1. ' This appeal has been preferred under section 30(2) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 so as to impugn the legality of the judgment dated 29-3-1994 of the learned Commissioner functioning under the Workmen's Compensation Act whereby the claim of the respondent for the recovery of the amount of premia, was accepted.
2. ' The relevant factual background of the matter is that Rab Nawaz (deceased) was employed in the appellant company but he died on account of road accident. Mian Khan respondent who is father of the said Rab Nawaz moved the learned Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation constituted under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the grant of premia as envisaged by S.0.10(b) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders)
3. Ordinance 1968. This claim of the respondent was accepted by the impugned order and it was held that the appellant company is liable to pay the premia to the respondent.
4. ' At the hearing of the. Appeal the learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection that no appeal under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is competent against the order of the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation awarding compensation under S.0.10(b) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. In support of this contention he relied on the following precedent cases: {{TABLE}} (1)
5. 1975 PLC 777 1976 PLC 92 1981 PLC 490, 622, 685, 844.
6. 1982 PLC 603, 641, 689.
7. 1983 PLC 763.
8. 1985 PLC 1093.
9. 1993 PLC 391. {{TABLE}} ' On the other hand the learned counsel for the appellant argued that the appeal is competent and he sought support from 1976 PLC 405 and 1984 PLC 1189.
10. ' I studied the relevant law and the case file in the light of the arguments addressed and judgments cited at the bar.
11. ' This is by now settled that no appeal would be competent unless it is specifically provided by the relevant statute. Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 provides for appeal against the order of the Commissioner but the various clauses from (a) to (e) of this section would not cover any order passed under S.O. 10(b) of the Standing Orders Ordinance. I, therefore, agree with the view taken in the cases cited from the respondent side and hold that this appeal is not maintainable. The case 1976 PLC 405 referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant proceeds on different facts and is inapplicable while in the other case 1984 PLC 1189 a contrary view has been taken from those relied on from the respondent side. The learned counsel for the parties had also argued the case on merits but after holding that no appeal is competent before this Tribunal it would amount to futile exercise to go into the merits. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed as not competent with no order as to costs.