1. ' Appellant Mst. Khurshid Begum has called in question dismissal of a Rent Case No,850/89, ordered on 18-2-1992 by learned VIIth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi South.
2. ' Admittedly the respondent is in occupation of the shop in litigation bearing No,1-A on the ground floor of a building, namely, Rahim Manzil, at Jamcela Street, Karachi, which is owned by the appellant.
3. ' Rent Case No,850/89 was moved by the appellant under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereafter mentioned as the Ordinance), for eviction of the respondent from the shop in litigation. In her application under section 14 of the Ordinance, the appellant claimed to have issued notice under section 14 of the Ordinance to the respondent calling upon him to vacate the demised shop as the same was required for her own personal use. Said notice was however, replied on behalf of the respondent, who did not vacate the shop in question. Hence the appellant filed the application.
4. ' The rent application was contested by the respondent who in his written statement challenged the same to be incompetent, not maintainable and bad in law. Respondent took plea that Rs,85,000 were taken from him as Pagri by the appellant. He also averred in his written statement that the appellant was in possession of a building having sufficient income and accommodation and she also owned a number of flats and shops in her name It was denied if the appellant had a need for the shop in litigation.
5. ' After recording evidence of the parties, the learned Rent Controller under the impugned order dated 18-2-1992 dismissed the rent application. Hence this appeal.
6. ' Mr. Manohar Lal, learned counsel for the appellant argued that appellant Mst. Khurshid Begum was over 60 years of age and her husband had died on 6-7-1988 and hence she required the shop in litigation for the purpose of doing some business. Learned counsel for the appellant conceded that Rent Case No,851/89 was filed by the appellant against another tenant, but argued that said rent case was in respect of residential flat, although the application was moved under section 14 of the Ordinance. Learned counsel stated at the Bar that said rent application was decided and so also appeal filed by the tenant against acceptance of the rent application. In support learned counsel for the appellant cited the cases of:
(i) Muhammad Bux v. Karim Bux alias Kaman Lala (1987 CLC 13).
(ii) M.S. Baroba v. Manzoor Ahmad (PLD 1986 Karachi 407).
(iii) Ulfat Hameed v. Mst. Birj Khatoon PLD 1982 Karachi 823).
(iv) Wali Muhammad v. Mrs. Hameeda (PLD 1981 Karachi 794).
(v) Younus v. Mrs. Hameeda (1982 CLC 580).
(vi) M/s. Construction Services (Pakistan v. Ali Hussain 1982 CLC 1241).
(vii) George Levi v. Mrs. Sakia Sultana (1984 CLC 3066).
(viii) Kamal Afreen v. Mansoor Muhammad Qureshi (PLD 1983 Karachi 598).
(ix) Abdul Majid v. Mst. Naimunnisa Begum (PLD 1981 SC 118).
7. ' Mr. Imran Ahmed, learned counsel for the respondent conceded that the respondent was given notice under section 14 of the Ordinance. It was argued that the appellant did not need the premises and hence the Rent Controller had rightly dismissed her rent case. Learned counsel emphasized on the word "needs" appearing in section 14 of the Ordinance and contended that order under section 14 of the Ordinance cannot be passed by the learned Rent Controller unless he is satisfied that there needs for the appellant. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that she had admitted that she was having sufficient income from her property and she owned two other buildings besides the building in which the shop in litigation was situated. It was added that bona fide can be considered even any case under section 14 of the Ordinance. In support learned counsel for the respondent cited the cases of:--
(i) Mst. Najma Ashraf v. Mst. Noor Jehan (1994 SCMR 913).
(ii) Hafiz Abdul Malik v. Muhammad Ilyas (PLD 1989 SC 356).
(iii) Ghulam Muhammad v. Zahir Ahmad Khan (1986 CLC 681).
(iv) Manzoor Hussain v. Mst. Naheed Akhtar and others (1991 MLD 724).
(v) Saadat Ali Baig v. S. Bux Ellahi (1991 CLC 623).
