1. ' Appellant Muhammad Usman has called in question his eviction from the shop in litigation, ordered by IInd Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller Hyderabad in R.A.No,3 of 1989.
2. ' Admittedly appellant Muhammad Usman is in possession of the shop in litigation and one small store at the upstairs of Quarter No,C/2-151 Unit No,8 Latifabad Hyderabad.
3. ' Respondent Iqbal Hussain Khan claimed to have purchased the premises in litigation and to have let out the same to the appellant, at the rate of Rs,225 p.m. Under a Tenancy Agreement dated 21- 12-1986. Respondent added that he was serving in WAPDA, from where he had retired on 3-8-1988 after reaching the age of 60 years. Respondent also stated that he was a crippled person and was without job and he desired to run his own business with help of his two sons in the premises in litigation. Before filing the rent application, the respondent sent a legal notice to the appellant and also requested him personally to surrender the premises in litigation as the same were required for personal bona fide use. The appellant refused to surrender the premises and hence the respondent filed Rent Application No,3 of 1989 under section 14 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (hereinafter to be mentioned as the Ordinance) for eviction of the appellant.
4. ' The rent application was contested by the appellant, who in his written statement challenged the same to be not maintainable. Appellant denied the receipt of notice. He denied the respondent being owner of the premises in litigation. At the same time he admitted relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the respondent. The appellant showed ignorance about the respondent having retired from Wapda service. He challenged the requirement of the premises in litigation by the respondent for personal bona fide use, and averred that the respondent had filed the rent application, not for requiring the premises for personal need, but to take revenge as the appellant had appeared against him as a witness in a rent case filed against Munir uddin.
5. ' After recording evidence of the parties, learned Rent Controller under the impugned order dated 22-12-1993 accepted the rent application and directed the appellant to hand over vacant possession of the premises in litigation to the respondent within 60 days and to pay cost. Hence this appeal.
6. ' Mr. Munawar Ali Kazi learned counsel for the appellant argued that notice under Section 14 of the Ordinance was not served upon the appellant before filing of the rent case, and hence the rent application was not maintainable. It was next argued that the respondent had not been able to establish that he was owner of the premises in litigation and hence he had no right to move an application under Section 14 of the Ordinance. In support learned counsel for the appellant cited the cases of:
(i) Syed Muhammad Haider Zaidi and others v. Abdul Hafeez and others (1991 SCM R 1699);
(ii) Syed Hasan Askari Rizvi. v. Muhammad Aziz (PLO 1989 SC 1).
7. ' Mr. Raja Khan learned counsel for the respondent argued that the plot, of which the premises were part and parcel, was purchased by the respondent in 1953 and that there was no practice of execution of sale-deeds in respect of the plots of Shah Latifabad Township. It was further argued that the premises in litigation were let out to the appellant under a written Rent Agreement dated 21-124986. In respect of notice under Section 14 of the Ordinance, it was vehemently argued that the same was served upon the appellant who admitted his address in the notice Exh. 19 dated 17- 10-1988 to be correct during his cross-examination. In support learned counsel for the respondent cited the cases of:
(i) S. Moinul Hassan v. A.H. Junaid (1985 CLC 882).
(ii) Syed Israr Alain v. S.M. Hussain (1983 CLC 468).
(iii) Moeen Afridi v. Capt. MR. Choudhry (1982 CLC 1116).
8. Provisions contained in Section 14 of the Ordinance are meant to benefit inter alia certain category of landlords, who are about to retire or have retired or who were about to cross a particular age.
9. These provisions are in addition to the normal provisions contained in Section 15 of the Ordinance, about eviction of tenants, on fulfilment of certain conditions mentioned in said section.
10. ' In reply to the objection raised by the appellant that the respondent was not owner of the premises although he was his landlord, respondent produced Allotment Order Exh.14, issued by the Collector of Hyderabad and Chairman of the Administration Committee, Shah Latifabad.
11. Respondent also produced a lease deed Exh. 15, under which plot of the premises in litigation was leased out to him for a period of 50 years. From the date of the deed. In his written statement the appellant did not deny the relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the respondent.
12. His main objection was that the respondent was not the owner. In this respect reliance was placed on the case of Syed Muhammad Haider Zaidi (1991 SCM R 1699), where it was held that the word "landlord" used in Section 14 of the Ordinance refers to its primary meaning, namely, the owner and not to its extending meaning. In the same case it was clarified that an attorney or an agent simplicitor, who was authorised to receive rent on behalf of owner of the property concerned cannot press into service section 14 of the Ordinance for his personal benefit. There can be no cavil with the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which do not apply to this case where the respondent himself has invoked section 14 of the Ordinance. It may be noted that in certain areas the absolute ownership of a plot is never given to anybody. For example in the Cantonment Areas, the person owning a property is given lease-hold rights in the plot over which his property stands. This does not mean that no landlord owning a property in Cantonment Area can maintain an application for eviction for personal use under the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act. On the same analogy the plots in Latifabad, Hyderabad, are given by allotment and thereafter lease deed is executed by which lease-hold rights are given to the allottees. This does not mean that no landlord of Latifabad, Hyderabad, area can maintain an application for eviction under Section 14 of the Ordinance. It may be mentioned here that appellant Muhammad Usman in his affidavit did not take the plea that the respondent was not owner of the plot, over which the premises in litigation are situated. In his cross-examination he admitted that he was tenant in the case premises for preceding 10 years. He admitted his signature on rent agreement (Exh. 17). He admitted that the respondent used to issue rent receipt after receipt of monthly rent by him. This shows that the appellant has been treating the respondent as his landlord and has been paying him the rent. In the case of Moeen Afridi (1982 CLC 1116) the tenant was paying rent to the landlord by cheque and electricity and gas bills were also issued in the name of the landlord and there was agreement of tenancy between the parties and it was held that it could safely be said in such circumstances that the landlord is owner of the premises. In the case of S. Moinul Hassan v. A.H.
