding on the parties after the expiry of two months from the date on which a Notice in writing of an intention to terminate this Settlement is given by one of the parties to the other party of this Settlement." Admittedly the binding period of the said Settlement has not yet expired, when on 4th June, 1973, the respondent-Union served a Notice under section 26(1) of the Ordinance raising eight demands including the demand relating to the Bonus which is the subject- matter of the appeal. The appellant on 11th of June, 1973 replied to the said Notice and specifically alleged that it was in contravention of the Settlement dated the 8th of June, 1972. The Conciliation failed and it resulted in an application under section 32(1-A) of the Ordinance giving rise to the impugned Award whereby the learned Court accepted the demand as regards Bonus, on the sole ground that the appellant used to pay customary bonus and now they must pay bonus on profit. 3.
Mr. Khan, the learned Representative for the appellant Insurance Company in the first place contended that the demand in respect of bonus is barred by Para 11 of the Settlement arrived at on the 8th of June, 1972. It is at page 171, which runs as under: "In full and final settlement of all the demands on the Company by the International General Insurance Company of Pakistan Staff Union (General Department), vide its letter dated 22-3-1972, the aforesaid Union, representing the employees of the Company in its West Pakistan Establishment, accepts the offer made by the Company, as specified in this agreement and withdraws all other demands made in the above- mentioned letter but not specified in the term of this Memorandum of Settlement and undertake to make no further demands, including those which are not accepted by the Company and, are " withdrawn by the Union, during the period of operation of this Agreement as hereinafter specified."
Mr. Khan laid emphasis on the words "no further demands, including those which are not accepted by the Company. There is much force in thel contention of Mr. Khan. The sacredness and solomnity of a settlements cannot be denied. The Supreme Court in the case of M. M. Isphani & Co: Ltd. (1), Cornelius J., observed: "Agreements entered into under settlement are binding on the employers and employees both."
4. In the next place Mr, Khan contended that even otherwise it would appear from the terms of this settlement regarding bonus that the conclusion of the leamed Court is not justified. Clause IV of the Settlement dated 8th of June, 1972 relating to bonus reads as under: 'The Profit Bonus paid to the employees in the past in the form of Eid and 2nd Bonuses will henceforth be payable and regulated in accordance with the conditions and payments outlined in Standing Order 10-C(2)(a) & 3 of the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance, 1972." Relying on the above terms of Settlement Mr. Khan contended that the admitted position that now arises is that the bonus which was being paid in the past was not customary bonus but only profit bonus and therefore the conclusion of the learned Court is not warranted. That the conclusion ofl Mr. Khan is correct finds support from omission of clause (/v) oils Standing Order 10-C. This seems to me to be deliberate. Had clause (ivjl been mentioned the contention now raised before me would not have been available to Mr. Khan. Moreover the 10-C was introduced on the 13th of April, 1972 which was only prospective and it cannot be given retrospective effect The Demand No. 1 of the respondent- Union reads as under: "The Company was paying bonus regardless of profits or losses (1) equivalent to one month's wages as a customary bonus since its inception and (2) from 1969, it was raised to 2 months, one bonus was disbursed at the eve of Eid, called "Eid Bonus" and second Bonus as special Bonus. This is borne out from salary cards. It is, therefore, demanded that in addition to customary bonus as above, bonus based on net profit be paid from 1968 till date to all workers having service for more than 90 days, 30% of net profits of the respective years such as from 1968, it shall be paid up-till-date, divided by the aggregate of monthly wages workmen to set up the quantum. The arrears shall thus be paid within 7 days."
5. In this connection Mr. Khan also pointed out that the respondent- Union cannot be allowed after about one year to repeat the demand about bonus. A notice dated the 4th of June, 1973 under section 26(1) of the Ordinance was given to the appellant-company which the Company immediately on 11th of June, 1973 replied.
The best that can be said for the Union is that there is no estoppel against law. If the Union was entitled to claim bonus under Standing Order 10-C it could do so. The fact, however,! remains that the Union having accepted the terms of the Settlement for aboutp one year cannot now be allowed to agitate the question of bonus. . | 6. Mr. Majeed, the learned Representative of the respondent relied on sections 3 and 4 of the Standing Order Ordinance, 1968, in support of his contention that the Union could not contract out of the benefits conferred under Standing Order 10- C. There is no force in this contention. The agreement in respect of bonus already reproduced cannot be said to deminish the right of the Union as conferred under Standing Order 10-C. The Union has only accepted certain factual position and it cannot be said to have modified the provisions of 10-C by admitting the factual position that in the past they were taking profit bonus. 7.
Lastly Mr. Khan contended that the claim was barred by section 32(6)(l)(v) of the Insurance Act, 1938. He submitted that Insurance Act is a special Act while Standing Order Ordinance is a general Act applicable to all Commercial Establishments and Industrial Concerns. It is not necessary to examine this position in view of my finding that I have given above.
8. The appeal, for the reasons given above, is allowed and the Award of the learned Labour Court is set aside. Workers' Union v.
Standard Printing Press 567 (Inamullah Khant Appellate Tribunal)