8. ' In support of her case respondent Mst. Khurshid Begum filed her personal affidavit where she said that her husband Haji Allah Bux expired on 6-7-1988. She produced photo-copy of such certificate issued by K.M.C. Mst. Khurshid Begum added that on 18-3-1989 she sent a notice through her advocate to the respondent under section 14 of the Ordinance. She produced copy of such notice as Exh.A/2. She also produced copy Exh.A/3 of the reply dated 10-4-1989 received by her from the respondent. In this way the provisions contained in section 14 of the Ordinance appeared to have been complied. Mst. Khurshid Begum was subjected to a lengthy cross-examination, during the course of which she admitted that on the ground floor of her building there were four shops and behind those there were two godowns. She also admitted that there are 8 flats on the first floor and there are four floors plus ground floor. The appellant added that her son Karim Bux was dealing with the tenants. She also admitted that she earned her livelihood from the rent of the building and she was paying income-tax out of her income and her son Karim Bux and Huzoor Bux were owners of Khurshid Centre and Qasar-i-Khurshid. Appellant admitted that she had collected rent of the demised premises up to June 1989 and she sent a legal notice to the respondent in March 1989.
9. She further stated that the tenants were inducted in the building in 1988 as per para. 7 of her affidavit. The purpose of putting such question in the cross-examination appears to be to establish that the appellant was not requiring the disputed premises bona fidely or in good faith. Perhaps learned counsel who cross-examined the appellant thought that she had filed the application under section 15 of the Ordinance. During her cross-examination Mst. Khurshid Begum does not appear to suppress any fact. She has been frank enough to reply every question that was put to her irrespective of its relevancy. It was suggested to the appellant in her cross-examination that Rs,85,000 were paid to her husband as goodwill, but she denied this. She denied the suggestion that Rs,200,000 were demanded by her as compensation and Rs,600 per month were demanded from the respondent as rent. Appellant denied the suggestion that she annoyed with the respondent for having given correct figure about her income to the Income-tax Department.
10. Here it may be observed that there is plethora of case-law including the cases cited by learned counsel for appellant (which would be discussed A later on), showing that the question of bona fides is not to be looked into while considering an application under section 14 of the Ordinance, which is different from section 15 of the Ordinance.
11. In rebuttal respondent Dr. S.C.. Cou said in his affidavit that he paid Rs,85,000 to husband of the appellant as Pagri/deposit as per the practice in the locality. He said that 20% of the amount of Pugri goes to the landlord out of the amount received from incoming tenants. Respondent further stated that the appellant is doing the business of renting out her shops and flats and she was earning lot of amount by receiving rent and commission/percentage as a result of changing tenancy receipts. Respondent further stated that before moving rent case the appellant got vacated some tenements from her tenants in Rahim Manzil and subsequently rented out the same to other tenants at higher rent and after receiving goodwill. Respondent named 3 of such tenants, who were not examined as witnesses. Respondent also stated that the appellant had sufficient monthly income and that she was earning Rs,35,000 per month without showing the same in her income-tax return. Respondent explained that the appellant was unhappy with him because he disclosed her true monthly income. Respondent took the trouble of giving the amount paid as income-tax by the appellant from 1985-86 to 1988-89. The respondent unnecessarily want to the extent of giving particulars about evocational activities of children of the appellant. It was also stated in the affidavit of the respondent that the appellant was living a comfortable life in a bungalow and she was not likely to shift to a conjested flat of two rooms. Appellant is said to have admitted in her cross-examination that she has no need of the premises in litigation. All these facts are irrelevant in a case of this nature, where requirements of section 14 of the Ordinance are alone to be seen without knowing into the question of bona fide need. The evidence adduced by the respondent does not further his case to any extent. In the case of Ulfat Hameed (PLD 1982 Karachi 823), the view taken was that section 14 of the Ordinance does not contemplate an inquiry by the Rent Controller into the genuineness or otherwise of needs expressed by a landlord and inquiry before the. Rent Controller under