1. ' JAVID IQBAL, J.--The appellant is landlord of the disputed shop situate in Tilak Incline, Hyderabad, Sind. The respondent is tenant occupying the said premises. The appellant served a notice to the respondent, dated 30th May, 1985 under section 14(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 (hereinafter called the Ordinance) to the effect that the appellant was going to retire from Government service on 3rd December, 1985 and that he required the shop in question for his personal use as he intended to start business therein after his retirement. This notice was received by the respondent on 1 June, 1985 and he also replied to the same through his counsel vide letters dated 11 June, 1985. Eventually the appellant filed a suit for ejectment of the respondent from the said shop under section 14 of the Ordinance before the Rent Controller Hyderabad on 13 August, 1985. The suit was decreed in favour of the appellant and against the respondent on 18 March, 1986 on the ground that the appellant required the disputed premises for his personal bona fide use, his case being governed by categories (c) and (e) enumerated in section 14(1) of the Ordinance. The respondent was ordered to vacate the premises and deliver vacant possession of the disputed shop to the appellant within two months from the date of the order. Aggrieved by the same the respondent filed an appeal before the High Court of Sind, Hyderabad Circuit which was allowed by learned Single Judge on 10th August, 1 986 and the order dated 18 March, 1 986 of the Rent Controller was set aside.
2. ' Leave to appeal was granted in this case to the appellant-landlord to consider inter alia whether the learned Single Judge was right in holding that the notice under section 14(1) of the Ordinance was invalid inasmuch as it was given more than six months before the date on which the appellant was due to retire from service, and that as to whether the High Court was justified in holding that ejectment proceedings taken before the Rent Controller by the appellant against the respondent were premature having been initiated on the basis of an invalid notice dated 30th May, 1985.
3. ' Learned counsel for the appellant stated that his client in his notice dated 30 May, 1 985 had made it quite clear that he was to retire on 3 December, 1985 on attaining the age of sixty years and that therefore the said notice was valid and in accordance with the provisions of section 14(1) of the Ordinance. The notice was received by the respondent on 1 June, 1985. However, in his reply dated 11 June, 1985 the respondent did not raise any such objection that the said notice was invalid as it was not in accordance with the provisions of section 14(1) of the Ordinance. He had only raised objection that the appellant was already in possession of two more shops other than the shop in occupation of the respondent and that therefore he was not entitled to the possession of the disputed shop on the fake ground of personal need. It was next submitted that since the respondent did not vacate the premises and deliver vacant possession of the same within two months from the date of the receipt of the notice, the appellant instituted a suit for his ejectment on 13 August, 1985 under section 14 of the Ordinance. It was contended that as to invalidity of the said notice under section 14(1) of the Ordinance no objection was raised by the respondent in his written statement and no specific issue to that effect was framed by the trial Court. The argument of the learned counsel was that the Rent Controller who decreed the suit on 18 March, 1986 was correct in arriving at the conclusion that the respondent was liable to be ejected from the disputed premises and that the Rent Controller was satisfied that the said premises were required by the appellant for his personal bona fide use, his case being governed by categories (c) and (e) of section 14(1) of the Ordinance. Learned counsel submitted that by category (c) of the said section was meant "a salaried employee due to be retired within the next six months" and that by category
(e) was meant "a person who was due to attain the age of 60 years within the next six months". It was submitted by learned counsel that the notice, dated 30th May, 1985 under section 14(1) of the Ordinance served on the respondent by the appellant was valid as he was due to retire and to attain the age of sixty years on 3 December, 1985. This notice was received by the respondent on 1 June, 1985 and its receipt is admitted by him. Thereafter, the ejectment suit was filed after the expiry of two months' period. In such circumstances there was no justification on the part of the learned Single Judge of the Sind High Court who had accepted the appeal of the respondent, in holding that the notice sent by the appellant to the respondent was premature as the same was given more than six months before the date on which the appellant was due to retire as well as to attain the age of sixty years, and that hence the same was not in strict compliance with the provisions of section 14(1) of the Ordinance. According to the learned counsel the learned Judge had relied upon the minority view of a Full Bench judgment titled Barkatullah Khan v. Mirza Muhammad Hasan (PLD 1986 Kar.309), and the minority view was to the effect that a notice which was not served in accordance with the provisions of section 14(1) of the Ordinance would be anything but a notice under the aforesaid section. In other words service of notice strictly in accordance with section 14(1) of the Ordinance was a condition precedent and that no landlord was competent to apply to the Rent Controller for eviction of a tenant without first serving such notice. According to the learned counsel through a strict interpretation of section 14(1) of the Ordinance in this manner, when no objection had been raised respecting the notice's invalidity before the trial Court in the written statement of the respondent and no issue to that effect had been framed, the learned Single Judge while hearing the appeal could not have set aside the judgment of the Rent Controller on the ground that the said notice being invalid, the proceedings before the Rent Controller w114011 followed such notice were not maintainable under the law.