13. Junaid (1985 CLC 882) the view taken by a learned Judge of this Court was, that a tenant is bound by and should honour the initial agreement of tenancy and that a Rent Controller is not the regular Court to open up controversy relating to the title in the property. In said case the tenant was inducted into the premises under a tenancy agreement and he had been paying rent under such agreement. In said case it was also observed that transfers between the family members touching ownership of the property which is subject-matter of a rent case, are not germane for the purpose of resolving the controversy between a tenant and the landlord. In the said case landlord a salaried person moved an application under section 14 of the Ordinance for ejectment of his tenant on the ground that he would. Be retiring from service on a particular date. Rent case was opposed on the ground that the landlord was not owner and that he had obtained a voluntary retirement from service, which must be taken to be a resignation and not retirement. In the cited case, the landlord possessed original lease deed executed by K.D A. In his favour and he was held to be owner of the property in question. After having obtained the premises on rent from the respondent, the appellant is estopped from challenging the title of the respondent in view of Article 115 of Qanoon- e-Shahadat. I, therefore, hold that this rent application was maintainable and the Rent Controller took correct decision to this effect.
14. ' On the point of personal requirement, the respondent filed his own affidavit as well as affidavits of S.M. Yousuf and Wasim Iqbal. He produced office order Exh. 18, showing that he retired from service of WAPDA on 3-8-1988 on completion of 60 years of age. In his affidavit the respondent stated that he was serving in WAPDA and had retired on 3-8-1988. In his cross-examination the respondent admitted that besides order Exh. 18, he was not given any other letter about his retirement. He also admitted in his cross-examination that it was not mentioned in his rent application as to, what business he would carry out in the disputed premises. It is, however, not necessary for a landlord seeking eviction on personal need to give full particulars of the business proposed to be established in the premises in litigation. In this respect reference may be made to the case of. Mst.
15. Saira Bai v. Syed Anisur Rehman (1989 SCM R 1366). The appellant did not produce any evidence to rebut the fact that the respondent had retired from service except solitary denial in his affidavit.
16. The appellant admitted in his cross-examination that he is having a shop beneath stair-case alongwith small space adjoining the shop and that the respondent is residing on the first floor. The appellant admitted that the respondent had two major sons. He showed his ignorance about the respondent having retired from service. The appellant also admitted that the respondent was lame. The evidence adduced by the appellant, does not rebut assertion by the respondent on oath, as to his requirement of the premises, for his personal use. Such assertion has not been shaken in cross-examination or disproved in rebuttal.
17. ' It may be mentioned here that word "good faith" appearing in clause (vii) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the Ordinance, does not appear in the provisions contained in section 14 of the Ordinance. In spite of this, it was observed in the case of Syed Israr Alam (1983 CLC 468) as below: "The mere use of the word 'need' would envelop the concept of bona fides. After all, it has to be established that a person needs the premises, and in such enquiry it can never be said that the word has to be interpreted as if it were divorced from the concept of bona fides or mala fides.
18. Taking that view would mean that even unreasonable and fanciful need will have to be met only if the landlord were to come and say that he needs the premises. Such an intention could never be attributed to the legislature because the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance is enactment of a nature that is designed to protect the right of occupation of a tenant."
19. ' In the same case it was also observed that a landlord, when he is projecting his needs, has to subject himself to judicial scrutiny, so that it should be found whether the needs that, he expresses are genuine, or he is wanting more accommodation on account of desire to live in unreasonable luxury or a desire to dislodge his tenant. Even on the touchstone laid down in the said case, the respondent appears to have established his case, about his need for the premises in litigation for personal use. His case therefore comes within the four corners of section 14 of the Ordinance.
20. ' Another question arises, as to, whether the notice contemplated by subsection (1) of section 14 of the Ordinance was served upon the appellant, before filing of the ejectment case. In para. 6 of his affidavit the respondent stated that after his retirement he requested the appellant to hand-over the shop in litigation alongwith the store room, to him for his personal bona fide use and that subsequently a legal notice was also sent to the appellant. He produced copy Exh. 19 of the notice dated 17-10-1988, sent to appellant Muhammad Usman with A/D receipt Exh.
20. In his cross-examination, the appellant admitted that his address was the same that was written in the rent application, in the rent agreement and in the legal notice dated 17-10-1988, copy Exh.
19. A/D receipt Exh. 20 appears to be containing signature of the addressee. Since the notice copy Exh. 19 contains correct address of the appellant, hence it is presumed to have reached its addressee. Case of Syed Hassan Askari Rizvi (PLD 1989 SC 1) is distinguishable because in the cited case the notice under section 14(1) of the Ordinance was sent by the landlord F to the tenant four days before the date when in fact it should have been sent. No such question arises in the instant case, where the appellant did not complain of late receipt or early receipt of the notice required to be sent under section 14 of the Ordinance. Plea of the appellant was, non-receipt of the notice.
21. ' For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order does not require interference. Consequently this appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. The appellant is given a period of two months to surrender possession of the premises in litigation to the respondent.