' These First Rent Appeals Nos. 445 of 1983, 446 of 1983 and 447 of 1983 are directed against the orders dated 6th April, 1983, passed by the Second Senior Civil Judge/A. S. J. And Rent Controller, Karachi, whereby he accepted the ejectment applications of the respondent and directed the appellants to vacate and hand over the possession of the premises within sixty days from the date of the orders. The question of law in these appeals appears to be one of first impression. The three appeals are directed against a common order passed in three different ejectment applications which were started against three different tenants with respect to three different ejectment cases.
But all the three cases were started by the respondent who is the owner of Commercial Building known as Al Aziz Building.
2. The facts which give rise to these appeals are that the widow respondent who is owner of shop premises of Al-Aziz Building on commercial Plots Nos. 677-678, Commercial Area, P. E. C. H.
9., Karachi. The respondent filed ejectment application being 2485/82, 3294/82 and 3295/82 that she is a widow as her husband died on 14th June, 1981 and she is a landlady and the appellants are her tenants in respect of Shops Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the said building on ground floor. She is a qualified tailor and dress-maker and has got sufficient experience of cutting, sewing and stitching and dress-making and passed such examination held by the Department of Industries, Punjab for such Diploma. She requires these shops for her bona fide use to start her own business of ready- made garments and as such needs the demised shops for setting up establishing the same. The shops are situated in the commercial area and are quite suitable to meet the requirement of the applicant/respondent and to provide a source of income. Consequently she served notices to the occupants of various tenements including the notice, dated 4th January, 1982 to the appellants. On 14th May, 1982 the respondent moved ejectment application for ejectment of the said appellants under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 in the Court of 'Ind Senior Civil Judge/Rent Controller, Karachi. Which were registered as R. C. Nos. 2485/82, 3294/82 and 3295/82.
Each of the appellants filed the reply statement within the meaning of section 14 of the said Ordinance and the other grounds as stated in the written statement challenging the bona fide of her need that she disqualified herself by letting out a flat on first floor without exchanging the same with one of the three tenants/appellants viz. Mr. George Levi who has residential accommodation on the ground floor and also she let out one shop premises to one Haji Rafiq after the same was vacated by Paki-Pakai-Roti Corporation after the death of her husband. She is also not entitled to avail the benefit of section 14 as she is the owner of other building and grown up children and she is owner of 1/8th share in the building and she is a landlady of 56 years of age and did not require the premises in question for her own business for carrying her livelihood.
3. The learned Rent Controller framed the following issues :-
(1) If the applicant is a widow ?
(2) If she has served a notice under section 14 (1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance on the opponent ?
(3) If the applicant is in occupation of any commercial building to run her business owned by her in any locality ?
(4) If the premises in case has been let out to the opponent after her becoming widow ?
4. The respondent examined herself in support of the application. Each of the appellants examined himself. The learned Rent Controller after recording the evidence of the parties and hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, allowed the applications by separate orders, dated 6th April, 1983 and he directed all the three tenants/appellants to vacate and hand over possession of the shops in question to the respondent within sixty days from the date of the orders passed in each of the ejectment applications.
5. The tenants/appellants being aggrieved by the impugned orders have preferred three separate appeals on the grounds mentioned in the memo. Of appeals.
6. I have heard Mr. Zia Pervaiz learned counsel for the appellants in all the three appeals and Mr. Muhammad Jamil, learned counsel for the respondents in all the three appeals. The learned counsel for the appellants. Mr. Zia Pervaiz has raised the following contentions in support of these appeals :
(i) The respondent has failed to prove bona fide requirement.
(ii) The learned Rent Controller has misread the evidence on record.
(iii) She let out one shop in the same building after her widowhood.
7. As regards contention No, 1, the learned counsel for the appellants has urged that the respondent has not proved bona fide requirement. Ordinarily, it is for the landlord/landlady to judge his or her needs, unless it can be shown that the application has been filed with some ulterior motives. The Rent Controller should normally give weight to the statement on oath made by the landlord/landlady in that behalf. It is his/her decision on this point which should prima facie prevail and the Rent Controller should not ordinary become the judge of his/ her needs, unless the matetial has been brought on the record by the tenant to show that the desire of the landlord/landlady to occupy the house/shops for his/her own residence/ shop is not genuine.
8. In ordinary circumstances when an owner says that he/she requires his/her own premises for his/her own use and occupation one need not unnecessarily start with the presumption that he/she is not stating the truth. The desire to reside or to carry out business in one's own premises is a natural desire of all human beings, and, in normal circumstances, one may start with the presumption that a claim of requirement by a landlord/landlady for personal use and occupation is true. It is, false, is of course, a rebuttable presumption and may be displaced by acceptable evidence. The mere statement that the case of the landlord/landlady i' not sufficient to displace the presumption, specially because they attempt to prove the falsity of the landlord/landlady's case by trying to show that his real purpose was to enhance rent has failed. In this caste the landlady respondent has sufficient means to start ready-made garment is not sought to be denied at all. There is nothing in law which prohibits a person who is not carrying on any business from carrying on business.
9. The respondent had filed three applications for eviction from four shops in possession of three different tenants.
10. It is common ground that central commercial area is a place where considerable ready-made garments business is carried on. The premises of the respondent are admittedly situated in central commercial area. It cannot, therefore, be said that the respondent is acting capriciously in seeking possession of these premises to carry on ready-made garments business nor can it be said that he desire to do so is absurd.