4. Learned counsel in support of his arguments placed reliance on 1983 SCMR 191 (Viali Muhammad and another v. Mst Hamida Bai) wherein it was held: "The prescribed period is for the benefit of the tenant and is intended to allow him sufficient time to vacate the premises and further he cannot be ejected summarily under section 14 of the said Ordinance without the efflux of time. This is the statutory requirement, but in the circumstances of the case, as the appellants had failed to raise this objection at the earlier stage and allowed a year to pass, the High Court was correct in holding that there was no substance in this legal objection which was eminently against the spirit of the provision which allowed summary relief to the widow."
5. ' To sum up his arguments learned counsel submitted that section 14(1) of the Ordinance should have been interpreted liberally and that in the instant case since the notice was valid and no objection in respect of its invalidity had been raised, the impugned judgment of the High Court be set asie and the judgment passed by the Rent Controller be restored.
6. ' Learned counsel for the respondent in reply submitted that previously the appellant had filed an ejectment suit against the respondent on the ground that he required the disputed shop for the personal need of his son but the same had been dismissed by the Rent Controller. It was argued that the respondent in his reply to the notice of the appellant did raise the objection that he had other shops than the one under the occupation of the respondent and that therefore he was not entitled to the possession of the said shop on the ground of personal need. However, in his written statement before the trial Court the respondent also raised objection to the effect that the notice was illegal and mala fide and that it was not in consonance with the provisions of the law and that therefore it was invalid. Learned counsel further submitted that on the basis of this very objection of the respondent an issue was framed by the Rent Controller to the following effect: "Whether the case of the applicant is governed by section 14 of the Ordinance?"
7. He therefore submitted that it was not correct on the part of the learned counsel to state that no objection regarding the invalidity of the said notice was raised and that no issue to that effect was framed. Learned counsel next submitted that the provisions of section 14(1) of the Ordinance are special provisions and therefore if any landlord was to claim ejectment of the tenant on the basis of the said provisions he must give the notice to the tenant strictly in accordance with section 14(1) of the Ordinance. If this was not done the notice would become invalid and the proceedings of ejectment which were based on the same would also be not maintainable under the law. He further submitted that the strict interpretation of the said section by the High Court was in accordance with the spirit of the legal provision and the learned Single Judge relying on PLD 1986 Ker. 309 had correctly arrived at the conclusion that the notice in the instant case was invalid being premature as it was given more than six months before the date on which the appellant was due to retire from service or to attain the age of sixty years. According to the learned counsel for the respondent 1983 SCM R 191 was not applicable to the facts of the present case in which objection regarding invalidity of the notice served on the tenant had been raised during the trial of the ejectment suit before the Rent Controller who had framed an issue to that effect. Therefore, according to the learned counsel that judgment could not be cited in support of the appellant's case.
8. ' We have heard learned counsel for both the parties. The appellant was in the Railway Police serving as Head Constable. He was due to retire and to attain the age of sixty years on 3 December, 1985. He served notice on the respondent under section 14(1) of the Ordinance on 30 May, 1985 which was stated to have been received by the respondent on 1 June, 1985. Thus, it is evident from these dates that it was sent four days before the date when it should have in fact been sent.
9. Consequently if section 14(1) of the Ordinance is to be strictly interpreted because this is a special provision introduced in the Sind -Rented Premises Ordinance by way of an amendment to benefit the categories of landlords mentioned therein, then the notice in the instant case sent by the appellant to the respondent under the aforesaid section was premature as the same was given four days more than six months before the date on which the appellant was due to retire or to attain the age of sixty years. Thus, strictly speaking, it was not in strict compliance with the provisions of section 14(1) of the Ordinance and as such was correctly held to be invalid. The record also indicates that although it was not stated by the respondent in his reply to the notice that it was not specifically in accordance with the provisions of section 14(1) of the Ordinance and was therefore invalid, objection to that effect in a general manner had been raised on behalf of the respondent in his written statement, and it was on the basis of the said objection that an issue was framed to determine as to whether the case of the appellant was governed by section 14 of the Ordinance. Therefore, learned counsel for the appellant is not correct to state that no objection to that effect was raised by the respondent and no issue to that effect had been framed. Since this is the position 1983 SCMR 191 would not be of any help to the appellant in the circumstances of the present case. The only point which requires determination in the instant case is as to whether section 14(1) of the Ordinance is to be interpreted strictly or liberally. In our view since the provisions thereunder are special for the benefit of some landlords who fall in certain categories given in section 14(1) of the Ordinance, it should be strictly interpreted because the general provisions under which an application can be made for ejectment of a tenant before a Rent Controller are given in section 15 of the Ordinance. We note that while the ejectment suit was pending before the Rent Controller (decided on 18 March, 1986) the appellant had not only been retired but also attained the age of sixty years. Be that as it may, since in our view the notice in the instant case under section 14(1) of the Ordinance was invalid, the learned Single Judge of the High Court was correct in arriving at the- conclusion D that the proceedings before the Rent Controller based on the same were not maintainable under the law. The result is that the judgment of the learned Single Judge is maintained and this appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
10. ' However, before parting with this case we would like to observe that if the appellant is advised to serve a fresh notice in strict compliance with section 14(1) of the Ordinance or subsequently initiates ejectment proceedings against the respondent by way of an ejectment application under section 14 of the Ordinance, this judgment shall not he a bar for him.