section 14 of the Ordinance must be confined to the objections raised by a tenant as to the jurisdictional facts. In the case of M.S. Baroba (PLD 1986 Karachi 407), a learned Division Bench of Court observed that according to section 15(2) (viii) of the Ordinance the legislature has used the word "good faith" as & condition for requirement of the premises by the landlord, while it has omitted to do so in section 14 of the Ordinance, in case of requirement of premises by widow or orphan whose both parents are dead or salaried employee due to retire within next six months or has attained age of sixty years. It was observed in the said case that manifest intention towards legislature that the question of good faith had not been gone into in the case of aforesaid persons if there conditions mentioned in section 14 of the Ordinance have been complied with. In the cases of Muhammad Bux (1987 CLC 13), Wali Muhammad (PLD 1981 Karachi 791), Younus (1982 CLC 580) and M/s. Construction Services Pakistan (1982 CLC 1241), it was held that a landlord in his application under section 14 of the Ordinance was not required to prove bona fides of his needs and his claim that the premises was required for personal use would be sufficient and that there was difference in the language implied in sections 14 and 15 (2)(vii) of the Ordinance and the question of bona fides cannot be investigated in an application under section 14 of the Ordinance.
12. ' As against this learned counsel for the respondent cited the case of Hafiz Abdul Malik (PLD 1989 SC 356), where the view taken was not different. In said case the landlord remained silent for over 15 years after attaining the age of 60 years and it was held that there was no time fixed under section 14 of the Ordinance for moving such application. After making all these observations the Supreme Court of Pakistan ordered eviction of the tenant. In the case of Mst. Najma Ashraf (1994 SCMR 813), it was held that if the landlady sought eviction under section 14 of the Ordinance, then only one ground was available to her which was that she had attained age of 61 years and the other grounds about her illness about her son being crippled would put her case within the ambit of section 15 rather than section 14 of the Ordinance. In this case also it was held that the question of bona fides or mala fide gone into in an application under section 15 of the Ordinance. In the case of Ghulam Muhammad (1985 CLC 581) the view taken was that bona fide requirement is not required to be proved by the landlord under section 14 of the Ordinance, but he has to prove that he needs the building and the word "needs" indicates that the landlord has to establish that it is not his arbitrarily desire to have particular premises vacated but that he has a need for the same and the need has to be proved and that unless and until some prima facie need is established a landlord cannot insist in irrespective to the need he should be given premises because he desires to have the same. In the cases of Manzoor Hussain (1991 MLD 724) and Saadat All Baig (1991 CLC 623), decided by me, the view taken was that although no period of limitation is prescribed for moving an application under section 14 of the Ordinance, but inordinate delay of over three years militates against genuine need of the landlord and it indicates that it was arbitrary desire of the landlord to have premises in litigation vacated by the tenants. In the case of Saadat Ali Baig (1991 CLC 623), decided by me, the view taken was that no period of limitation was prescribed for moving application under section 14 of the Ordinance.
13. It is correct that the appellant owns many flats and shops and has sufficient earnings from the rent of the premises owned by her and she pays income-tax also, but all this things would not come in her way for seeking eviction of a tenant under section 14 of the Ordinance as such question are not germane to the need of the premises in litigation by the appellant for personal use. The case-law discussed on the points showns that the appellant is not required to prove that she requires the premises in good faith for her use. Section 14 of the Ordinance gives blanket right to a landlord/landlady under the circumstances mentioned in said section to seek eviction of his/her tenant, notwithstanding the provisions contained in section 15 of the Ordinance. The appellant is therefore, entitled to have the respondent vacated from the premises in litigation.
14. ' For the foregoing reasons this appeal is accepted and the impugned order is reversed and the rent application moved under section 14 of the Ordinance is accepted and eviction of the respondent from the shop in question is ordered to take place after six months. No order as to costs. Such short order was passed on 3-10-1994 and these are the reasons for the same.