11. The learned counsel for the appellants has urged that she has to prove bona fide and in support of his arguments he placed reliance on case of 1983 CLC 468, PLJ 1983 Kar.
15. The facts of the case are quite distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. Mr. Zia Pervaiz's contention is that the Court will look to the bona fide requirement of the applicant/respondent. This contention I must frankly say is utterly unacceptable, section 14 (3) of the Ordinance provides that eviction order of the tenants from the disputed premises is in a summary manner. There is no statement or any faint indication even in any part of the provision that the requirement of the applicant/respondent be bona fide. The law says that if the applicant wants an order for eviction of tenant he must file an application before the Rent Controller ' who will pass eviction orders. The procedure envisaged is that when an application under section 14(3) is filed by the landlord/landlady the Controller shall order eviction of the tenant from the building in a summary manner.
12. I am of the view that ejectment on the ground of personal requirement by landlady under section 14 of the Ordinance does not make it necessary for the Rent Controller to go into the question of bona fide and mala fide and in this respect in case of Wali Muhammad v. Mst.
Hameeda (1) it was pointed out that there was difference in the language employed in sections 14 and 15 of the Ordinance. In Wali Muhammad v. Mst. Hameeda a decision of this Court referred to above also it was held that the question of bona fide cannot be investigated into an application under section 14 in view of the difference in the language employed in sections 14 and 15 (1) (viii).
13. The view taken by me gets supports from the decisions of this Court (i) K. P. Moidoo and another v. Mst. Noor Jehan Begum (2), (ii) Abdul Rashid v. Muhammad Zakaria Khan (3) (iii) Mst. Sardar Begum v. Hasina Jan (4). The contention has no force.
14. The learned counsel for the appellants has attacked the order of the Rent Controller on the ground that the area is against law and evidence on record. In support of his argument that the findings of the learned Rent Controller is against law and not based on evidence, learned counsel took me through the evidence on record. I had also the advantage of the assistance rendered by the learned counsel for the respondent.
15. In order to appreciate the submission made by the learned counsel I would refer to the evidence of Zakia Sultana P.W.
1. She is the landlady and widow. In support of the plea of personal requirement, the said witness stated that she is the landlady of Al-Aziz Building situated on Plot Nos. 677 and 678. Her qualifications were not challenged in cross-examination. Even the certificates were exhibited without an objection by the appellants. The perusal of record shows that the learned Rent Controller has taken into consideration the evidence on the record c to the effect that the respondent is diploma holder in tailoring, cutting and sewing the documentary evidence on record supported by oral evidence fully justified the conclusion that the respondent requires the premises for establishing ready-made garments.
16. I have been taken through the evidence of the witnesses as also the judgment of the trial Court.
1 find that the said findings are based
(1) PLD 1981 Kar. 794 (2) 1973 CLC 723
(3) 1983 CLC 1304 (4) 1983 CLC 3258 ' upon proper evidence and in my view those findings are correct. I cannot say that the said findings are either perverse or without any basis. She admitted in cross-examination that the building was situated on two plots. Even the appellant himself in his cross-examination admitted that the building consists of six tenements and the building in which the tenants situate is commercial building in commercial area.
17. George Levi, one of the appellants, had also admitted that the premises in his occupation are on the ground floor of the commercial building. I am of the view that mere use of the premises for residential use will not change the nature of the building. It is also admitted in evidence that the respondent does not own any commercial building but she is residing in a residential building.
There is no bar for her to apply under section 14 of the Ordinance. I am also supported in my view with a decision in the case of this Court Syed Ali Hussain Rizvi v. Mst. Muzaffar Jehan (1) and in the case of Muhammad v. Muhammad Sharif and others (2).
18. The learned counsel for the appellants has contended that she is not a full owner but entitled to 1/8th share in the building. On the other hand, Mr. Muhammad Jamil has contended that, she is the full owner of the premises and in support of his argument he placed reliance on decisions in cases of Mst. Safia Bai v. Abdul Sattar (3) and also on section 2 (f) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. Section 2(f) of the Ordinance provides that the "landlord" means the owner of the premises and includes a person who is for the time being authorised or entitled to receive rent in respect of such premises. This question has been considered by my learned brother Z. C. Valiani, J., in the case of Mst. Safia Bai v. Abdul Sattar in which my learned brother has come to the conclusion after giving cogent reasons. I am in respectful agreement with this decision of my learned brother Z.C.
Valiani, J. For the reason given by him in his judgment reported in PLD 1983 Kar.
419.
19. For the reasons stated above I find that the order of the learned Rent Controller is based upon proper appreciation of evidence and is supported by material on the record. The learned counsel for the appellants could not point out any such defect as mentioned above in the orders under appeals.
I, therefore, find no justification in the above appeals and these are therefore, dismissed but I grant four months' time to vacate the premises on the conditions that each of the appellants shall continue to deposit rent in terms of the learned Rent Controller's order. However, in case they will make default the respondent shall be entitled to file execution before the expiry of the above- mentioned four months' time and the writ of possession will be issued without any notice to them.
(1) PLD 1983 Kar. 410 (2) 1983 SCM R 180