DECISION This appeal has been filed under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act against the order of the Commissioner ordering the compensation to be paid by the appellant.
2. Ismail son of respondent No. 1 was in the employment of respondent No. 2 and was insured under the Group Life Insurance Scheme in terms of Standing Orders 10(6) of the Standing Orders Ordinance.
He died while he was in the employment of respondent No. 2. Consequently respondent No. 1, mother of the deceased made an application under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act to the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act against respondent No. 3. The claim was contested and it was inter alia pleaded that since it was covered by the Group Insurance Policy the said Life Insurance Company was liable for the payment of the compensation. Subsequently the appellant was impleaded as a party. The appellant disputed the claim on the ground that the policy issued by the appellant was not a workmen compensation policy but it was a Group Life Insurance Policy as contemplated by Standing Order 10(6) of Standing Order Ordinance and the appellant was not the employer of the deceased and, therefore, the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. It was also pleaded that the application made under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act was not maintainable and in any event the deceased was not covered by the Group Life Insurance Scheme as he was not actively on duty on the date of his death. Subsequently the application made by respondent No. 1 was amended and it was treated to be under section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
3. The learned Commissioner on the basis of the material produced before him allowed the claim against the appellant. Consequently the present appeal has been filed.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was not maintainable as the order was passed under Standing Order 10(6)(5) Standing Orders Ordinance and no appeal was provided. To support his contention he made reference to my decision dated 23-7-1975 in in the case of Daily *Mushriq' v. Mst. Rehmat Khatoon. The learned counsel for the appellant has not succeeded in distinguishing that case. I, therefore, see no reason to take a view different from one I had taken. The only point which was raised by the learned counsel is that the application in the present case was under the Payment of Wages Act and subsequently amended and treated under section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In my view this hardly makes any difference as it is a settled position that although a wrong section is quoted it is the duty of the Court to apply the proper section. The claim in the present case falls under Standing Order 10(6) of the Standing Orders Ordinance and not under Payment of Wages Act or Workmen's Compensation Act. As already indicated in my previous decision that only the procedural provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act had been incorporated in the Standing Orders Ordinance by the amendment. "Apparently the present case was dealt with under Standing Orders Ordinance and not under the Workmen's Compensation Act as is being wrongly assumed. In other words the powers to decide the claim were conferred upon the Commissioner by virtue of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act incorporated in the Standing Orders Ordinance and, therefore, thel Commissioner derived the jurisdiction from the Standing Orders itself andL he could not be deemed to be acting under the Workmen's Compensationf* Act. Since there is no provision in the Standing Orders Ordinance allowing) the right of appeal such a right cannot be derived from another enactment.
5. In the circumstances the appeal is dismissed. At the request of the learned counsel of the appellant I order that the payment of compensation to the respondent No. 1 be suspended for one week as the counsel expressed his desire to hie writ petition in the High Court.