' CH. KHURSHID AHMED, J.--- The petitioner was one of the three accused named in the F.I.R.
No,156/94 registered at Police Station, Secretariat Islamabad at 10-15 p.m. On 7-10-1994 on the basis of statement made by Qurban Hussain son of Noor Din under section 302/34, P.P.C.
2. Briefly the allegations against the petitioner, his co-accused Nawaz Kiani and Mumtaz as contained in F.I.R. Are that while armed with fire-arms they committed Qatal-e-Amd of Sufi Muhammad Ramzan. The deceased that day visited complainant. He was upset and informed the complainant that the accused were chasing him. The accused had enmity with the deceased over elections but were presently after him as they suspected the deceased of helping Mansabdar etc., accused in a murder case in obtaining relief of bail.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that it was a blind murder; the petitioner, Nawaz Kiani and Mumtaz were nominated as accused out of enmity; further that Mahmood and Sultan P.Ws. Were very close relatives of the deceased; one of the accused, namely Mumtaz, was found innocent during the investigation; no weapon of offence was recovered from the petitioner nor any weapon, which was allegedly seen with him by Mahmood and Muhammad Sultan P.Ws had been specified; 13 crime empties, allegedly recovered from the spot, were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory alongwith klashnikov recovered from Nawaz Kiani but were found not to have been fired from the said klashnikov and that the case of the petitioner was similar to the one of Mumtaz, who had been allowed bail in the case. He relied on Rafiq Ahmad v. The State 1984 M LD 1411, Afzaal Ahmad v. The State 1995 SCM R 932, Tariq Bashir v. The State PLD 1995 SC 34 and submitted that the case of the petitioner was that of further enquiry and the petitioner was entitled to the relief under subsection (2) of section 497, Cr.P.C.
4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant as also the learned Additional Advocate-General opposed the bail application. It was submitted that the first information report was promptly lodged; the petitioner, Nawaz Kiani and Mumtaz were named as accused; there was a motive which has not been denied; two klashnikovs were recovered from Nawaz Kiani, the co- accused; 30 crime empties were recovered from the spot and that the dead body was rippled with bullets; the prosecution had collected sufficient evidence connecting the petitioner with the commission of the crime; petitioner led to the office of Rent-a-Car from where Car No,IDC-3941 was hired and was used in the occurrence; Taxi Car No,IDC-3941 was recovered; Mukhtar Hussain and Ashfaq Mehmood son of Muhammad Rafiq got recorded their statements under section 161, Cr.P.C. Which support the prosecution case. It is maintained that the prosecution has tangible evidence to be produced at trial; report under section 173, Cr.P.C. Was filed in Court on 8-3-1995 and copies of all documents were delivered to the accused in the case as provided under section 265-C, Cr.P.C. And that the petitioner and his co-accused were obtaining adjournments on one ground or the other. He placed reliance on Muhammad Ismail v. Muhammad Rafiq PLD 1989 SC 585, Muhammad Khan v. Sanaullah and another PLD 1971 SC 324, Ghulam Rasool v. Ghulam Muhammad and 3 others PLD 1971 SC 128 and Mst. Resham Jan v. Abdur Rehman 1991 SCM R 1849.
5. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments addressed at bar, gone through the record and precedent cases. The question whether Mahmood and Muhammad Sultan, prosecution witnesses, are interested and related to the petitioner or not, or that the motive cuts both ways in this case is to be appreciated by the trial Court in the light of the evidence. For the moment suffice for us to observe that this Court will not conduct a preliminary enquiry but will only make tentative assessm ent and look at the material collected by the Investigating Agency for and against the accused. On tentative assessm ent of evidence collected by the prosecution in the present case we, prima facie, are satisfied that tangible evidence is available with the prosecution which, if produced in evidence during the trial and left unrebutted, may lead to the inference of guilt of accused. It is not permissible at this stage to enter into deeper appreciation of evidence and examine the merits of the le case. Their Lordships in the Supreme Court in Khalid Sehgal v. The State PLD 1%2 SC 495 were of the view that the Court has not to examine the merits of the prosecution case or the plea of the defence or to make an appraisal of the material on record but merely-- "to look at the material placed before it by the investigating agency and prima facie satisfied that some tangible evidence can be offered which, if left unrebutted, may lead to the inference of guilt."
This principle was followed subsequently in Muhammad Shafiq v. Muhammad Hanif and another 1970 SCM R 143 and also in Tariq Bashir's case referred supra. We, therefore, find no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed.
6. It is, however, directed that the trial of the case shall be concluded expeditiously and in any case by 30-9-1995.
7. At this stage the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the direction for early disposal may not be issued as it may cause inconvenience to the counsel, who were already very busy in direction cases and for this reason he is prepared to withdraw this petition.
8. We informed the learned counsel that it is no stage to make such a request as the orders have been announced after hearing the parties. It was made clear that it is sole prerogative of the Court under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. I , to afford justice to all parties and it has wide powers to make orders which are u deemed necessary to secure ends of justice. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.